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Abstract
In this  thesis,  I  endeavour to rethink the history of  higher  education in the United
Kingdom after the Second World War through a framework generated using the work of
Kojin Karatani. It explores three distinct perspectives – instrumentalism, idealism and
community – which I argue form a triadic structure which, when grasped, opens the
way to a heterodox reading of the postwar British university. This tripartite formulation
draws from Karatani's work on the “triad of concepts” he locates in different spheres of
philosophy, and is developed through a “trans-genealogical” methodology inspired by
the historical-philosophical approaches of Michel Foucault and Karatani himself.
The thesis can be divided into three parts. In the first part the thesis' methodology is
elucidated from the aforementioned work of Foucault and Karatani. In the second part, I
trace the development of each of the three perspectives or “questions” in the British
university in order to present a counter-narrative to popular accounts which generally
divide it  into two phases,  each characterised by a rupture:  first,  a social  democratic
rupture  oriented  by  a  principled,  idealist  vision,  and,  second,  a  neoliberal  rupture
characterised by an economistic and instrumentalist mentality. Contrary to this “two
rupture thesis,” I argue for a view which posits an underlying continuity between the
two phases, in that the essence of the later phase can, in fact, be found in the earlier
phase, which laid the foundations for an instrumentalist university, the first perspective
in the triad. Following this, the roots of idealism, the second perspective which appears
opposed to the first, are untangled and revealed to be tainted by instrumentalism and
fundamentally untenable. The third perspective of community is then investigated, with
a focus on its  contemporary manifestations.  To end this  second part,  an alternative
vision of  higher education, which I  call  an associationist  university,  is  explored and
found to be a productive horizon to be approached but less helpful for immediate action.
In the final part, I propose a way of dealing with the co-existence of the three questions
or perspectives within the university at present. This way is founded upon the idea of
vocation.  Various tensions,  such as  that  between partiality  to  one or  more of  these
perspectives and attempts at integration, are interrogated. To flesh out these dynamics,
the sphere of British critical legal theory is taken as a case study. The thesis concludes
with a plea for a university that is grounded on the principle of transcritical oscillation.
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Prelude: Ruins
“Take a look around you at the world you've loved so well,
And bid the ageing empire of Man a last farewell, 
It may not sound like Heaven, but at least it isn't Hell, 
It's a brave new world,
With just a handful of men.
We'll start all over again.”
 (Jeff J. Wayne 1978)
“The sight  of  Kobe  made  me think  seriously. that  we
might not be able to think of. any vision of the future.
without the image of ruins in mind.”
(Kojin Karatani 1995a, 124)
In 1947, surveyors for the gargantuan Survey of London project – which continues to
this day –  recorded the architecture of Tottenham Court Road and its  surrounding
neighbourhood, producing the third of four volumes covering just the historical parish
of  St.  Pancras.  Of  University  College  —  better  known  today  as  University  College
London (UCL) — they observed that a significant part of its buildings were in state of
ruin as a result of bombs dropped during the Blitz  (Roberts and Godfrey 1949, 21:89).
The damage suffered by this seat of higher learning, which the 19th century Anglican
clergyman  Thomas  Arnold  once  labelled  “that  godless  institution  in  Gower  Street”
(Crilly 2005, 18), was the result of at least two separate bombings.
A high-explosive bomb on the night of 18th September, 1940 destroyed the Great
Hall  —  built,  ironically,  as  a  First  World  War  memorial  —  as  well  as  the  physics
laboratory (Roberts and Godfrey 1949, 21:89). More than 100,000 volumes in the library
were also lost, including what was one of the best collections of German scholarship
outside the German-speaking nations  (Harte and North 1991, 181). On 15th October,
1940, incendiary bombs started a fire which burned the iconic dome which rises over
the rest of the main Octagon Building, as well as damaging various other parts of the
building (Harte and North 1991, 180). The surveyors of 1947 noted that the removal of
the damaged outer dome in 1944 had revealed a brick cone, “a miniature imitation of the
device which Wren used at St. Paul’s” (Roberts and Godfrey 1949, 21:90).
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Of course, at the point of the bombing, the operations of University College had
almost entirely been evacuated to various locations outside London, primarily to Wales,
but also to Hertfordshire, Yorkshire and Hampshire  (Collins and Mees 1999, 350–351;
Harte and North 1991, 188). The word “almost” is necessary as the eccentric scientist
and Marxist J. B. S. Haldane “refused to budge, continuing his work for a time 'subject,'
as he reported gleefully, 'to a certain amount of siege by the College authorities'” (Harte
and North 1991, 181). A letter from Haldane to Harlow Shapley of Harvard illustrates
the difficulties faced by academics even after the return to London in 1944. Half of the
college, he stated, “was destroyed by bombs, and the remainder is infested with rats”
(Haldane 1944).
The physical destruction wrought upon University College was far greater than
most other universities. Oxford and Cambridge, most notably, had been spared from
intense  bombing  by  the  Luftwaffe.1 Nevertheless,  universities  across  the  United
Kingdom  experienced  significant  upheavals,  including  evacuations,  shortages  of  all
kinds and the calling up of students and staff for various forms of national service.
When taken together with the intense self-questioning that Britain and the rest of the
world experienced as a result of the bloodiest war in history, far greater change was
wrought in the inner consciousness of the British university in this short period than
would be visible by a post-war survey of its architecture. The proud spires of Oxbridge
may have survived the war, but the vision and mission of university education  ante
bellum certainly did not.
1 A popular allegation, repeated by Stephen Hawking in one of his essays, is that there was an 
agreement between the Germans and British in which the former would not bomb Oxford and 
Cambridge, and in return the latter would not bomb the equally iconic university towns of Heidelberg
and Göttingen (Hawking 1994, 1–2). Historical evidence for this claim is limited, and it appears to 
have been disproven in 2007 when an amateur fisherman discovered an unexploded Second World 
War bomb in the Oxford Canal (The Oxford Student 2007). Nevertheless, it is certainly true that both 
Oxford and Cambridge escaped largely unscathed from the war. It can be contended that the real 
reason for this was that neither were targets of any military or otherwise tactical significance. 
Support for this can be found in George Quester's argument that both the Allied and Axis forces set 
limits – some explicit but mostly implicit – on what were fair targets for aerial bombardment 
(Quester 1963).
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“[W]e should have the modesty to say to ourselves that, on
the one  hand,  the  time  we live  in  is  not  the unique  or
fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything
is  completed  and  begun  again.  We  must  also  have  the
modesty to say, on the other hand, that – even without this
solemnity – the time we live in is very interesting; it needs
to be analyzed and broken down, and that we would do
well to ask ourselves, 'What is the nature of our present?'”
(Foucault 1990a, 35–36)
This thesis is a historical-philosophical investigation into the British university from the
end of the Second World War to the present. Its point of genesis can be traced back to
the  twelve-day  occupation  of  the  Mansion  building  at  the  Trent  Park  campus  of
Middlesex University in May 2010 by students and supporters as part of a campaign to
save the university's philosophy department from closure. It was during the course of
his involvement in this occupation that the writer of this thesis found himself asking,
“What sort of higher education world are we dwelling in at present, in which a small
but  world-renowned  department  of  philosophy  can  be  shut  down  ostensibly  for
narrowly failing to meet the financial target of contributing 55% of its total income to
the  central  administration,  when  in  actual  fact  it  was  questionable  methods  of
accounting by the very central administration which led to this failure on paper?”1
As  a  result  of  this  sense  of  amazement,  befuddlement  and  indignation,  the
research project which has led to this thesis was conceptualised. Rather than simply
interrogating the university at it appeared to function in the contemporary moment, it
seemed more fruitful to dig further back into history in order to understand how we got
1 The campaigners arguments were as follows: “Management claims that Philosophy is 'subsidised' by 
other subjects, however, are not correct. In reality, the actual subsidy goes in the opposite direction. 
In addition to covering its portion of the management and administrative costs of its School (in our 
case, the School of Arts and Education), a subject group at Middlesex University is expected to make a
'contribution' to the 'centre'. The management currently demands that a subject area contribute at 
least 55% of its gross income to the centre (and although such contributions are often measured in 
different ways, this is considerably more than most other universities demand). As it stands, by what 
they call 'the credit count' method of calculation, the Philosophy & Religious Studies subject group 
already makes a 53% 'contribution' (Philosophy’s contribution on its own stands at 45%). Using the 
figures projected for recruitment by the university’s Admissions department, if our programmes had 
remained open then the contribution from Philosophy & Religious Studies would have risen to 59% 
for 2010-11 (with Philosophy on its own at 53%). From 2003-2009, moreover, a significant portion of 
Middlesex Philosophy’s research income was actually diverted to support research in Business and 
Management, which performed poorly in RAE2001.” (Save Middlesex Philosophy 2014)
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from a mythical “there” to here. As mentioned earlier and further explained in what
follows, the time period which was eventually settled upon was from the post-Second
World War period to the present.
However, although the subject-matter of the thesis “presented itself,” it did not
come with instructions on the side of its tin. Methodologically, how was the history of
the contemporary form of the university meant to be investigated? A decision was first
made  to  adopt  the  approach  of  Foucauldian  genealogy.  Subsequently,  however,  the
limits of such a method became apparent, and so it was supplemented and widened with
the  more  overtly  Kantian  and  idiosyncratically  “transcendental”  approach  of  the
Japanese  theorist  Kojin  Karatani.  Thus,  in  Chapter  One  we explore  how these  two
distinctive yet convergent methods can be brought together into a workable framework
which forms the methodological background for the rest of the thesis.
Before we can outline the contents of the main body of the thesis, however, it is
necessary for us to grasp its basic structure, which is deeply triadic due to its being
inspired by the “triad of concepts” or “conceptual triad” of phenomenon, idea and thing-
in-itself  which Karatani  distills  from the writings  of  Kant  and posits  as  a recurring
pattern in the wider philosophical tradition. The diagram on the following page visually
represents this  structure.  From it  we can see that  there  are  two triads  in particular
which are crucial for our understanding, and they are related even as they are discrete.
The first consists of three distinct perspectives which, it is argued, have structured and
continue to structure the postwar British university, namely Instrumentalism, Idealism
and  Community.  We  shall  name  this  the  university  triad  and  can  describe  it  as
“superstructural,” given that it appears very explicitly in the argument. Its terrain is that
of the discourses and practices in the university itself, and thus forms a hermeneutic
and heuristic framework, for it allows us to both interpret the postwar history of the
British university as well as formulate potential ways of intervening in it.
A second triad is more implicit, and can be termed the epistemic triad, because it
is concerned with the sort of knowledge which is being sought in the various parts of
the thesis. Unlike the elements of the university triad, it lies largely beneath the surface
of the argument,  and can thus be described as “infrastructural” or even as a “meta-
structure,”  for  it  pertains  not  to  the  postwar  British  university  itself  but  rather  our
analysis of this university. In other words, it conditions the lines of argument which are
pursued in each of the chapters, even while it leaves the spotlight and centre stage to
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the elements in the university triad.
The order in which the university triad is deployed is largely a result of the
external constraints of the historical narrative, and thus it moves from Instrumentalism
to Idealism, then to Community. The order in which the epistemic triad is deployed, on
the other hand, is related to the structure of argumentation which was chosen, and thus
we move from determining what is true, to what is timely and appropriate, and finally to
what  is  authentic.  What  is  consistent  in  both  cases,  however,  is  that  “objective”  or
external  issues  are  addressed  before  “subjective”  or  internal  ones.  It  is  important,
however,  to  emphasise  that  each  element  in  the  university  triad  can,  in  theory,  be
subjected  to  all  three  forms of  enquiry  in the epistemic  triad.  As  we shall  see,  the
specific  combinations  of  infrastructural  questions  and  superstructural  perspectives
which occur in each chapter of the thesis – which may at first sight look like strange
mix-and-matches  –  are  the  result  of  a  chronological  narrative  (in  the  case  of  the
university triad) meeting a structure of argument (in the case of the epistemic triad).
In  Chapters  Two and Three,  the  underlying epistemic  question addressed  is,
“What is true?” This thought-centric method of enquiry is deployed to examine the two
most prominent strands of discourse-practice in the university, namely Instrumentalism
(which is action-centric in orientation and content) in Chapter Two and Idealism (which
is thought-centric in orientation and content) in Chapter Three. Both these strands can
be said to be “objective,” in the sense that they deal with matters which are supposed to
be external to subjectivity, although the first focuses on calculations based on a given
context while the second focuses on principles which are deemed context-independent.
Much debate and dispute within the British university at present, both in terms
of formal academic debate as well as everyday conversations and grievances, is founded
upon certain assumptions about  its  history in the postwar period.  One of  the  most
common of these divides the history of higher education since the end of the Second
World War into two periods, the first characterised by the formation of an ostensibly
“public” vision of the university, linked to the project of the postwar welfare state, and
the second by a “neoliberal” turn in its underlying philosophy, linked to the Thatcherite
era and its successors. This formulation, which we shall call the “two ruptures thesis,”
will be challenged through a scrutiny of relevant documents and statements from this
era when connected to a wider societal frame. The veracity of the default narrative in
most “critical” circles, which charts the rise of a progressive and humanistic “public
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university”  followed by a fall  into  a  neoliberal  system,  will  be  contested by,  firstly,
assembling in Chapter Two an interpretation which emphasises the continuity of the
instrumentalist policies of the 1980s and beyond with the immediate postwar period
with which they are rarely associated. The basic argument here is that far from being a
Thatcherite distortion, the “neoliberal” university of the present has in fact its point of
invention in the postwar Labour government under Clement Attlee, which justified its
social democratic policies, including that of higher education, in instrumentalist terms.
Thus, it was suffused with what we may identify as a form of “action-centricism,” a
perspective which focuses on pragmatic concerns, for what was deemed necessary and
expedient took precedence over other factors.
This explication of postwar instrumentalism in British higher education will be
followed by an investigation in Chapter Three into the roots of the broadly idealist
vision of a “public university,” often symbolised by the the 1963 report of the Committee
on Higher  Education,  chaired  by Lord  Robbins  –  commonly known as  the Robbins
Report. This vision of higher education is often posited as the principled alternative to
the neoliberal university, and thus it will  be taken as the representative form in the
postwar period of  idealism, a perspective which focuses on consistent principles as the
central guiding force. Such idealism is a species of the genus of “thought-centricism,” a
mode of operation which is founded upon rationalism. It will not only be argued that
the Robbins Report is far from the progressive document that it is commonly taken to
be, but also that the sort of idealism the “public university” ideology is grounded upon is
untenable, founded as it is upon what Kant would call a “constitutive” use of reason,
rather than a “regulative” one. A constitutive idea is taken to be realisable as a whole,
while a regulative idea is meant to be an index to guide one's actions, but never realised
in its  entirety.  It  will  be  demonstrated through an engagement with Kafka that  the
regulative  idea provides  a means of  practising idealism in a form which avoids the
snares which the public university ideology has fallen into. Overall, the central concern
of these two middle chapters is the accuracy of the tale which is normally told of this
period, and thus by dispelling some of the most widespread myths through historical
and theoretical analysis, we will be able to clear the way to a less straight-jacketed view
of the present state of British higher education.
After  redrawing some of  the  battle  lines  in the recent  history of  the  British
university, we turn in Chapter Four to a different epistemic question, namely, “What is
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timely and appropriate?” This question, which focuses on the temporal-spatial context,
can be phrased more specifically as,  “What strategies or interventions are called for
given the  present  state  of  play  in  the  British  university?”  If  we now see  the  clash
between Instrumentalism and Idealism in  a  somewhat  different  light  to  that  of  the
prevalent narratives, what are we to do? What supplements can be provided to make up
for what is lacking or deficient? What current trends are there which we should be
wary  of?  These  are  some of  the  questions  which  we will  explore,  in  particular  by
examining  a  third  element  of  the  university  triad  which  does  not  always  receive
adequate attention, which we may term  community.  By this we mean the aspects of
higher education which coalesce around issues of being-with as well  as the sensible
conceived  and  experienced  through  the  aesthetics  involved  in  encounters  with
otherness. This element of the university triad is feeling-centric in orientation, in the
sense that it is the affective dimension of life which is most involved in its workings.
In  this  fourth  chapter,  two  differing  and  indeed  competing  conceptions  of
community and relating to otherness, the substantialist and the non-substantialist, will
be compared, using as an aid the concepts of gemeinschaf and gesellschaf as outlined
by the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. These conceptions will then be utilised to examine
the role of community in recent times in three spheres of the university, namely that of
students, non-academic staff and academic staff. The present challenges in this sphere
will be explored before proposing an alternative to substantialist and non-substantialist
community which would address these difficulties. This will be a vision of the university
community which could provide a horizon for action, but will need to be supported by a
structure  which  affirms  the  singular  and  potentially  mutually-supportive  vocations
which denizens of the university are to live out.
This mention of vocation leads us into a consideration in Chapter Five of the
third  element  in  the  epistemic  triad,  which  is  captured  in  the  question,  “What  is
authentic?”  Here  the  “objective”  assessments  of  the  postwar  British  university's
historical contours and the its present state are placed to one side, and the “subjective”
matter  enquired  into  is  how  various  actors  in  the  university  can  intervene  and
participate in it in a manner congruent to their personal and collective stirrings. The
nature of this investigation thus involves all three elements of the university triad, and
following a general treatment of the concept of vocation, its variegated expressions in
the sphere of the university are mapped out in a diagram which treats Instrumentalism,
15
Introduction
Idealism and Community as three poles in a triangular “space.” It will be argued that
vocation involves the expression of specific gifts or charismata, to use a term from the
writings of St Paul.
This more-or-less abstract conception is then made more concrete in Chapter Six
through an examination of  a particular sphere of the university,  namely that of the
British  critical  legal  tradition,  which  is  then  linked  back  into  the  sphere  of  higher
education in the UK as a whole. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that this approach
centred on vocation and gifts, which provides an answer to the feeling-centric epistemic
question,  ultimately needs to be brought into conversation with the other epistemic
questions of thought-centric truths or principles and action-centric contextualisation, in
the wider whole if not always within singular persons.
If, having read through the outline presented above, the lay of the territory of
this  thesis  appears  rather  obscure  or  even  confusing,  rest  assured  that  things  will
become clearer as the thesis progresses and its skeletal form takes on a more fleshly
incarnation. However, one more thing remains to be said. Given the fact that certain
areas  of  knowledge  which  this  thesis  deals  with  are,  to  borrow  an  adjective  from
Andrew McGettigan in his book-length assessment of the UK government reforms to
universities since 2010, very much “live” ones (McGettigan 2013, ix), it is inevitable that
there will be sections of it which have been left behind by further developments. Hence,
to the best of the author's knowledge, this thesis is completely up-to-date with how
things stood in August 2015, both in terms of the “empirical” threads of British higher
education, and the “theoretical” threads of continental theory – e.g. Foucauldian and
Karatanian thought – discussed throughout. In some of these empirical areas, however,
it has been possible to incorporate a couple of recent developments, such as the UK
Government White Paper published in May 2016, titled Success as a Knowledge Economy.
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A Preliminary Note
This thesis draws from Kojin Karatani's writings, but – by and large – not the segments
which  have  attracted  the  most  attention  in  Anglophone  academia  thus  far.  When
combined with the relative obscurity of the work of Kojin Karatani in legal academia
(and indeed much of academia in the United Kingdom), it appears to the writer that a
brief explanatory diversion may be of some use.
The initial discovery of Karatani’s work in the English-speaking world focused
on his literary and cultural criticism, which although distinctively grounded in theory
and history, nevertheless took as its “main subject” works of literature and aspects of
Japanese culture. It was thus unsurprising that his first monograph to be translated into
English was The Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, with translation work beginning
in the late 1980s and the book appearing in print in 1993 (Karatani 1993c). Subsequently,
his involvement in the ten-year series of ANY conferences on architecture from 1991 to
2000 introduced him to scholars and practitioners in the field and those working more
generally  with  issues  of  space.  Karatani  participated  in  six  of  the  ten  conferences,
together with thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Saskia Sassen and David Harvey as well
as architects such as Rem Koolhas, Arata Isozaki and Peter Eisenman.1 This contributed
directly  to  the  translation  and  publication  of  Architecture  as  Metaphor:  Language,
Number, Money in 1995 (Karatani 1995b, xlvi).
The  appearance  of  Transcritique:  On  Kant  and  Marx in  2003  expanded  the
breadth of Karatani’s readership (Karatani 2003b). This astonishing work of philosophy,
politics and political economy has become the most widely known of his books, not
least of all through Slavoj Žižek’s appropriation of his conceptualisation of the Kantian
parallax in the Slovenian philosopher’s  book  The Parallax View  (Žižek 2006b). Thus,
Transcritique, broadly-speaking, marks a turn in the reception of Karatani’s work from
being concentrated in the circles of literary and cultural studies to spilling over into
various disciplines involving politics and philosophy. The fact that the publication of
Transcritique in Japan followed shortly after Karatani's foray into the politics of social
movements  as  one  of  the  co-founders  and  primary  theoreticians  of  the  New
Associationist  Movement  (NAM)  certainly  contributed  to  this  turn  as  well  (New
Associationist Movement 2001). The subsequent publications of History and Repetition in
2012  (Karatani  2012) and  The  Structure  of  World  History in  2014  (Karatani  2014),
1 ANY was an acronym for Architecture New York, but also a playful reference to undecidability, with 
conference titles such as Anyone, Anywhere, Anything and Anybody. Collected excerpts from the 
proceedings of each conference were published. Karatani's papers were Karatani 1991; Karatani 1992; 
Karatani 1993a; Karatani 1995a; Karatani 1997a; Karatani 2000.
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alongside a number of journal articles in a similar vein (Karatani 2007; Karatani 2008a;
Karatani 2008b) have contributed to the continuation of this trend.2
From  Transcritique onwards,  it  can  be  said  that  the  foremost  concept  in
Karatani’s work has been that of the mode of exchange, which he develops in order to
analyse  contexts  from  our  political  present  (as  he  does  in  the  final  chapter  of
Transcritique)  to  those  as  maddeningly  ambitious  as  the  whole  sweep  of  recorded
human history (as he attempts in  The Structure of World History).  From this concept
comes,  for  example,  his  diagnosis  of  the  hegemonic  trinity  of  Capital-Nation-State,
formed from the modern amalgamation of three forms of exchange which he refers to as
reciprocity (Mode A), plunder-redistribution (Mode B) and commodity exchange (Mode
C), with Mode C being the dominant partner. Alongside this diagnosis also comes a
suggested “cure” to the problems that we face under the system of Capital-Nation-State,
namely the possibilities of going beyond it through a fourth mode of exchange, the
elusive Mode D, which he sometimes terms association or simply X.
Hence, in the view of secondary commentators such as Yamoi Pham, the most
fertile areas of Karatani’s work for those who wish to apply his ideas appears to be “his
unique approach to world history” through the prism of the modes of exchange, which
can be extended through “further empirical studies” and developing “a more concrete
vision  of  Mode  D  by  exercising  our  sociological  imagination”  (Pham  2014,  330).
However,  although  I  am  in  agreement  with  Pham  with  regard  to  the  significant
potential of such directions of research, I have chosen to focus on two interrelated areas
of  his  work  which  are,  in  my  view,  extremely  promising  but,  thus  far,  have  been
somewhat neglected in the literature available in English. These two areas are: firstly,
his  historical-philosophical  methodology;  and,  secondly,  a  specific  segment  of  the
theoretical foundations of his better-known work in the 2000s which were laid down in
his studies on Kant in the 1990s.
Of the former, little needs to be said at this point, as it will be discussed in ample
detail  in the first chapter. It  suffices to note that Karatani's approach to history and
2 Karatani himself has described a break between his work in the 1970s and 1980s (which is, it should 
be noted, the period in which he wrote The Origins of Modern Japanese Literature and Architecture as 
Metaphor, although they appeared in English in the 1990s) and that of the 1990s and 2000s (Karatani 
2000, 259). Nevertheless, to borrow a distinction made by Eduardo Mendieta in his consideration of 
developments in the oeuvres of Foucault and Habermas, it is argued that Karatani's shift was not one 
of “general orientation” but merely rather “how that orientation, or philosophical attitude, [has been] 
directed to a set of problems” (Mendieta 2014, 246–247). In other words, the central threads of his 
work have been more or less consistent.
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theory bears not a few traces of the idiosyncratic iconoclasm with regard to disciplinary
boundaries for which he is well-known. His method, I venture to suggest, arises from
his – perhaps deliberate – location at the margins of the disciplines that he finds himself
categorised under. Although he first came to distinction as a literary critic, his work, as
Sabu Kohso has observed, did not focus on the conventional “judg[ing] the value of
oeuvres in a specific genre” but rather “engag[ed] 'transcendentally' in the mechanisms
of discursive historicity, penetrating a multitude of domains” (Kohso 1995, xviii). In his
introduction to  Architecture as Metaphor,  Arata Isozaki listed some of the “domains”
traversed by Karatani in the book as including “philosophy, logic, political economy,
cultural  anthropology,  sociology  and  urban  studies”  (Isozaki  1995,  vi).  Nevertheless,
perhaps one of the best statements of his (at least partial) disciplinary “homelessness”
can be found in his final paper to the series of Any conferences, where he stated, rather
poignantly:
These conferences have long been considered a place of interaction between
architects  and  philosophers.  However,  I  do  not  really  see  myself  as  a
philosopher, and I have no interest in discussing architecture theoretically.
With a couple of exceptions, I have attended all the Any meetings over the
past ten years, but who then have I been at these conferences? In effect, I
have been a thing-in-itself as other. That is to say, I have not shared the same
language with most of the other participants, nor did I try to do so. I refused.
As a consequence, I was rejected. At Any, I have been a thing-in-itself but not
a phenomenon.  Indeed, many people were even unaware of my presence.
Perhaps the organizers hoped that I would fulfill just such a function. But for
me, this is not a pleasant position to be in. And so, in many ways, it comes as
a relief to me that this role is finally over.3
The second relatively neglected strand of Karatani's thought that this thesis takes
up is his writings on Kant in the 1990s. In his introduction to the English edition of
Architecture as Metaphor, written in 1992, he writes that he began reading Kant seriously
after the “collapse” of “architecture as metaphor” – that is, the dominant ideology of
grand narratives of “'constructing' human society” – in 1989  (Karatani 1995b, xli). His
most significant discovery was arguably that he had “been unwittingly engaging in a
kind  of  Kantian  critique  all  along”  in  his  “interventions  that  critically  examine
architecture as metaphor in order to expose its limits” (Karatani 1995b, xl). This led to
his  re-evaluation  of  his  previous  work  through  the  lens  of  Kantian  transcendental
critique, culminating in his explicit adoption of what he has termed “transcendental
3 Indeed,  it is noticeable that in the published excerpts from the panels during the Any conferences, 
the participants addressed very few questions to Karatani, and rarely made references to his papers.
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retrospection” (Karatani 1993b).  It is this methodological re-reading of his own pre-1989
work and his subsequent elaborations of such a reading which connects this second
strand to the first which is intimated above and discussed further below.
However,  there is one particular portion of Karatani's 1990s readings of Kant
which this thesis picks up upon in a significant fashion. This is his formulation of what
he termed the “triad of concepts” in Kant's writings, consisting of phenomenon, idea
and the thing-in-itself.4 According to Karatani, these three terms form an “architectonic”
(Karatani 1994) or “relational structure” in which “the name of each term is alterable.
but only insofar as the relational structure is maintained”  (Karatani 1993b). It is this
triadic structure which Karatani distills from Kant that is employed in this thesis to
think through the British university in the postwar period.
Thus, having positioned in outline the theoretical thrust of the thesis with regard
to the wider body of Karatani's work, it is time to begin. At the beginning of Chapter V
of Book 1 of Charles Dickens' Hard Times, the narrator says to the reader, “Let us strike
the key-note. before pursuing our tune” (Dickens 1995, 18). To attempt to strike such a
note – or, rather, a series of introductory notes that perhaps can be described as a motif
– for the long, angular tune that is to follow, the first chapter will deal with issues of
method as well as set out, in summary form, the central argument of the thesis.
4 Two essays from this period in which Karatani devotes some space to this formulation are Karatani 
1993b; Karatani 1994. This triad is also discussed in Transcritique (Karatani 2003b, 30, 90). As far as I 
have been able to establish, there are only two pieces of secondary literature on Karatani in English 
which give some explicit attention to this aspect of his thought. The first is Klausmeyer 2010. The 
second is an interview with Karatani conducted by the radical geographer Joel Wainwright, in which 
the latter questions the former as to whether Marx's value form theory can be understood as “an 
explicit reiteration of Kant's triadic structure” (Karatani and Wainwright 2012, 33).
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Chapter 1:
On Trans-Genealogy:
Towards a Historical-Philosophical Method
“[T]he  past,  even  the  recent  past,  is
another country.”
(Mercer 2015)
“There’s only freedom in structure, my
man. There’s no freedom in freedom.”
Branford Marsalis (Maslin 1992)
In an interview in 2006, Slavoj Žižek described how he set an exam for students at the
European Graduate School in the following words:
You know, I had to be there for exams for the students so I thought how
should I terrorize them. I told them: “You ask yourself a question and then
you answer it.” Ah, but you know, they didn't have any excuses. They couldn't
have said: “Ah, sorry, I could not answer you.” They had to be at their best. No
excuses. (Žižek 2006a)
Patrick Dunleavy, in his book Authoring a PhD, sets out the task of writing a “big
book” thesis, a thesis such as this one, as follows: “[T]he specific nature of the contract
is that the author develops and communicates a question, and then proffers an answer
to it”  (Dunleavy 2003, 19). This definition is undoubtedly accurate, and has interesting
parallels with Žižek's unorthodox graduate school exam. Nevertheless, what it does not
touch  upon,  and  what  Žižek's  difficult  assignment  does  not  involve,  is  the  rather
mundane  task  of  setting  out  the  methodology for  the  production  of  the  book-long
answer  to  the  question  asked.  Some  theses,  particularly  in  certain  branches  of  the
humanities, are able to avoid or mitigate this step due to the largely self-explanatory
nature of their undertaking – in other words, the method reveals itself as the thesis is
read, or is relatively uncomplicated and thus can be set out in a few pages (or even a few
paragraphs). In such cases, the old adage of creative writing, “Don't show; tell,” applies.
This  thesis  unfortunately  does  not  fall  under  such  a  category.  Its  methodological
underpinnings are not only integral to the rest of it, but are in fact a somewhat unusual
harmonisation  of  the  modus  operandi of  two historical-philosophical  thinkers.  As  a
result, a significant amount of space has to be devoted to explaining them. It is hoped,
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however, that this laying of the foundations will be able to hold the reader's interest.
This  chapter  is  divided  into  two  parts.  We  shall  first  explore  a  historical-
philosophical  methodology  developed  by  Michel  Foucault,  famously  known  as
genealogy. Following this, an account will be provided of how Foucauldian genealogy
can be brought into a productive encounter with the resonant yet distinct approach of
Kojin Karatani, which he has termed “transcendental retrospection.”
1.1 On Genealogy, or a 'History of the Present'
Attempting to sketch in some detail the concept of genealogy as it was enunciated and
practised  by  Michel  Foucault  is  not  a  straightforward  task.  In  his  most  detailed
discussion of his approach to it – namely in the essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”
(Foucault 1977b) – Foucault speaks of genealogy in a way not too dissimilar to how
Buddhist  scriptures traditionally speak of  the  concept  of  nirvana;  that  is,  in  Wendy
Brown’s words, by elaborating not what it is but rather “what it defines itself against”
(W. Brown 2001, 100).
In the article, Foucault distinguishes genealogy from conventions of progressive
historiography  and  metaphysics  by  taking  a  route  Brown  sees  as  characteristic  of
genealogical practice itself in its “embattled 'emergence' [that] must fight for place, and
more specifically, must displace other conventions of history in order to prevail”  (W.
Brown 2001, 100). This method of constant opposition to progressive historiography and
metaphysics – in a style reminiscent of the fictional method of “calculatus eliminatus”1 –
leads to the recognition that both are “implicated in the other”, and hence genealogy
enables  the  development  of  a  “philosophically  self-conscious  historiography”  and  a
“historically self-conscious philosophy”  (W. Brown 2001,  100).  Put simply,  genealogy
allows one to  realise  the mutual  entanglement of  both history  and philosophy,  and
opens up the way to fresh, ignored and/or barely-treaded paths.
Gary Gutting has suggested that the widely used tripartite division of Foucault's
oeuvre into archaeology, genealogy and the problemization of ethics2 limits, at certain
points,  our appreciation of  the complexity of his work. He writes,  for  example that
1 Modifying slightly the method propounded by the Cat in the Hat in the Dr Seuss children’s video The
Lorax: “The way to know a certain something is to find out what it's not.” Or to quote a more 
distinguished source, in Oscar Wilde’s essay “The Artist as Critic,” he states that “the primary aim of 
the critic is to see the object as. it really is not” (Wilde 2001, 240).
2 See, for example, Flynn 2005a, 29; Davidson 1986, 221.
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“'[a]rchaeology'  and  'genealogy'  are  primarily  retrospective  (and  usually  idealized)
descriptions of Foucault's complex efforts to come to terms with his historical material”
(Gutting 2003, 6–7). He proposes, as an alternative, “tracking Foucaultian histories along
four dimensions: histories of ideas, histories of concepts, histories of the present, and
histories of experience” (Gutting 2003, 7). It must here be stressed that for our purposes
this interpretive schema is not meant to replace the “traditional” one – indeed, in the
next section the latter will  be invoked to support a “problematizing Foucault” – but
rather to supplement it by trying to understand, specifically, what the term “history of
the present” means for genealogy.
For  Gutting,  these  four  dimensions  are  found  at  different  points  throughout
Foucault's works. They are not categories  per se, and hence it is not the case that any
single monograph falls squarely into any of them. The idea of a “history of the present,”
which is a term Foucault himself uses to describe his project in  Discipline and Punish
(Foucault 1977a, 31) is expounded upon by Gutting. He writes that they “begin from
[Foucault's] perception that something is terribly wrong in the present,” which leads
him to attempt to “use an understanding of the past to understand [that thing] that is
intolerable in the present”  (Gutting 2003, 10). How this can be distinguished from the
traditional aim of history is that “[w]hereas much traditional history tries to show that
where we are is inevitable, given the historical causes revealed by its account, Foucault's
histories aim to show the contingency – and hence surpassibility – of what history has
given us” (Gutting 2003, 10). Hence, although the terms “genealogy” and “history of the
present”  are  not  interchangeable,  both  describe  in  slightly  different  ways  what  is
attempted in the second, third and fourth chapters of this thesis.
As the old saying reminds us: carts shouldn't be put before horses. The beast of
burden which provides the power for a genealogical analysis must first be described, at
least in its characteristics which are the most pertinent for this thesis. Once we have
done  so,  it  becomes  far  easier  to get  on to  the  actual  labour  of  genealogy-inspired
enquiry, which will follow in the next three chapters.
Where We Begin: Something Has Gone Terribly Wrong
Wendy Brown states in Politics Out of History that the “starting point [and] object” of
genealogy is the present (W. Brown 2001, 95). This is supported by numerous statements
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Foucault made throughout the history of his work, outlined by Clare O’Farrell.3 As early
as 1967 he stated that “I seek to diagnose, to carry out a diagnosis of the present. To say
what we are today and what it means, today, to say what we do say”  (Foucault and
Carrette 1999, 91). A decade later in Discipline and Punish he declared he was “writing
the  history  of  the  present”  (Foucault  1977a,  31).  And as  late  as  1983  he said  in an
interview, “the question I start off with is: what are we and what are we today? What is
this instant that is ours? Therefore, if you like, it is a history that starts off from this
present day actuality” (Foucault 1996, 411).
However, the relationship between the past and the present in a genealogical
study  is  a  complex,  perhaps  almost  counter-intuitive  one.  The “duty”  of  genealogy,
writes Foucault, is “not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it
continues secretly to animate the present” (Foucault 1977b, 146). And this is because, for
Foucault, there is no “predetermined form to all [the present’s] vicissitudes” and hence
it is impossible to “pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that
operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things” (Foucault 1977b, 146).
So,  it  seems  clear  that  the  present  cannot  be  analysed  by  tracing  an
uninterrupted line from the past that leads into where we are today. In other words, the
present  cannot  be  subordinated  to  the  past,  and  is  not  overshadowed,  much  less
dominated, by it. However, it is also important to avoid making the reverse assumption,
that is, to unduly privilege the present and view the past through the lens of our time.
After  all,  in  Discipline  and  Punish,  Foucault  distinguished  “writing  a  history  of  the
present” from “writing a history of the past in terms of the present” (Foucault 1977a, 31).
It appears then that the practice of genealogy requires one to take careful steps
as  one  attempts  to  identify  half-buried  tracks  that  may  reveal  the  disrupted  trails,
fractured by ruptures, that  connect the present to the past and back again. But what
drives  one  to  begin  with  the  present?  Todd  May  has  written  that  with  regard  to
Foucault and Nietzsche:
They both target the mindless conformism that characterizes contemporary
society.  For  Nietzsche,  that  conformism is  a  product  of  the  dominance of
reactive forces; for Foucault,  it  has more to do with historically grounded
realities  such as the emergence of  capitalism and the evolution of  church
doctrine.  However,  both  share  a  revulsion  against  conformity  that
characterizes the world each of them lives in. (May 2006, 65)
It  can  be  said  that  the  starting  point  for  genealogy  is  a  feeling  of  severe
3 This point and the quotes in the rest of the paragraph are drawn from O’Farrell 2005, 71–72.
24
Chapter 1
discomfort, even horrendous disgust at a present state of affairs. Andre Glucksmann has
offered an interpretation of the ethic of Foucault's work as centred around a notion of
“the intolerable” (Glucksmann 1992, 336–339).4 The choice faced by someone wishing to
take this path, he writes, is not between the two Weberian ethical poles of responsibility
and conviction, but rather “between, on the one hand, a morality of extreme urgency
which analyses the cases of what is intolerable and, on the other, a kind of edifying,
fine-thinking thought or morality aiming to resolve all problems at once and for the
eternity of ages” (Glucksmann 1992, 337).
Also, as O’Farrell points out, this attempt to write a “history of the present” is
“not  simply  a  diagnosis,  [but]  also  an  intervention”  (O’Farrell  2005,  72).  Such  an
intervention gazes into the past, but its focus is to open up avenues in the present in
which change becomes possible.  Without  attempting the former one will  crash into
seemingly invisible, but real “walls” that lie in the world;5 without the latter concern the
former risks becoming mere archival work.
Hence, in the case of higher education, which is the subject of this thesis, to
attempt a genealogical intervention into the present is certainly apt given the present
circumstances that the world of the universities is finding itself. In the United Kingdom,
the  complete  withdrawal  of  funding in  the  arts,  humanities  and  social  sciences  for
undergraduate  studies  beginning in 2012 has  resulted  in a  massive  upheaval  in  the
disciplines falling under these categories. Other reforms such as the liberalisation of the
rules governing the area of private providers of higher education have given rise to
legitimate fears that institutions which fail as a result of the cuts will be either forced to
close6 or  taken over  by  for-profit  education  corporations  such  as  Apollo  Education
Group Inc.7 The situation has certainly, it is submitted, become intolerable. Hence by
4 Although Glucksmann does not mention it in his piece, it is quite certain that he adopted the term 
“intolerable” from the language of the Group for Information on Prisons (GIP) that Foucault co-
founded in 1971, declaring in a questionnaire that: “The situation in the prisons is intolerable. 
Prisoners are being treated like dogs” (Macey 1994, 262).
5 Once again, it must be emphasised that these “walls” are not gnostic elements of the past which 
secretly steer the present, but rather, as we shall see below, structural patterns which, once 
constructed, have a tendency to persist, and which can be identified through careful enquiry.
6 The latest White Paper, Success as a Knowledge Economy, includes a section on “market exit” where it 
is stated that “the possibility of some [higher education] institutions choosing – or needing – to exit 
the market. is a crucial part of a healthy, competitive and well-functioning market” (Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills 2016).
7 Apollo Education Group, Inc. is a corporation based in Phoenix, Arizona which operates a number of 
for-profit educational institutions. Its most infamous institution is the University of Phoenix, which 
has an enrolment of about 380,000 students worldwide, its gargantuan size the result of, inter alia, 
very loose admission requirements and emphasis on distance learning. There have been numerous 
criticisms of the quality of the academic provisions, for example, Dillon 2007. In the UK, Apollo 
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writing a history of the present situation, what is aimed for is an intervention which
will  lend  towards  a  better  contextual  understanding  as  well  as  the  identification  –
although not prescription – of some possible paths towards an-other university which
may be seen,  from what  we shall  later  call  an exclusivist  perspective,  as  absolutely
necessary to combat the horrors that seem to be looming in the future; and, from what
will be termed a pluralist perspective, as vital supplements for a present dominated fully
by the reductionist instrumentalism which drives the “reforms” just mentioned.8
Of Origins and Sources
Genealogy is commonly linked to the idea of the rejection of origins, or to be more
precise, the rejection of the exaltation of the origin as the site where the multi-layered
mire of  history becomes as clear as the source of  a stream. Nietzsche and Foucault
obviously do not deny the fact  that an institution (e.g.  one linked to morality)  or a
practice  (e.g.  incarceration)  came  from  somewhere.  What  they  clearly  distance
themselves  from  is  the  search  for  an  origin as  the  key  to  understanding  such  an
institution  or  practice.  Heidegger  held  that  the  question  of  Being  can  only  be
understood be returning to, in Todd  May's words, “its original asking, before it was
buried under the weight of the metaphysical tradition” (May 2006, 64). Foucault, on the
other hand, says, quoting Nietzsche’s words in The Wanderer and His Shadow: “The lofty
origin  is  no more  than 'a  metaphysical  extension which arises  from the  belief  that
things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth.'” (Foucault 1977b, 143).9 
It is this idea that there is an actual point of emergence that where there lies a
pure,  untainted  ideal  with  which  all  subsequent  discussion  of  a  practice  must  be
coloured  that  is  disputed.  In  the  words  of  Foucault,  genealogy  “rejects  the  meta-
historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself
to the search for 'origins'.”  (Foucault 1977b, 140). In a lecture delivered two years later,
Foucault speaks about the distinction Nietzsche draws between “origin” (Ursprung) and
“invention” (Erfindung),  saying that for Nietzsche, there is no  Ursprung,  no origin of
Group are the owners of BPP Professional Education, which provide business and law degrees.
8 These two perspectives will be explored in Chapter Five.
9 Foucault's reference gives the source of the quote by Nietzsche as aphorism 3 of The Wanderer and His
Shadow. The text is actually what is sometimes published these days as Part Two of Volume II of 
Human, All Too Human. The aphorism in the R. J. Hollingdale translation reads as follows: “'In the 
beginning'. To glorify the origin – that is the metaphysical aftershoot that breaks out when we 
meditate on history and makes us believe that what stands at the beginning of all things is also what 
is most valuable and essential” (Nietzsche 1996, 302, italics in original).
26
Chapter 1
things such as religion, poetry or the ideal but only their their Erfindung, their invention
(Foucault 2000b, 6–7).10 This insight may admittedly seem rather banal when applied to
the subject matter at hand – “Of course the neoliberal university was invented,” one
might say. “Of course it does not have a non-material origin. There was no doubt about
this fact in the first place, unlike with, say, religion, with its complicated, mythically-
and-metaphysically-bound history.”
The point,  however  is  not  so much to argue for  a material  invention over a
metaphysical origin, but to recognise that – to repeat what has been stated above –
there  is  no  “unbroken  continuity  that  operates  beyond  the  dispersion  of  forgotten
things”(Foucault 1977b, 146). To return to Bologna in 1088, or to the motto universitas
magistorum et scholarium (Ridder-Symoens 2003, 8), is a quest that will teach us very
little if we are hunting for a pure line of descent. However, what we  can learn from
examining the earlier days of the university is  how seemingly bygone elements can
resurface in more recent times as a matter of contingency which nevertheless appears as
a  (singular)  repetition.  We  shall  see  this  to  be  the  case  in  Chapter  Four  when  we
compare certain aspects of the university at present with that of the medieval and early
modern periods.
The preceding discussion on “origins” leaves various questions. One may ask, for
example, what genealogy concerns itself with if not the search for a pure instance of
genesis, and if the idea of a simple beginning is intrinsically problematic. Also, what
would be  the source  material  of  such an inquiry? Foucault’s  response is  that  “if  [a
genealogist]  listens  to  history  he  finds  that  there  is  'something  altogether  different
behind things':  not a timeless and essential  secret,  but the secret that they have no
essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms”
(Foucault  1977b,  142).  After  all,  as  Foucault  famously  declares  at  the  opening  of
“Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History”:  “Genealogy  is  gray,  meticulous  and  patiently
10 It should also be noted that Karatani makes a similar argument in relation to the apparent “discovery”
of “landscape” in Japanese literature: “We might say that 'landscape' was not so much discovered 
within the epistemological inversion concentrated in genbun itchi as it was invented. In this book I 
used the term 'discovery of landscape' to connote the inversion whereby something which had never 
existed before came to be seen as self-evident, as an existence which in fact preceded the inversion.” 
(Karatani 1993c, 193, italics in original, bolded text mine) In other words, for Karatani, the notion of 
“discovery” confuses the history of a particular thing and is likely to result in a faulty genealogy. 
Therefore, Karatani's use of the word “origin” should not be taken to mean an embrace of the 
obsession with origins which Foucault critiques, but rather a problematisation of the term. As Brett 
de Bary notes in her introduction of his Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, “As [Karatani] wrote in
the afterword to the first edition of his book, each of the words of its title, 'the words “Japanese,” 
“modern,” “literature,” and especially “origins,” should in fact be bracketed'” (Karatani 1993c, 2).
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documentary.  It  operates  on  a  field  of  entangled  and  confused  parchments,  on
documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times”  (Foucault 1977b,
139). Although this thesis does not, in the main, deal with materials as fragmentary as
this description of Foucault's, it does engage with documents which are entangled and
confused  in  the  sense  of  having  been  either  largely  forgotten,  constantly  read  in
particularly narrow ways, or even misread.
Further  down he  says,  “historical  beginnings  are  lowly:  not  in  the  sense  of
modest or discreet like the steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing
every infatuation” (Foucault 1977b, 143). And on the next page, “A genealogy of values,
morality,  asceticism,  and  knowledge.  will  cultivate  the  details  and  accidents  that
accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it
will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other. . The genealogist
needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin” (Foucault 1977b, 144). This is in part a
journey,  as  it  were,  into  the  margins  of  history,  into  what  may  have  been  largely
ignored or  skimmed over  by  previous adventurers.  Even where familiar  territory  is
trodden upon, a genealogical eye views matters at a different angle. We will see this in
Chapters Two and Three where we shall examine the contradictions of certain common
readings of prominent government-sponsored reports related to higher education.
Interrogating Foucault’s “Anti-Institutionalism”
At first glance it may appear that a fair number of Foucault’s projects aim to enquire
into the heart of institutions. For example, his second major work was titled The Birth of
the Clinic. The subtitle of Discipline and Punish was, after all, “The Birth of the Prison.”
And throughout his career he constantly referred to schools, religious institutions and
so on. We also cannot forget his first and most hefty monograph,  History of Madness,
which dealt with mental asylums (Foucault 2006).11
Hence, when one attempts to begin writing a genealogy of particular aspects of
the university, one may become quite perplexed while reading certain passages from
Foucault,  particularly  in essays  and interviews late  in his  life  and career,  where he
categorically disavows any interest in institutions as subjects of analysis. For example,
in “Questions of Method,” he asserts that in Discipline and Punish:
11 This text is an unabridged version of Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique , which was 
first translated in abridged form as Madness and Civilization (Foucault 1964).
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the  target  of  analysis  wasn't  “institutions,”  “theories,”  or  “ideology”  but
practices—with the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable
at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not
just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic
circumstances—whatever role these elements might actually play—but, up to
a point, possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence,
and “reason.” It is a question of analyzing a “regime of practices”—practices
being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules
imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and
interconnect. (Foucault 2000a, 225, italics in original)
A few lines further he reiterates his point, saying that his aim was “to write a history
not of the prison as an institution, but of the practice of imprisonment” (Foucault 2000a,
225, italics in original). Hence, if one wishes to take Foucault at his word and apply this
principle to the project at hand, it appears that it would antithetical to the Foucauldian
method to attempt a genealogy of the university as an institution. In such a case, would
it not be far more in line with the spirit of his genealogy to say that one is carrying out
an analysis of the practice(s) of higher education?
The  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  our  understanding  of  what  an
institution is. In his 1949 work  The Concept of Mind,  the analytic philosopher Gilbert
Ryle tells this made-up story:
A  foreigner  visiting  Oxford  or  Cambridge  for  the  first  time  is  shown  a
number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments
and administrative offices. He then asks “But where is the University? I have
seen where the members  of  the Colleges live,  where the Registrar  works,
where the scientists  experiment and the rest.  But I  have not yet seen the
University in which reside and work the members of your University.” It has
then to  be  explained  to  him that  the  University  is  not  another  collateral
institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices
which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has
already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination
is understood, the University has been seen. (Ryle 2009, 6)
Ryle tells this story in order to illustrate what he calls a “category-mistake,” the
placing of “the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or
range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another” (Ryle 2009, 6). For
him,  a  university  is  an  “institution”  in  the  sense  of  an  organisational  aggregate  of
affiliated activities and facilities related to higher education in a particular place. Thus, it
lies in a different “category” to that of halls of residence, libraries, laboratories, and so
on. Following on from this, when all these individual universities are brought together,
we have “the university,”  which is a “universal,”  namely an entity that is said to be
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present in various particular things. Other examples of universals include “the state,”
“the people,” and “capitalism.” While not all universals are institutions, all institutions
on a macro level, if understood in the usual way, are universals.
In  his 1978-1979 lecture  series at  the Collège de France entitled The Birth of
Biopolitics, Foucault proposes a bold methodological starting point for his lectures: “Let's
suppose that universals do not exist” (Foucault 2010, 3). If we follow Foucault's radical
gesture and choose to not take the university as a “thing” existent in its own right, we
can  analyse  it  as  an  “effect”  which  is  constituted  or  composed  of  “phenomena  of
coagulation,  support,  reciprocal  reinforcement,  cohesion,  and  integration”  (Foucault
2009, 239). Viewed in this manner, it can also be apprehended as  a “social relationship,”
as  the  German  anarchist  theorist  Gustav  Landauer  argued  with  regard  to  another
composed effect commonly deemed an institution – that is, the state  (Landauer 2010,
214).12 Foucault himself describes the “state effect” as the result of “a thousand diverse
processes”  (Foucault  2009,  239);  in  other  words,  it  is  the  cumulative,  dynamic  and
ongoing outcome of a multitude of relations, rather than an organised and organising
force in itself.
By thinking of the university in a similar fashion, that is to say, primarily as a
process constituted of manifold processes rather than a substance, both the manner of
one's analysis as well as the mapping of possible trajectories of change are significantly
transformed.  In  both  cases,  the  value  of  what  Nietzsche  referred  to  as  the  “little
unpretentious  truths”  which  are  “modest,  simple,  sober,  [and]  so  apparently
discouraging”  increases  greatly  (Nietzsche  1996,  para.  I.3).  Instead  of  a  monolithic
institution, we encounter a swirl of multiplicity. The latter conception, of course, is no
less daunting than the former, although the challenges it poses are very different. If
there is no object to be seized or mastered, then the strategies to be deployed in an
attempt to influence the working out of higher education have to be interventions in
process. To invoke a dramatised nautical metaphor, for those who would seek to work
within the arguably “intolerable” spaces of  higher education, the university is not  a
single ship which can be turned around by a mutiny which replaces the captain, but
rather the sum total of seaborne traffic in which even the humblest of interventions,
such as a single conversation between two like-minded sailors in a tavern, may develop
12 Among those who regarded the state as an institution was Landauer's fellow anarchist Peter 
Kropotkin (Kropotkin 1946, sec. X).
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into something larger,  such as the establishment of  a far-flung pirate  utopia,  which
could eventually play an important part in altering the entire sphere in question.
This approach to studying the university, drawing from what Foucault called a
“nominalist method in history”  (Foucault 2010, 318), is based on the principle that it
does not have an existence separate to the “network of alliances, communications, and
points of support” which constitutes it (Foucault 2009, 117). Thus, it becomes impossible
to  neatly  separate  out  particular  phenomena as  “extraneous” and irrelevant  for  our
investigation  simply  by  their  appearance  as  being  exterior  to  the  university  as
traditionally-defined. As a result of this, the spheres which this thesis enquires into are
far broader than if we were to delimit the university in the usual manner, including
among them postwar social democracy, conceptions of community and the history of
vocation. Nevertheless, for practical purposes, the scope of our analysis is at the same
time more targeted and specific. As it is impossible for us to encompass the whole scope
of these manifold processes which together constitute the university, our central focus
will be on those elements which are related to what we shall call the triadic structure of
the postwar British university.
Having explored the terrain of Foucauldian genealogy in this first section – and
made  mention of  “structure,”  a  word  with mixed connotations  for  Foucault  and his
followers  –  we  shall  now turn  to  the  task  of  bringing  this  historical-philosophical
tradition  into  a  productive  conversation  and  intercourse  with  what  can  be  loosely
described as another genealogical method, namely that of Kojin Karatani.
1.2 From Genealogy and Transcendental Retrospection to Trans-
Genealogy
Foucault: Genealogy
As charted in the preceding section in some detail, Foucault is commonly known as an
intellectual descendent of Nietzsche and a practitioner of the genealogical tradition that
the latter can be said to have begun. While this is certainly true, there is another thinker
in the Western philosophical tradition whose path Foucault can be said to have walked
in – even if in his own unique way – and extended. This thinker is none other than
Immanuel Kant.
Over the last two decades, this somewhat controversial and yet undeniable link
has been explored in significant detail by writers such as Béatrice Han, Marc Djaballah
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and Colin Koopman (Han 2002; Djaballah 2011; Koopman 2013). Nevertheless, the most
telling statement  with  regard  to  this  relationship  comes from an entry  in a  French
dictionary of philosophy published in the 1980s, which declares:  “To the extent that
Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his
project  could  be  called  a  Critical  History  of  Thought”  (Florence  1998,  459,  italics  in
original). This declaration comes, in actual fact, from the proverbial horse's mouth, as
the dictionary entry was “almost entirely” authored by Foucault himself, and attributed
to a fictional person, “Maurice Florence” (Florence 1998, 459).
However, Foucault was certainly not a straight-forward Kantian or Neo-Kantian.
As Béatrice Han points out, Foucault adopted Kant's critical project of investigating the
conditions  of  possibility  for  experience;  however,  he  did  not  approve  of  Kant's
“transcendental”  method  due  to  its  anthropological  essence,  which  looks  to  human
experience for its foundations, and hence enthrones “man and his doubles” as the centre
of  enquiry  (Han  2002,  3;  Foucault  1973,  chap.  9).  Foucault,  as  an  anti-humanist,
formulated the alternative concept of the “historical a priori,” which was “the starting-
point from which it was possible to define the great checkerboard of distinct identities
established  against  the  confused,  undefined,  faceless,  and,  as  it  were,  indifferent
background  of  difference”  (Foucault  1973,  xxiv).  This  startling  development  of  the
Kantian concept of the  a priori transforms it from a transhistorical starting point of
knowledge to one which is “fully given in history, which transforms itself with it, and
which nevertheless somehow lies beyond it in defining the conditions of possibility,
themselves variable, from which the knowledge of an epoch can and must form itself”
(Han  2002,  4).  In  other  words,  Foucault  reintroduced  history  into  the  scene  of  the
conditions of possibility of knowledge and human experience: he endeavoured, in his
own way, to historicise Kant's transcendental critique.
Karatani: Transcendental Retrospection
Halfway around the globe, and working for some years in the same present as Foucault,
the Japanese literary theorist and political philosopher Kojin Karatani distilled a method
of enquiry from similar sources: Nietzsche and Kant, but also Marx and Freud. In the
1970s,  he first linked together the projects of Marx and Nietzsche in an essay, “The
Genealogy of Marx,” arguing that Marx's examination of classical political economy –
particularly  Adam  Smith's  understanding  of  exchange  value  –  bore  strong  familial
32
Chapter 1
resemblances to Nietzschean genealogy in its “intent. to trace [a thing] back to the
'vanishing mediator'” and “disclose that the cause and effect, as commonly perceived,
are reversed” (Karatani and Wainwright 2012, 32). Subsequently he turned to the study
of Kant and discovered that the thrust of the Nietzschean genealogical method, namely
the  “critique  of  the  perspectival  perversion,”  could  be  traced  back  to  Kant's
transcendental critique (Karatani and Wainwright 2012, 32).
For Karatani, “the point of transcendental critique is to reveal that what we take
for granted as object is only a composite of a certain 'form' that is unknown to us”
(Karatani 1994). He continues: “This is a sort of retrospection, but to an origin that can
be grasped only transcendentally, not one that we imagine to be the cause of the effect
known  to  us”  (Karatani  1994).  Karatani's  understanding  of  “transcendental”  is
significantly more expansive than Kant's, in that he takes “the 'transcendental' [to] not
[be] confined to narrow epistemological questions” (Karatani 1993b). In his own words,
the concept should be used “more broadly than [in] Kant: as an act of bracketing what
we empirically take for granted as evident and natural, and scrutinizing the conditions
that  make  such  a  conviction  possible;  because  'transcendental,'  in  this  sense.  has
existed both before and after Kant”  (Karatani 1994).13 In other words,  pace Koopman
(Koopman 2010, 106), we can be practitioners of transcendental critique without being
strict adherents of Kant's transcendental idealism.
However, whereas Foucault's modification of Kant's  a priori appears as a turn
towards history, Karatani argues that transcendental retrospection – his favoured term
– to which he cites Nietzsche's genealogy, Marx's Capital, and Freudian psychoanalysis
as examples, “is not an empirical historical retrospection, but a sort of retrospection that
poses  radical  questions  about  the  historicist  premises  upon  which  we  are  always
dependent, when we begin our speculations”  (Karatani 1993b, italics mine). The term
13 This broadening of transcendental critique culminates with Karatani's formulation of the concept of 
“transcritique,” which is an method founded upon the Kantian concept of antinomy and which is 
concurrently transcendental and transversal in that it oscillates between seemingly contradictory 
positions. It is perhaps instructive that a similar widening of the Kantian antinomical method, and 
implicitly his critique, can be found in the writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who saw the 
antinomy at work far beyond the realm of cognition and into wider spheres of existence (de Lubac 
1956, 145). Nevertheless, Proudhon's position arguably takes things too far by positing antinomy as 
“everywhere in Being, everywhere in Nature, everywhere in the physical world and the social world” 
(de Lubac 1956, 145). Karatani, on the other hand, has argued that “[W]hat Kant meant by 'antinomy' 
is not the kind of contradiction that exists everywhere, but the kind that can never be resolved, no 
matter how dialectically you treat it.” This, he emphasises, can be contrasted to a form of Hegelianism
which holds that “contradictions are innumerable and everywhere, and they all can be sublated, if 
treated dialectically” (Karatani, Hioe, and Small 2014). Putting it differently, the antinomy is not the 
one and only tool with which we should use to understand the universe.
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“transcendental” should be sharply distinguished from “transcendent,” the latter being
concerned with the question of “things beyond the immanence of the world, such as
'Platonic form[s]' and 'unchanging essences'” (Bryant 2014). The former denotes, rather,
“a  questioning of  the  mode of  recognition rather  than a  questioning of  the  content”
(Karatani  1993b,  italics  mine).  What  is  being  questioned,  in  other  words,  is  an
“unconscious structure that precedes and shapes experience” (Karatani 2003b, 1). Such a
structure is not transhistorical, but neither is it historicist – that is, it is not bound by an
insistence upon,  or  even an obsession with,  empiricism.  This nuanced distinction is
illustrated in Karatani's description of the task he set out to complete in his latest work
to be translated into English, The Structure of World History:
I am not trying to write here the sort of world history that is ordinarily taken
up by historians. What I am aiming at is a transcendental critique of the
relationships between the various basic modes of exchange. This means to
explicate structurally three great shifs that have occurred in world history.
(Karatani 2014, 28, italics in original, bolded text mine)
Another  way  of  putting  it  is  that  transcendental  retrospection  and  critique
occurs at a meta level. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, can be understood as a
metapsychology rather than an empirical psychology in that the psychical structure of
id, ego and superego advanced in it “can be spoken of only as figure” – which is to say
that  they,  like the Kantian conceptions of  sensibility,  understanding and reason,  are
“functions about which we can only  say that they are at work”  (Karatani 2003b, 34).14
Karatani goes as far as to say that “they are  nothing,” but “a 'nothing' that  exists  as a
certain function” (Karatani 2003b, 34, italics in original). At this point, it could be asked:
how exactly does one posit a transcendental structure in a realm other than human
cognition,  since  what  is  being dealt  with involves  more than simply the process  of
introspection which is commonly regarded as characterising the theoretical operations
of  Kant  or  Husserl?15 Moreover,  what exactly  does Karatani  mean by a “functional”
structure?  To  answer  these  questions,  we  can  turn  to  the  example  of  Freud's
14 For a defence of the metapsychological aspects of Freud's work against interpretations stressing “the 
evidence of the couch,” see Kitcher and Wilkes 1988. Contrary to those such as Adolf Grünbaum who 
evaluate Freud's work according to empirical criteria, Kitcher and Wilkes argue that metapsychology 
can lead to a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognition.
15 It should be noted that Karatani has argued that, even though “[p]hilosophy begins [and ends] with 
introspection as a mirror,” Kant's work is not mired in “subjectivist self-scrutiny” but in fact is 
“haunted by the perspective of the other” (Karatani 2003b, 2). It is this haunting of the other that gave
birth to his conceptions of the “pronounced parallax” and “antinomy,” whereas Husserlian 
phenomenology, as stated in the footnote above, can be said to extinguish the other by attempting to 
absorb it into the transcendental ego. This is the result of attempting to purge the “impure” element of
the other in Kant's transcendental critique (Karatani 2003b, 90).
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“metapsychology.”
As already stated, Freudian structural model of the psyche, which is divided into
id, ego and superego is advanced not as consisting of objects existing empirically but
rather as figure (Karatani 2003b, 34). In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Laplanche and
Pontalis  describe  metapsychology  as  “an  ensemble  of  conceptual  models  which  are
more or less far removed from empirical reality”  (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 249).
While this  definition certainly does not endear the concept to believers in positivist
science,  these  conceptual  models  are,  in  truth,  far  from  being  are  false  or  purely
imaginary  constructions.  They  are  formulated,  rather,  within  a  dialogue  between
empirical  analysis  and  rational  conceptualisation,  but  can  only  be  posited
transcendentally – that is, as forming a “structure” which lies outside of the bounds of
empiricism, and which serves as a map to study the field of play. Freud himself defined
metapsychology in his 1915 essay, “The Unconscious,” as aiming towards “describing a
psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects” (Freud 2001).
Hence, it is by analysing the  relations between the elements at stake, both in
their temporal and spatial dimensions, that a structure emerges, which then can be put
forward as a  figure  that has  both heuristic and conditioning dimensions.16 It not only
enables  us  to  categorise  and  comprehend  the  complexity  of  the  subject-matter  in
question, but until it becomes conscious to us, it will inevitably condition our reality
without  us  realising  it.17 Although in  his  writings  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  Karatani
appears to emphasise the transcendental aspect of his critique, from the publication of
Transcritique in 2001 it becomes clear that is important to distinguish his argument from
a theoretical move that is simply a reversal of the privileging of empirical datum over
any hypothetical structure – that is, it is not that there is some unconscious structure
pre-determining all that happens. As Karatani points out, “the revolutionary aspect of
Freudian psychoanalysis was not in the idea of 'the unconscious controlling much of
human behaviour'; as presented as early as in Interpretation of Dreams (and this idea had
16 Once again, this is clear from Karatani's own statement of his project in The Structure of World 
History: “What I am aiming at is a transcendental critique of the relationships between the various 
basic modes of exchange. This means to explicate structurally three great shifs that have occurred in 
world history” (Karatani 2014, 28, italics mine). Another instance where he highlights the importance 
of relationality is in Transcritique where he states that the significance of the Copernican turn was 
not a “choice between geocentricism or heliocentricism, but rather in grasping the solar system as a 
relational structure – using terms such as 'earth' and 'sun'” (Karatani 2003b, 31, italics in original).
17 This does not fall foul of Foucault's aforementioned objection to seeing the past as secretly animating 
the present, for the structure we are speaking of is, in fact, neither in the past nor “originary.”
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existed since antiquity)”  (Karatani 2003b, 32). Rather, “it was [Freud's] attempt to see
what exists in the  gap between consciousness and unconscious vis-à-vis the form of
language,” and “[i]n the course of this attempt, he came to extract the unconscious qua
transcendental  structure”  (Karatani  2003b,  32,  italics  mine).  In  other  words,  the
antinomy can only be bridged, at strategic points, by means of constantly dwelling in
the “parallax gap,” in the uncomfortable space in between two seemingly conflicting
viewpoints.18 It is there where one encounters, to quote Bryan Klausmeyer, “the radical
alterity of the thing-in-itself” (Klausmeyer 2010, 44).
Foucault and Karatani: Trans-Genealogy
Returning to Foucault, it is interesting to note that he too explores the links between
Nietzsche, Marx and Freud in his 1967 essay,  “Nietzsche, Freud,  Marx,”  in which he
focused on the their  interrelated “techniques of  interpretation”  (Foucault  1998,  269).
There are two fairly well-known statements of Nietzsche which are often cited together:
firstly, “facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations” (Nietzsche 1968, 481);
and, secondly, “this also is only interpretation” (Nietzsche 1989, sec. 22). These sayings
are  quite  possibly  what  Foucault  had  in  mind  when  he  states  in  the  essay,  as  an
extension of sorts, that “[t]here is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all
everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself
to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs” (Foucault 1998, 275).
Although Foucault's genealogy appears at first glance to turn Kant's critique in a
historicist direction, his is not a naive historicism but one that is fully cognisant of the
nature of doing history in the light of Nietzsche. In other words,  it  is not simply a
matter of delving into the archive as if that would in itself provide a firm basis from
which to write a “history of the present.”  Instead, in “What is Critique?”, he stresses
that the “historical-philosophical practice” that he advocates requires one to “make one's
own  history,  fabricate  history,  as  if  through  fiction,  in  terms  of  how  it  would  be
traversed by the question of the relationships between structures of rationality which
articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it”
(Foucault 1997, 45).19 However, the task of genealogy is far more than merely a radical
18 It is Žižek who coins the term “parallax gap” to describe the space of Karatani's transcritique, and 
extends it to various spheres of analysis (Žižek 2006b, 50).
19 It should be noted that the references to both “structures of rationality which articulate true 
discourse” and “mechanisms of subjugation” in this quote from a 1978 lecture indicate that the oft-
repeated claim that Foucault's genealogical method entailed an abandonment of the focus on 
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hermeneutics  that  takes  one  to  the  boundary  where  the  separation  of  “fact”  and
“interpretation” or “fiction” break down.20 It can be described more accurately as the
tricky task of “problematization.”
Colin Koopman, in his recent book  Genealogy as Critique, boldly advances the
thesis  that  Foucault's  genealogical  method can best  be  understood in the light  of  a
statement he made in a 1984 interview with Francois Ewald  (Koopman 2013, 17).  In
response to a question that appears to suggest a rupture in Foucault's thought beginning
with Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault responds, “The notion common to all
the work that I have done since Histoire de la folie is that of problematization” (Foucault
1990b, 257). From this, Koopman argues that “the critical inquiries Foucault developed
under  the  auspices  of  the  analytic  and  diagnostic  procedures  of  archaeology  and
genealogy are best seen as problematizations of our present”  (Koopman 2013, 17). In
problematising the present,  Foucault  carries out a Kantian-inspired enquiry into the
conditions of possibility in our contemporary situation. This attention to the conditions
discourse and knowledge in an earlier “archaeological period” in favour of an analysis centred merely
on power is ill-founded. While it is clear that the work that Foucault did under the explicit heading of
genealogy involve elements of power which were not prominent in previous work which he termed 
archaeology, Foucault's concern with the formation of knowledges continues right up to the end of 
his life. What can be said to have taken place was a widening of his analytical scope from knowledge 
to “power/knowledge.” This perspective, which we may refer to an “expansion thesis,” is developed by
Colin Koopman in a recent book, where he also argues that the focus on rupture in Foucault's earlier 
work (particularly in The Order of Things which, although Koopman does not say exactly so, can 
perhaps be described as a tour de force of one gigantic épisteme after the other) develops into a more 
dynamic “history of continuity-with-discontinuity” (Koopman 2013, 42).
20 The uniqueness of Foucault's approach to Nietzsche can be seen by contrasting it with the work of 
Gianni Vattimo, another thinker who invokes the interpretative nature of a post-Nietzschean world, 
but with much greater emphasis upon this point. Vattimo situates his reading of Nietzsche within an 
“Italian” tradition which follows on from the publication of Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche in 1961.
His specific iteration embraces a “nihilist” and “post-metaphysical” philosophy and claims to have “a 
closer (and perhaps more 'ideological') relationship with political events” than “French” readings of 
the same period. While recognising the “political engagement. of philosophers like Foucault and 
Deleuze,” Vattimo characterises their interpretations of Nietzsche as “critical-suspensive,” “artistic,” 
and “literary” (Vattimo 2006, 195). Certainly Foucault's Nietzsche does not lend easily to mainstream 
representative politics of the sort that Vattimo has engaged in, but, to recall Marx's famous thesis, it 
can be argued that a predominantly hermeneutic Nietzsche entails one which is less likely to change 
the world in a significant manner. Ultimately, however, “a tree is known by its fruit,” to quote a 
Galilean carpenter-rabbi (Matt 12:33, NKJV). Alessia Ricciardi has charted the playing out of Vattimo's
version of Nietzschean interpretation, associated with the intellectual movement of “weak thought” 
(pensiero debole) in Italy, and judges it as having absorbed dominant trends of mass culture and even 
neoliberalism rather than questioning them (Ricciardi 2012, 126–133). It is probably significant that 
over the last decade or so, Vattimo has distanced himself from his views in the 1980s and 1990s, 
although it can be argued that such a perspective is also in line with a current trend – that is, an 
increasing sense of confidence in some left-wing circles as a result of developments such as the Latin 
American pink tide, which Vattimo lauds in a recent book (Vattimo and Zabala 2014, 121–140). Of 
course, Foucault himself was not immune from being influenced by changing times, and some have 
even argued that he briefly became enamoured by neoliberalism in the late 1970s (Behrent 2009). The 
obvious point, however, should still be noted, namely that this was before neoliberalism was actually 
applied to Western economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom.
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of the subject-matter being interrogated, rather than mere contents and practices, is
what distinguishes Foucault's  genealogy from the genealogical methods practised by
Bernard Williams and Nietzsche:
Whereas Williams and Nietzsche used genealogy to cast judgments on certain
concepts (truthfulness  and  morality,  for  example)  and  the  practices
instantiating  them,  Foucault  used  genealogy  to  critically  investigate  the
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  the  practical  exercise  of  such  concepts .  The
purpose of Foucault’s unique conception of  genealogy as problematization is
to make manifest the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present as a
material for thought and action that we would need to work on if we are to
transform that  present.  If  other  genealogists  have aimed at  vindication or
subversion of the problematizations at the heart of who we are, Foucault aims
at a practice that would reveal our problematizations to facilitate their further
transformation. (Koopman 2013, 18, italics added)
As I have previously written, for Foucault, all genealogy begins with the present. To be
exact, the starting point for genealogical critique is a sense that something has gone
terribly  wrong  –  where,  in  the  words  of  the  founding  manifesto  of  Le  Groupe
d'information  sur  les  prisons (GIP)  which  Foucault  co-initiated,  “the  situation.  is
intolerable” (Macey 1994, 261–262). As already stated above, it is not difficult to see why
we may wish to designate the present landscape of higher education in the UK as being
“intolerable.”  Sweeping  changes  to  the  system  of  funding  are  causing  a  massive
upheaval,  leading  to  developments  such  as  the  closure  of  departments  deemed
“unprofitable” in universities erstwhile funded primarily by the state21 and the rise of
for-profit higher education providers for whom the financial interests of shareholders
outweigh the ostensible mission of providing and facilitating learning, leading to all
sorts  of  questionable  practices  such  as  admitting  ill-qualified  students  who,  having
received student loans, do not show up for classes  (Malik, McGettigan, and Domokos
2014).  Meanwhile,  the  conditions  in  which  academics  labour  continue  to  worsen
dramatically,  through infra-legal  forms of  control  of time and energy which lead to
stress,  disillusionment  and  cynicism  (Gill  2009).  To  list  all  the  elements  which  are
alarming would require much more space than can be provided here.
Having said all this, should a sense of a intolerable thing in the present impel
one to commence a genealogy, it would not be a Foucauldian genealogy if it was pre-
determined  to  simply  attack  or  subvert  the  present.  It  is  a  rather  unfortunate
development  in  the  reception  of  Foucault's  work  that  many  of  his  readers  have
21 The most severe case being the effective “bonfire” of courses at London Metropolitan University in 
2011, where 70% of all courses previously offered were cut (Garner 2011).
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projected their  normative  assessments  – normally negative – into the sphere of  his
histories. It is often tacitly assumed that when Foucault is discussing something which
is commonly seen as problematic within a particular intellectual milieu, it is because
such a  thing is  “bad.”  One clear  example  is  his  1978-1979 lectures  on neoliberalism
which, since their first publication a decade ago, were widely read as being a “critique”
of  neoliberalism  before  it  was  pointed  out  that  Foucault  himself  was  at  the  time
somewhat open, if not favourably disposed, towards some of the ideas that he discussed
(Foucault 2010; Behrent 2009; Patton 2013). Indeed, as Foucault said: “My point is not
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same
as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do”  (Foucault
1983, 231–232). To practise a Foucauldian-inspired genealogy requires one to suspend
simplistic normative assessments such as “good” or “bad” and instead enquire into the
dangerous  contingencies  that  are  latent  in  the  present  formulations  of  the  subject-
matter of study, which reveal their underlying conditions. That is to say, we should read
the word “dangerous” here as “pregnant with uncertain possibilities.”
Bearing in  mind the  proviso  in  the  preceding paragraph,  now that  we have
identified the “intolerable” nature of the contemporary university in the UK, it is to
problematization that we turn. As Koopman points out, it is insufficient to demonstrate
that our present is contingent; what is more crucial is to identify “how the present is
contingently made up”  (Koopman 2013, 21, italics in original). Once again, this is the
element of genealogy which is linked to the Kantian critical project:  to uncover the
conditions that made it possible for our present situation to come about. In other words,
to make a problem of what is generally – in the words of Karatani – “taken for granted”
(Karatani 1993b). Against commentators who argue for a sequential understanding of
Foucault's methodology which begins with archaeology, follows on into genealogy and
finally  moves  into  problematization,22 Koopman  presents  a  persuasive  reading  of
problematization as a steady current throughout Foucault's oeuvre – latent in the earlier
years  but  increasingly explicit  in  his  later  work  (Koopman 2013,  44–48).  When put
together with what can be termed his “expansion thesis” – that is, that genealogy is an
expansion of archaeology rather than a replacement of it (Koopman 2013, 42) – what we
get is a relatively cohesive and yet wide-ranging method which chimes in much greater
harmony with Foucault's formidable body of work, which has constantly been found to
22 To give just two of countless examples: May 2006; Flynn 2005b.
39
Chapter 1
not comply with any strict periodisations.23
Where Karatani's  transcendental  retrospection may helpfully  supplement this
formulation  of  Foucauldian  genealogy  is  in  its  insistence  that  the  “transcendental”
element of critique not be jettisoned in a heady romance with the historical. To do so
would be to throw the proverbial  baby out with the bathwater,  the latter being the
problematic conception of the “transcendental” that is specific to the original Kantian
version.24 What is necessary is to hold the transcendental – understood in Karatani's
terms, that is, a recognition of a figurative structure which escapes empirical analysis in
the conditions of possibility that have led to our present – and the historical in a state of
paradoxical tension, recognising that they often appear to point in different directions,
but yet refusing to yield one to the other and dissolve the antinomy. Such a commitment
draws from Karatani's more recent concept of “transcritique,”  where one accepts the
“pronounced parallax” that results from trying to avoid the optical delusion of a single
standpoint,  and  instead  oscillates  tranversally  between  the  poles  of  the  antinomy.25
Putting it differently, while in its general operations Foucauldian genealogical critique
moves  horizontally  along  a  seemingly  immanent  plane,  Karatanian  transcendental
retrospection burrows vertically to seek out underlying structures which can be seen to
be at work (Karatani 2003b, 1).26
What  this  leads  us  to  is  a  conception  of  Kantian-inspired  “transcendental”
23 Stuart Elden, amongst many others, has constantly underlined this point in his surveys of Foucault's 
Collège de France lectures, in which themes which some deem surpassed return, and themes some 
deem to come rear their heads prematurely, e.g. Elden 2012.
24 Such is the case with Koopman, who rejects the depiction of Foucault's method as having a residual 
transcendental dimension by writers such as Béatrice Han-Pile, arguing instead that it is a resolutely 
historical form of Kantian critique rooted in empiricism (Koopman 2013, 110). Even though scholars of
Foucault are divided on this point, it is not necessary for us to take a particular side, for by adopting 
Karatani's expansive conception of transcendental critique, the arguments adduced by Koopman 
which are based on a narrow reading of “transcendental” – i.e. involving universal conditions of 
possibility – do not apply.
25 As Karatani notes, transcritique “is not some kind of stable third position. It cannot exist without a 
transversal and transpositional movement” (Karatani 2003b, 4, italics mine). Koopman appears 
particularly wary of collapsing Foucault into a Husserlian phenomenological space where the 
historical and transcendental are “amalgamated” (Koopman 2013, 110). It is clear that Foucault 
himself rejected the phenomenological approach in the preface to the English edition of The Order of 
Things, as it “gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to act
[and] which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity” (Foucault 1973, xiv). Karatani,
too, considers that the Husserlian move of bracketing “the self-evidence of the life world” in order to 
delve into the transcendental ego results in it subsuming all else and becoming the sole object of 
investigation. In not considering other egos, alterity is completely lost, and the possibility of a 
pronounced parallax with it (Karatani 2003b, 90). Hence, a Husserlian amalgamation of the historical 
and the transcendental is not transcritical.
26 This metaphor of horizontal and vertical methods of critical enquiry is borrowed from Arata Isozaki's 
introduction to Karatani's Architecture as Metaphor (Karatani 1995b, vii–viii).
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critique, which I would like to call trans-cendental/critical genealogy, or trans-genealogy,
that  is  both  humbler  and  bolder  than its  Kantian  precursor  at  the  same time.  It  is
humbler because it does not claim to have discovered transhistorical conditions of all
human experience. Nevertheless, and more crucially, it is bolder because by entering
into both the terrains of the transcendental and the historical on its own terms, it opens
itself to attack from those who strongly believe in the primacy of one or the other.27
Karatani himself foreshadows this move when he says that “we [should] persist in the
Kantian  term,  'transcendental,'  except  that  in  order  to  elucidate  its  dynamism  and
function further, transcritique has to intervene” (Karatani 2003b, 34). It is argued that to
apply  Karatani's  transcritique  towards  his  earlier  conception  of  transcendental
retrospection entails bringing the latter into contact with the historical-empirical, via a
conversation with Foucauldian genealogy, resulting in trans-genealogy.
To summarise this trans-genealogical approach in a nutshell, it is an endeavour
to identify the conditions of possibility which have created and continue to sustain the
present, through both the elucidation of the “mode of recognition” that is at work, as
well as the “contents” that interact with it. The tricky task is to collapse neither into
pure  transcendentalism  (by  focusing  merely  on  the  mode  of  recognition)  or  pure
historicism (by focusing on the contents, i.e. the historical specificities), but to dwell,
rather, in the interstice, or parallax gap, that lies in between the two. In the specific case
at hand, it  involves an examination of both the “questions”  that are at  work in the
ongoing construction of the university, as well as the “answers” that have been and are
given.  Empirical  investigation  of  the  latter  must  be  carried  out  in  tandem  with
transcendental (re)construction of the former. Once they are identified and analysed,
these questions and answers can be shown to fit into a structure which has conditioned
the development of the university in the United Kingdom from the Second World War.
Brief Interlude: Why Begin After the War?
However,  before  we can commence our  study,  which takes  as its  starting point  the
apparent  rise  of  what  may  be  termed  “neoliberal  rationality”28 within  the  British
27 The work that Jean-Luc Nancy has done on the concept of “transimmanence” has gentle resonances 
with what is at work here (Nancy 1996, 34–35). The transcendental element of trans-genealogy is not 
transcendent – that is, it is not outside the world, but yet while remaining within it contains a motion
which resists closure within a radically immanentist historical vision.
28 The term “neoliberal” is used here with some reluctance, as its popularity in recent academic and 
non-academic writing has led to it being rather amorphous and imprecise. This has led some to 
interrogate the variations of its deployment, e.g. Hardin 2014. Nevertheless, it has become for many 
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university, it is necessary to justify the time period chosen. The obvious question that
arises  is:  why begin at  the  end of  the  Second World  War?  After  all,  could  not  the
instrumentalism that is very clear within the “neoliberal mode” in higher education be
traced back further, to the very beginnings of the university in Europe?
Hence, it  is  necessary to stress that the point of  temporal  departure for this
thesis has not been chosen arbitrarily, but arises rather from the particular nature of the
neoliberal form of higher education that is at issue. Karatani, in his study of the origins
of  modern  Japanese  literature,  makes  an  interesting  point  about  how far  back  one
should go:
But my own feeling is that the genealogical “return,” that is, the tracing back
of origins, should not be taken too far. [For example,] [b]y contrast to many
scholars who sought the origins of anti-Semitism in medieval and ancient
times,  for  example,  Hannah  Arendt  looked  to  the  late-nineteenth-century
consolidation  of  state  economies.  .  [With  regard  to  modern  literature,]
[w]hile it might appear that a more deep-rooted origin can be traced further
back, to do so would be to ignore the inversion that emerged in this time
period itself; indeed, it would strengthen that very inversion. (Karatani 1993c,
194–195)
Similarly, with regard to the investigation of the phenomenon of biopolitics, a
clear difference can be discerned between the approach of Foucault and that of Giorgio
Agamben. The latter  has posited that biopolitics  is  “at  least  as old as the sovereign
exception,”  and thus stretches  back to “the most  immemorial  of  the  arcana imperii”
(Agamben 1998, 6). The former, on the other hand, located its genesis in the modern era,
stating that it was, among other things, “bound up with the development of capitalism”
(Foucault 1978, 141–143). Commentators such as Marie-Christine Leps have pointed out
that Agamben's position results in “a juridico-institutional, linguistic and transhistorical
perspective” (Leps 2012, 22) rather than the resolutely historical approach of Foucault,
which while not denying the possible “universal forms” in a “thought-event” (Leps 2012,
26), emphasises that – in his own words – “the setting in motion of such universal forms
is itself historical”  (Foucault 1994, 580). Although Agamben would vociferously deny
that  this  is  the  case,  his  move  can be  seen as,  to  use  a  term of  Karatani's,  one  of
inversion (tentō); that is, the projection of a particular time-bound invention – in this
case, biopolitics – further into the past than necessary, to the point of making it seem
the “key term” for investigation into contemporary higher education, and thus this thesis adopts its 
use at strategic points, although careful distinctions will be made.
42
Chapter 1
inherent and essential to the constitution of a particular sphere – in this case, politics.29
This thesis will – in a sense – take the side of Foucault against that of Agamben,
and will  argue that there is something distinctive about the emergence of neoliberal
rationality within the university when compared to earlier forms of higher education.
This claim is, of course, relatively uncontroversial,  given the attention that has been
given to the uniqueness of the ongoing neoliberal moment in the British university's
history.  However,  whereas  most  narratives  of  the  neoliberal  university  locate  its
beginnings in the break with the postwar consensus in the context of the wider British
society and economy which took place during the 1970s or 1980s (depending on one's
perspective),  it  will  be  argued  that  the  invention  of  this  neoliberal  form of  higher
education should be traced back to the 1940s, to the building of the “public university”
as part of the postwar Keynesian settlement.30
Moreover, contrary to the position that what we see happening is completely
without precedent, it will also be argued that a  structure can be discerned within the
messy play of discourses and practices within the history of British higher education in
which a conceptual triad of instrumentalism, idealism and community constantly reveals
itself.31 In other words, what we have is a mixture of rupture and continuity,  which
explains why a valid case can be made for either a thesis of newness or a thesis of
sameness.  Thus, in summary, it can be said that the neoliberal university is not only
older than most accounts, but is also a particular manifestation of a constitutive tension
between a triad of interrelated concepts.
1.3 The Questions of the University
To employ the methodology of trans-genealogy to investigate the British university of
the  present  –  a  subject-matter  which  we  have  already  established  is  ripe  for  such
29 One example that Karatani gives of inversion is that of Adam Smith's portrayal of commodity 
exchange in the past according to the shape of the modern market economy which existed in his 
time, i.e. as taking place between individuals (Karatani 2014, 81). In an essay published in English in 
1995, Karatani emphasises this point succinctly by writing that “[w]e must be wary of tracing back to 
'origins' in the all too distant past. For to do so almost always results in the projection onto the past of
an inversion of recent 'origin'” (Karatani 1995c, 6). There is a clear resonance here with the 
Nietzschean-Foucauldian genealogical critique of “origins,” discussed above (Foucault 2000b, 6–9).
30 I am indebted here to the work of the literary theorist and political historian Michael Gardiner who 
has identified such a dynamic in the wider British social sphere (Gardiner 2013). Nevertheless, as will 
be demonstrated, it is not the case that the developments in the university merely mirrored that 
which were occurring in the rest of society or, even more crudely, an economic base.
31 It must be remembered, however, that this structure is posited transcendentally, as a figure, rather 
than as actually-existing (i.e. empirical) entities.
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enquiry – requires us to ask, “What is taken for granted  – that is, appears self-evident
to  the  point  of  being  invisible  –  within  its  bounds?”  It  is  argued  that  this  largely
unconscious “mode of recognition” is none other than the underlying foundations of
discourses and practices within the university. These foundations can be ascertained by
discerning from the various arguments about the direction of higher education as well
as  practical  policies  within  this  sphere  what  exactly  are  the  questions  which  these
arguments and policies are trying to answer.
It is argued, further, that the structure which is expressed by these questions and
answers is not one that is completely unique to the university, but in fact mirrors the
Kantian conceptual  triad  of  phenomenon,  idea  and  thing-in-itself  that  Karatani  has
identified and traced through other forms of transcendental critique such as Freudian
metapsychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis.32 This triad, he explains, is a “relational
structure”  that  brings  traditional  concepts  together  into  a  practical  “architectonic”
(Karatani 1993b), which, it can be said, allows us to scrutinise the state of play with a
lens which brings it all into focus rather than with blurry eyes. The rest of this section,
although formulated with historical aspects clearly in the picture, will focus on laying
out,  in  outline,  a  structure  of  the  university  corresponding  primarily  to  the
transcendental aspect of trans-genealogy. The historical-genealogical component will be
supplied in the chapters that are to come.
Instrumentalism
In the university at present, much of the debate, both ongoing and in the recent past,
has been delimited by a consequentialist question, which can be phrased generally as
follows: “What are the consequences of a particular university policy for the goals that
we are aiming for?” It is this question which has been answered at different times in
different  ways,  but  has  remained  primary  throughout  the  postwar  era.  Many
commentators on university policy have focused on the difference between the various
answers given to the question, whether the succession of those that became hegemonic
(for a time) or their competitors, while neglecting to enquire into the very question
being asked. In other words, much ink has been spilt comparing competing policies of
32 Karatani links the Freudian ego, super-ego and id to the Kantian categories of understanding, reason 
and sensibility (Karatani 1994). He also posits that the Lacanian Imaginary, Symbolic and Real 
correspond to the Kantian idea (that is, semblance or illusion, Schein in German), phenomenon (or 
form) and thing-in-itself  (Karatani 2003b, 34). However, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
psychoanalytic dimension that these correlations potentially open up will not be explored.
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university  policy and governance,  without  recognising that at  the  roots of  many of
these is a single question which, when unconsciously accepted, structures almost all the
debate and action that is to follow.
To situate this question in the structure that is being (re)constructed, it is argued
that it corresponds to the Kantian notion of phenomena within Karatani's triad. In other
words, it is focused on what appears to be the “objective world” – that is, the world of
nature – but which is, rather, the sum total of sensible intuitions grasped by the concepts
of  understanding. It is unsurprising that predominantly empirical studies focus on this
part of the structure of the university, for when this action-centric approach is taken out
of its relational structure, it falls on the side of the antinomy which is represented by
empiricism and the historical. Those who call for pragmatism within the university thus
display their obsession with this instrumentalist question, and hence with the layer of
the university which is phenomenal.
It is important for us to note, at this juncture, two matters. First of all, in and of
itself,  the  instrumentalist  question  is  without  definite  content.  To  recapitulate,  its
generic form is as follows: “What are the consequences of a particular university policy
for the  goals that we are aiming for?” If one changes the goal(s) or  telos that is being
strived towards, the weighing up of the consequences – and hence the conclusion that is
likely to be reached – changes dramatically.
Secondly, it should be noted that the nature of the Kantian conceptual triad, as
Karatani formulates it, is that each of the three elements is indispensable. The rejection
or abandonment of any one concept in the triad results in an imbalanced and thus faulty
picture, with potentially serious consequences.33 Thus, following on from this insight, it
becomes  clear  that  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  asking  the  instrumentalist  question  at
specific points. It is ultimately futile to imagine a university that does not in some way
take into account the impact of its workings upon practical and “external” matters such
as the training of skilled labour.
Idealism
The instrumentalist question has never been the only one animating the workings of the
university.  Although  consequentialism  has  played  a  large  role  –  perhaps  even  the
33 One example that Karatani gives is the tossing aside of the thing-in-itself by some German idealists 
and romantics such as Fichte, with the result being “a loss of the position from which to view Idea as 
Schein” (Karatani 1993b).
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formative role – in higher education from its very beginnings, alongside it has existed
another tradition which is focused upon ideals (or ideas) of the university.
The question this tradition asks is, “What overarching principle(s) should govern
the university?” Among the answers to this question that have been mooted in times
gone by (but also in the present) are liberal education, the pursuit of truth, and the
glorification of God. At the present moment in the United Kingdom, one of the most
notable answers to this question of the university is that of the vision of the “public
university,” which will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter Three.
As with the instrumentalist question, the idealist question is a form without a
determinate content. It is an integral part of the underlying structure of the university,
but depending one's pedagogical, philosophical and political positions, the exact form of
the question and the answers that are “found” will differ. Nevertheless, whether they are
current  or  dated,  popular  or  unpopular,  hegemonic  or  marginal,  all  answers  to  the
question  of  ideals  correspond  with  the  realm  of  the  idea in  Karatani's  Kantian
conceptual triad. In other words, it involves the faculties of  understanding and  reason,
which  cooperate  to  apprehend these  ideas.  This  being so,  when extracted  from the
relational  structure,  this  thought-centric approach falls  on  the  side  of  the  antinomy
which is represented by rationalism and idealism. Those who call for principles within
the university display their obsession with this question of ideals.
However,  this  link  to  the  Kantian  idea  reveals  that  all  ideals  are  ultimately
illusions or Schein (Karatani 1995b, 185).34 Although pragmatists who are focused on the
instrumentalist question may wish to dismiss these illusions as being impractical, it is
instructive that Kant made a distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas. As
we shall explore further in Chapter Three, the former claim to be realisable in fact, and
so can be linked to the Marxian “ideal to which reality [will]  have to adjust itself”
(Karatani  2003b,  217),35 whereas  the  latter  “constantly  offers  the  ground  to  criticize
reality” (Karatani 2003b, 217) by being “an index toward which people should gradually
attempt to draw close” (Karatani 2014, 233). Regulative ideas, while being illusions, are
transcendental (or necessary) illusions, in that they are things “we cannot do without”
34 Karatani argues, drawing from Kant, that the point of genesis of such ideals (or Idee) is an attempt to 
access the inaccessible “thing-in-itself”: “Idee is an imaginary representation of the 'thing-in-itself': it 
is that which can never be grasped and represented by any theoretical approach.” Such Schein are 
“arrogation[s] of reason” (Karatani 1995b, 185–186).
35 Karatani argues that the Hegelian idea is based on such a constitutive notion, and that many 
orthodox Marxists have followed in this direction in believing the utopia of communism to be 
realisable, with the end-result being many of the atrocities of the 20th century.
46
Chapter 1
(Karatani 2014, 233). Likewise, as has already been said, it is impossible to conceive of
the university completely outside the bounds of instrumentalism.
Thus, here we find what appears to be an antinomy, such as the one Kant faced
when  confronted  with  empiricism  and  rationalism,  and  Marx  with  historicism  and
idealism. One temptation, which many succumb to, is to resolve the tension in one or
the other direction, embracing one side and tossing out the other. Such a solution is, in
fact, an illusion, for a formal denigration of either instrumentalism or idealism does not
prevent  hidden calculations  or  ideals  from operating.  In  other  words,  as  alluded  to
above, a militant instrumentalism inevitably produces ideals of its own, while a militant
idealism cannot avoid making decisions based on instrumental goals at various points.
Another  temptation,  however,  is  to  create  a  “Third  Way”  which  attempts  to
surmount this antinomy by an aesthetic and organicist turn. As we shall  see, this is
arguably the path that was taken by the German Romantics and Hegel, a stance which
within the sphere of the university we may term community.
Community
So far we have described the perspectives or questions of instrumentalism and idealism
using largely Kantian terminology. There is, however, a third question which can be
formulated using developments in German idealism following Kant. This can be referred
to as the perspective of  community, which is founded upon a particular conception of
being-with which in its classic social-political form tends to be bound up with the idea
of the nation. In The Structure of World History, Karatani elucidates how the conception
of the nation, which is analagous in our university triad to community, is related to the
domains or faculties which Kant also employed:
In [Hegel's] logic, as in Herder's the germ of reason is already present at the
stage of sensibility, and subsequently it gradually unfolds through a process
of  self-realization.  This  means  that  while  the  nation  (Volk)  pertains  to
sensibility, it also belongs to the domain of reason, and hence it reaches its
final realization in the form of the nation-state. (Karatani 2014, 224)
In  other  words,  whereas  the  perspective  of  instrumentalism arises  from  the
confluence of sensibility and understanding, and idealism from that of understanding
and reason, the perspective of community – according to the German idealists – is a
blend of  sensibility and  reason. This latter combination is heretical within the Kantian
system, and Karatani takes great pains to disclaim its validity, arguing rather that what
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Herder and Hegel performed was an illusory synthesis of sensibility with reason and
understanding  through  the  faculty  of  the  imagination  (Karatani  2014,  220–221).36
Regardless of the orthodoxy of this argument within a broadly Kantian framework, the
fact remains that such a position has been and can be staked in the wider scheme of
things. Rather than simply deny it, it is better to accord it a place within our frame of
discussion. What we may term the question of community is focused on the following
matter:  “What  is  the  impact  of  a  particular  university  policy  on  the  university
community?” This is far from a straightforward enquiry, for we shall see later, there are
competing visions of community which influence the answers that are reached.
The discussion thus far can be summarised in the diagram on the following page.
As  the  diagram  demonstrates,  each  of  the  three  perspectives  is  linked  to  a  major
category  of  ethical  thought.  Instrumentalism  is  solidly  consequentialist,  idealism  is
deontological,  while  the question of  community to correspond,  in its  most common
forms, to a rather traditional form of virtue ethics. As Ivan Illich points out, virtue in the
Greek polis was understood as “fitting behaviour,” that is, “the ethos. appropriate to a
certain ethnos, or people” (Illich 2005, 147). This ancient conception of virtue could not
conceive of an ethics which was not rooted in a people and, by extension, a place or soil.
Thus,  the  perspective  of  community  does  not  actually  overcome  the  antinomy  of
instrumentalism or idealism, but rather creates a third position which both competes
with  both  of  them.  Thus,  rather  than  a  conflict  of  two  laws  (anti-nomia)  we  find
ourselves in a tussle between three laws, for which we may coin the word trichonomy,
from the Greek tríkha (divided into three parts) and nomos (law).
However, if we wish to practise a trans-genealogical approach, there is no easy
resolution to this triadic tension. We have to persevere through it, but by utilising a
transversal and transpositional movement, we can dwell in the parallax gap where we
find ourselves confronted with not simply analysing phenomena nor debating ideas, but
the  uncomfortable  space  of  what  Karatani  has  termed  the  transcendental  topos for
transcritique, which, unlike community, is not an alternative “positionality” but a mere
36 Karatani's point is clearly inspired by the Transcendental Deduction in the first edition of Kant's First 
Critique, where imagination mediates between sensibility and understanding (Kant 1998a, sec. A124). 
It is also notable that in interpreting the theoretical moves of Herder and Hegel he conflates reason 
(Vernunf) and understanding (Verstand) (Karatani 2014, 221). This can be explained by the fact that 
Hegel's does not follow Kant's strict distinction between the two as distinct faculties of the mind with
separate domains but rather assigns them separate tasks within his conception of the mind as a 
living, organic unity, with understanding concerned with apprehending parts and reason with 
grasping the whole (Berry 1982, 131–134).
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interstice where there is no imaginary synthesis between or escape from the opposed
forces,  but  only  the  persistence  of  the  trichonomy  in  the  constant  confrontation
between pragmatic concerns, principled ideas and communal aesthetics. To dwell in this
topos is to accept a vocation which involves moving between the various poles, in order
to find a manner of superseding the ternary of Instrumentalism-Community-Idealism.
Each Question Only Arises Through Bracketing
Having outlined the three main elements of the proposed discursive-practical structure
of the university, it will nevertheless be helpful to explore what exactly it means to be a
“question” within this structure. The latter's foundation is a perspective of “pronounced
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parallax,” which allows us to view a particular thing in its multiple facets, and has been
described by Karatani as a practice of  bracketing. It is true that the term “bracketing”
has  a  post-Kantian  lineage  in  that  it  was  first  deployed  by  Husserl  to  refer  to  the
phenomenological suspension of judgement about the natural world in order to focus
on the contents of mental experience. However, this development of Husserl's was itself
premised  on  Kant's  distinction  between  noumena and  phenomena.37 Moreover,  it
certainly describes well Kant's operation in  The Critique of Judgment where he argues
that when it comes to matters of taste we have to place to one side concerns that do not
pertain to the aesthetic domain. This is vividly illustrated in the following passage:
If  any one asks me whether I  consider that the palace I  see before me is
beautiful, I may, perhaps, reply that I do not care for things of that sort that
are merely made to be gaped at. Or I may reply in the same strain as that
Iroquois  sachem who said that nothing in Paris pleased him better than the
eating-houses. I may even go a step further and inveigh with the vigour of a
Rousseau against the vanity of the great who spend the sweat of the people
on such superfluous things. Or, in fine, I may quite easily persuade myself
that if I found myself on an uninhabited island, without hope of ever again
coming among men, and could conjure such a palace into existence by a mere
wish, I should still not trouble to do so, so long as I had a hut there that was
comfortable enough for me. All this may be admitted and approved; only it is
not  the  point  at  issue.  All  one  wants  to  know  is  whether  the  mere
representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may
be to the real existence of the object of this representation. (Kant 1986, 43)
In other words, an aesthetic analysis becomes clouded if one attempts to engage
at the same time with matters ethical, political or idiosyncratic bordering on irrelevancy.
To critique the political message of a film, for example, is a task which is separate from
a judgement of the qualities of its cinematography. However, it is not the case that any
of these stances “assumes priority over all other criteria. What counts here is not simply
bracketing  but  also  un-bracketing”  (Karatani  2000,  258).  Such  is  the  movement  of
parallax: examining the contours of each domain by temporarily suspending the others.
However, bracketing is not simply investigating particular domains – such as
cognition, ethics, aesthetics or economics – as if they predated the act of investigation.
Instead, it is the very operation of bracketing which brings these domains into being. In
the words of Karatani: 
[O]ne of Kant’s most crucial propositions is that domains themselves come
37 Husserl describes bracketing, or what he calls the phenomenological epoché, as follows: “We put out 
of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; we parenthesize 
everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being” (Husserl 1982, 61). 
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into existence by way of transcendental reduction (bracketing). . Modern
science was established by bracketing moral and aesthetic judgments. Only at
this moment did the “object” appear. Machiavelli came to be known as the
father of modern political science precisely because he discovered the domain
of politics by bracketing morality. (Karatani 2003b, 114)
How does all this apply to our investigations in this thesis? The argument I am
making is that each of the three questions of the university arise when the other two are
bracketed. For example,  instrumentalist  calculations – which are often justified by a
deceivingly  simple  phrase  such  as  “let's  be  realistic  here”  –   can only  be  made  by
pushing aside issues of ideals and community and it is this bracketing procedure which
creates the instrumentalist perspective in the first place. Likewise, the idealist position is
summoned  into  being  when  one  insists  that  principles  are  to  trump  all  other
considerations. Finally, the perspective that privileges the community in evaluating a
particular course of action has to suspend instrumentalist and idealist matters.
Of course, in actual practice, these three questions often intermingle, or at least
are ordered in some hierarchy of importance:  “x  should come first, and then  y,  and
finally  z.” Although this is possible in a sense, because shuttling from one question to
the next in some fixed order could be seen as a variety of the practice of transcritique, it
is easy to be tempted to regard this procedure as being more stable than it is in reality.
Even more tempting is the idea that we should keep the “bigger picture” always in view,
a picture which encompasses all three questions as mere constituent parts. Žižek, who
has  employed  Karatani's  transcritical  method  to  discuss  economics,  politics  and
ideology as three spheres in our contemporary understanding of the social, has argued
that such an idea is a trap:
The trap to be avoided here, of course, is the naïve idea that one should keep
in  view the  social  totality,  of  which  democratic  ideology,  the  exercise  of
power and the process of economic (re)production are merely parts. If one
tries to keep all these in view simultaneously, one ends up seeing nothing—
their  contours  disappear.  This  bracketing  is  not  a  mere  epistemological
procedure, it answers to what Marx called “real abstraction”—an abstraction
from power and economic relations that is inscribed into the very actuality of
the democratic process, and so on. (Žižek 2004, 129)
Likewise, it is impossible to reconcile, in the sphere of higher education, the deep
disjointedness between idealism, instrumentalism and community into a holistic totality
of sorts. The reality of parallax means that one cannot view one's subject-matter from
multiple perspectives at the same time – after all, each of us has only one pair of eyes.
This  limitation  explains  why,  for  example,  those  who  privilege  an  instrumentalist
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perspective  simply  cannot  see  “eye-to-eye”  with  those  who  privilege  an  idealist
perspective.
Beyond  this,  however,  it  also  explains  how people  who consider  themselves
“principled” can swiftly turn into “pragmatists” when placed in a different context, as
the  different  viewpoints  can  be  adopted  in  a  manner  akin  to  switching  between
spectacles of various tints and lenses. It is for this reason that we come across cases of
academics with clearly conflicted loyalties such as that of Craig Calhoun, the present
President of the London School of Economics. In November 2011, Calhoun wrote an
article for the “Possible Futures” blog of the Social Science Research Council – which he
was the president of at the time – criticising the eviction of various Occupy groups by
city and university authorities across the United States. In this piece, the decisions of
leaders such as New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the presidents of Harvard and
UC  Berkeley  to  call  in  the  police  to  dismantle  protest  camps  were  criticised  as
“reminiscent of the Chinese government ousting protestors from Tiananmen Square”
and a “disturbing” development in “ostensibly democratic America” (Calhoun 2011).
Fast-forward  a  few years,  and  we find Calhoun,  as  President  of  the  London
School of Economics, supporting the eviction of student occupiers due to, among other
things,  the “shockupation”38 disruption of a lecture which led to management having
“no option but to take firm action to bring the occupation to an end”  (Mancini 2015).
Although Calhoun stated in a letter to the occupiers that he was “personally sorry to
have  reached  this  point”  (Mancini  2015),  does  that  alter  the  fact  that  he  ended  up
mirroring the actions of the authorities he criticised back in 2011, who “thought it was
more important to maintain public order than to allow. particular citizens to exercise
public voice” (Calhoun 2011)? It can be argued that in this case, Calhoun switched from
viewing protests of this sort from an idealist perspective to an instrumentalist one. Even
though he had not publicly disowned his earlier statements with regards to the Occupy
camps, his new job as head of the LSE meant that he had to bracket those views.
This point, however, leads on to another matter: if the questions of the university
come into being through bracketing, and hence cannot be scrutinised all at once, are
they hermetically sealed off from each other and unconnected? We shall return to this
question  in  Chapter  Four,  for  only  after  examining  the  instrumentalist  and  idealist
38 The disruption of lectures has been a tactic of disgruntled students from time immemorial, but in 
some recent student mobilisations such as the LSE Occupation the rather grand title of 
“shockupation” has been used to describe such actions.
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questions within the historical context of postwar British higher education will we be
able to address the issue of relationality between the elements of the wider picture.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out the methodological underpinnings of the overall thesis via
a joint reading of the historical-philosophical approaches of Michel Foucault and Kojin
Karatani. By bringing together the former's genealogy with the latter's transcendental
retrospection through a tracing of their respective lineages back to the critical tradition
of Kant, it was demonstrated that the first can be fruitfully supplemented by the second
in order to prevent the transcendental element of critique from being discarded in a fit
of  historicism.  For  this  combined  method  I  proposed  the  name  trans-genealogy,
borrowing from Karatani's  more recent writings on what he terms transcritique.  By
constantly  shifting  registers  between  the  transcendental  and  the  historical,  in  a
ceaseless movement that is both transversal and transpositional, I will in the following
chapters  approach  the  subject  matter  of  the  postwar  British  university  from  the
interstice or parallax gap that lies between the two, and thus be able to examine both
the  underlying “questions”  that  form the  structure  of  the  university  as  well  as  the
“answers” that fill out this structure.
In the third part of this chapter, I outlined each of the three questions which
made up the structure of the university – instrumentalism, idealism and community –
before  moving  on  in  the  final  part  to  their  procedural  aspects.  Each  of  these
perspectives,  I  argued,  can  only  be  constituted  in  a  bracketing  procedure  which
suspends the other domains, due to the operation of the pronounced parallax. It is this
condition that is at the root of the contradictions between the questions, which results
in,  inter alia,  the situation of those who claim to be principled, yet end up acting in
ways which can only be described as crudely pragmatic or instrumentalist. 
Having sketched out our way of proceeding, and drawn a very basic map of the
terrain to be covered, it is time for us to begin our journey proper. In the following
chapter we begin our examination of postwar British higher education by scrutinising
the structural perspective of Instrumentalism, which emerged in the immediate period
after  the Second World War,  but  is  often misdated due to  a  seemingly  obvious but
ultimately erroneous association with the infamous “neoliberal” phase which many still
believe we are currently in.
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A University Not For Itself:
The Rise of Instrumentalism in Higher Education
“A cow can pretend that it exists not for itself but for
man.  Man  can  pretend  that  he  exists  for  humanity.
Humanity can pretend that it exists in order to sustain
ontological reality. . Thus the meaning of existence is
tossed about from one level of reality to another.”
(Egon Bondy 2001, 217)
In a BBC Radio 3 programme in 2000, the intellectual historian Stefan Collini explored
the awkwardness – or perhaps even the absurdity – of higher education institutions like
his  own University  of  Cambridge having glossy mission statements  by  imagining a
hypothetical “mission statement” for a medieval monastery:
There’d no doubt be one bar graph showing the increasing number of souls
prayed for per annum, and another showing the declining value of the tithe;
there’d  perhaps  be  a  picture  of  a  saintly  elderly  monk  painstakingly
illuminating a manuscript, and certainly pictures of younger monks happily
planting vegetables and brewing beer; and of course there’d be a statement by
the prior about the efficiency gains that had been made by starting matins
earlier and ending vespers later. But wouldn’t all that leave you with just the
teensiest suspicion that something rather important about monasteries was
being omitted or misrepresented here? (Collini 2012, 140–141)
This quote comes from the published version of Collini's radio addresses, from a
2012 collection,  released in the waning ferment  of  the 2010-2011 reforms under the
Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  coalition  and  titled  What  Are  Universities  For? The
book's  title  poses  a  deceivingly  simple  question,  but,  as  with  many such queries,  a
multitude  of  answers  can  be  (and  have  been)  proffered  in  response  to  it.  Collini's
tongue-in-cheek monastery mission statement, framed as an analogy to contemporary
higher education captures an important aspect of recent developments in this age-old
debate, namely the sidelining of purposes for the university which are intrinsic to the
university itself. The medieval monastery, like the contemporary university, was a hive
of activity, but much of it could not be properly understood without an immersion into
the  deep  ethos upon which it  was  founded.  What  Collini  describes  is  a  perspective
which would result from a steely-eyed corporate consultant being transported through
time  to  this  cenobitic  community  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Yet,  without  grasping  the
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foundation of the contemplative community in the cycle of worship offered multiple
times a day – known as the Work of God (opus Dei) – one would be simply distracted by
the many other activities which may seem far more interesting or “useful” from the
hegemonic viewpoints in our current day, but which were in fact incidental rather than
essential.
However,  as  was  set  out  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  starting  point  of  our
genealogical enquiry is the present-day actuality of the university, and not an idealised
form. We have to accept that in the case of much top-down higher education policy –
whether at the level of elected government or individual institutions – the dominant
framework in which decisions are made is one where the university's reason for being is
found not in itself but rather its instrumental functions. This is, thus, the instrumentalist
viewpoint,  and  which  forms  the  logical  starting  point  of  our  investigation  in  this
chapter.  We  shall  first  define  and  outline  the  essence  of  this  perspective,  before
exploring its surge to prominence in the postwar period, and its centrality until  the
present day.
2.1 The University Without (its Own) Content
An  instrumentalist  perspective  of  higher  education  can  be  defined  as  an  approach
whereby the primary measure  of  the  value or  desirability  of  a  particular  university
policy  or  a  particular  set  of  practices  in  the  sphere  of  higher  education  is  its
consequences for the specific goals which have been pre-determined. The crude version
operates as follows: if the policy or set of practices advances these goals, then it is to be
favoured; if it has minimal positive effect upon or, worse still, hinders these goals, then
it is to be rejected or at least seriously called into question.1
1 It should be noted that this definition of instrumentalism differs slightly from the more conventional 
formulation in social theory of what is termed instrumental rationality or reason. Instrumental reason 
is generally defined as a mode of thought which focuses on finding the best means to a certain end, 
without enquiring into the value of that end. In Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer excoriated a 
particular version of this form of rationality, arguing that in it “[r]eason has become completely 
harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and nature, 
has been made the sole criterion” (Horkheimer 2013, 13). His specific critique here can be generalised 
to other forms of instrumental reason by simply replacing “the social process” and “the domination of
men and nature” with whatever end is chosen. The difference between this conception of 
instrumental reason and the definition of instrumentalism in this thesis is that the former focuses on 
the relationship between and relative importance of means and ends, whereas the latter is more 
concerned about how a particular policy or set of practices is evaluated. In other words, while a critic 
of instrumental reason might propose, as an alternative, a system of rationality in which both means 
and ends must be evaluated, or indeed (as Gandhi argued) brought into harmony, this is somewhat 
tangential to the nonetheless related question of what the measure of a particular policy should be.
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Hence, the essence of instrumentalism in higher education, in its most extreme
form,  is  that  the  university  is  merely  an  instrument  to  further  certain  ends,  and
therefore does not have intrinsic value – that is, it exists not for itself but for whatever
goals we may wish to set for it. The end-result of the purest version of this viewpoint is
that the university is emptied of whatever raison d'etre it may have previously been seen
as having, becoming a university without (its own) content.
In his seminal work,  The University in Ruins, published soon after his untimely
death in 1996, Bill Readings diagnosed in the university of the time a condition very
similar  to  what  we have named instrumentalism,  albeit  using his own terminology.
According to Readings, for most of the history of the modern university, its operations
had been characterised by being tied to what he called a referent, which was “a specific
set of things or ideas” which pulsated at the heart of the institution (Readings 1996, 17).
The predominant referent, whose definitive statement was made in the 19 th century by
Alexander von Humboldt, was that of  culture. The university, through its activities of
research and teaching, was “linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role
as producer, protector, and inculcator of an idea of national culture” (Readings 1996, 3).
However, beginning in the 1960s, Readings argues, the ideology of culture has
been gradually displaced from the heart of the university, and in its place we now have
a discourse of “excellence”  (Readings 1996, 3–4). This new central idea of excellence at
first  appears  to  be  something of  substance,  since  there  seems to  be  no shortage of
methods of measuring it. However, it is precisely due to this limitless multiplicity of
ways of measuring excellence that it is revealed as having no content of its own. This
content-free (non-)referent is particularly slippery, for as Readings puts it:
What  gets  taught  or  researched  matters  less  than  the  fact  that  it  be
excellently taught and researched. . 'Excellence' is like the cash-nexus in that
it has no content; it is hence neither true nor false, neither ignorant nor self-
conscious. It may be unjust, but we cannot seek its injustice in terms of a
regime of truth or self-knowledge. Its rule does not carry with it an automatic
political or cultural orientation, for it is not determined in relation to any
identifiable instance of political power. (Readings 1996, 13, italics in original)
Indeed, this non-referent of excellence is something we cannot oppose without
looking very odd or at least giving the appearance of mere cynicism. Thus, “we all agree
upon it because it is not an ideology, in the sense that it has no external referent or
internal content”  (Readings 1996, 23). If the pursuit of excellence in higher education
sounds  vague,  even  vacuous,  sub-divisions  of  such  excellence  are  often  no  less
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ambiguous, as Readings demonstrates with the following example: 
Cornell  University  Parking  Services  recently  received  an  award  for
“excellence  in  parking.”  What  this  meant  was  that  they  had  achieved  a
remarkable  level  of  efficiency  in  restricting motor  vehicle  access.  .
[E]xcellence could just as well have meant making people's lives easier by
increasing the number of parking spaces available. The issue here is not the
merits of either option but the fact that excellence can function equally well
as  an  evaluative  criterion  on  either  side  of  the  issue  of  what  constitutes
“excellence in parking,” because excellence has no content to call  its own.
(Readings 1996, 24, italics in original)
The underlying  emptiness  in  the  notion  of  excellence  brings  us  to  a  deeper
understanding of instrumentalism that may not be obvious in the more simplistic form
that was outlined at the start of this section, namely the fact that even if one selects an
apparently clear goal to be pursued in higher education policy and practice, such as the
facilitation of economic growth or simply being one of the “top universities” in the
country,  one's  progress  towards  that  end  cannot  actually  be  determined  other  than
through extremely crude metrics which can provide only rather inadequate or even
deceptive pictures of what is supposedly being measured. Pace Readings, however, what
he identifies as the discourse of excellence does not, in the British context, have its point
of invention in the 1960s,  but as we shall  see later in this  chapter,  already arose in
recognisable form in the immediate postwar period.
Hence, the irony is that even as instrumentalism attempts to evacuate the “soul”
of the university in order that external and measurable considerations may take the first
place, the mechanisms of measurement which are intended to steer the ship of higher
education  towards  these  goals  will  very  likely  turn  out  to  be  far  less  empirically-
rigorous than they appear at first sight.
However,  it  is important to note that the absence of specific content has not
prevented particular forms of content from overtaking others and muscling their way
into a central position. Although it is theoretically true that “excellence” in a particular
situation can be determined in multiple ways, more often than not it is instrumentalist
agendas of an economistic kind which have become generalised – that is, the sort of
excellence that has been pursued has been that which complies with the demands of the
sources  of  one's  funding,  whether  a  consumer  market,  a  bureaucratic  apparatus  or
something else.  Indeed,  where there  is  an apparent  vacuum of  sorts,  it  is  the  most
reductionist forms of ideology and practice which easily fill the space.
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Nevertheless,  returning to the broader  picture,  in  the history of  the  postwar
British university, the instrumentalist perspective has never attained – or, at least, has
yet to attain – such a degree of hegemony as to bring about a complete emptying of the
university's  inner  raison  d'etre  as  in  the  hypothetical  extreme  we  have  just  briefly
described. Instead, it  has co-existed alongside idealist perspectives of many kinds, as
well as, to a less obvious extent, perspectives focused on the university community. As
we have seen, however,  this co-existence has as its  paradoxical  partner the peculiar
condition in which each type of perspective can only be employed at any given moment
to the exclusion of the others.
Nevertheless,  it  is  quite  clear  the wind of  instrumentalism has been blowing
strongly in our direction for some time, and with apparently ever-increasing ferocity.
Wherever we turn in the university today, we find instrumentalist concerns of all kinds:
research is not only to be rated and ranked, but is rewarded if it has “impact;” teaching
is  measured not  by any intrinsic  qualities  but  according to  student  satisfaction; the
funding system is  designed in order to drive costs down while driving “quality” up
through the operation of market rationality; and so on. Although we, to quote a bard of
the 1960s, “don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows” (Dylan 1965),
we nevertheless might want to know why this particular stiff gale has been howling at
us so incessantly, as well as where it comes from and when it began. For this some
meteorological history may be helpful, and so it is to this history that we now turn.
2.2 Postwar Keynesianism and the Dawn of Economistic Instrumentalism
According to one common narrative of postwar higher education, the period from the
first Attlee government until circa 1979-1981 was one in which the vision of a “public
university” reigned and government funding was provided to realise such a vision, with
“public” here seen as the anti-thesis of the gradual “marketisation” or “privatisation”
that followed. Various versions of this thesis can be found across the literature. To give
just a few examples, A. H. Halsey wrote that the supply of public monies for university
expansion were reduced “for the first time, at least in living memory” by “a monetarist,
market-oriented government” (Halsey 1995, 108). Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney,
while recognising the problems of this narrative, nevertheless identified the year 1981 as
the  starting  point  of  “a  period  of  change  in  which  the  finance,  government  and
substantive content of higher education was subjected to. radical changes” (Kogan and
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Hanney 2000, 45–48). Finally, in a recent study triggered by the latest wave of higher
education reform under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, Roger Brown and
Helen Carasso have stated that  the  “process  of  marketisation may be  seen to  have
commenced with the Thatcher Government's  announcement in November 1979 that,
from the following academic year, students from overseas would no longer enjoy a fee
subsidy” (R. Brown and Carasso 2013, 3).2
The picture  that  emerges  from a  reading  of  these  texts  can  be  described  as
follows: we first have a gradually expanding public university imbued with the values of
the  postwar  consensus,  brought  into  being  by  the  first  Attlee  government  but
subsequently honoured by governments both Tory and Labour, which consisted of a
collectivist politics whose central pillars were a welfare state and a mixed economy;3
this was however brought to an end by a rupture with this consensus during the first
Thatcher government which set in train the move towards a “neoliberal university.”
Nevertheless, this relatively uncomplicated narrative of what happened and how
we got  here  can lead to rather  problematic  political  conclusions as  to  what  sort  of
university we ought to be fighting for, which will be discussed more fully in Chapter
Three. In brief, if there were two great breaks in the history of the postwar university,
and if we find the second break the dawn of a ghastly marketised and privatised system,
then it is far too easy to conclude that the solution is to return to the public values seen
as exemplifying in the first break, thus overlooking – or even ignoring – what Matthew
Charles has identified as “a fundamental contradiction [that] exists between capitalism
(and  not  merely  its  neoliberal  version)  and  a  mass,  modern  and  [truly]  public  [i.e.
popular]4 higher education system” (Charles 2012, 56, italics in original).
Hence,  in  the  next  section  of  this  chapter,  an  alternative  story  of  the
development of the contemporary university will be put forward, which contests the
ostensible  break  between  a  “public  university”  of  the  postwar  consensus  and  a
“neoliberal university” of the Thatcher and post-Thatcher period that is still our present.
2 This was the logical end-point of the initial step which seriously called into question the “value of an 
overseas student presence,” namely the introduction by the Labour government of higher (but still 
partially subsided) fees for overseas students in 1966-1967 (Lee 1998, 320).
3 Various historians of British politics have explored this postwar consensus, but its classic statement 
can arguably be found in Samuel H. Beer's Modern British Politics (Beer 1965). Other monographs 
which deal with the subject include Beer 1982; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Addison 1994; Marquand 
1988; K. O. Morgan 2001.
4 The words “truly” and “i.e. popular” are inserted here as a gloss to indicate some divergence from 
Charles' enduring faith in the concept of the public as a rallying point for a radical vision of the 
university.
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The narrative will show that the elements of the neoliberal university which proponents
of  a  welfare  statist  public  university  find  most  abhorrent  in  fact  originated  in  the
immediate postwar period itself. In other words, there was no paradise followed by a
fall, because the seeds of the fall were already sown in the very making of “paradise.”
Before we proceed, however, it should be noted that although state investment in
higher education overlaps partially with both the welfare state and economic planning,
and hence with the history and debates of those aspects of postwar reconstruction, it
contains specificities which make it a sui generis case of sorts. While public funding of
postwar higher education can be considered part of the wider effort to reduce inequality
in British society through the slow but steady opening up of a hitherto elitist institution,
it  was not  originally  conceived as  an essential  or  even a secondary element  of  the
“cradle to the grave” welfare state that arose out of the Beveridge Report. With regards
to the five “giant evils” which Beveridge diagnosed as plaguing Britain at the time, it is
arguably possible  to  subsume the  expansion of  higher  education as  an attack upon
Ignorance.5 Nevertheless,  although Beveridge was  most  concerned  with  the form of
ignorance which would prevent citizens from fully participating in the institutions of
democracy,  given  the  more  pressing  problems  in  the  provision  of  primary  and
secondary education, the issue of university expansion – or, in contemporary idiom,
widening participation in higher education – was clearly not seen as a priority and
received no discussion  (Beveridge 1942, para. 456). The primary impetus for such an
expansion would come from a different source, namely the Barlow Report, discussed
further below, which made the case in the language of economic competitiveness rather
than welfare. Regardless of all this, the more recent and ongoing changes to university
funding and regulation have been and are associated, in the eyes of many of its critics,
with what is seen as the wider dismantling of the postwar welfare state.
Likewise,  the  injection  of  public  funding  into  the  university  system  in  the
postwar  period  was in no sense  directly  associated –  in  the minds of  those  in the
government,  the  civil  service  or  indeed  the  public  at  large  –  with  the  wider  effort
towards nationalisation. However, there are nevertheless certain parallels between the
postwar university funding system and the policies of the first Attlee government which
involved the expansion of public ownership as well as attempts to introduce elements of
state  planning  within  the  British  economy.  It  was  these  parallels  that  led  to  John
5 The other four “great evils” were Want, Disease, Squalor and Idleness.
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Carswell's comment that the widening of the University Grant Committee's terms of
reference and accompanying changes to the composition of its personnel in 1946 could
be considered a “quiet  measure of  nationalisation”  (Carswell  1985,  14).  These partial
links to the welfare state and national policy complicate any discussion of developments
in the British university since the Second World War, but have to be accommodated
rather  than dodged.  Having clarified this  matter,  it  is  time to  begin  our  alternative
narrative of the postwar British university.
The Myth of the Two Ruptures
Although the focus of this thesis is on the university of postwar Britain, it is impossible
to examine its development without situating it within the wider context in related and
interpenetrating spheres such as the social, the economic and the political – that is, the
“network of alliances, communications, and points of support” of which Foucault wrote
(Foucault  2009,  117).  As  the  historian  of  British  higher  education  Michael  Shattock
opined in a discussion of how best to periodise the postwar university's history into a
coherent narrative, “Perhaps the most reliable interpretation is that the development of
British higher education closely mirrors the development of post-War British history,
political, economic and social. In other words, its development should not be seen as a
[specific] progression, as such, but as a reflection of wider currents of economic and
social change”  (Shattock 2012, 7). Having made this bold pronouncement, however, at
the outset of his extremely detailed chronicle of higher education policy since 1945,
Shattock restricts  his  engagement with the wider  scene of  postwar Britain to brief,
calculated forays, keeping the technicalities of higher education always at the centre.
This  thesis,  concerned as  it  is  with conceptualising  the  overarching and underlying
structure of the postwar university, will be less cautious and more promiscuous than the
accounts that have been hitherto provided by scholars of higher education (e.g. Stewart
1989; Tight 2009).6 Thus, it is necessary for us to devote some space here to the broader
6 W. A. C. Stewart's Higher Education in Postwar Britain, published in 1989, sets out to give “an historic 
sequence of developments which have taken place in universities, colleges of education and 
institutions of technical education in [the United Kingdom] particularly since 1945” as well as offer 
“some reasons for the changes and the present position. and [try] in some measure to look ahead” 
(Stewart 1989, ix). Chapters are organised in a chronological order, considering one decade after 1945 
at a time (e.g. “the 1950s,” “the 1960s,” etc.), and Stewart asserts in his preface that his is the first book 
of its kind (Stewart 1989, ix). Malcolm Tight's 2009 book, The Development of Higher Education in the 
United Kingdom since 1945, positions itself specifically as “an accessible, up-to-date, comprehensive, 
single-volume guide to the development of higher education in the UK since 1945,” an undertaking 
which Tight considers to not have resulted in any publication since Stewart's 1989 monograph (Tight 
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picture, before zooming back into the specific sphere of higher education.
In many ways, the strength of what we may call the dominant “two ruptures”
understanding of the postwar university outlined above is that it dovetails with a wider
narrative of British society which can be seen, in what is arguably one of its starkest
forms, in Ken Loach's documentary The Spirit of '45 (Loach 2013). The storytelling force
of this particularly strident statement of the view of the postwar period as divided into a
broadly  social  democratic  period  followed  by  a  neoliberal  long  revolution  was
succinctly captured in a review in the  Irish Times which pointed out that  “the film
allows in no dissenting voices.  Forget thesis,  antithesis and synthesis.  This is thesis,
thesis and more thesis” (D. Clarke 2013).
The film provides a visual chronicle of the policies of the Labour government led
by Clement Attlee, from its 1945 landslide victory to its extension in state policy of the
wartime system of centralised governance to peacetime. This resulted in, inter alia, the
creation of the National Health Service, a vigorous programme of housing development,
the  expansion  of  social  security  and  the  nationalisation  of  sectors  including  the
transportation system, the mining of resources and the provision of electricity. Through
interviews with people who lived through the war and the post-war social democratic
reforms, we hear stories of working class folk who felt their struggles in the preceding
decades had finally borne actual fruit. From usually tough miners weeping underground
when told  of  the  results  of  the  general  election  to  doctors  joyfully  announcing  to
patients that they no longer had to go without medical treatment due to lack of means,
the electrifying circumstances of the time for many is recalled in moving image.
The mood, however, shifts to a much bleaker tone in the last third of the film as
it deals with the Thatcher period and what has followed. Following footage of Margaret
Thatcher  quoting  St  Francis  of  Assisi  outside  10  Downing  Street  after  her  election
victory,  the  first  words  of  the  next  interviewee,  consultant  radiologist  and  public
2009, 1). In contrast to the latter, however, Tight organises his chapters according to themes, such as 
“policy and funding,” “research and knowledge,” and “the student experience.” This is a method clearly
influenced by the four-volume A History of the University in Europe edited by Hilde de Ridder-
Symeons and Walter Rüegg, which Tight himself praises in his Researching Higher Education 
(Malcolm 2012, 125). It would be fair to say that although the time period examined in this thesis, i.e. 
“since 1945,” is akin to that which was dealt with by Stewart and Tight in their respective books, the 
overall methodology adopted here is far less empirical and more conceptual and critical. If pushed to 
categorise this thesis under Tight's classifications of recent higher education research on “system 
policy” in Researching Higher Education (Malcolm 2012, 117–131), the work presented here would 
probably fall in between “the policy context,” “national policies” and “historical policy studies,” 
although its Karatanian/Foucauldian methodological foundations is a distinctive characteristic.
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healthcare campaigner Dr Jacky Davis, are, “Along came Thatcher, and suddenly it was
all about the individual. You know, the important thing was let's get rich and it's all
about me” (Loach 2013, 1:08:35-38). The remainder of the film tracks developments such
as the privatisation of various industries,  the dismantling of trade union power and
identity  as  well  as  the  rise  of  outsourcing,  before  ending  for  an  impassioned  plea,
juxtaposing the words of interviewees with footage of Clement Attlee's  first  victory
speech, to return to the collectivist ideals which are represented by “1945.”
The Spirit of '45 is useful to us as an example of the “two ruptures narrative” at its
purest. It thus opens the way to questioning the narrative as a whole, a task which is
less  straight-forward  with  more  sophisticated  versions  of  the  story.  It  would  be  a
mistake, however, to consider our operation here to be erecting Loach's film as a straw
man. Not only is the film, with its embodied interviews, clearly far from made of straw,
in its  approximation to a Weberian ideal  type,  it  effectively  represents  others in its
tradition.7
To return, now, to one of the problems of the film which was gestured towards at
the  beginning  of  the  last  paragraph,  the  straight-forward  depiction  of  the  Attlee
government  as  enacting  a  socialist  programme  obscures  the  deeper  reality  of  the
changes in British society at the time. It is undoubtedly true that in the minds of many
in the Labour Party of the time, as well as many of their supporters, what they were
doing was nothing less than building socialism within a framework of representative
democracy. In his speech at the celebration of the Labour landslide victory at Methodist
Central  Hall  in  the evening after  the government had been formed,  Clement  Attlee
declared, to loud cheers, what seemed to be an obvious fact: it was “the first time in the
history of [the United Kingdom] that a Labour movement with a  socialist policy” had
been elected with a working majority (Loach 2013, 26:06-18).
Nevertheless, in actual fact, what was eventually rolled out after the election was
an amalgamation of some elements of “supply-side” socialism with a broader framework
that  can be  more  accurately  described  as  Keynesian.  Hence,  it  can be  said  that  the
postwar Attlee government was in its  actual policies closer to the  liberal socialism of
John Maynard Keynes, rather than the proletarian socialism of Karl Marx which was
7 “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints 
into a unified analytical construct” (Weber 1949, 90).
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more  influential  even  among  non-Communist  socialists  on  the  Continent,  the
technocratic Fabian socialism of Beatrice and Sidney Webb, or even the ethical socialism
of R. H. Tawney which was so beloved by early British Labour figures such as Keir
Hardie. This is despite that fact that, by most accounts, Attlee himself identified with the
latter tradition  (Howell 2006, 130–132; Thomas-Symonds 2010, 15; Field 2009, xli). The
key point for us here is that Keynes' version of socialism was far more instrumentalist
than its “competitors.” Whereas the guild socialism of thinkers such as G. D. H. Cole had
broader ideals such as industrial democracy and the ethical socialists were concerned
with a renewal of human conscience, the liberal socialism of Keynes placed at its heart
the issue of efficiency. In his 1924/1926 lecture, “The End of Laissez-Faire,” he argued
that “capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be more efficient for attaining economic
ends than any alternative system yet in sight” (Keynes 1926, 41).
To advance the argument that the only socialism the Attlee government brought
about  was one of  a Keynesian variety,  it  is  necessary for  us to focus on the actual
content and effects of the policies in question, rather than the more strident and purist
rhetoric that preceded, accompanied and subsequently justified them. After all, the gap
between intentions and results in politics is often closer to a canyon than a comfortable
margin. This rather banal truism, however, may be enlightened by an interpretation of
Nietzsche's famous dictum that “the deed is everything”  (Nietzsche 1967, 45). A more
recent  translation  of  the  passage  from which  the  phrase  comes  from  renders  it  as
follows: “[T]here is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; ‘the
doer’ is invented as an after-thought, – the doing is everything”  (Nietzsche 2007, 26).
According to Robert M. Pippin, “Nietzsche is not denying that there is a subject of the
deed. He is just asserting that it is not separate, distinct from the activity itself; it is 'in'
the deed. . [As he writes in] Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 'I wish your self were in the deed
like the mother is in the child.'” (Pippin 2010, 75–76). The lesson we may draw is this:
Intention formation and articulation are always temporally fluid, altering and
transformable “on the go,” as it were, as events in a project unfold. I may start
out engaged in a project understanding my intention as X, and over time,
come to understand that this first characterization was not really an accurate
or a full description of what I intended; it must have been Y, or later perhaps
Z. And there is no way to confirm the certainty of one’s “real” purpose except
in the deed actually performed. My subjective construal at any time before or
during the deed has no privileged authority. The deed  alone can show who
one is, what one is actually committed to, despite what one sincerely avows.
(Pippin 2010, 78)
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Thus,  the  stated  intentions  and  official  sources  of  inspiration  for  the  Attlee
government's policies which laid the foundations of the British university after the war
and the rest of the postwar consensus are less important than an analysis of their deeds
and what  it  reveals  to us  regarding the vision and actuality  of  socialism contained
within them.8
Keynes Contra Fabianism et al.: The Pattern of the Postwar Consensus
Harold Lever, the barrister and Labour Party politician, stated the following in an article
in Tribune in 1949:
Two schools of thought are battling for the allegiance of the Labour Party.
Both schools believe that Labour’s political and economic aims can only be
achieved by Socialist planning. One School. insists that our plans must be
more or less permanently based upon direct physical control of the country’s
production and consumption. but the second school would rely mainly on
the use of budgetary and other financial measures . . . to achieve the plans
with the minimum of physical controls. (Francis 1997, 38)
Here we have, in summary, the two main strands of Labour thought upon the
question of planning and nationalisation. The former can be traced back to,  inter alia,
the Fabianism of Beatrice and Sidney Webb whereas the latter finds its genesis in the
liberal  socialist  ideas  of  thinkers  such  as  James  Meade,  who themselves  draw their
strength in a large measure from the ideas of Keynes (Jackson 2012).9 In his survey of
ideas and practices of political economy in the British Labour movement from 1884 to
the 2000s, Noel Thompson argues that although senior figures in the Attlee government
such as Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Attlee himself favoured a
more directive, micro-economic form of planning which would take place in tandem
with a strongly nationalised system of industry and other forms of state intervention,
the constellation of circumstances and early decisions in which the Labour Party's 1945
8 The approach taken here is indebted to an article by Cui Zhiyuan which draws from Pippin's reading 
of Nietzsche to justify an analysis of the Chongqing Experiment – a novel approach to urban and 
rural development that was pioneered in the direct-controlled municipality of Chongqing from the 
mid-2000s to 2012 – according to the theories of Henry George, James Meade and Antonio Gramsci. 
In his words, “It does not mean that the participants have deliberately followed these theories, only 
that their deeds are consistent with the theories” (Cui 2011, 648).
9 It should be noted, however, that Keynes was not the Almighty fount of all that has become 
associated with his name. For example, David Vines has argued that Meade had a significant role in 
the development of Keynes' ideas in The General Theory of Interest, Employment and Money through 
the former's involvement in the circle of younger economists who were gathered around Keynes at 
Cambridge, known as the “Circus,” and who in the early 1930s were debating Keynes' 1930 Treatise on
Money (Vines 2007). It is important, thus, to recognise even in early Keynesianism a school of thought
originating from Keynes but not completely tied to him as a single, atomised individual.
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manifesto was to be played out – including the weak form, institutionally-speaking, of
nationalisation  which  was  chosen,  an  emphasis  on  tripartite  consensus  between
management,  trade unions  and government as  well  as  a  lack of  willingness  by the
government to pursue the deep institutional reforms required for centralised planning –
resulted  in  the  ascendency  of  the  macro-economic,  demand  management  approach
ultimately premised upon Keynesianism (Thompson 2006, 139–142). The end-result was
that,  in  his  evocative  turn of  phrase,  “[i]nstead  of  the  pure  milk  of  socialism,  [the
Labour Party] had resorted to offering a semi-skimmed variety” (Thompson 2006, 4).
Most of us are familiar with nationalisation and planning of the centralised form,
partly due to its relatively simple logic: egalitarian public property replaces inegalitarian
private  property,  while  rational  planning  replaces  the  irrational  market.  The actual
intricacies of putting this logic into action are, of course, far more complicated, but the
essence of the vision is clear. With regards to liberal socialism, however, complications
arise even in attempting to describe it in brief. To say that the market can be employed
for the achievement of socialist objectives is an interesting proposition but one which
flew directly against the mainstream of left-wing thought in the nineteenth century and
at least the first half of the twentieth. Yet it was this marriage of markets and social
justice which was to triumph over both  laissez-faire and state socialism in the three
decades  after  the  war.  In  the  British  scene,  there  were  a  number  of  writers  who
beginning in the 1920s onward espoused varieties of this perspective, including J. A.
Hobson, John Strachey and Oswald Mosley. The specifics of their respective proposals
for a liberal socialism varied to a considerable extent, which enlivened the debates on
the  British  left  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  However,  the  intellectual  force  of  liberal
socialism,  when  it  was  actually  incorporated  into  the  postwar  consensus,  was
undoubtedly that of Keynes.10 It is for this reason that in this section we shall focus on
Keynes' writings on what, in a 1924 article, he termed a “true socialism of the future;”
that is, a “politico-economic evolution” grounded upon “co-operation between private
10 Although Keynes was not seen as a natural ally due to his ideological differences with the Labour 
Party over essential matters – we should remember that Keynes was a Bloomsbury Set elitist who had
a generally negative perception of the working-class, whom he regarded as “boorish” (Dostaler 1996, 
21) – it was the filtration of his ideas through more overtly left-wing writers such as Hobson that 
made it palatable to Labourites. In Peter Clarke's words, “[i]t was Keynes with a Hobsonian twist 
[which] remedied the scientific deficiencies of Hobson's analysis and the ideological deficiencies of 
Keynes's” (P. Clarke 1981, 274). It should, however, be noted that among the influential interventions 
in Labour debates in the 1930s were books written by James Meade and Douglas Jay which were very 
clearly Keynesian in inspiration: Meade 1936; Jay 1937.
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initiative and the public exchequer” (Keynes 1981, 219–223).
It may come to some as a surprise that Keynes ever espoused socialism, even one
of a liberal variety, given the conventional view of him as the saviour of capitalism. This
conventional  view  is,  in  part,  quite  correct.  Keynes  did  not  have  a  problem  with
capitalism per se, but only with what he saw as the problems of its laissez-faire variety.
It  is  also  true  that  he  was  not  primarily  concerned  with  equity  in  how capitalism
functioned, but rather with efficiency. Faced with the bipolar disorder of boom and bust
in capitalism, his primary prescription was counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy,
which would function akin to mood stabilising drugs, “abolishing slumps” and keeping
the economy “permanently in a quasi-boom”  (Keynes 1936, 322).11 After all,  given a
choice, only the most gung-ho of manic depressives prefer to retain their wild mood
swings.  Most, like Keynes,  prefer a policy which allows for the evasion of crushing
depressions, even if it means sacrificing the joyful exuberance of manic periods. After
all,  a steady state of “quasi boom” is, in theory and when realised in practice, more
efficient than a mercurial sequence of bubbles and crashes.
However, while it is also the case that Keynes was, in some ways, concerned
with issues of equity and social justice, these were always secondary to efficiency. In
“The End of Laissez-Faire,” he takes his distance from “doctrinaire State socialism. not
because it seeks to engage men's altruistic impulses in the service of society, or because
it departs from laissez-faire, or because it takes away from man's natural liberty to make
a million, or because it has courage for bold experiments;” indeed, he states that he
applauds “[a]ll these things” (Keynes 1926, 40). What he took issue with was rather its
irrelevance, as he saw it, to the economic problems of the time. State socialism, in his
view, was “little better than a dusty survival of a plan to meet the problems of fifty years
ago, based on a misunderstanding of what someone said a hundred years ago” (Keynes
1926, 40). In other words, it was incapable of achieving its aims, and thus failed the test
of instrumentalist efficiency. For Keynes, visions of socialism other than his own were
not  to  be  rejected  because  they  sacrificed  a  particular  understanding  of  individual
liberty, nor was laissez-faire to be rejected because of its economic injustice. They were
both  to  be  rejected  because  they  were  too  ideological,  and  were  thus,  practically-
11 It is perhaps instructive to note that during the period of the Great Depression which Keynes wrote 
some of his most enduring works, a journal article in the Psychological Review attempted to explain 
the cycle of boom and bust as being akin to “a patient suffering from a manic-depressive psychosis, in
which the boom period parallels the manic phase and the subsequent slump parallels the depressive 
phase” (J. J. B. Morgan 1935).
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speaking, ineffective instruments for the goals which they sought to bring about.
Hence, while Keynes' liberal socialism shared with other versions of the creed
the  general  belief  that  the  private  and  the  public  could  be  harmonised  towards  an
effective realisation of socially just aims, its particularity lay in the fact that pragmatism
trumped idealism at every point in which they came into conflict. An integral part of
this pragmatism was a technocratic perspective, whereby persons of expertise were to
oversee the workings of a complex machinery of state and quasi-state institutions. In his
address to the Liberal Summer School in 1925, he spoke these words which were not
included in the version originally published at the time:
I believe that in the future, more than ever, questions about the economic
framework of society will be far and away the most important of political
issues. I believe that the right solution will involve intellectual and scientific
elements which must above the heads of the vast majority of more or less
illiterate voters. Now, in a democracy, every party alike has to depend on this
mass of ill-understanding voters, and no party will attain power unless it can
win the confidence of those by persuading them in a general  way that it
intends to promote their interests or that it intends to gratify their passions.
. [However,] [w]ith strong leadership the techniques, as distinguished from
the main principles of policy could still be dictated from above. (Keynes 1972,
295–296, italics added)
Here  we  have  one  of  the  interesting  characteristics  of  the  instrumentalist
perspective, namely its association with elitism. Instrumentalism as a whole, due to its
obsession  with  efficiency  and  results,  often  leads  to  top-down  and  indeed  anti-
democratic procedures for formulating and executing policy.  It  is important to note,
however,  that  although  Keynes'  ideal  system  was  not micro-management  by  state
bureaucrats  via  directed  planning,  nevertheless  the  combination  of  centralised  and
decentralised management which he advocated could only be successfully carried out
by those deemed to be experts. All this was certainly the case with the institutional
model of nationalisation which the Attlee government put into place, and likewise for
the structure of the postwar university, with its central organ in terms of planning and
co-ordination being the technocratic University Grants Committee and its successors,
and its partners being the ranks of management in each higher education institution.
The  conception  of  nationalisation  which  was  theorised  by  the  Fabians  was
grounded on the idea that the “taking over of the great centralized industries” (Besant
1891,  II.2.10) would  enable  “the  substitution  of  consciously  regulated  co-ordination
among the units of each organism for their internecine competition”  (Webb 1896, 5).
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This was public ownership and planning of  a decidedly statist  sort.  Keynes did not
believe such a system was the right one, and in the interests of efficiency supported a
rather different form of  public enterprise founded upon the “management by public
boards with statutory powers” which would be “along the lines of 'semi-autonomous'
corporations” (O’Donnell 1999, 158). Although the public board or corporation is linked
most notably to the Labour politician Herbert Morrison, who famously made the case
for  such  a  model  of  nationalisation  in  his  1933  book,  Socialisation  and  Transport
(Morrison 1933), Keynes had already been putting a similar case from the latter half of
the 1920s. Keynes' conception of the “semi-autonomous corporation” was a middle way
of sorts in between centralised statism and  laissez-faire,  anchored on an idea of the
“public,” which, as will be discussed further below, was wider than the standard idea of
the  state  and yet  very  much detached  from the  profit  principle.12 In  a  1927 lecture
entitled “The Public and the Private Concern,” Keynes argued for the management of
public  enterprise  by  boards  at  a  distance  from  the  political  elements  of  the  state,
comprised  of  those  “chosen  solely  for  their  business  capacity”  and  “adequately
remunerated,” thus combining “the advantages of public ownership and responsibility”
with “the technical methods of management which private enterprise had evolved as
the most efficient for large-scale affairs” (Our Special Correspondent 1927). It was this
vision which was ultimately to prevail in the postwar consensus, rather than that of
many other writers who considered themselves true socialists.
However, it has already been stated that while there were parallels between the
establishment  of  postwar  instrumentalism  in  the  universities  and  wider  efforts  at
nationalisation,  there  were  also  obvious  divergences.  In  no  sense  was  there  the
establishment of a National Universities Board under which regional boards carried out
their work. However, it is instructive that in one of his earliest public pieces on the
subject, Keynes identified the universities as one of the two already-existing examples
of institutions in Britain that embodied his “socialism of the future” (Keynes 1925). Like
12 It should be noted that another alternative which was put forward in the 1920s to resolve the 
opposition between state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism was the guild socialism of writers such
as G. D. H. Cole, who advocated a decentralised system of industry and enterprise which would be 
characterised by workers' control in organisation and management (Cole 1920). Keynes, of course, 
was not persuaded by anything of the sort due to his lack of faith in the capacities of the ordinary 
worker. Cole's vision, in its essence, was of a type which fell foul of Keynes general critique of 
socialisms other than his own, as it “preferred the mud to the fish [and] exalts the boorish proletariat 
above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely
carry the seeds of all human advancement” (Keynes 1931).
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his other primary example, the Bank of England, despite their legal status as private
entities, they had “immense prestige and historical tradition,” but did not “in fact [work]
for private profit,” and had “no interest whatever except the public good” while being
“detached from the wayward influence of politics” (Keynes 1925). It should be noted that
despite Keynes' likening of the universities to the Bank of England, their respective fates
were to be rather different in postwar Britain, at least in legal status. While the former
remained independent, the latter was nationalised by the Attlee government in 1946.
Nevertheless,  despite  their  status  as  private  bodies,  the  universities  in  the
postwar period became even more part of the state, according to Keynes' definition of
the term. Robert Skidelsky has argued that for Keynes, the state was not “a synonym for
the 'government of the day',” or “those institutions which are conventionally located in
the 'public sector'” but rather the “network of institutions whose stake in the proper
functioning of the economy and society was so deep and extensive that their corporate
actions were not determined by motives of short-term profit maximization” (Skidelsky
1997, 434).  How does a private institution, driven by short-term profit maximization
transform into a public one,  according to Keynes? To explain this,  Skidelsky quotes
Keynes' letter of 26 March 1925 to  The Times, already referred to above, in which the
latter argued that “when a  corporation,  devised by private resources,  has  reached a
certain age and a certain size, it socialises itself, or falls into decay” (Keynes 1925).13
It  is  somewhat  telling,  however,  that  Skidelsky  ends  the  quote  before  this
comment  by  Keynes:  “As  time  goes  on  not  a  few  of  the  institutions  which  were
individualistic  experiments are socializing themselves.  But none, perhaps,  except  the
Bank of England — and (should I add?)  The Times newspaper — has yet completed the
process” (Keynes 1925, italics added). Although probably written in a somewhat tongue-
in-cheek manner, and hence unequal to his other two examples of the universities and
the Bank of England, Keynes' regard for The Times of its day as a public institution, even
13 In this Keynes was, in a sense, on the same side as the Fabians, who believed that the mergers of 
private enterprises into large trusts was part of a process of socialisation. The difference, of course, 
was that for the Fabians the creation of these large firms was merely a stepping stone to full public 
nationalisation – in Annie Besant's words, “centrali[sation] for us by capitalists, who thus 
unconsciously pave the way for their own supersession” (Besant 1891, II.2.10) – whereas for Keynes 
such a step was anathema as he understood socialisation in terms of investment, that is, in the gradual
transformation in the managerial culture of large joint-stock companies from being focused on 
shareholder profits to a more public ethos as a result of a sense of accountability to the wider society. 
Neither managed to foresee the endurance and further development of the contemporary multi-
national and transnational corporations in the latter half of the 20th century, larger than any great 
centralised industry preceding it, and much further from any notion or actuality of socialisation, 
whether that of formal ownership in the Fabian sense or of investment in Keynes' sense.
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laying aside the elitist perspective from which it springs, nevertheless speaks to our
times. For we live, after all, in the era of the British press in which the 1981 acquisition
of  the  newspaper  by  Rupert  Murdoch's  News  UK  (formerly  known  as  News
International)  and  its  subsequent  deployment  for  not  only  short-term  profit
maximisation but also political  manoeuvring has completely taken it  out of Keynes'
definition of what it means for an entity to have a “public” character, which, we should
remember, had as its two pillars transcendence beyond the profit motive into the realm
of the public good and freedom from the pernicious influence of politics.
In the tale of Keynes' third example of an institution prefiguring his “socialism of
the future,” we may draw a lesson which also applies to his second example and our
subject  of  interest:  the  university.  This  lesson  is  that  any  entity  which  appears  to
transcend narrow interests can easily revert to a focus on the bottom line, especially
when at  risk  of  bankruptcy  and  closure.  The financial  difficulties  which  led  to  the
Thomson Corporation selling  The Times to Murdoch's News International mirror the
present  consumer-oriented turn of  the  British  university,  imperilled as  many of  the
individual institutions of the latter are in terms of funding particularly since the latest
round of reforms beginning in 2010 under the watch of former Universities Minister
David Willetts. So long as we live in a social formation where capitalism predominates,
an  orientation towards  the  common can only  take  place  in  a  situation of  financial
stability, and therefore it is of immense importance how any institution is funded. The
more it is dependent on a single source – whether a private owner or the state – the
more susceptible it is to being thrown into a crisis when that source begins to run dry.
Dependence on a primary external source for one's funding is also the crux of a
focus on instrumentalism. In the days where money flowed from the University Grants
Committee and its successors, the university, despite its officially independent status
and significant degree of autonomy, had to ultimately toe the line whenever its funding
was at stake. This it did quite readily so long as its broader independence was respected
– for example with regards to the ear-marked grants for specific fields of study in the
1947-1952 quinquennium (Shattock 1994, 3) – but as greater pressures built up from the
1980s onwards, the character of its operations began to change. The nature of research,
in particular, was transformed with the advent of the Research Assessment Exercise.
With each rise in fees and concomitant decrease of state funding, instrumentalist policy
has shifted to pleasing its new source of sustenance to live and move and have its being:
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the student-consumer, whose most potent individual threat is to simply take its custom
elsewhere and whose heftiest collective weapon is the National Student Survey, with its
potential impact on choice of future consumers. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
Before we can speak of the development of instrumentalism in the postwar university,
we must first chronicle its emergence into the limelight.
The Beginnings of Economistic Instrumentalism in the Postwar University
It is often said that it is during times of crisis – that is, the moments characterised by
extraordinary circumstances – that seismic shifts in policy are made possible. In the case
of the gradually-increasing role of state funding in the sphere of higher education, it
was the Second World War which provided the ideal environment for its ascendency, as
well as that of the instrumentalist ethos which both accompanied and outlived it.
Prior to the outbreak of war, only 30% of the recurrent income of universities
came from government coffers, while as for capital grants, state funds channelled to
universities made up only £500,000 between 1923-1929 as compared to the £3,320,000 in
endowments during the same period (Owen 1981; quoted in Shattock 1994, 1). Turning
to the first quinquennium after the war, we find that the sum of recurrent grants alone
from the Treasury to the universities in 1950-1951 was triple the figure in 1945-1946,
that is, £15,222,408 as compared to £5,149,000 (Owen 1981; quoted in Shattock 1994, 1).
By the end of the 1940s, funding from the government made up 63.9% of the entire
income of universities, in contrast to just 35.8% in 1938-1939 (Berdahl 1959, 201–202).
This  sea-change  in  the  higher  education  funding  landscape  was  in  part  a
somewhat unintentional product of the war, a historical period as contingent as any
other. The war had led to the deterioration of university education through both damage
to infrastructure from the Battle of Britain as well as the dispersal of academics and
students either throughout the armed forces and other branches of national service or,
in the case of those who did not serve, around the country. However, by the end of the
war, the national mood had shifted significantly enough that what was to follow during
the period of reconstruction could in no true sense be described as unintentional. In
December 1945, the Attlee government appointed a committee and gave it the task of
assessing the state of higher education, particularly in relation to the provision of “man-
power”  for  scientific  research  and  advancement.  In  May  1946,  the  report  of  the
committee was released, officially titled Scientific Man-power but colloquially known as
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the Barlow Report after its chair,  Sir Alan Barlow, who was at the time the Second
Secretary to the Treasury.14 On the very first page of the report the Committee declared:
We do not think that it is necessary to preface our report by stating at length
the case for developing our scientific resources. . By way of introduction,
therefore, we confine ourselves to pointing out that least of all nations can
Great  Britain afford to neglect  whatever  benefits  the scientists  can confer
upon her. If we are to maintain our position in the world and restore and
improve our standard of living, we have no alternative but to strive for that
scientific  achievement  without  which  our  trade  will  wither,  our  Colonial
Empire will  remain undeveloped and our lives and freedom will  be at the
mercy of a potential aggressor. (Barlow 1946, 3)
In December 1946,  seven months after the Barlow Report was published, the
Parliamentary and Scientific Committee – an unofficial and rather large body composed
of Parliamentarians and representatives from the scientific world – published a report of
its  own.  The  document  supported  almost  all  the  recommendations  of  the  Barlow
Committee, and its Summary ended with the following words in capitals:
THE  REQUIRED  EXPANSION  OF  THE  UNIVERSITIES  WILL  ONLY  BE
ACHIEVED  –  AND  ACHIEVED  IN  TIME  –  IF  GOVERNMENT  HELP  IS
FORTHCOMING ON A BOLD AND GENEROUS SCALE – AND WITHOUT
DELAY. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ALONE HOWEVER WILL NOT SUFFICE
UNDER  PRESENT  CONDITIONS.  .  WITHOUT  SUCH  HELP  WE  CAN
NEVER SECURE THAT RAPID AND SUSTAINED INCREASE IN SCIENTIFIC
MAN-POWER  WHICH  IS  SO  VITAL  TO  THE  WELL-BEING  AND
PROSPERITY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS THAT
LIE AHEAD. (Parliamentary and Scientific Committee 1946, para. 1(13))
Returning to the Barlow Report, it argued that bold measures were necessary in
order to achieve an “immediate aim” of “doubl[ing] the present output [of scientific
researchers], giving us roughly 5,000 newly qualified scientists per annum at the earliest
possible moment” (Barlow 1946, 8). Apart from radically expanding the already-existing
universities,  the  Committee  pressed  for  the  establishment  of  “at  least  one  new
university” and for the upgrading of the five university colleges that existed at the time
(Exeter, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham and Southampton) to full university status “at the
earliest possible date” (Barlow 1946, 16–17).15
14 The Barlow Report was only one of several official reports commissioned and published at the time 
on post-secondary education, but it had by far the greatest impact upon postwar university 
expansion. These other reports included the 1943 Luxmore Report on agricultural education, 1944 
McNair Report on teacher training, the 1944 Goodenough Report on medical education, the 1945 
Percy Report on higher technical education and the 1946 Loveday Report on veterinary education. 
15 The former recommendation of the Committee for at least one new university to be established was 
not, in the end, taken up. The latter recommendation, on the other hand, was implemented, and all 
five university colleges mentioned were granted university charters within just over a decade, 
beginning with Nottingham in 1948 and ending with Leicester in 1957.
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By what means were recommendations such as those in the Barlow Report to be
implemented? With regards to the financial assistance which was to be channelled to
the universities, it was the University Grants Committee (UGC) which was to preside
over its disimbursement. The UGC has already been mentioned a few times thus far, but
here  it  may  be  helpful  to  explore  its  origins.  Unlike  most  of  the  public  university
systems that developed in other parts of the Western world, British higher education
managed to maintain a formal separation between individual university administrations
and the  state.  Aside  from the  government's  role  in  approving  the  establishment  of
universities and university colleges through Royal  Charters,  the first  significant link
between the everyday workings of the government and the universities came with the
establishment of the UGC in 1919. The UGC was essentially a top-down creation of the
Liberal government in the period immediately after the end of the First World War.16
Although it was widely acknowledged that the existing resources of the universities at
that  historical  juncture  were  “exhausted”  (Shinn  1986) to  a  point  which  could  be
described as a “financial crisis” (Shinn 1980, 234), it was particular political figures in the
government – most notably in the Board of Education – and not the management or
academics of higher education institutions who took the lead in the chain of events that
led to the formation of the Committee in 1919 (Hutchinson 1975, 587).
Impelled  by  the  post-WWI  situation,  the  UGC  was  set  up  to  advise  the
government  on  the  distribution  of  public  monies  to  the  various  self-governing
universities  (University  Grants  Committee  1985,  1).  In  the  words  of  the  Barlow
Committee,  it  “was originally intended to be a somewhat passive body whose main
function was to criticise proposals put forward by the universities and which was not
itself  expected  to  make  any  attempt  to  suggest  possible  developments  involving
expenditure to university authorities”  (Barlow 1946, 21). While the Barlow Committee
recognised, with some pleasure, that “the [UGC] has not in fact been content to accept
so passive a role,” the Committee's opinion was that, given the challenges facing post-
WWII  Britain,  the  time had come for  the UGC to  “increasingly concern itself  with
positive university policy” and thus it was “desirable for this purpose to revise its terms
of reference and strengthen its machinery” (Barlow 1946, 21).
On July 30, 1946, Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in
Parliament  the  new  terms  of  reference  that  the  UGC  was  to  adhere  to.  The  most
16 A detailed account of the events that led to the UGC's creation can be found in  Hutchinson 1975.
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important  amendment  was  worded  as  follows:  the  Committee  was  “to  assist,  in
consultation  with  the  universities  and  other  bodies  concerned,  the  preparation  and
execution of such plans for the development of the universities as may from time to time be
required in order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national needs”  (Dalton 1946,
col. 129, italics added). However, the UGC, in its own account of the period, went at
lengths to counter the view held by some that “the principles of central planning and of
academic autonomy” were “irreconciliable opposites” (Committee 1948, 82).
Here we can see how a significant part of the impetus behind the UGC was a
growing faith in centralisation or, at the very least, greater co-ordination or planning
which  we  have  already  discussed  in  the  previous  section  of  this  chapter.  Indeed,
although Keynes championed the universities as an example of his “socialism of the
future,”  for  his  vision  to  truly  be  incarnated,  the  individual  institutions  had  to  be
augmented by the strengthening of this semi-independent state body. With this blended
system of centralised and decentralised management by experts, the task that was set
out by Keynes and his co-authors in Book 2 of the 1928 Liberal Party report,  Britain's
Industrial Future, could be fulfilled. This task was that “of guiding existing tendencies
into a right direction and getting the best of all worlds, harmonising individual liberty
with the general good, and personal initiative with a common plan” (Liberal Industrial
Inquiry 1928, 64–65). Nevertheless, when faith in a common plan started to fade, or at
least morphed into its neoliberal version whereby central government would set out the
framework in which individual institutions would operate (and indeed, compete), the
strong flavour of instrumentalism did not subside.
The most significant aspect of the expansion of the UGC's work, it is submitted,
is  the  fact  that  it  created  a  situation  whereby  the  universities  were  increasingly
beholden to state finance. This was fine while university-state relations were cordial, the
economy was healthy and the principles of the postwar consensus held sway. However,
when the British economy began to face difficulties from the 1970s onwards, it was only
a  matter  of  time  before  an  ideological  realignment  would  take  place.  The financial
drivers for this shift can be linked to the circumstances surrounding the 1973-74 oil
crisis and what followed (Shattock 2012, 122–124), while its ideological component was
the rise of  a  neoliberal  rationality beginning in the Thatcher period and continuing
under New Labour.
If the centralisation of university funding had not taken place in the 1940s and
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1950s, the impact of the shift in state policy with regards to the welfare state and public
services from the 1980s onwards may not have been as significant within the sphere of
higher education as they were in actuality. In other words, the rise of state funding
managed by the UGC was a necessary if not sufficient condition for the process which
led  to  a  shift  in  the  dominant  form  of  instrumentalism  in  the  neoliberal  period.
Economic progress and the needs of society were now to be served by an extension of
the  consumer  mentality  within  the  sub-sphere  of  teaching  and  the  mechanisms  of
technical measurement within the sub-sphere of research within the wider sphere of the
university. Nevertheless, the form of instrumentalism was preserved, if not the content.
Nowhere within the Barlow Report, other reports of its time, nor in the records
of their implementation by the Attlee government was there any mention of or even the
hint of a sentiment towards the creation of a publicly-funded university system which
would  serve  ideals  such  as  that  of  Deweyan  democracy  by  –  in  the  words  of  the
Manifesto of the UK Campaign for the Public University – “the development of a public”
with “the capacity  for full  participation”  (Campaign for  the Public  University 2010).
Equally absent is any notion of a public university which would expand the ranks of a
university-educated  “middle  class”  which  would,  to  quote  the  American  academic
Christopher Newfield, “have interesting work, economic security, and the ability to lead
satisfying  and  insightful  lives  in  which  personal  and  collective  social  development
advanced side by side” (Newfield 2008, 3). It is thus manifestly clear that the foundation
of the postwar university was the service of an instrumentalist aim that lay outside the
boundaries of higher education itself,  namely, economic progress. In the eyes of the
Barlow Committee, it was to do so by training scientists and other experts who were
indispensable to developing the postwar economy; in other words, its task was not the
fostering  of  citizens  for  democracy,  the  facilitation  of  social  mobility  nor  even
“widening  participation,”  but  rather  the  training  of  what  has  more  latterly  become
known as human capital (Becker 1975). From whence, then, came these conceptions of
the public university which contemporary idealists so stridently defend, if not from its
practical origins? This puzzling question is the subject of the next chapter.
However, it is important to note here that the various raison d'être supplied by
proponents of a “public university” are themselves not devoid of instrumentalism. After
all, the tasks of forming citizens or widening the net of those who are to benefit from
higher education are also, strictly-speaking, exterior to the internalities of the university
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– that is,  teaching and research. Indeed, it  cannot be overemphasised that the three
questions of instrumentalism, idealism and community are always engaged at any time,
although due to the pronounced parallax it is impossible to grasp them as a harmonious
whole. The essential thing to be discerned is not whether elements of these three are
present – because they will always be, even if some are obscured – but rather which of
the three is  dominant.  The difference between a vision of the public university and a
vision  of  a  university  subordinated  to  economic  imperatives  is  that  the  former
emphasises an ideal, while the latter emphasises instrumentalist aims and calculation,
necessarily bracketing other domains in order to attain these emphases.
Returning to our narrative, throughout the Conservative hold upon the reins of
government in the 1950s, the system of higher education developed during the Attlee
government was not tampered with nor reorientated. In actual fact, following a marked
surge from £16,600,113 in 1951-52 to £20,000,000 in 1952-53, the annual recurrent grant
managed by the UGC continued to rise steadily and by the end of the decade stood at
£34,350,000 (1959-60)  (Berdahl  1959,  201).  When urged in a written question from a
Labour MP in 1953 to  form a Royal  Commission on the role  of  universities,  Prime
Minister Winston Churchill responded that he saw “no reason to be dissatisfied with the
way in which the needs of society have been met by the universities” (Churchill 1953, col.
96–7).  Indeed,  in  the  wider  sphere  of  social  policy  the  Keynesian  consensus  too
continued to hold; however, within higher education the specific message was clear: the
universities were serving the instrumental purposes for which government funding was
provided, and thus the status quo was to be affirmed and perpetuated. At the end of the
day,  instrumentalism was and remains  to  this  day a  widely  accepted  framework in
which much dispute occurs over its technicalities, but not the principle in itself.
Conclusion
In  the  chapter's  first  section,  I  defined  instrumentalism  as  a  perspective  of  higher
education whereby the primary measure of a policy or set of practices within higher
education is its consequences for the particular goals which have been pre-determined.
The ultimate consequence for a radical application of this perspective is a university
without (its own) content, a university which has been hollowed out of any purposes or
telos of its own, and subordinated to exterior goals. By linking my analysis with that of
Bill Readings', I put forward the view that the ambiguity of instrumentalism lies in its
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almost pathological obsession with measurements and metrics of what it deems to be
excellence, an obsession which ultimately subverts its own purposes as it reveals the
incapacity of its rather crude means to achieve its ends in any meaningful way.
Having defined  instrumentalism in  its  broad  contours,  I  then,  in  the  second
section of the chapter, explored its point of invention within the history of the postwar
British university. This required a treatment of the wider terrain of British society after
the Second World War, which I explained by looking at how the liberal socialist ideas of
Keynes formed the nucleus of the postwar consensus, and also laid the groundwork for
the development of the neoliberal society that replaced it in content while retaining its
instrumentalist  form.  This  viewpoint  requires  us,  I  argued,  to  abandon  the  “two
ruptures” thesis whereby Thatcherism is considered as breaking completely with the
Keynesian consensus, and understand instead the lines of continuity that connect the
two despite their respective specificities. In dealing with the specific history of higher
education, we took a trek around the milestones which led to postwar instrumentalism,
namely  the  Barlow  Report,  the  expansion  of  state  funding  managed  through  the
reformed  University  Grants  Committee,  and  the  continuation  of  this  policy  by  the
Conservatives through the 1950s.
In the next chapter we will move on to the next temporal stage of the narrative,
that is, the British university of the 1960s and 1970s. The historical elements will be
balanced against the conceptual development of the perspective of idealism, particularly
the dominant form which posits that the essence of postwar higher education is that of
a vision of a “public university.” The aim will be to explain how this ideal arose and
created  a  myth  of  its  founding.  This  founding  myth  was  even,  in  some  versions,
backdated to the very start of the postwar order.  We will also explore the dangerous
potential consequences of persisting with this myth, including a dearth of imagination
leading to a desire to revive a golden age which is considered to have been lost to the
rise of a putative “neoliberal university.”
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Self-(Mis)understanding After the Fact:
The Formation of the Idealist Conception of the Public University
“If  we want  to  spare  ourselves  the  painful  roundabout
route  through  the  misrecognition,  we  miss  the  Truth
itself:  only  the 'working-through'  of  the  misrecognition
allows us to accede to the true nature of the other.”
(Žižek 2008, 69)
“If  I  wanted  a  market,  I  would  go  to  Billingsgate,  not  a  university!”  Such  was  the
statement written on a placard which was on display at one of the early demonstrations
I attended in London against the rise of the cap for British and EU undergraduate tuition
fees in late 2010. The sentiment expressed there was clearly founded on the idea that
university education should be a sphere for neither profit-making market operations,
such as would be appropriate at the famous Billingsgate Fish Market in the city, nor
perhaps even pseudo-market-like mechanisms within a quasi-public sector. While the
laconic genre of the placard did not allow its author to state what she thought higher
education should be premised upon, the context of the protest would indicate that it was
highly likely that its carrier believed in an ideal of the university as a place of learning
governed by its own principles, and not those of capitalist exchange relations.
Having explored the contours of the instrumentalist perspective in the previous
chapter, this chapter picks up on another trend in our present conjuncture, namely the
affirmation  of  an  approach  to  higher  education  which  valiantly  stands  opposed  to
instrumentalism,  particularly  of  the  neoliberal  variety.  Grounded  on  firm principles
rather than calculations of an instrumentalist sort, this approach can be called idealism,
and it is it that drives sentiments such as the one animating the placard discussed above.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to mapping out the general contours of such
an idealist perspective. Following this, the chapter's second section focuses on what is
arguably the most prominent of the many varieties of  an idealist  conception of  the
university in present debates here in the United Kingdom, namely the vision of the
public  university.  In  the final  section,  we examine in greater  detail  the  place  of  the
idealist perspective within the structure of the postwar British university.
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3.1 The University with a Single, Unifying Ideal
An approach to higher education which is founded upon an idealist perspective involves
the  identification  of  an  overarching  ideal  by  which  theory  and  practice  within  the
university  is  to  be  judged.  Speaking simplistically,  any  substantive  policy  or  set  of
practices which conforms to or at least advances this central principle or model is to be
favoured, while policies or sets of practices which detract from it are to be resisted.
Whereas  the  instrumentalist  perspective  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter
empties  the  university  of  its  own  content  and  measures  higher  education  policy
primarily by its effects upon specific, pre-determined goals, the idealist perspective is
premised upon an opposing dynamic. Its supporters are firm believers in the unique
place and mission of the university, even if they disagree with each other as to the
specificities  of  such  a  place  and  mission.  They are  thus  united  in  their  resentment
towards any enslavement of the institution to what they consider externalities, such as
attempts  to  quantify  contributions  to  economic  growth  and  cost-benefit  analyses
grounded  upon  methodological  individualism.  This  is  not  to  say  that  all  idealist
perspectives are categorically opposed to such externalities, but they consider them to
be secondary at best, and hence disapprove of the instrumentalist's constant recourse to
such calculations in attempting to evaluate higher education theory and practice.
While  idealist  perspectives  often do justify  themselves,  at  least  in  part,  with
arguments of the university's contribution to wider society, they are often phrased in
high-minded  terms  such  as  culture,  collective  intelligence  or  the  common  good.
However, for the most pronounced idealists, even these are seen as concessions to an
instrumentalist mentality focused on practicalities rather than pure principles. Hence,
while the obsession of instrumentalists with empirical statistics is quite conspicuous, it
should be noted that moderate idealists are not opposed in principle to quantification
per se, but the figures they favour are those which measure the advance or retreat of
their  ideals,  such  as  rates  of  participation  in  higher  education  for  those  with  a
democratic vision of the university. At the day's end, it can be said that the essence of
the idealist approach is the belief in a single, unifying ideal for the university which is
premised upon rational conceptualisation rather than empirical pragmatism. Indeed, it
is  this  emphasis  on  rational  principles  which  distinguishes  it  from  perspectives
grounded upon community, because although idealism and community share a certainty
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about the uniqueness of the university, their respective grounds for this belief are very
distinct. Idealists focus on abstract principles, and are thus thought-centric. Conversely,
those who focus on what makes the university a community unlike any other and the
manner in which this specialness can be maintained are therefore feeling-centric.
There  have  been  innumerable  manifestations  of  the  idealist  perspective
throughout the history of the university, even if many have drawn their sustenance
from a few key sources in history, including the Greek notion of  paideia, the Roman
idea of  liberalia studia,  the  studia  humanitatis  of  medieval  Europe,  and the German
conception of Bildung. A few classic and recent examples may be illustrative here. John
Henry Newman's famous defence of a humanistic ideal of liberal education in The Idea
of a University needs little introduction (Newman 1996).1 More recently, Bill Readings, in
The University of Ruins, charts a narrative of the modern university ideal from Kant's
university  of  reason  to  Humboldt's  university  of  culture  (Readings  1996).  Finally,
Derrida, writing in one of the cyclical crises of the humanities, formulated his ideal of
the university without condition (Derrida 2002).
What unites all these different versions of idealism is that they occupy the space
of the idea or transcendental illusion in the conceptual triad that Karatani derives from
Kant (Karatani 2003b, 90). Constructed upon and governed by first principles, the ideal
is akin to a majestic castle raised in the domain of the rational mind. 2 Nevertheless,
every ideal can, in the final instance, be categorised under one of two headings also
derived from Kant, namely constitutive3 or regulative ideas. In Karatani's words:
1 It is worth noting, however, that many commentators sidestep a key element of Newman's argument, 
namely his stress upon the importance of theology to the university (Newman 1996, Discourses II-IV).
2 There are also programmatic ideals which at first glance appear to be a strand of idealism, but which 
are based not on rational construction but rather a conservative inclination towards what has served 
the institution well in times gone by, and which is then advocated for preservation. In their 1971 
work, The British Academics, the sociologists A. H. Halsey and Martin Trow identified what they 
considered to be a unifying “idea of a University” in the British system of higher education. This idea 
or ideal consists of “certain normative criteria”: “First, it should be ancient; second it should draw its 
students, not from a restricted regional locality, but from the nation and internationally; third, its 
students, whatever their origins, should be carefully selected as likely to fit into and maintain the 
established life and character of the university; fourth, those who enter should be offered (to use a 
Victorian distinction) 'education' and not merely 'training'. This end necessitates, fifth, a small-scale 
residential community affording close contact of teachers with taught in a shared domestic life and, 
sixth, a high staff-student ratio for individualised teaching” (Halsey and Trow 1971, 67). It is clear that
this ostensible “idealism” is in fact an example of a community-centred approach, that is, closer to a 
plea for a specific form of life, albeit one which is an apologia for a former or vanishing status quo. 
Such perspectives will be addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.
3 In some translations of Karatani's work into English, most notably The Structure of World History, the 
Japanese term kōseiteki is mistranslated as “constructive” rather than “constitutive,” the latter being 
the correct term given the Kantian foundation of Karatani's arguments (Lange 2015, 197).
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To explain this distinction, Kant used the difference between mathematical
proportionality and philosophical analogy. In mathematics, if three terms are
given, a fourth can be determined: this is an instance of the [constitutive]. In
speculative  [i.e.  regulative]  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  the  fourth  term
cannot be derived a priori. But speculative thought provides us with an index
as we search through experience for something that might serve as the fourth
term. . To put this in simple terms, we see the [constitutive] use of reason at
work  in  its  classic  form  with  Jacobinism  (i.e.,  Robespierre):  the  violent
remaking of society based on reason. By contrast, the regulative use of reason
works to draw people ever closer to some index, even as that index always
remains at some distance. (Karatani 2014, 233)
In  other  words,  a  constitutive  idea  is  one  whose  adherent  believes  can  be
actualised in its purity, whereas a regulative idea is one which serves primarily as a
horizon  to  move  towards,  a  guide  to  channel  its  adherent's  efforts.  Although  both
involve deep commitment, the former's dogmatism lies in clear contrast to the latter's
openness.  Karatani  makes  a  link  between  this  Kantian-inspired  distinction  and  a
passage  in  The  German  Ideology  which  he  attributes  to  Marx  rather  than  Engels:
“Communism for us is not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which
reality  [will]  have  to  adjust  itself.  We  call  communism  the  real movement  which
abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the
now existing premise”  (Marx 1998, 57,  italics in original).  The failure of mainstream
Marxists to pay heed to this key passage led them to adopt a constitutive use of reason,
a  choice  which  has  had  grave  consequences,  particularly  in  the  twentieth-century
(Karatani 2003b, xi–xii).
On the left wing of politics, the struggle between constitutive and regulative
forms  of  ideas  has,  of  course,  not  been  unique  to  Marxism.  Anarchists,  too,  have
grappled  with  this  problem,  especially  following  the  gradual  ebbing  away  of
revolutionary anarchism as a mass movement in the twentieth-century. In the  British
context, a fiery debate raged in the pages of the anarchist journals Freedom and Anarchy
from the mid 1950s to the early 1960s about the possibility of achieving a fully anarchist
society. On one side were those who wished to maintain a revolutionary stance which
made the establishment of such a society as the central aim – in other words, anarchism
as  a  constitutive  idea.  On  the  other  side  were  those  such  as  George  Molnar  who
proclaimed  that,  given  the  fact  that  the  tenets  of  anarchism were  unlikely  to  ever
achieve universal assent, any fully anarchist society would be an imposition and thus
contradictory to the essence of anarchism itself. Thus, all anarchists could and should do
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was live in “permanent opposition” to mainstream society (Molnar 1961, 125). This latter
position effectively threw out the idea of an anarchist society altogether, leaving only
the possibility of pockets of principled resistance in the interstices of societies indelibly
opposed to anarchism.
George Woodcock took an intermediate position, arguing that since anarchism
as  a  mass  political  movement  in  the  form  envisaged  by  Bakunin  and  Kropotkin
appeared no longer tenable, anarchists therefore had to “abandon all social, economic
and  organisational  dogmatism”  and  instead  work  to  nurture  “the  various  positive
tendencies that emerge in society almost spontaneously” in order to “transform them
into a trend towards growing liberation from the trammels of the state” (G. Woodcock
1956, 4).4 Building on Woodcock's argument between the two poles, Colin Ward staked
out a position which resembles anarchism as a regulative idea, arguing that it should be
treated “[n]ot as an aim to be realised but as a yardstick, a measurement or means of
assessing reality”  (Ward 1961, 3). Stuart White sees Ward's position as involving both
elements  of  the  dichotomy  subsequently  formulated  by  Murray  Bookchin  between
social  anarchism  and  lifestyle  anarchism  (Bookchin  1995),  contending  that  Ward
“refuses  to  choose  between  them”  (White  2011,  102).  “Beyond  the  episodes  of
'permanent protest',” White writes, “in which anarchy is fleetingly grabbed and enjoyed,
there  is  a  need  for  a  social  vision:  a  working,  always  provisional  conception  of  a
different kind of society towards which the anarchist should work”  (White 2011, 97).
More  generally,  and  particularly  on  an  experiential  level,  it  can  be  argued  that  a
regulative idea arises from a transcritical oscillation between a constitutive idea and its
abandonment, rather than a fixed and stable third position. Affirming a regulative idea
involves a longing, however brief, for it to be actualised in a constitutive manner as well
as a sense of loss, however fleeting, when such a longing is released, thus returning the
idea to the status of an index to guide and evaluate one's efforts.
4 It is instructive to note that the distinction between Molnar and Woodcock's respective views mirrors 
that of two of the five different strategies that H. Richard Niebuhr argues Christians have taken in 
relation to the wider culture. Molnar's recommendation is akin to the perspective of “Christ against 
culture,” where “the sole authority of Christ over the Christian” is affirmed while “culture's claims to 
loyalty” are rejected (Niebuhr 2001, 45). Woodcock's position, on the other hand, is analogous to that 
of “Christ transforming culture,” whereby the Christian believes that the conversion of the culture to 
the Christian way is possible. This, of course, requires “a more positive and hopeful attitude” (Niebuhr
2001, 191). At the end of the day, the anarchist and the rigorously non-conformist Christian are both 
opposed to mainstream culture, which the tradition of the latter terms simply “the world.” For this 
reason, any person or movement desiring to contest elements of the hegemonic way of the world can 
find useful resources in both the anarchist and the radical Christian traditions, which in fact overlap 
at points, for example in the Christian anarchism of Leo Tolstoy and the Catholic Worker movement.
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This thesis contends,  however,  that adopting a constitutive approach to ideas
does not always mean an attempt to remake the entire world according to a radical
blueprint, such as with Jacobinism and Stalinism. The various forms of totalitarianism
that we have seen in history and continue to struggle with in the present certainly form
one tradition of constitutive thinking. However, there is also a strand of constitutive
idealism in which a more “moderate” ideal is taken up, and what seems on the surface to
be a less ambitious blueprint often leads to a greater confidence that it may actually be
implemented. The form of mainstream social democracy ascendent from the second half
of  the twentieth-century,  discussed in the preceding chapter,  is  one instance of  this
tendency,  but  the  same can be  said  of  other  non-utopian visions  which  attempt  to
realise certain ideals while accommodating themselves to the really-existing conditions
of the contemporary socio-economic-political matrix, which is well-described by even if
not  wholly  reducible  to  what  Karatani  has  termed the  Borromean  knot  of  Capital-
Nation-State,  a  system of  interlocking elements  which may sometimes appear to be
opposed but which in reality stabilise each other (Karatani 2014, xiv).
One such constitutive idea in the sphere of higher education is that of the public
university.  In  our  present  conjuncture  where  the  dominant  trajectory  in  higher
education policy – at both the levels of the state as well as individual institutions –
appear to be strongly leaning towards “privatised” values, affirming the public character
of higher education is, in one sense, a valiant, principled response. Nevertheless, there is
much that the vision of the public university does not question, such as the idea of the
omnicompetent  modern  state,  the  ideology  of  meritocracy,  the  assumption  that
education is best carried out through large institutions and the embedding in the last
instance of the university within the circuits of capital – in other words, the foundations
upon  which  mainstream  social  democracy  has  been  constructed  over  the  past  half
century or so. These capitulations to the modern state appear at first glance as a further
hindrance  to  the  constitutive  idea  of  the  public  university  mounting  a  totalising
challenge to the regnant instrumentalist order, but in fact illustrate the truth that pure
idealism is impossible. Unlike instrumentalism, which may be expressed in near-total
forms  by  straight-forwardly  bracketing  ideals  and  community  –  although,  as  was
pointed out in the previous chapter, not without inevitably creating pseudo-ideals and
pseudo-communal structures  – the realisation of  idealism (as  well  as  community)  is
always circumscribed by the bare facts of material and practical limitations. In other
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words,  even  those  most  committed  to  a  particular  idealist  approach  are  inevitably
restricted by the necessity of unbracketing practicalities at various points.
In other words,  if  we return to the triangle diagram in the previous chapter,
there  are  areas  which  are,  in  practice,  near-impossible  to  dwell  within.  These
inaccessible spaces of pure idealism or community are depicted in the diagram below.
Having outlined the basics of the idealist perspective in the university, we can
now turn to evaluating the specific constitutive idea of the public university. The best
way to begin is to trace its points of invention, and it is to that task which we now turn.
3.2 The Public University and its Founding Myth
The slow yet steady neoliberalising “reforms” to British higher education which have
been taking place over the last few decades have been given various labels, but one of
the  most  widespread  is  that  of  privatisation,  linked  as  the  term  is  to  the  wider
Thatcherite  reforms  in  the  state  and  economy  from  the  1980s  to  the  present.  Its
invocation brings us to the famous dichotomies, the old yet constantly shifting battle
lines which have structured political and economic thought since the dawn of industrial
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capitalism and liberal democracy in the West: public versus private, state versus market,
left versus right, “equality” versus “liberty,” and so on. In this perceived tug of war, any
move towards one side is followed by clarion calls across what appears to be the great
divide to reaffirm the other side, regain any lost ground, and, if possible, attempt to
retake the advantage.
Hence, it is no wonder that the ascendency of values linked to private interests
over public goods in the sphere of the university have led to a counter-movement which
aims to defend the vision of a “public university.”  However,  the dichotomy posed is
problematic, not least because it all too easily traps us within the allied dualisms already
mentioned,  thus foreclosing alternative  ways of  thinking through the problem. One
example of such an alternative perspective, draws from a more medieval understanding
of  the  public/private  distinction,  in  which the  two are  far  from being diametrically
opposed but are instead complementary due to the distinction between possession and
use.5 Even  more  crucially,  the  nature  of  the  historical  and  contemporary  ideal  and
actuality of “the public” in the United Kingdom is left unexamined, leading to a fuzzy
conception  primarily  premised  upon  a  negation  of  forms  of  privatisation  which
introduce the profit motive and business models in thought and organisation. In other
words, even if one has a strong distaste for profit-driven private initiatives in the sphere
of higher education, one should be wary of such aversions driving one into the arms of
“the public,” if one is not clear about what affirming such a “public” really entails.
To begin, the concept of a public university, for some, has been bound up with
questions  of  property  and  ownership.  In  the  1960s,  the  educationist  and  later
polytechnic  director  Eric  Robinson  advocated  the  outright  nationalisation  of  the
5 Robert Skidelsky, writing about Keynes' ideas of the public which were discussed in the preceding 
chapter, argues that it “has its roots in a mediaeval past, when property was invested with both 
private and public functions” (Skidelsky 1997, 434). In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas explains the 
theological aspect of property through a broad distinction between “the power to procure and 
dispense” these external things and the power to use them (Aquinas 1920, sec. 66).  Bede Jarrett OP 
glosses this passage by explaining that within the Christian theology of the medieval era, “the 
possession of property belongs to the individual, but. that the use of it is not limited to him” (Jarrett 
1914, 81). It can be argued that the British university obeyed this principle up until the postwar 
period. Despite being private bodies which possessed private property, the use of such property was 
open to those outside the university. According to John Carswell, for instance, the universities were 
always seen as “public” given their “public” character of providing museums, parks and so on, even 
before they were publicly funded (Carswell 1985). By contrast, the completely publicly-funded model 
of higher education is, in a sense a reversal of this medieval principle. Public property in the form of 
taxes fall into the private “use” of individual students. This is analogous, interestingly, to the form of 
possession and use within the monastic tradition. Nevertheless, we should note that Jarrett argues 
that “[t]he economics of a religious house are hardly of such a kind, thought the mediaevalists, as to 
suit the ways and fancies of this workaday world” (Jarrett 1914, 82).
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universities – in contrast to the postwar “quiet measure of nationalisation” described by
John Carswell  and referred to  in the previous chapter  – as  he believed that  higher
education  could  not  be  truly  democratised  so  long  as  the  universities  remained  in
private ownership and control and thus outside the realms of rational planning on a
national scale (Times Educational Supplement 1966). For others who wish to preserve the
autonomy  of  the  university  from  the  state,  what  is  more  crucial  is  simply  public
funding. A third view is that a general orientation towards the public good over private
interests  is  all  that  being “public”  involves.  As  we have seen,  this  was the view of
Keynes, who exalted the British university as a quintessential part of the public, and
indeed the state as he understood it. To repeat the words of Keynesian scholar Robert
Skidelsky, the state was, for Keynes, the “network of institutions whose stake in the
proper functioning of the economy and society was so deep and extensive that their
corporate actions were not determined by motives of short-term profit maximization”
(Skidelsky 1997, 434). It is at times easy to forget that Keynes was writing about how the
university embodied his vision of liberal socialism in the late 1920s, when the large-
scale injections of state funding of the postwar period were still some years away. Thus,
it is possible on this third account of “the public” to have a university primarily funded
by private means and yet be considered a public institution.
For many contemporary advocates of the public university vision, however, this
Keynesian definition of what it means for an institution have a public character will not
do. For John Holmwood, inspired by John Dewey, the university's “fundamental role for
culture and for public life” comes from the idea of being “an instrument for 'collective
intelligence'”  (Holmwood 2011,  8).  A truly public  university is  one which is  “at  the
service of the public” and has “social justice at its heart;” if it is not so, then it is “just
another  private  corporation in which a  corporate  economy has  become a corporate
society”  (Holmwood 2011,  14).  State funding,  according to this  strand of  thought,  is
crucial to maintaining the actuality of the former public-minded idea and preventing it
from degenerating into the latter “corporate-dominated” model. The Robbins Report of
1963 is seen as a harbinger of mass higher education and democratisation (Holmwood
2011, 3), as well as a prophetic text to be returned to in these neoliberal times (Williams
2013). Holmwood states that “to argue for the public university and its social mission is
not to look back to a 'golden age' of the university before mass higher education, but to
embrace the very principles associated with the development of mass higher education”
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(Holmwood 2011, 8). This statement by Holmwood notwithstanding, it must be pointed
that  for  many  proponents  of  the  public  university,  there  is  indeed  a  “golden  age,”
namely the  period  from the  1962 Education Act,  which  instituted  compulsory  local
authority grants for fees and living expenses for all those obtaining a place in higher
education, until 19736 when the gradual rollback of funding began.7
This  “long  decade”  from 1962-1973  can  be  analysed  as  the  higher  education
component of what educationist Brian Simon termed “the breakout” in education of the
1960s  (Simon 1991,  chap.  5).8 This  relatively  compressed period of  time saw drastic
changes to the higher education landscape. No fewer than twenty new universities were
created, the population of students in higher education more than doubled, from 217,000
in 1962-63 to 463,000 in 1971-72 (Simon 1991, 262 , 426), and the controversial “binary
policy” separating the “autonomous” university sector from the “public” – that is, local
authority-controlled – institutions was promulgated by the Labour government, leading
to  the  establishment  of  thirty  polytechnics  (Brennan  2008,  233),  hailed  by  socialist
educationist Eric Robinson as “people's universities” (Robinson 1968).
These  practical  developments  were  nothing  short  of  monumental  for  the
institutional structure of higher education in the decades to come, but their legacy is
more than matched by a single report commissioned by the Tory government in 1961
and  published  in  1963,  namely  the  already  much-mentioned  Report  on  Higher
Education chaired by the eminent economist, Lord (Lionel) Robbins. These two elements
of the breakout of the long decade, the practice and the theory, were closely interrelated
yet not equivalent, for there were a number of significant divergences between the two,
such as the Report's clear preference for a “unitary system” of higher education which
was negated by the aforementioned “binary policy.” But the meeting of the two streams
produced a rushing river which has been immortalised in the history of supporters of
6 The turbulent economic period of the 1970s led to a series of policies which gradually reduced 
government expenditure on higher education, leading to a matching gradual reduction of the target 
for full-time and sandwich places in higher education by 1980/1981 from 750,000 in December 1972 
when the White Paper “Education: A Framework for Expansion” was published (somewhat ironically 
by Margaret Thatcher, then Secretary of State for Education and Science) to a mere 500,000 by March 
1980 (Booth 1982, 36–37).
7 A more generous interpretation of a “golden age” for “public” British higher education would date its 
beginning to the immediate postwar period. This is the view that was expressed, for example, by Lord
Swann in his opening of the debate in the House of Lords on the Croham Review on the UGC. He 
opined that the “golden age for universities” lasted “from just after the war until 1973,” and in this 
period “[s]ociety valued them, governments of every shade valued them, new universities were 
founded, morale was high and it was a time of great enthusiasm and creativity” (Swann 1987).
8 Indeed, if we wanted to be generous, we could begin this “long decade” of mass higher education 
expansion in 1961 when Sussex, the first of the “plate-glass universities,” opened its doors.
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mass  higher  education  according  to  progressive  and  democratic  principles  of  a
particular  social  democratic  sort,  under  which  those  in  the  tradition  of  the  “public
university” ideal can be subsumed.
Here we see the various threads from which the ideal of the public university
was and is knitted, which essentially draws from the side of the infamous dichotomies
which favours  the public  over  the  private,  the  state  over  the  market,  equality  over
liberty, and so on. On the other side of these divides, we find, of course, the elements
which dovetail more smoothly with the instrumentalist visions which we examined in
the previous chapter.  In our  present  higher education conjuncture,  we could add to
these binaries the Robbins Report against the Browne Report,  the Alternative White
Paper produced by academic critics against the government's own 2011 White Paper on
Higher Education, and so on.
However,  the  link which  a  narrative  such  as  Holmwood's  asserts  between a
professed democratic conception of mass higher education which can be given the name
“the  public  university”  and  the  Robbins  Report  is  one  which  is  actually  far  more
complicated  than  it  may  appear  at  first  glance.  After  all,  the fact  that  the  higher
education blueprint most celebrated by British social democrats in the postwar period
originated from the pen of a well-known neoliberal economist and member of the Mont
Pelerin Society is one that should make us pause and reflect. Thus, it is to examining
this  incongruous  confluence  of  social  democracy  and  neoliberalism,  the  putative
(proto-)manifesto of the public university ideal, which we now turn.
Robbins: Social Democrat in Neoliberal Clothing, or Vice Versa?
In an interview with Robbins not long before he died, the educationist and historian of
higher education Peter Scott enquired as to how, as a member of the establishment and
a  right-wing  economist,  he  ended  up  endorsing  the  progressive  cause  of  higher
education expansion. Robbins replied that his perspective on the importance of such an
expansion originated from a conversation he had on the subject with a London School
of Economics colleague, the renowned ethical socialist R. H. Tawney. Tawney, who had
spent some of the war years in the United States, had said to him: “You could never
overestimate how much America had benefited from the fact that so many of her people
had had at least the smell of a higher education” (Scott 2014).
Given that this explanation for Robbins' progressivism in higher education came
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straight from the horse's mouth, it may seem harsh to opine somewhat cynically, as
philosopher-sociologist Steve Fuller did in a letter to the  Times Higher Education, that
Robbins'  real  motives  were  in  fact  consistent  with  his  wider  intellectual  positions.
According to Fuller, the true spirit of the Robbins Report was what we know today as
“human capital  development,”9 in which the ancient universities such as Oxford and
Cambridge  could  be  regarded  as  “intellectual  protectionists  that  imposed  artificially
high barriers to student entry”  (Fuller 2013). Robbins'  solution, Fuller argues, was to
support  the  establishment  of  competing  institutions  which  were  focused  on
“contemporary  subjects”  –  that  is,  new  products  in  the  “market”  –  but  without  a
decrease in quality (Fuller 2013).
Fuller's theory may seem uncharitable, but it is far from unsubstantiated. Placing
aside his apparent repetition of the common misassumption that the Robbins Report
was the driving force behind all the “plate-glass universities” of the 1960s – seven of
these had in fact already been approved in the late 1950s  (Simon 1991, 202) – the fact
that Robbins had consistently argued against the ethical and political philosophy of the
welfare state throughout his career makes it difficult for us to conclude that he had
negated  those  views  in  the  area  of  higher  education  policy  merely  from  a  single
enlightening  comment  from  Tawney.  Another  explanation  must  be  found  for  the
apparent about-turn of the man who argued in his influential text,  An Essay on the
Nature and Significance of Economic Science,  that “social utility” is “[i]nteresting as a
development  of  an  ethical  postulate”  but  “entirely  foreign  to  the  assumptions  of  a
scientific Economics” (Robbins 1932, 125).10 Fuller's brief letter is a gesture in the right
direction, but we have to journey further for an answer that may fully satisfy.
A suitable place to begin our investigation is the very text of the widely-lauded
Robbins Principle:
Throughout our Report we have assumed as an axiom that courses of higher
education should be available for all  those who are qualified by ability and
attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so. What type of education they
9 It is noteworthy that Richard Layard, who was Senior Research Officer for the Robbins Committee, 
has stated that the emerging work on human capital by Gary Becker, “identifying education as a 
major factor in economic performance and showing that there were quite good returns to higher 
education as an investment,” was an important influence on the Report (Layard 2014, 14).
10 It is worth noting the obvious fact that the Report was a policy document on higher education rather 
than a work of scientific economics. Therefore it could be argued that in this context social utility was
not a postulate which would be “entirely foreign” and unavailable to Robbins in writing the Report. 
Nevertheless, what Robbins produced clearly bears the marks of a conservative economist, and there 
is ultimately nothing in the Report which contradicts his neoliberal economic views.
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should get and in what kind of institution are questions we consider later on;
and the criterion by which capacity is to be judged is clearly a question on
which there may be a variety of opinions. But on the general principle as we
have stated it we hope there will  be little dispute.  (Robbins 1963,  sec.  31,
italics added)
Robbins  then goes  on to  say that  if  this  axiom is  challenged,  there  are  two
grounds upon which it may be vindicated. Firstly, “conceiving education as a means,” it
is clear, Robbins says that “modern societies [cannot] achieve their aims of economic
growth and higher cultural standards without making the most of the talents of their
citizens,” especially “if we are to compete with other highly developed countries in an
era of rapid technological and social advance” (Robbins 1963, sec. 32, italics added). Such
language is redolent of the 1946 Barlow Report on  Scientific Man-Power,  discussed in
Chapter Two, and thus lends an instrumentalist twist to the Robbins Principle, revealing
a  clear  element  of  continuity  with  the  economic  utilitarianism11 of  the  immediate
postwar period. Nevertheless, it is the next section of the Report which may provide a
backbone for an idealist reading:
But  beyond  that,  education  ministers  intimately  to  ultimate  ends,  in
developing man's capacity to understand, to contemplate and to create. And it
is a characteristic of the aspirations of this age to feel that, where there is
capacity to pursue such activities, there that capacity should be fostered. The
good society desires equality of opportunity for its citizens to become not
merely good producers but also good men and women. (Robbins 1963, sec. 33)
Such language certainly resounds to a certain extent with the progressive humanism
contained in the words of Tawney which Robbins related to Scott. Nevertheless, there is
a distinct transposition in key, for Tawney's phrase, “how much America had benefited,”
still  revolves  around  a  conception  of  social  utility  similar  to  that  which  Robbins
rubbished in his famous monograph, whereas Robbins' words appear to transcend – or,
rather,  descend  from  –  the  level  of  collective  interest,  entering  the  sphere  of  the
intellectual, artistic and perhaps even spiritual development of individual human beings.
Thus  we  see  that  when  we  look  at  the  actual  text  of  Robbins'  report,  the
collective good which Tawney spoke of takes on an unsurprisingly economistic flavour,
11 The term economic utilitarianism is used here to denote the form of instrumentalism which focuses 
upon economic goals and aims, that is, economic utility. This can be distinguished from the classical 
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill which takes the advancement of pleasure or 
happiness to be the measure of the utility of a particular thing. In Bentham words: “By utility is 
meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or 
happiness” for the party concerned, whether an individual or a community (Bentham 2000, 14–15). 
Henceforth, whenever the term “utility” is used in this thesis, it is economic and not classical (i.e. 
hedonistic) utility which is being referred to.
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while  the  humanistic  ideal  is  one  which is  focused  squarely  on the individual.  The
progressive tone with which this key portion of the report has been rehearsed in the last
half  century  now seems  to  have  been  a  creative  reworking rather  than an faithful
representation. The explicit  use of the term “equality of opportunity,”  as well  as the
references to providing for and fostering capacity where it exists, evinces a meritocratic
ideal beloved of technocrats of all political colours and many right-wing individualists.
Nonetheless,  all  of  this  provides  us  only  with  clues  of  Robbins'  underlying
loyalty to right-wing economic and social ideas. The Robbins Report was a manifesto of
both continuity and rupture with the higher education policy of the postwar order up to
the point of its publication. The element of continuity was in its instrumentalist concern
with economic growth, but this thread was not emphasised in many later readings of
the Report. The true rupture, however, did not  involve the statement of a progressive
vision of the public university, but rather nothing less than a marginalist or “Jevonian”
revolution in higher education policy.
The  term  “Jevonian  revolution”  has  become  associated  with  the  Marxist
economist  Maurice  Dobb  (Schabas  2002).  In  his  1973  work  Theories  of  Value  and
Distribution since Adam Smith,  Dobb employed it to analyse William Stanley Jevons'
development of the marginal utility theory of value as a specifically British version of
the wider “marginal revolution” also associated with the Austrian economists such as
Carl Menger and the French economist Léon Walras (Dobb 1973, chap. 7). According to
Dobb, the impact of Jevons' intervention was to move economic analysis away from the
emphasis of the classical school on “costs incurred in production” – which were “rooted
in conditions and circumstances of production” – and instead “toward demand and final
consumption; placing the stress on the capacity of what emerged from the production-
line to contribute to the satisfaction of the desires, wants, needs of consumers”  (Dobb
1973, 167, italics added). It is also rather instructive for our purposes that back in 1936,
Robbins himself delivered a paper to mark the centenary of Jevons' birth in which he
appraised his intellectual ancestor's “great idea, the idea that the origin of the objective
exchange  values  of  the  market  was  to  be  traced  to  the  subjective  valuations  of
individuals,” arguing that it “shifted the whole emphasis of analysis in such a way as to
deserve the name of revolution” (Robbins 1936, 4, italics added).
The  pre-existing  paradigm  of  postwar  higher  education  policy  before  the
publication of the Robbins Report was based on calculations of the number of personnel
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needed for specific jobs, especially scientists. The Barlow Report and others written in
the 1940s and 1950s were based on this model, whereby the number of higher education
graduates required in particular fields were estimated in order to determine the number
of places and amount of funding to be made available. Robbins unsurprisingly rejected
this model, given its production-centric foundations which were the mainstay of central
planning. In a recent article to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Report's publication,
Claus Moser, the statistician who led Robbins' research team recollected, “Lionel said
that all the studies there have ever been about how many people in a particular job are
needed by society were always wrong” (Gibney 2013). The correct question according to
this view is not, “How many scientists do we need to 'produce'?” but rather “How many
people are qualified to attend university, and would like to do so?”12 Rephrasing the
latter in crude economic terms: what is the consumer demand for university education
as a product,  and how could it  be most effectively satisfied? The answer which the
Robbins Committee arrived at in 1963 was, of course, expansion.
In  other  words,  the  Jevonian  revolution  which  the  Robbins  Report  enacts
effectively converts the position of students from being the product or commodity in
question – that is, a system where graduates are the object of planned calculation by the
state  and  its  related  bodies  –  to  being  the  consumer  of  the  commodity  of  higher
education qualifications. The protagonist of university policy shifts from the top-down
state which attempts to determine the demand for graduates, to the individual potential
graduate  whose demand for  a degree is  what matters.  The 2011 White  Paper  much
maligned by many in the academy and left-wing commentators turns out to have had a
title firmly in the tradition of this reading of the Robbins revolution, namely, Students at
the Heart of the System (Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2011).
Thus,  when  contemporary  campaigners  for  the  public  university  urge  for  a
return to the principles of the Robbins Report, they have taken a generous reading of
12 Here it is important to note that the Barlow Committee did resort to a similar logical procedure when
it relied on research on “the distribution of intelligence” to allay traditional fears that university 
expansion would mean a reduction in standards. Tests conducted by psychologists of the time 
concluded that five percent of the population possessed intelligence on a level with the upper half of 
Scottish and Manchester university students. Based on this research, the committee argued that the 
fact that the upper half of university students nation-wide constituted only one percent of the 
population meant that only one in five potential university graduates were being recruited (Barlow 
1946, 8–9). The key difference between the Barlow Report and the Robbins Report, however, is that 
Robbins' argument rested completely upon supply-side calculations, while the Barlow Committee 
utilised such arguments merely to assert that there was sufficient talent for its proposed doubling of 
the number of students recruited by the universities.
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the  rhetoric  –   bordering  on  misinterpretation  –  for  the  real  essence.  The Browne
Review and the Coalition reforms to higher education in 2010 stand squarely in a more
hidden,  but  more  authentic  strand  of  the  Robbins  Report,  which  was  principally
concerned with higher education as the satisfaction of a consumer demand, even if it
was  largely  masked  by  accompanying  discourse  which  could  be  read  in  liberal
humanistic terms. When seen through this light, the apparent perversity of the Robbins
legacy being appropriated by David Willetts, the former Minister of Universities and
key antagonist of proponents of the public university,  in his 2013 pamphlet  Robbins
Revisited: Bigger and Better Higher Education  no longer seems so sacrilegious (Willetts
2013).  Indeed,  Willetts  quite  rightly  imputes  Robbins'  approach  to  higher  education
expansion, which “put the aspirations of the student for more education centre stage,” to
“his training as a neo-classical economist sceptical of central plans” (Willetts 2013, 67).
Some of Willetts' arguments in the pamphlet are worthy of closer analysis, not
least because they tell us something of the mind of the man who oversaw the rise of the
fee cap for undergraduates to £9,000, but also because they illuminate a deeper issue,
which is how the tension between instrumentalism and idealism is conceived by many.
In  particular,  with  regards  to  Robbins'  ideas  on  learning,  which  shaped  the  policy
content  of  the  report,  Willetts states  that  he  “achieved a  perfect  equipoise  between
utilitarian arguments  and confident appeals  to underlying value”  (Willetts 2013,  17).
Here we find the rather commonsensical belief that instrumentalism and idealism are
merely  conflicting  tendencies  which  require  a  balance  to  be  struck  between  them.
However,  according  to  the  transcritical  perspective  that  has  been  laid  out  in  the
preceding chapters, and particularly in the last part of Chapter One, striking such a
balance is impossible due to the fact that one is unable to view the university from these
two opposing perspectives at once. Thus, any apparent “equipoise” attained is in actual
fact  an illusion which hides either the subordination of  one to the other,  a  frenetic
transposition which allows for conflicting interpretations, or both.
It is argued that Robbins' ostensible balancing act within the dichotomy between
instrumentalism  and  idealism  is  a  case  whereby  both  rhetorical  transposition  and
effective  subordination  are  present,  but  obscured.  The  first,  Robbins'  oscillation,  is
unsurprising due to his own subjective position as both a neoliberal economist and an
academic schooled in the traditions of the British university. In a strange enactment of
transcritical  motion,  the  former  role  compels  him  at  certain  points  to  take  an
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instrumentalist perspective which favours utility,  productivity and other economistic
measurements, while the latter leads him to switch at other points to an idealist vision
founded upon “ultimate ends.”13 It is crucial that we recognise that these perspectives,
contra Willetts, do not meet elegantly in the middle or even coalesce in some form of
stable synthesis, but remain incongruous and opposed. Their tension-filled cohabitation,
however, is what has led to the emergence of two divergent lineages of the Robbins'
legacy. Most academics and the liberal-minded have latched onto his defence of higher
education as an intrinsic good, forming what may be termed an “Idealist Robbins” in no
small part in their own image, while ignoring the evidence of economistic utilitarianism
which  has  provided  the  basis  for  a  counter-tradition,  which  we  may  call  the
“Instrumentalist Robbins.”
This may lead one to ask: which of these two, then, is the “true Robbins”? Is it
the high-minded rhetoric which the Report was couched in or the policy-minded reality
which the Report brought about? The answer proposed in this thesis is that both could
be said to be  true,  because if  we are  to dig beneath the surface  where economistic
utilitarianism and humanistic education appear antinomically opposed in the British
university, we will find that their roots are actually intertwined. In other words, what is
a real contradiction on one level turns out to be connected at a deeper level. However,
like most marriages throughout human history, this hidden matrimony is not one of
equals, but involves a relationship of subordination. In this case, the ultimate supremacy
of instrumentalism within the knot can be traced to the fact that mainstream twentieth-
century British socialism – the tradition which the supporters of the “public university”
13 In her biography of Robbins, Susan Howson writes that the first lecture that Robbins attended at the 
London School of Economics was very likely that of the director, Sir William Beveridge, “opening the 
session on the first day of the Michaelmas term, Monday 4 October 1920,” in which the latter 
“expatiated on the virtues of ‘Economics as a liberal education’.” Beveridge “defined the objects of a 
liberal education as twofold – ‘The training of the mind’ and ‘The understanding of one’s 
environment so as to be in harmony with it’ – both of which the study of economics and the other 
social sciences, especially in the form of a broad degree such as the BSc(Econ), could easily provide” 
(Howson 2011, 69). She goes on to say that “Robbins was involved in several future reforms of the 
BSc(Econ) and tended to look back on the degree he took as a model to be preserved or recreated” 
(Howson 2011, 69). With this knowledge, it is unsurprising that Robbins continued to believe whole-
heartedly in the value of a liberal education, and expressed such sentiments in the Report he wrote, 
even if they did not sit easily with the strongly instrumentalist tenor of his economic and political 
views. Here we have a classic case of the tension in British conservatism between radical 
neoliberalism and older forms, e.g. that of Disraeli and the One Nation Toryism which descends from 
him. The latter strand, while still believing in the free market, is less ebullient about its virtues due to 
a greater emphasis on “preserving and safeguarding the old, the familiar, the beloved, the well-tried” 
(Hearnshaw 1933, 7). This often leads to a conservatism which is marginally less instrumentalist in 
the economistic sense which we are most concerned with.
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consciously  and  unconsciously  draw  their  sustenance  from  –  chose  to  set  its
philosophical foundations upon the very Benthamite individualism which nourished the
market liberalism it attempted to displace in the economic and political sphere.
This latter insight is one that David Marquand discussed at some length in his
1987 essay, “Beyond Social Democracy.” After pointing out the Benthamite essence in
the  mainstream  of  British  socialist  thought  in  the  twentieth  century  –  with  the
honourable exception, among the central figures, of Tawney – he goes on to write:
As  Karl  Polanyi  showed,  the  “great  transformation”  from  agrarian  to
industrial society followed a parabola rather than a straight line. In the first,
market-liberal, phase, the laws and customs which impeded the growth of a
market economy were repealed or done away with. But before that phase had
run its course, a reaction had set in; and in the second, interventionist, phase,
new  laws  and  customs  were  introduced  to  protect  society  from  the
consequences of the previous one.  In Britain,  however,  the reaction against
full-blooded market liberalism took place under the same philosophical aegis —
and, more importantly, in the same cultural framework — as had the movement
towards  it.  .  State  intervention  was  tentative,  hesitant  and  reactive;  and
although it was sometimes justified in other terms, the logic behind it was
essentially utilitarian. (Marquand 1987, 246–247, italics added)
This  capitulation  to  the  utilitarian  framework  of  British  social  thought  has
greatly  hobbled  the  development  of  alternatives  to  the  market  liberal  position  by
demarcating  the  boundaries  where  thought  and  practice  are  allowed  to  operate
according to an instrumentalist orthodoxy. In the sphere of the university which we are
concerned with in this thesis, it is easy to see the playing out of this early decision to
justify  public  expenditure  on higher  education primarily  on economic terms.  In the
previous chapter we saw how the reforms to the British higher education system in the
immediate  postwar  period  originated  in  instrumentalist  calculations  to  promote
economic growth rather than any firmly-held and/or rationally-formulated ideals, thus
disproving any claim that the British university of the immediate postwar period was
founded upon a solidly humanistic or principled vision. Now our closer reading of the
Robbins Report reveals an underlying instrumentalism which in the end overpowers its
idealist  outer  shell.  This  discovery  too  goes  against  the  grain  of  many  dominant
narratives of the postwar university which place the Report on a towering pedestal.
At this point, a committed proponent of an resolutely idealist approach to higher
education might declare, even object, slightly paraphrasing G. K. Chesterton, “The ideal
has not been tried and found wanting. It has been found difficult; and left untried.” 14
14 Chesterton's original statement concerned “the Christian ideal” (Chesterton 2011, 19).
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There is a sense in which this is true. A university founded upon a single, unified ideal
has never come into actuality, due to the practical and constant subordination of the
ideal  to  the  instrumental.15 However,  in  the  history  of  the  postwar  university  the
coexistence of idealist discourse with instrumentalist reality created an illusion that the
former was in the driving seat, particularly in the minds of those predisposed towards it
such as academics and others of a progressive bent. It was thus possible to formulate the
constitutive idea of the public university, even though it did not correspond to reality.
Of course, from the perspective of the politicians and civil  servants who formulated
higher  education policy  in  Whitehall,  the  instrumentalist  underpinnings  of  postwar
university policy were never obscured, as a cursory glance through any White Paper or
equivalent official document in the postwar period would demonstrate.
This phenomenon of observing a single chain of events and yet arriving at very
different interpretations of what was and is going on can be explained by the failure of
academics and bureaucrats to fully practise transcritical oscillation. The choice to persist
in viewing the development of British higher education from a single perspective, even
after  becoming  aware  of  other  perspectives,  has  brought  about  the  mutual  self-
deception on all sides. The degree of self-deception has been greater, however, on the
side of the idealists, culminating in the Robbins Report-thumping we have seen as of
late  in  reaction  to  the  overt  neoliberal  tone  presently  being  employed  by  the
government and those supporting its policies. However, if we wish to be precise, the
idealists of the public university have not only deceived themselves, but have actually
carried out an act of misrecognition, to use a term of Žižek's. Žižek explores the concept
of misrecognition throughout his oeuvre, drawing from, inter alia, Lacan, Althusser and
Spinoza, but fairly concise statements and examples can be found in Chapter 2 of  The
Sublime Object of Ideology (Žižek 2008, 60–77). It should be pointed out, however, that a
large portion of his work on misrecognition involves the individual misrecognising an
element of herself, whereas what we are dealing with here is the idealist misrecognising
of the nature of the postwar university, that is, something (largely)  outside herself.  If
traditional false consciousness is doing one thing while believing one is doing another,
and contemporary self-deception or ideology is apparently seeing or doing one thing
while  tacitly  knowing  one  is  seeing  or  doing  another,  then  misrecognition,  in  the
15 Once again, it should be noted that the conservative pattern of Oxbridge described by Halsey and 
Trow, although put forward as a unified ideal, in fact developed incrementally rather than according 
to a “rational” blueprint, and should be treated as a species of community (Halsey and Trow 1971, 67).
97
Chapter 3
instance we are dealing with here, is seeing one thing and giving it another name, only
to realise at the end that what one understood by that other name is in fact the thing as
it  really  is.  Moreover,  at  the  end  of  the  process,  one  comes  to  realise  that  one's
misrecognition has also contributed to producing the truth of the thing that one thought
was present.
In the case of proponents of the public university, what they beheld was the
expansion of British higher education for instrumentalist purposes from the end of the
war until the early 1970s, but in their eyes what was being constructed was a system of
democratic mass higher education. Since 1973, expansion has continued even as public
funding  has  gradually  ebbed  away,  and,  in  response,  these  adherents  to  the  public
university ideology have been critical of government policy, believing it to be a betrayal
the ideals  of  the  public  university.  It  is  argued here  that  although the enlightening
moment of  kenshō has not yet arrived for many of these idealists, the deeper truth is
that  the  public  university  was  never  anything  more  than  the  sunny  side  of
instrumentalist university policy – that is, it is not that they saw a public university
where one did not exist at all; rather, the public university was in fact the primarily
ideological but also partially real counterpart to the hegemonic instrumentalism in the
postwar higher education order.
Ideals such as the public university thus operate in a manner somewhat akin to
the  Tower  of  Babel  in  Frank  Kafka's  short  story,  “The City  Coat  of  Arms.”  In  this
adaptation of the Biblical tale, a group of people gather as a community in order to build
“a tower that will reach to heaven”  (Kafka 1992, 433).16 The grand project of a tower
stretching to the heavens is what brings this  community together, but various factors
including fears of making errors as well as a cheery optimism about the progress of
human knowledge and building technology lead to very little actual construction work
on the tower taking place. However, what does result is the building of a city for the
workmen, even as the project of the tower persists as a unifying ideal for the various
factions  among  the  population.  In  Kafka's  words,  “The  idea,  once  seized  in  its
magnitude, can never vanish again; so long as there are men on the earth there will be
also the irresistible desire to complete the building” (Kafka 1992, 433).
It is also interesting that the narrator in the parable states that “the second or
16 Aside from this most basic premise of constructing a tower to the heavens, the versions in the 
Hebrew scriptures and Kafka differ significantly.
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third generation [of city dwellers] had already recognized the senselessness of building
a heaven-reaching tower; but by that time everybody was too deeply involved to leave
the city” (Kafka 1992, 434). Although the general paucity of invocations of the relatively
moderate ideal of the public university in recent years may be an indication that it is
regarded  by  many  denizens  of  British  higher  education  today  as  an  unachievable
project,  the  fact  that  it  continues  to  be  trotted out  in times  of  trouble  such  as  the
ongoing reforms since 2010 shows that it continues to operate as a residual ideology
that can never be completely erased from the British university unconscious.
Of course, one clear distinguishing feature of the public university ideal which
sets  it  apart  from  Kafka's  parable  is  the  fact  that  while  the  Tower  of  Babel  is  an
unrealised monument, there are some who argue that the public university as defined
by its proponents actually existed during a putative golden age, for at least the “long
decade” from 1962-1973 discussed above, if not from the immediate postwar period until
1973. For these city dwellers, the tower once stood proud and tall – or had been at least
constructed sufficiently for use, even if there were still plans for further expansion – but
was  demolished  by  neoliberal  saboteurs,  and  remains  to  be  rebuilt  once  again.  As
argued above, this view is founded upon a misrecognition, and thus would be more
accurate  to  say  that  what  proponents  of  the  public  university  ideal  thought  was  a
majestic tower to the heavens was, in fact, always a corporate skyscraper painted in
gold, focused on instrumentalist aims even while decorated in a manner congruent with
idealist propaganda. The grand vision was only attained in the imagination, and here
Karatani's words are instructive:
Plato did not capriciously pose the being of the  ideal, or the foundation of
knowledge. Indeed, he failed rather miserably in his attempt to implement his
idea of  the  philosopher-king.  Instead,  Plato realized the impossible  in the
imaginaire:  he made Socrates a martyr to this impossible-to-achieve idea.
All of this demonstrates the impossibility of the being of the ideal and yet, at
the same time, it repeatedly invokes the will to architecture by asserting that
the impossible, the  being  of the ideal, be realized. This  will to architecture is
the foundation of Western thought. (Karatani 1995b, xxxv)
How do we grapple with this persistent will to architecture – which can also be
described as a drive towards construction and implementation – that is a daily reality?
The answer is, once again, to approach ideals regulatively rather than constitutively. As
was stated above, one adopts and feeds a  regulative idea by oscillating transcritically
between the temptation towards a constitutive idea and its abandonment. Just as the
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regulative idea of communism as “the real movement which abolishes the present state
of things” only comes into being by opting against the constitutive idea of communism
as “a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to
adjust itself” (Marx 1998, 57, italics in original), a regulative approach to an ideal of the
university involves giving up the dream of implementing a blueprint or actualising a
total vision, embracing instead the task of “draw[ing] people ever closer to some index,
even as that index always remains at some distance” (Karatani 2014, 233). This is, after
all, the insight of Kant, who believed that the transcendental illusion or Schein cannot be
done away with,  but  could be  transformed into a  regulative  form  (Kant  1998a,  sec.
A689).
3.3. Examining the Structural Place of the Public University
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that the prime position given to the
Robbins Report in the genealogy of the modern British public university as formulated
by its proponents is, to say the least, highly questionable. Despite the alleged adherence
of the architects of the postwar university order to a vision of higher education which is
diametrically opposed to the presently hegemonic versions of instrumentalism, a closer
inspection  revealed  that  such  a  vision  was  never  much  more  than  the  ideological
supplement to  a  system that  was,  at  its  core,  clearly  instrumentalist  from the  very
beginning. The place of the public university ideal within the structure of the postwar
British university is nevertheless a relevant matter for our consideration, for to dismiss
this ideal merely on the evidence of a flawed line of descent would be to commit what
some epistemologists have termed the genetic fallacy17 and thus sidestep the issue of its
contemporary significance.
As things presently stand, the ideal of the public university serves as a rallying
point for those who wish to oppose the economistic forms of instrumentalism whose
dominance in the sphere of higher education continues to increase. By reaffirming the
broadly social democratic vision of the postwar consensus, projected onto the Robbins
Report, campaigners for the public university enact a form of resistance towards the
creeping neoliberalisation of the British university.
However,  it  is  at  this  point  that  Karatani's  insight  into  the wider  context  in
17 One commits the genetic fallacy when one conflates the “causal origins of a belief with its 
justification” (Honderich 1995, 306).
100
Chapter 3
which the social democratic impulse takes place may prove instructive. In Transcritique
he analyses our present social formation as follows:
One often hears the prediction that, thanks to the globalization of capital, the
nation-state will disappear. . But, no matter how international relations are
reorganized  and  intensified,  the  state  and  nation  won’t  disappear.  When
individual  national  economies  are  threatened  by  the  global  market
(neoliberalism),  they  demand  the  protection  (redistribution)  of  the  state
and/or  bloc  economy,  at  the  same  time  as  appealing  to  national  cultural
identity. So it is that any counteraction to capital must also be one targeted
against  the  state  and  nation  (community).  The  capitalist  nation-state  is
fearless because of its trinity. The denial of one ends up being reabsorbed in
the ring of the trinity by the power of the other two. This is because each of
them, though appearing to be illusory, is based upon different principles of
exchange. Therefore, when we take capitalism into consideration, we always
have to include nation and state. And the counteraction against capitalism
also has to be against nation-state. In this light, social democracy does nothing
to overcome the capitalist economy but is the last resort for the capitalist nation-
state’s survival. (Karatani 2003b, 281, italics added)
While it would be ill-advised to simply transpose the dynamics which are active
in the wider social formation into the more restricted and specific sphere of the British
university, we can identify an analogous tendency in the latter whereby those who are
discontent  with  our  present-day  vicissitudes  have  turned  to  reasserting  a  social
democratic vision of the university in order to counteract the accelerating developments
towards a more neoliberalised system. However, if we accept Karatani's argument about
the  futility  of  attempting  to  re-establish  social  democracy  given  the  underlying
connection between capital and the state, then we have to recognise that fighting for a
renewed  public  university  is  merely  shifting  from  one  articulation  of  an  unjust
university to another – with apparent victories on one side counter-balanced by losses
on another – yet ultimately maintaining the overall  structure. Hilaire Belloc's poem,
“On a Great Election,” captures this paradox in the patriarchal politics of the 1920s:
The accursed power which stands on Privilege
(And goes with Women, and Champagne and Bridge)
Broke — and Democracy resumed her reign:
(Which goes with Bridge, and Women and Champagne). (Belloc 1925, 28)
Yet our analysis here of the university has so far involved only two elements,
instrumentalism and idealism, whereas the conceptual triad discussed in the previous
chapters involves a third element, namely community. Investigating this third factor is a
crucial step to break out of what seems on the surface like unending struggle between
the two titans discussed in the preceding chapter and this one, a struggle that on one
101
Chapter 3
level looks to be a deadlock between diametrically-opposed forces, but on another level
can be understood as internecine strife between components of a greater whole.
Conclusion
I began this chapter by defining the idealist approach to higher education as one which
is structured by a “single, unifying ideal,” before examining the two forms of ideals in
Kant,  that  is,  the  constitutive  and  the  regulative.  The drawbacks  of  conceiving and
holding to ideals of a constitutive form were explored, and the alternative of ideals of a
regulative  form was  put  forward.  I  also  explained  how pure  idealism is  impossible
within the structure of the university due to the fact that every expression of university
life is bound up with matters of materiality and practicality, and illustrated this through
another form of the triangular diagram first introduced in Chapter One.
I then proceeded on to the second section, where the constitutive ideal of the
public  university  was  analysed  according to  its  putative  sources,  namely  the  actual
breakout in higher education during the long decade of 1962-1973 and the theoretical
vision put forward in the Robbins Report. However, although the former connection is
unproblematic, the latter is another matter, with the hint as to its complexity arising
from a realisation as to the strange confluence of neoliberal economics and seemingly
progressive views on higher education within Robbins the man and Robbins the report.
It was argued that a closer reading of the latter reveals that the former was ultimately
true to his  intellectual  positions,  and that  if  we juxtapose the Report with Robbins'
expressed ideas, we will find that his underlying rationale for expansion was quite the
opposite of the democratic impulse among progressives, despite the patently humanistic
tenor  of  the  Report's  rhetoric.18 Having  asserted  that  the  advocates  of  the  “public
18 It can also be argued from a radically democratic perspective that short of a system in which all are 
given full access to higher education should they desire it, any paean for a humanistic education is 
ultimately flawed. Here we should recall Gramsci's argument that the traditional schooling system is 
oligarchic because under it “each social group has its own type of school, intended to perpetuate a 
specific traditional function, ruling or subordinate” (Gramsci 1971, 40). The fact that certain children 
receive a humanistic education and others – the subaltern – are denied one results in the 
maintenance of the existing hegemony. Transposing this insight into higher education, so long as 
such an education is the preserve of some and not all, the system is not truly democratic but rather 
(at least residually oligarchic), despite numerical and proportional increases in participation. This 
argument, however, falters somewhat if one subscribes to a view of vocation which asserts not only 
that different people have different skills and callings, but that all callings are of equal worth and 
value. Equality does not require homogeneity. It does not follow from this, however, that the injustice
and oppression involved in various spheres of work are to be downplayed or even ignored. The 
practical utility of a particular line of work, especially those involving manual labour, can be 
recognised while desiring to abolish or at least transform it; conversely, the prestige of certain white-
collar occupations may mask their actual futility. In regard to the latter, see Graeber 2013.
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university” ideal have misread Robbins, I then explained how such a misreading became
possible, focusing on the strange antinomical content in the Report, which oscillates
from plainly radical instrumentalism of a particularly consumer-led sort to traditionalist
conceptions of university education. It was put forward that such idealists have not only
misled themselves but have indeed misrecognised the essence of the postwar university.
I then returned to a discussion of the place of idealism in the structure of the
university,  pointing  out  that  the  seemingly  interminable  dichotomy between it  and
instrumentalism obscures the role of a third element within the university triad, namely
that  of  community.  This  third  leg  of  the  three-legged  stool  of  the  superstructural
university is the subject of our next chapter.
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Torn Between Common Life and Individualism:
The Thorny Issue of Community
“As philosophers,  we search below our feet  because
our generation has lost its grounding in both soil and
virtue.  By  virtue,  we  mean  that  shape,  order  and
direction of action informed by tradition, bounded by
place,  and  qualified  by  choices  made  within  the
habitual  reach  of  the  actor;  we  mean  practice
mutually recognized as being good within a shared
local culture that enhances the memories of a place.”
(Groeneveld, Hoinacki, and Illich 1990)
“What is evoked by world religions – whether that of
Moses  or  of  Jesus  or  some  other  –  is  a  repressed
exteriority that worked and still works as a power to
deconstruct  the  community  and  communalized
religion, even though it is soon reappropriated by the
community. We find such thinking from the exterior
in  the  pre-Socratics  who  worked  in  the
communicative  spaces  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea,
which  they  look  on  as  Verkehrsraum.  Unlike
Socrates, they were foreigners and stood in the space
between communities. . Heidegger decries the loss of
being afer Plato, but he himself is, in fact, a thinker
belonging to the community that expels this kind of
in-between being.”
(Karatani 1992, 137)
The rustic village and the cosmopolitan city are spatial figures that represent the two
extremes of our contemporary experience of human community. In the first, everyone
knows everyone else, and the presence of a stranger is swiftly recognised. A tangible
communal, indeed parochial sense pervades the entire place, and for those who choose
to  dwell  there,  the  dominant  experience  of  belonging  is  that  of  holding  things  in
common. In the second, neighbours often do not even know each other, and a stranger
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can  slip  past  unnoticed.  The  spaces  where  people  congregate  are  hives  of  often
disconnected activity, even if in the same “genre” such as sport or reading, and for those
who opt to live in such places, belonging is ephemeral and difficult to pin down. The
experience of openness, general freedom and plurality is dominant and highly valued.1
The sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies uses the word gemeinschaf (often translated
as “community”) to denote the first state of affairs and gesellschaf (often translated as
“society”) to denote the second state of affairs (Tönnies 2001). The epigraphs above from
Ivan  Illich  and  Karatani  likewise  capture  the  forces  which  tend  towards  these  two
concepts, the former being an interiorising dynamic forming and reinforcing what is
shared, and the latter a deconstructive dynamic, arising from an exterior and calling
into question the inward-facing nature of its opposite. Nevertheless, as it is with almost
all  such  conflicting forces,  they often co-exist  in  a  certain tension,  rather  than one
reigning in an unadulterated form. In this chapter we shall explore how they shape the
dynamic of the third pole of the University Triangle, namely community.
If the 1940s and 1950s formed a period whereby the instrumentalist foundations
of the postwar university were laid down, and the 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of an
illusory idealist conception of the public university, immortalised in the Robbins Report,
the period from the 1980s until  the present is particularly salient for examining the
question of community. The shifts in policy during this period have resulted in a system
of higher education which focuses increasingly on the individual – whether a member
of the student body, academic staff or non-academic staff – as the privileged site of
academic life.  This individualisation of governance, and the concomitant rise of self-
governance, raises in a particularly intense fashion the problem of alterity – that is, how
those within the sphere of the university relate to each other, the other related spheres
of society and indeed, by extension, the otherness present within themselves.
In the first section of this chapter, we shall engage in an broader enquiry into the
perspective of community, which is ultimately an attempt to grapple with the question
of alterity, with some help from twinned concepts such as gemeinschaf and gesellschaf.
In the second section, these ideas are put to the test within the context of the postwar
1 In the history of modern Western philosophy, these two figures of city and village can arguably be 
represented by Königsberg and Todtnauberg, the favoured dwelling spaces of, respectively, Immanuel
Kant and Martin Heidegger. Könisberg was an important port by the Baltic Sea, the multicultural 
capital of the Kingdom of Prussia. Todtnauberg was and is a tiny village in the Black Forest, remote 
and scenic. Kant was a theoretician of cosmopolitanism founded on reason, Heidegger of home 
(Heimat) and rootedness based on a certain spiritual sentiment. We find here in the correspondence of
biography and thought what Steffi Richter calls a “'homology' of life and thinking” (Richter 2015).
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British  university,  and,  in  particular,  since  the  reforms  of  the  early  1980s.  This
contextualised discussion is supplemented by juxtaposing developments over the last
few decades with eerily similar instances from the earlier history of the university in
Europe. The recent and present conditions experienced by students, academics and non-
academic staff are examined in turn, noting the impact of particular policies on the
vibrancy or otherwise of community in its variegated forms. Finally, in the last section,
we begin to sketch out an alternative to the forms of community which the first and
second sections explore, based on the judgment that they are ultimately insufficient for
the present conjecture which we face in the contemporary British university.
4.1 Community and its Discontents
The issue of community is primarily concerned with the problematic of otherness, and
can  be  taken  in  two main  directions,  both  appearing  to  be  equally  valid  yet
fundamentally opposed. The first form of otherness is found and experienced within the
context of proximity and commonality,  manifesting itself as a life in  community. To
illuminate  what  is  here  meant  by  community,  we  might  use  rather  the  term
gemeinschaf, as formulated by the Tönnies in the following terms: “All kinds of social
co-existence  that  are  familiar,  comfortable  and  exclusive  are  to  be  understood  as
belonging to  Gemeinschaf. . [For example, in]  Gemeinschaf we are united from the
moment of our birth with our own folk for better or for worse” (Tönnies 2001, 18). Here
the other to be encountered is not primarily the absolute other but rather “his brother
[or sister] whom he hath seen,” the love of whom is established in the First Epistle of
John as the first test towards the love of the one “whom he hath not seen” (1 Jn. 4:20,
KJV).2 Moreover, even in a tight-knit group people are not carbon copies of each other.
Nevertheless,  some  may  deride  this  conception  of  otherness  as  being
insufficiently  other,  in  that  it  necessarily  involves  a  significant  degree  of  common
belonging, based upon aspects such as place, tradition, vocation and shared ideology.
Such  is  the  position  held  by  Karatani,  hostile  as  he  is  towards  what  he  considers
communal spaces where rules are shared and the other can be “interiorized within the
2 The full verse runs: “If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not 
his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?” While it may seem 
odd to liken the stranger or alien to God, what they share is a radical otherness which is unruly and 
unpredictable. Depending on one's theology and social framework, both God and the outsider may be
rumoured to be good or bad (or, to use more traditional language on the theistic question, benevolent 
or wrathful), or even both (whether a mixture or equally at the same time), thus one or all of faith, 
reason and/or experience is required for an assessment to be made and a conviction to be formed.
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self” (Karatani 1994). His stance, however, can and should be understood, at least in part,
as the result of his life-long struggle against inward-looking trends in his native Japan. 3
However, those who favour this form of otherness, such as Ivan Illich in many of his
writings, argue that what they call “vernacular” rootedness is essential in order to avoid
the pitfalls of overly-abstract modern society. Such a turn towards the vernacular is, in a
sense, one possible response towards the standardising, conformity-inducing aspects of
modern technologised society, a response which looks back to move forward. In the
1990  “Declaration  on  Soil,”  co-authored  with  Sigmar  Groeneveld,  Lee  Hoinacki  and
other friends,4 Illich argues for a revival of virtue in order to address the ecological
crises which we are still facing now. Virtue, they write, “is traditionally found in labor,
craft, dwelling and suffering supported, not by an abstract earth, environment or energy
system, but by the particular soil these very actions have enriched with their traces”
(Groeneveld, Hoinacki, and Illich 1990).
The  second  form  of  otherness  is  focused  on  exteriority  and  difference,
manifesting itself as an existence oriented towards spaces where alterity is central, such
as cosmopolitan world society.  The corresponding concept  in Tönnies,  opposing the
aforementioned  gemeinschaf,  is  that  of gesellschaf,  which  he  defines  as  follows:
“Gesellschaf means life in the public sphere, in the outside world. . We go out into
Gesellschaf as if into a foreign land”  (Tönnies 2001, 18). On his part, Karatani argues
that “society should be clearly distinguished from community: the language spoken to
the other will become social, dialogic, and polyphonic only if the other is an outsider to
the  community where  a  common  set  of  rules  is  shared;  the  dialogue  within  a
'community'  is  merely a monologue”  (Karatani 1995b, 140,  italics added).  If  we are to
follow this  definition,  the  space  for  such dialogue  – or,  more  expansively,  for  such
intercourse or  exchange – is necessarily at the interstices of established communities;
3 In a 1997 lecture, Karatani stated that he “felt almost suffocated in Japan during the 1980s,” during the
generalised euphoria created by the triumph of Japanese capitalism (Karatani 1997b). Carl Cassegard 
has pointed out that during this period, Karatani's trenchant opposition to “the closed, amorphous 
system of Japanese power” led him to describe “the global market in positive terms as a liberating and
deconstructive tool that undermined the autonomy and closure of national communities,” although he
did so “not because he saw the market as good in itself but because he hoped that the collapse of the 
Japanese model would liberate buried alternative traditions” (Cassegard 2007, 11). This interiority-
phobic aspect of his thought has not subsided in recent years, as his 2014 conversation with Kim 
Uchang demonstrates. There, Karatani argues that the Japanese tradition of avoiding open discussion 
and dissensus is “not universal” and “cannot work outside Japan” (Kim and Karatani 2014, 179).
4 It is worth noting the centrality of the conception and practice of friendship within Illich's thought, 
which has led to the use of the term “friends” for his circle of collaborators and interlocutors. A 
concise treatment of his understanding of friendship can be found in Illich 2005, chap. 11.
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that is, at what Karatani in his writings in the 1980s and 1990s calls a communicative or
inter-crossing space, drawing from the term Verkehrsraum found in Marx's early writings
(Karatani 1993b). In his more recent output, Karatani does not make use of the term
communicative space, but the concept remains active even as it modulates, as is clear
from his later discussion of the “transcendental topos” where transcritique is possible
(Karatani  2003b, 134) as well  as in many implicit  references to similar “in-between”
spaces, such as in his discussion of “intercourse and commerce” within world-empires
(Karatani 2014, 105). 
Before we move on, it should noted that it would be incorrect to pit Illich and
Karatani against each other. While the target of each thinker's critique appears at first
glance to be exactly what the other is putting forward, a more careful  reading will
demonstrate that the abstract modern society which Illich lambasts is not in fact the
transcendental  topos  of  Karatani's  transcritique,  and  neither  is  the  inward-facing
community which Karatani attacks equivalent to the form of being-together which Illich
truly believes in. That is to say, Illich's apparently simple affirmation of  gemeinschaf
was in fact a tactical move which does not fully represent the radical conception of
human solidarity which he developed in his late work, namely that of borderless yet
embodied  friendship  based  on  Christian  agape.  Similarly,  Karatani's  advocacy  of
gesellschaf was a manouevre he performed in the 1970s and 1980s in order to outflank
Japanese insularity, but in his most recent work we find a far more nuanced idea of
what an intercrossing space may look like. Thus, Illich's position is in fact more complex
than  is  apparent  in  most  of  his  popular  writings,  even if  it  is  undeniable  that  the
contents of the latter display a bias towards gemeinschaf. Likewise, careful distinctions
can and should be made between the various concepts  which stress  exteriority and
difference in Karatani's thought. We shall turn to examine these matters in more detail
in the final section of this chapter.
Nevertheless,  returning  to  the  main  thread  of  our  argument,  the  degree  of
conflict  between the two conceptions of  otherness  is  far  from insignificant,  as each
harbours within itself a critique of the other. This two-sided critique is often latent or
implicit, but can also quite easily become patent or explicit under the right conditions.
At a deeper level, however, what is at stake is what we may call a meta-antinomy within
the problematic of otherness, in which one is torn between belonging and withdrawal,
or community and solitude. Pace Karatani and his withering critique, for a community
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tending towards  gemeinschaf to be healthy and stable, it cannot smother the subjects
that  are part  of  it  with demands for  total  belonging and  community,  because some
degree  of  withdrawal  and  solitude  is  necessary  for  these  persons  to  maintain  their
personality  or,  shall  we  say,  singularity.5 Likewise,  a  community tending  towards
gesellschaf that  only  encourages  withdrawal,  solitude,  dispersion  and  freedom  will
eventually turn into – if it is not already – an anti-social collection of individualistic
monads. The phrase “tending towards” is important, because as Jose Harris points out,
“[t]he crucial question in any 'empirical' setting [is] not whether a particular individual,
institution, idea or action belong[s] to 'Gemeinschaft' or 'Gesellschaft', but where they
[are] positioned on the continuum between the two,” because “a human individual.
simultaneously  experience[s]  some  degree  of  both  Wesenwille [natural  will]  and
Kürwille [rational will], spontaneity and calculation, 'selfhood' and 'personhood', kinship
ties and market forces” (Harris 2001, xxviii).
Upon reaching this point of the argument, it is inevitable to pause, indeed to
hesitate, because what is involved is an entry into or at least a skirting around the edges
of very old and seemingly never-ending debates. To gesture to just one recent period of
such intense academic skirmishes, towards the end of the last century, a series of books
by reputable French and Italian philosophers entered,  sans any evasion, this terrain of
intellectual struggle. These texts include Jean-Luc Nancy's  The Inoperative  Community,
Maurice  Blanchot's  The  Unavowable  Community,  Giorgio  Agamben's  The  Coming
Community and Roberto Esposito's Communitas. Taken together, they form an approach
to  community which  we  may  term  non-substantialist,  one  of  two  matrices  of
interactions  of  gemeinschaf and  gesellschaf which we will  explore,  the  other  being
substantialist community.
The general  aim of  these  monographs  was,  in  the  recent  words  of  Esposito
gazing back in retrospect, to be “radically deconstructive toward the way the concept-
term [of community] had been used in twentieth-century philosophy as a whole – first
by the German organicist sociology on Gemeinschaf (community), then by the various
5 Given that any sense of common belonging is necessarily inchoate and partial, it may be questioned 
whether the figure of community as a force of overpowering conformism is in fact a straw man 
erected by its critics. It is true that the ideology of identitarian community, in certain contexts, has 
been and continues to be a divisive, retrograde force, providing fuel for nationalist and even fascist 
movements. Nevertheless, to tar all forms of community with the brush of incipient fascism is to take 
a particular phenomenon and generalise it for a much wider category, simply by virtue of the same 
word being invoked. Instead of performing this elision (which can considered a form of the “hasty 
generalisation” fallacy), we should carefully distinguish between different forms of community.
109
Chapter 4
ethics  of  communication,  and  finally,  by  American neocommunitarianism”  (Esposito
2013, 83).6 Despite their many divergences, what united these three strands of thought
and which made them ripe for deconstructive critique was “a tendency – which could
be defined as metaphysical – to conceive of  community in a substantialist, subjective
sense” – that is, “as a substance that connected certain individuals to each other through
the  sharing  of  a  common  identity”  (Esposito  2013,  83,  italics  added).  For  these
continental  philosophers,  the  most  perverse,  if  not  immediately  noticeable,  effect  of
positing such a substance was that, in Esposito's words, it converted community from
being about the common to being rather about the proper, that is, “[w]hat its members
had  in  common was  what  was  proper  to  them – that  of  being  proprietors of  their
commonality”  (Esposito 2013,  83,  italics added).  Moreover,  Nancy argued the sort  of
organic  community which  many long(ed)  for  has  never  in  fact  existed,  stating  that
“[c]ommunity  has  not  taken  place,  or  rather,  if  it  indeed  certain  that  humanity  has
known (or still knows, outside of the industrial world) social ties quite different from
those familiar to us [in the modern West], community has never taken place along the
lines our projections of it.” (Nancy 1991, 11, italics in original).
To put it simply, what we may call the ideal type of substantialist community is a
matrix  in  which  gemeinschaf generally  takes  the  lead,  with  its  positing  of  organic
belonging based on clear (if often invented) markers of identity such as geographical
origin, language or ethnicity. Nevertheless, there are also more overtly “artificial” forms
of substantialist community based on, for example, creeds and ideologies. In such cases
what is shared is to a much greater extent a matter of conscious adoption, but what is
constant is the idea that the community is bound together by something – a property –
they hold jointly, such as their shared religious, political or philosophical persuasion.
On the other hand, the ideal type of non-substantialist  community can be said to be
community formed under general conditions of gesellschaf, in that it is the unknown,
suspect, unruly or even overtly hostile other – the one with whom one does not share
some “thing” such as nationality, race or belief – to whom one opens oneself. In the
words of Esposito, “the common is not characterized by what is proper but by what is
improper, or even more drastically, by the other; by a voiding, be it partial or whole, of
property into its negative; by removing what is properly one's own that invests and
6 In Communitas, Esposito makes a similar argument but includes alongside these three strands of 
theory “the communist tradition. despite quite a different categorical profile” (Esposito 2010, 2).
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decenters the proprietary subject, forcing him to take leave of himself, to alter himself”
(Esposito 2010, 7).
It must be acknowledged that the non-substantialist conception of community –
whether termed as inoperative, unavowable or coming – is particularly seductive in an
age where the utter failures and indeed disasters of deploying the concept of community
in the previous century are still not far from our minds. Yet, is there is a sense in which
we should resist the allure of such deconstructions today? Although we have quoted
Karatani as endorsing  gesellschaf  in his earlier work, in a 2003 lecture, he traces his
being influenced in the 1970s and 1980s – the period in which he wrote works including
Architecture as Metaphor – by the work of Derrida, before stating that “[d]econstruction
was meaningful under the binary opposition of the Cold War regime. It may be said that
when the Soviet bloc collapsed, deconstruction lost its political meaning, and more often
than not resulted in rhetorical techniques for equivocating”  (Karatani 2003a, 23). This
argument is an explicit example of Karatani's aforementioned principle that “critique is
impossible without moves.”  As will  be discussed further below, Karatani's  shift from
speaking about inter-crossing spaces to a transcendental topos is significant. Returning
to  the  continental  European  expositions  of  non-substantialist  community,  it  is
noteworthy that the first text in this dialogue, namely Nancy's essay, “The Inoperative
Community,”  was  written  in  1983,  before  the  fall  of  20th century  Really-Existing
Socialism,  and  in  fact  begins  with  a  consideration  of  the  disappointment  of  “real
communism”  (Nancy 1991, 1–3). Thus, if we are to follow Karatani's argument, at the
point of emergence of this series of related texts, the critique shared by Nancy, Blanchot,
Agamben and Esposito7 of substantialist community had a particular relevance which
we cannot assume today in the wider world, much less in the specific sphere of higher
education in Britain today.
Hence,  the  question  that  befalls  us  is  this:  is  the  critique  of  substantialist
community what the context of the contemporary British university requires, or at least
7 It should also be noted that although each of these texts has its own specificities and nuances, and 
thus it may to some seem audacious – and perhaps even ironic, given their critique of commonality 
as a property – to bundle them all up into a common unit, it is certainly the case that what they all 
share, as Marita Vyrgioti has pointed out, is an affirmation that “community does not constitute any 
'wider subjectivity', and neither does it bear any objective, material elements, apart from one: 'it 
cannot be objectified'” (Vyrgioti 2015, 2). Vyrgioti's article explores the deep resonances between the 
respective texts of Nancy, Agamben and Esposito, but it can also be said that underlying the 
divergences between Nancy and Blanchot is an agreement on the originary “absence of community” 
(I. James 2010, 177).
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would benefit from? Or would either an affirmation of substantialist community or an
abandonment of a focus on community altogether in favour of a fully deconstructive
gesellschaf – that is, one which does not even attempt to establish an attenuated form of
community  –  be  more  appropriate?  This  is  an  action-centric  question  within  the
structure of the Epistemic Triangle, whereby the measure is not truth, which guided our
investigations in Chapters Two and Three, nor authenticity, which the next chapter will
focus upon, but rather  timeliness, based on a reading of the context we are in. In the
previous  chapters  we  have  caught  a  glimpse  of  how rampant  instrumentalism and
illusory  idealism  have  created  an  environment  of  university  education  which  is
antithetical to any strong formation of community, and in this chapter we shall examine
this question in greater detail. The general argument which will be put forward is that,
at present, the concept of the university as a community is, if it appears at all, but a
flimsy  veneer  covering  some  of  the  excesses  of  consequentialist,  instrumentalist
university policy and governance. This takes a few forms, and thus we shall selectively
map out the territory according to the impact of postwar policy, in particular since the
1980s, on students, academics and non-academic staff.
However, at the risk of sounding like a music player set to repeat, we should
preface our cartography by emphasising once again that the deficiencies of a particular
manifestation of  community do not, in and of themselves, provide sufficient reason to
abandon the concept altogether. The writer and populariser of Eastern philosophy Alan
Watts, in an early book meant as an immanent critique of the Christian tradition, wrote
that “[t]he Church has always walked forward on extremes like a man on two legs, and
you cannot walk by putting both legs forward at the same time” (Watts 1947, 8). At the
day's end, it is possible to justify, in the abstract, each of the approaches to the question
of  community briefly explored  above,  and  thus,  on  one level,  the  crucial  task  is  to
determine which foot is the most appropriate one to put forward at a given time. After
all, if the foot one settles on is in reality already ahead of the other (or other two, for we
can imagine the university better as a three-legged creature), one is likely to lose one's
balance and topple over.
However, if  one views the three-legged university as being akin to Karatani's
Capital-Nation-State, to maintain the former's balance is a conservative rather than a
revolutionary operation, and so there is a sense in which a discernment of the untimely
may be in fact more important for those who wish to see radical change. For there are
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two divergent poles in the discernment what it is to be advanced in a particular time
and place. Both involve sensing what the mood of the times is in a particular context,
but the response of the first is to move along with it, while that of the second is to move
against it. The first may be called a liberal approach, and the second a radical one. The
Victorian theologian William Inge captured the challenge of the former approach when
he said that “he who marries the spirit of the age will soon find himself a widower”
(Nineham 1976, 227). The latter alternative was put forward forcefully by Nietzsche in
his second Untimely Meditation where he counselled: “[I]f you want biographies, do not
desire those which bear the legend 'Herr So-and-So and his age', but those upon whose
title-page there would stand 'a fighter against his age'” (Nietzsche 1997, 95).
In both cases, however, one's stance is strongly determined by one's context, for
if, in the abstract, one person is has decided to say “yes” and another person to say “no”
to whatever is hegemonic in the present-day, then the actual content of their stances are
essentially dependent on what exactly is the dominant position in a given place and
time.  Some may consider  both  these  approaches  too reactive,  and  indeed  there  are
positions  which  appear  to  lie  between  the  two,  such  as  that  of  the  “moderate
conservative” who merely reinterprets the tradition to which she has pledged herself to
in order to best engage the situation at hand, but does not have a strong desire to either
be for or against the current. Such an outlook, however, is radically different to the
approaches which choose to affirm or negate the present state of things, for a different
bracketing operation is  at  work.  What  is  being privileged is  no longer timeliness –
which, it must be emphasised, includes also its inverted image of untimeliness – but a
form of truth. Hence, in this chapter, we shall leave such cases to one side.
4.2 The Postwar British University and Community
It is now time to turn from considering in the abstract the two approaches to handling
alterity,  namely  the  ideal  types  of  substantialist  community and  non-substantialist
community, comprised as they are of interactions between gemeinschaf and gesellschaf,
to a more concrete analysis. This analysis will be carried out by addressing, in turn, the
question of community as it is manifested within the distinct yet overlapping spheres in
which students, non-academic staff and academics work and dwell in the contemporary
British university, with reference to its more and less recent history.
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Students and Community
The  first  thing  which  has  to  be  pointed  out  with  regards  to  the  condition  of  the
contemporary British student is her role within the present system of university finance
which can be traced back to the 1966 decision by the Department of Education and
Science (DES) under Anthony Crosland to raise international student fees from £70 to
£250  (Shattock  2012,  157).  The DES  justified  their  decision  as  being  in  line  with  a
recommendation by the Robbins Committee to broaden the income base of universities,
but it was pointed out by Lionel Elvin, director of the Institute of Education a member
of the committee, that the original proposal was to increase the fees of all students, and
not just international students (“Increased Fees for Overseas Students” 1967, 461). J. M.
Lee argues that the DES' decision was driven by the belief, which was not backed up by
any hard evidence or even sustained argument, that wealthy European and American
students should not benefit from highly subsided British higher education, rather than
the  Robbins  Committee's  concern  for  creating  multiple  streams  of  income  for  the
universities  (Lee  1998,  318).  The  German  anti-Nazi  theologian  Martin  Niemöller's
famous phrase, “First they came for. and I did not speak out because I was not a.”
thankfully did not fully describe the response of students and academics of the time, as
not only did student activists occupy buildings in protest, even the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals issued a statement protesting the discriminatory effect of the
decision and its negative impact on the universities' international character  (Shattock
2012, 157). Nevertheless, these acts of resistance failed to reverse the decision, which
was indeed in fact “repeated” with a wider scope in the reforms under Willetts in 2010.
If we use GDP per capita to measure income value, the increase of overseas students'
fees in 1966 would be an increase from £2,736 to £9,773 in today's terms. Hence, forty-
four years after a tripling of fees was imposed on international students, home students
in  British  universities  (with  the  partial  exception  of  Scotland)  received  the  same
treatment, with the fee cap rising from £3,000 to £9,000.
As  a  result  of  these  changes,  contemporary  higher  education is  increasingly
dependent for its funding upon – and thus beholden to – student finance, while being
regulated by and residually funded by the state.8 In this  sense,  what has arisen is  a
8 In the British context, it is instructive that the state still funds the bulk of higher education by 
providing loans to students for fees and living costs, even if the loan portfolio or “student loanbook” 
may be sold, part by part, to private parties in order for the government to transfer the risk of “the 
growing portfolio of Income-Contingent Repayment student loans on the Government's balance 
sheet” to the private sector (HM Government 2009, 68). Andrew McGettigan has examined this and 
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system very much similar to the medieval universities, with the ironic twist being that it
is highly unlikely that the architects of higher education reforms over the last four and
a half decades consciously set out to revive elements from the university of the Middle
Ages, but in their desire to create reform and progress, they have ended up producing
repetitions.
Hence, it may be instructive for us to briefly examine some salient elements of
the earliest days of the medieval university, relevant as they are for our time due to their
particular blend of  gemeinschaf  and  gesellschaf.  Many of  us in the present may be
unaware of the fact that when the institutions which developed into the great ancient
universities first emerged in the High Middle Ages, fees from students were the  only
source of livelihood for the doctors of the studium (Rashdall 1895a, 1:210). Indeed, even
though the University of Bologna is said to have been officially founded in 1088, there
was  little  to  distinguish  the  Bolognese  law schools  from previously-existing  private
operations, run by masters for students who paid the agreed fees, until around the final
two decades of the 12th century, when a key development occurred  (Ridder-Symoens
2003, 48). This was the founding of the first  universitas or guild of scholars with an
elected rector by foreign students in the town, modelled on the other guilds which had
begun to make headway into Italian cities (Rashdall 1895a, 1:163–164). It is particularly
important to note that the first universitas or scholars guild in Europe, was founded in
Bologna not by masters but rather by students. This led to the formation of a university
controlled by students rather than – as developed later in Paris – by masters (Cobban
1980).  Although  today  the  word  university  is  used  to  describe  most  institutions  of
higher education, the medieval teaching organisation managed by the collegia doctorum
was in fact known as the studium, and in many places in Southern Europe this structure
remained separate from that of the  universitates or universities managed by students
(Rashdall 1895a, 1:167).
In order to best understand this phenomenon of the student-run university, we
should  examine  its  most  outstanding  example,  namely  the  university  that  arose  in
Bologna. The purpose of the  universitas, itself a federation of smaller organisations of
students from specific localities, was “to guarantee the mutual aid and protection of the
students  against  the  exactions  of  the  local  people  and  local  authorities”  (Ridder-
other intricacies of the post-2010 student finance system in detail (McGettigan 2013, chap. 13–14). A 
third stream of university funding comes from partnerships with profit-making (i.e. in our time, 
capitalist) institutions as well as some public sector bodies.
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Symoens  2003,  48).  The  universitates were  set  up  as  a  necessity  within  a  political
structure which did not accord legal rights to non-citizens, a category which most of the
students in Bologna and other such universities fell under due to their foreign origin
(Cobban  1971,  35).  Some  who  believe  strongly  in  the  abstract  concept  of  “student
power” may be tempted to see these forms of self-organisation as a wholly-beneficient
development; however, the early history of the University of Bologna reveals a dark side
to these historically-realised forms of organised student power, as we shall see below.
The institution of  salaries  paid  by  the  State  was  a  slightly  later  but  no  less
significant  development,  and  was  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  put  a  brake  on  the
emerging trend of  Bologna doctors being lured to teach in other towns upon being
promised a salary (Rashdall 1895a, 1:211). The first extant record of such a payment was
in 1280, a sum of 150 librae to the Spanish canonist Garsias for a year's teaching, and
here too it is important to note the power of the students, who negotiated the contract
even though it  was paid by the Bolognese Republic  (Rashdall  1895a,  1:212).  At  this
moment in history, with the organised power of the universitas at a high point, and was
recognised by the magistrates of Bologna, it did not matter a great deal whether the
salary was paid by the City or by the universitas itself. What was certain, however, was
that  in  Bologna  the  students  had  usurped  the  power  which  in  the  universities  of
Northern Europe were held almost completely by the masters (Cobban 1980). However,
in their  attempt to escape or at  least  improve their  precarious existence as resident
aliens,  far  from  being  “the  oppressed  who,  by  freeing  themselves,  can  free  their
oppressors”  (Freire 2003, 56),  the student guild in Bologna became instead “the new
boss”  who was  “same  as  the  old  boss”  (The Who  1971).  This  quote  from  Hastings
Rashdall, extended as it is, is nevertheless helpful as a vivid illustration of the extent of
the domination of the organised students exercised over their professors in those years:
[T]he  Doctors  were  compelled,  under  pain  of  a  ban  which  would  have
deprived them of  pupils  and income,  to  swear  obedience to the Students'
Rector and to obey any other regulations which the Universities might think
fit  to  impose  upon  them.  While  not  entitled  to  a  vote  in  the  University
Congregation, the Professor was liable to privatio or expulsion from a Society
to whose privileges he had never been admitted. . [A] Professor requiring
leave of absence even for a single day was compelled to obtain it first from
his own pupils and then from the Rectors and Consilarii: and if he proposed
to leave the town, he was required to deposit a sum of money by way of
security for his return. . The Professor was obliged to begin his lecture when
the bell of S. Peter's began to ring for mass, under a penalty of 20 solidi for
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each  offence.  Even  in  the  actual  conduct  of  his  lectures  the  Doctor  is
regulated with the precision of a soldier on parade or a reader in a French
public library. He is fined is he skips a Chapter or Decretal; he is forbidden to
postpone a difficulty to the end of the Lecture lest such a liberty should be
abused as a pretext for evading it altogether. . The Law-texts were divided
into portions known as puncta and the Doctor was required to have reached
each punctum by a specified date. At the beginning of the academical year he
was bound to deposit  the sum of  10 Bologna pounds with a banker,  who
promised to deliver it up at the demand of the Rectors: for every day that the
Doctor was behind time, a certain sum was deducted from his deposit  by
order of these officials. (Rashdall 1895a, 1:197–199)
It is perhaps rather ironic that the excerpt above mirrors Foucault's description
of  a  key  element  of  the  guild  apprenticeship  which  was  the  forerunner  of  the
disciplinary apparatus known as the “manufactory,” namely “the relation of dependence
on the master that is both individual  and total”  (Foucault  1977a,  156).  The irony, of
course, is that at the University of Bologna it was the masters who became for a time
completely dependent upon the apprentices, a fact which resonates with the rather grim
actuality  of  other  ostensibly  revolutionary  regimes  throughout  history  where  an
oppressed majority has gained the upper hand over the previously-dominant minority.
It is clear that all these instances have been a far cry from the Marxist ideal where, to
quote Paulo Freire, the “[r]esolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. implies
the disappearance of the oppressors as a dominant class” (Freire 2003, 56).
The humanist Marxist critique of those such as Freire holds that “[i]t is therefore
essential that the oppressed wage the struggle to resolve the contradiction in which
they are caught; and the contradiction will be resolved by the appearance of the new
man: neither oppressor nor oppressed, but man in the process of liberation. If the goal
of the oppressed is to become fully human, they will not achieve their goal by merely
reversing the terms of the contradiction, by simply changing poles” (Freire 2003, 56). If
we are to adopt this tenet of the humanist Marxists, then it is clear that the law students
of Bologna did not set out to create and live out the existence of the new man, a figure
for which some of us are still waiting, and may perhaps be doing so in vain.
The end of student power in Bologna and other universities in Southern Europe
came about as a result  of the communes taking on more and more of the duties of
remunerating the professors via the fixed salaries which, as stated above, superseded
individually-paid fees  (Rashdall  1895a,  1:212–213).  This  gradual  change was  perhaps
summarised best by Alan B. Cobban: “Student power, bereft of its economic teeth, fell a
117
Chapter 4
victim to  communal  politics.  It  lingered  on  in  Italy  as  a  movement  without  much
substance: by 1500, it had been reduced to nullity” (Cobban 1971, 48).
At this point a clamouring voice may cry out with the question: what does this
genealogical detour have to do with community in the postwar British university? The
answer is  simple  and unsophisticated:  the  case  of  the  Bolognese student  universitas
demonstrates  that  a university  which  is  funded  primarily  by  student  fees  can  be
presented as one which puts – to borrow the title from the 2011 White Paper published
by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills – “students at the heart of the
system”  (Department  for  Business  Innovation  and  Skills  2011),  but  in  reality  tends
toward  a  condition  where  vulgar  instrumentalism  is  the  true  beating  heart  of  the
institution. Such an instrumentalist core is incapable of building a just university or
even creating a community which is not based on more than transient interests such as
“good teaching” and “a great student experience.” Hence, the formation of a student-
centred university, if lacking a wider ethical and political framework which may be part
of a common pattern of life to check tendencies towards narcissistic self-service and
self-enjoyment, will very likely lead not to freedom, but indeed unfreedom for all. For
aside from the impact upon the conditions of academic and non-academic labour, the
only freedom a student has under such an arrangement is that of the total consumer.
To return to the rebellious  universitates of  thirteenth and fourteenth century
Southern Europe, it is clear that far from being idealists of the soixante-huitard variety,
they were pragmatists whose primary reason for attending university was in order to
gain  the  qualifications  they  required  for  career  advancement.  Far  from  being  the
preserve of aristocrats interested primarily in a broad, humanistic education, Cobban
reminds us that “the universities [of these two centuries] were,  par excellence, centres
for vocational training, gateways to lucrative careers, [and thus] those who attended
them did so primarily from a sense of social urgency, from a need to realize professional
ambition” (Cobban 1971, 33). In this sense, the 21st century British university has more
in common with the medieval university than many of us realise. There is nevertheless
one  key  element  in  which  differentiates  the  medieval  student  “at  the  heart  of  the
system” from his contemporary counterpart, namely the fact that while the first exerted
power over  the masters  and the city  authorities  through  collective  organisation and
action, the second does so through individualised mechanisms like the National Student
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Survey.9 While such atomised forms of power have a cumulative effect which may be as
formidable as the  universitates of  the Middle Ages,  the central difference is that the
latter promoted a more immediate and embodied sense of community than the former.
The medieval  scholars  could still  be  regarded,  more or less,  as  consumers,  but  they
believed in banding together as associations of consumers, whereas the contemporary
student-consumer primarily acts in isolation, in line with monadic liberal philosophy.
The  student-controlled  universitas may  appear  at  first  sight  to  have  been  a
straight-forwardly substantialist  community strongly tending towards gemeinschaf, as
its members shared not only a common experience and identity as apprentice scholars,
but lived in the same locality. Nevertheless, this apparent stability is counteracted by the
fact that the strongest weapon the universitas wielded against one of its chief rivals, the
communal authorities, was not fuzzy notions such as prestige but rather the very real
threat of secession (Le Goff 1980, 146). Hastings Rashdall points out that this bargaining
chip  was  unique  to  the  universitas as  opposed  to  the  other  guilds  in  the  medieval
commune, for the latter “were composed of citizens, who never thought of disputing the
authority  of  the  city-government,  and  who  could  not  put  themselves  beyond  its
jurisdiction without losing both property and status. The Universities were composed of
aliens, who refused to recognize the authority of the State in which they lived when it
conflicted  with  the  allegiance  which  they  had  sworn  to  their  own  artificial
commonwealth”  (Rashdall  1895a,  1:170).  The  essentially  nomadic  character  of  the
scholars meant they could uproot themselves at any time and move the operations of
the university elsewhere, leaving the commune bereft of sources of income and status.
This  mobilitas loci which actively militated against the development of deep ties to a
particular place – which can be seen as evidence of gesellschaf-tending relations within
a generally  gemeinschaf-oriented wider  environment – was largely destroyed  along
with the organised power of  students  as  the  university  developed a  “more ordered,
sedentary character” in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Cobban 1971, 66).
Nevertheless, if the endowment of various chairs and construction of permanent
colleges  and  buildings  have led to  definitively  sedentary core  of  the  university,  the
continued fact that it provides only a temporary home for most who enter as students
means that a nomadic undercurrent still  flows strongly beneath the seemingly solid
9 The proposed Teaching Excellence Framework would strengthen this tendency. For a cogent critique 
of the recent White Paper, Success as a Knowledge Economy, which sets out this planned development 
and other related mechanisms, see Woodcock and Toscano 2016.
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superstructure.  While  the  political-legal  environment  in  which  students  in  British
universities carry out their studies no longer necessitates anything close to the student-
dominated universitates, the return of the university to having student fees as a primary
source  of  funding  threatens  to  deepen  the  elements  of  self-seeking  and  “thin
community”10 instrumentalism,  the  previous  historical  incidence  of  which  we  have
briefly explored in the case of the Bolognese  universitas, but which arguably has also
been steadily growing in the postwar period. We cannot, of course, use the word “anti-
social”  to describe these trends,  for if  we understand the social  through the lens of
gesellschaf or  even Karatani's  earlier  conception of  communicative spaces,  the  free-
flowing and weakly-bonded elements  of  medieval  and  contemporary  student  life  is
indeed constitutive of such “social” or “thin” communal connections.
Does this rise in looser  gesellschaf bonds indicate – or at the very least create
the conditions for – a growth of non-substantialist  community within the university
student body? It is difficult to answer this question conclusively at this point. To start
with, it can be argued that the possibility of non-substantialist community tends to arise
upon  the  failure  and/or  disillusionment  with  substantialist  community,  which  takes
place not only within the boundaries of a particular sphere such as the university but
also in the wider “social imaginary,” to borrow a term from Charles Taylor.11 We have
already mentioned evidence of the latter in the work of Karatani and the continental
theorists of non-substantialist  community in the 1980s and 1990s, in which they point
out the flaws of the substantialist model. The shrivelling of a substantialist conception at
a particular point of space-time, however, does not automatically lead to the growth of a
non-substantialist  alternative,  for  it  is  equally  possible  that  the  disintegration  of
gemeinschaf-like relations leads simply to an atomised, disconnected non-community.
To the extent that a sense of community still persists in the university within the
10 Although gemeinschaf and gesesllschaf are normally translated into English as “community” and 
“society,” it may be also helpful to draw from a distinction the theologian and social critic Giles Fraser
has made between “thick community” and “thin community.” In the former configuration of social 
ties “people look after each other and have a high degree of civic pride,” but are “often not good at 
dealing with difference, or with outsiders” (Fraser 2016b). In the latter situation, “you can be as 
different as you like. Nobody cares,” and so although what exists “isn’t really much of a community at
all” (Fraser 2016b), it is arguably nevertheless a variety of community, even if a rather heterodox one.
11 Taylor defines the term in the following manner: “By social imaginary, I mean something much 
broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social 
reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, 
how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations” (Taylor 2004, 23).
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student  body,  such  persistence  occurs  in  spite  of  rather  than  due  to  contemporary
institutional arrangements. It was already pointed out by Michael Rustin in 1994 that
the focus on “greater flexibility” in higher education, expressed in techniques such as
modularisation and credit transfer schemes, “theoretically allow students, now redefined
as autonomous interest-maximising consumers, to compile programmes at the locations
and in the time-slots they prefer, rather than by compelling them to conform to the
spatial and temporal organisation convenient to the university” (Rustin 1994, 190–191).
Moreover,  the spatial  proximity which traditional  forms of substantialist  community
depend  upon  has  been  overturned  by  “[t]he  development  of  'distance-learning
techniques' promises to facilitate the physical dislocation of higher education from the
university’s own territory, and make it possible for students to study whenever and
wherever they want” (Rustin 1994, 191).12 Such developments do not make community –
whether substantialist or non-substantiailst – impossible, but they certainly transform
the manner in which any type of community can be created and sustained.
Having discussed the issue of student life and its impact upon community, it is
time for us to turn to another sphere of university life, one which is often ignored in
discussions  about  higher  education.  This  is  the  sphere  which  is  inhabited  by  staff
members who are not academics, such as cleaners, catering staff, library staff, security
personell, and so on.
Non-Academic Staff and Community
Almost completely absent in the standard histories of the university is the role of non-
academic staff. The references to those who worked in the university but who did not
partake in its intellectual activities, or indeed those who lived in the towns alongside
the scholars,  are few and far between in both Hastings Rashdall's magisterial  three-
volume  The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages as well  as the formidable four-
volume  A History of the University in Europe edited by Hilde de Ridder-Symoens and
Walter Rüegg, which stretches from the medieval period to the present. Not only that,
the references that do appear are of largely of no consequence to the narrative, such as
12 This latter development, of course, would not have been possible without technological innovations 
which allow for increasingly disembodied learning which can be done at any place or time, e.g. with 
lectures that one could watch on a tablet or smartphone on public transport. In a 1996 interview, Ivan 
Illich comments that “hospitality requires a threshold over which I can lead you and TV, internet, 
newspaper, [and] the idea of communication [has] abolished the walls and therefore also the 
friendship, the possibility of leading somebody over the door” (Illich 1996). It can likewise be said that
communications technology has abolished the walls of the university, for both good and ill.
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Rashdall's quip that the prelates who designed the university colleges did not expect
“those who accepted [their liberality] to live like labourers” (Rashdall 1895b, 3:662).
Nevertheless, what has become clear in many recent higher education struggles
is the intimate connections between the respective forms of precarity endured by non-
academic staff, students and academics. As a result, some of the most notable campaigns
on British university campuses in the past decade have involved or even centred upon
the  conditions  of  labour  for  non-academic  staff.  Of  these,  the  anti-privatisation
campaign at Sussex University in 2012-2013 stands out, as aside from widely-deployed
tactics  such  as  the  prolonged  occupation  of  buildings  which  has  been  utilised  to
differing degrees of success since the “sit-ins” in the middle of the twentieth century, the
campaigners carried out numerous temporary occupations which disrupted cafes, the
conference centre and other university services, and hosted a national demonstration on
25 March 2013 whereby thousands of students from across the country descended upon
the campus in Falmer, on the outskirts of Brighton (Various 2016). Even more innovative
was the creation of the “Pop-Up Union,” which was “a temporary, low-dues, trade union
with the sole purpose of organising industrial action to defeat outsourcing,” formed as a
response to the reluctance of  officials  from the established unions to  call  for  strike
action (Solidarity Federation 2014). Although it proved to be a temporary rather than a
permanent formation, the Pop-Up Union became the second-largest union on campus
for a time, assisted by the fact that it was an industrial rather than a trade or craft union,
with membership open to all workers in the university (Solidarity Federation 2014). In
fact,  the Pop-Up Union's  membership very swiftly exceeded that of  all  three official
unions combined in the areas of work which were due to be outsourced (Bergfeld 2013).
Although the strike action which was planned was derailed by a successful technical
challenge by the university authorities on legal grounds, the Pop-Up Union in its short
life-span managed to pioneer a novel organisational form and win concessions from the
administration, even if the wider campaign was defeated (Solidarity Federation 2014).
The historian and activist Richard Braude has pointed out that the roots of many
of the recent industrial disputes involving manual labourers in white-collar workplaces,
of which cleaners have formed a majority, can be traced to the novel development of a
separate workforce of cleaning staff in the new clerical offices which were built as a
result of “the increasing globalisation of industry [which] caused capitalists to rely more
and more on vast communication networks, to facilitate everything from stock transfers
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to mail order services” (Braude 2013). Cleaning had been merely one of the jobs carried
out by the general labour force in factories, but given the sedentary nature of office
work,  it  proved  more  cost-effective  to  hire  cleaners  as  a  distinct  section  of  labour
(Braude 2013). In Braude's words, “Thus the offices became divided into two kinds of
work: computing, and cleaning. An amalgamation of the great machines which have
come to dominate so much of 21st century life; and beside them, a form of work which
still falls outside of computerisation” (Braude 2013).
In the university, however, the division between manual labour and intellectual
labour was established far before it came to exist in many other places of work. The
former was, of course, not seen as being anything other than incidental to the  raison
d'être of the institution and therefore invisible in its discourse, even if it was very visible
in  its  everyday  practical  reality.13 George  Caffentzis  remarks  concerning the  rise  of
white-collar labour in the late 1960s and early 1970s:
The very image of the worker seems to disintegrate before this recomposition
of capital. The burly, “blue collared” line worker seems to blur in the oil crisis,
diffracted  into  the  female  service  worker  and  the  abstracted  computer
programmer.  . And it  all  feels  so  different!  Your  wages  go up,  but  they
evaporate before you spend them; you confront your boss but he cries that
“he has bills to pay”; and even more deeply, you don’t see your exploitation
any more. On the line, you could literally observe the crystallization of your
labor-power into the commodity, you could see your life vanishing down the
line,  and  you  could  feel  the  materialization  of  your  alienation.  .  In  the
“energy/information” sector, you seem to be engulfed by the immense fixed
capital  surrounding you. It  feels as if you were not exploited at all,  but a
servant of  the machine, even “privileged” to be part  of the “brains of  the
system.” (Caffentzis 2013, 26–27)
It is rather startling to think that students and academics throughout history
have no doubt experienced the feeling of privilege that arises from their sense of being,
in Caffentzis' words, “part of the 'brains of the system,'” with learned treatises or at least
registers of various sorts to record their existence within the university system, while a
great host of manual labourers who held up the infrastructure of the institution have
simply done their work faithfully for an unspecified number of years before passing into
nameless oblivion. Hundreds of years before Hardt and Negri's thesis of the centrality of
immaterial labour in Empire was to be published and critiqued for its sidelining of the
13 In the UK, the “bedders” of Cambridge (the equivalent term at Oxford being “scouts”), domestic 
workers who cleaned the residential rooms of students appear to have been acknowledged in a 
university edict in 1635 which forbade women under fifty “to make any beds or perform any other 
service within any scholars' chambers” (Stubbings 1995, 12).
123
Chapter 4
(still-)material  labour  which sustains  the world system, their  gesture  was actualised
within the general perception of the workings of the universitas and studium generale.
In a sense,  the problematic of otherness within the institutional  space of the
university is faced most acutely in the interactions between non-academic staff, on the
one hand, and students as well as academics, on the other. Whereas the student may see
in her professor an image of what she may someday become or at least emulate in her
pursuit of knowledge, and the academic may see in her student a reflection of the proto-
academic  she  once  was,  the  non-academic  staff  member  occupies  a  space  which
historically was not within the sphere of self-recognition or empathy.14 Nevertheless,
with the phenomenon of increasing precariatisation in the Global North, this boundary
appears  to  be  breaking  down,  as  this  statement  by  a  student  participant  in  the
aforementioned anti-privitisation campaign at Sussex University demonstrates:
The privatization of services at Sussex has created a two-tiered staff body.
Catering workers who were at Sussex pre-privatisation still have sick pay,
holiday pay and a pension scheme for the meantime, while newer workers
employed by outsourcing giant Chartwells have no such benefits and are on
zero  hour  contracts.  This  casualization  of  work  actively  decreases  job
security:  try  to  use  your  labour  as  a  bargaining tool  and  your  boss  may
decide they have no shifts for you next week. If these jobs aren’t already filled
by students, these are precisely the kinds of jobs – and conditions – students can
expect to be taking on afer university. Zero hours. Little pay. No benefits. It is
in the interest of every students [sic] to campaign on issues like the living
wage, sick pay and holiday pay. Now. (Al Ghussain 2014, italics added)
The reduced prospects facing the British university student at the beginning of
the  21st century  are  evinced  in  a  August  2015  report  by  the  Chartered  Institute  of
Personnel and Development (CIPD) which indicates that 58.8% of UK graduates are in
non-graduate jobs, a figure only exceeded in Greece and Estonia (Chartered Institute of
Personnel and Development 2015, 15). The strange but perhaps somewhat redemptive
side-effect of this deterioration in the relative social position of graduates is the greater
solidarity  that  is  felt  between the  student  and  the non-academic staff member,  and
arguably between the academic and non-academic staff member as well. This increased
sense of solidarity is potentially productive of perceived commonality which may lead
14 Even those in the perceived “upper tier” of non-academic staff such as senior library personnel are 
not exempt from being at least occasionally perceived as a structurally important yet secondary 
appendage of the body of the university. Although not a few academics regularly acknowledge the 
role of librarians in contributing to their research, the situation appears rather different among 
students. Research at the University of Sheffield “showed that most students were unable to 
distinguish different groups of staff, were unaware of their departmental librarian and did not 
recognise the academic role of librarians” (Bickley and Corrall 2011, 223).
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to  gemeinschaf-esque  ties  between  these  groups  of  university  denizens  who  have
historically had little in common despite working and living in overlapping worlds. The
rise of precariatisation, in other words, has created a common “property” between them.
If  we  relate  this  development  to  the  phenomenon discussed  in  the  previous
section of the rise of  gesellschaf-tending relations within the student  community, we
find a strange co-incidence of forces pulling in the both the directions of substantialist
and  non-substantialist  community.  We have  already discussed  the  loosening  of  ties
within the student bodies of universities. The decline of union membership since the
1980s  is  another  instance  of  the  diminishing  of  a  historical  forms  of  substantialist
community (Gumbrell-McCormick 2013, 2).  However,  in the rise of precarity among
both non-academic staff and students, a possible new conduit for a limited substantialist
community has  been  formed  between  swathes  of  non-academic  staff  and  students
through the sharing of the proprium of precarious conditions of work and life. Such a
potential formation would be far from comprehensive, however, as even if students and
graduates are becoming subject to increasing levels of precariatisation, there is still a
sizable proportion of students – the 41.2% in the CIPD report, to use just one figure –
who are still enjoying the benefits of their graduate qualifications, and who thus do not
possess the common property of an ongoing experience of precarity which would give
them potential membership of any “community of the precarious.”
Academic Staff and Community
On the subject of academics and community, we may begin by observing that the form
of approaching otherness favoured by Karatani, that is, society or gesellschaf, fits a little
too  easily  with  the  tendency  in  academia  towards  individualism  and  withdrawal.
Indeed, it is instructive to note that in  Transcritique, Karatani quotes with approval a
passage  from  Descartes'  Discourse  on  Method where  the  French  philosopher  speaks
about his anonymous scholarly life in Amsterdam (Karatani 2003b, 134). In fact, in an
earlier  piece,  Karatani  describes  the  role  of  the  city  for  Descartes  as  that  of  a
communicative  space  (Karatani  1993b).  In  the  passage  itself,  Descartes  states  his
pleasure of living in a place “where amid a teeming, active, great people that shows
more interest in its own affairs than curiosity for those of others, [he has] been able to
live as solitary and as retiring a life as [he] would in the most remote of deserts, while
lacking none of the comforts found in the most populous cities”  (Descartes 2006, 27).
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More tellingly, in a letter on 5 May 1631 to his friend, Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, he
writes that “in Amsterdam he paid no more attention to the people he met than he
would to the trees on his friend’s estate and the animals that browsed there” (Descartes
2006, xi).15 Nothing could be further from an endorsement of substantialist community
and gemeinschaf.
This pseudo-monastic existence within the confines of a bustling city, by his own
account, did much good for Descartes' intellectual activity. Here we have to not lose
sight  of  the  fact  that  academic  labour,  especially  in  the  humanities,  tends  toward
individualism  –  and  thus  operates  fairly  well  within  conditions  where  gesellschaf
predominates – not primarily as a matter of principle but simply by the mechanics of
the work involved, which except in certain very unique cases of intense collaboration
tends to produce writing which issues from the pen of a single person or, at most, two
or three people.16 However, returning to Descartes, we have to recall that he was not an
academic philosopher and scientist in the modern fashion; that is, he did not teach or
carry out his research within the context of a university, but rather was what we would
today  call  an  independent  scholar,  constantly  on  the  move  as  required  by  the
vicissitudes of his controversial career and ability to find patrons who would support his
work (Smith 2013, 18). This (semi-)nomadic existence, while matching a not insignificant
part of  the  lives of  the  majority of  academics today who work under  conditions of
precarity, could not have been more different from the position of tenured or at least
permanently-employed  professors  in  our  present,  especially  when  we  consider  the
relative fame (and infamy) Descartes achieved during his lifetime in academic circles.
Hence, the precariatisation within the contemporary university may be seen as a
return of academic labour to an earlier historical mode, even though only in part and
with certain modulations.  Gary L.  Herstein has pointed out the rise of  independent
15 The original French reads: “[J]e n'y confidere pas autrement les hommes que i'y voy, que je ferois les 
arbres qui se rencontrent en vos forests, ou les animaux qui y paissent” (Descartes 1897, 1:203).
16 A case can certainly be made that the degree to which what is created from academic activity can be 
attributed to a single person or small group is largely an illusion, given the many “inputs” into the 
process from various sources and directions. Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, for example, have 
argued persuasively for an understanding of the “sociality” of academic labour (Harney and Moten 
1998, 170–172). In a somewhat different direction, theorists of Actor-Network Theory have explored 
the connections between human researchers and non-human “actants” in the material environments 
of laboratories and other spaces of research (Latour 1979; Latour 2005). Nevertheless, the illusion is 
primarily an exaggeration – even if in some cases a gross exaggeration – rather than a complete 
fiction, for there is a sense in which even the broadest understanding of academic work cannot erase 
the aspects of solitary, personal labour which is involved, especially on an existential level. Moreover, 
as explored in greater detail below, what is certainly far from a fiction is the system of academic 
measurements and rewards which favour single-authored pieces, and thus less collaborative work.
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scholars in recent years resembles the situation during the early modern era in Europe,
where  many  critical  thinkers  were  forced  to  operate  outside  the  boundaries  of
traditional universities due to the conformity that was required by the latter (Herstein
2016).  The  control  of  these  academic  institutions  was  intertwined  with  the  most
powerful  bodies  of  the  time,  namely  the  state  and  institutional  church.  Indeed,  the
medieval writer Jordan of Osnabrück put forward the idea that the “three mysterious
powers. by whose co-operation the life and health of Christendom are sustained” were
Sacerdotium,  Imperium and Studium (Rashdall 1895a, 1:4). If the monolithic strength of
these institutions had been divided and weakened by the early modern period as a
consequence of the Protestant Reformation and its political aftershocks, their successors
continued to wield great influence within their respective jurisdictional territories. For
example,  as  a  result  of  teaching Descartes'  physics,  Henricus  Regius,  a  professor  of
medicine at the University of Utrecht was condemned by the rector of the university,
the Calvinist theologian Gisbertus Voetius, as a “French liar's monkey”  (D. M. Clarke
2006, 218). Among the results of the rather convoluted controversy was the decree of
university's academic senate on 25 March 1642 that Regius was to restrict his teaching
to medicine and “traditional authors” and an enforced truce, at the height of the debate,
which was executed through a prohibition of the Utrecht magistrates forbidding “very
rigorously printers and booksellers in this city and within its jurisdiction to print or to
have printed,  to  sell  or  to  have  sold,  any small  booklets  or  writings  for  or  against
Descartes, under penalties to be decided” (D. M. Clarke 2006, 229, 241).
At this mention of Descartes' followers and detractors, it should be noted that
although Descartes was not  in his later  life  an absolute  hermit,  Desmond Clarke,  a
biographer and scholar of his work, writes that in Holland he was “very much out of
touch with his native country and with his family,” and only “visited infrequently by a
few close friends and supporters with whom he shared the secret of his address” (D. M.
Clarke 2006, 179–180). Clarke judges that he “had become a reclusive, cantankerous, and
oversensitive loner” (D. M. Clarke 2006, 180). It is impossible to conceive of his situation
as one evincing a radical opening up to the other in the spirit of non-substantialist
community. He operated, in truth, as a solitary monad regardless of whether he was
living in the busy  gesellschaf of Amsterdam, or in a village such as Egmond aan der
Hoef,17 only occasionally coming into contact with a small and select group of people.
17 The village, located on the coast of the North Sea, “was so isolated that it took eight days for letters to
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Our situation in the British university today appears somewhat different and yet
is in some ways rather similar to the independent scholars of Descartes' day, and this is
indeed mirrored in most other parts of the world. The precarity and lack of academic
freedom which was faced by independent scholars in early modern Europe seems to
resonate with our higher education present.  Indeed, more sustained attention to the
longue durée of the university, which is sadly beyond the scope of this thesis, may yet
confirm the rather likely hypothesis that the period of academic security and comfort
that was enjoyed during the first three decades of the postwar years in Britain was part
of a longer period of exception rather than the rule.18 Nevertheless, the silver lining in
this rather ominous cloud is the fact that if precarity has been the norm within the
academy  and  wider  society,  then  it  is  possible  for  us  to  draw  lessons  from  the
sourcebook of history for deactivating the individualising tendencies of contemporary
academic conditions by using them in a different way, as well as perhaps even building
forms of community and solidarity.
In a 1993 lecture, the American educationist Alexander W. Astin discussed the
system of recruiting and rewarding academic personnel  within the modern research
university, pointing out that although countless books and articles had been written
about the ill effects of privileging research at the expense of teaching, very little had
been said about the impact of the publish-or-perish regime upon the building of a sense
of academic community (Astin 1993, 8). He went on to explain:
Scholarship is,  of  course,  a highly competitive  and individualistic  activity,
where  the  most  productive  and  visible  scholars  are  accorded  significant
professional status, pay, and recognition by their universities. While it is true
that some scholarly products have multiple authors (which would signify a
cooperative or joint effort), such publications generally get less credit in the
personnel  review process  than do  single-authored  pieces.  In  other  words,
even  within the  field  of  scholarship,  the  reward  system  encourages
individualism and discourages community in the pursuit of knowledge. (Astin
1993, 8, italics in original)
We have here a  simple  and yet penetrating insight about  both the academic
enterprise as it has been throughout its history as well as its present configuration. It is
certainly true that scholarship has by and large always been, as Astin in the quote above
reach him from Leiden” (D. M. Clarke 2006, 277). It goes without saying that Descartes would not 
have participated in any serious way in the elements of gemeinschaf which would have existed there.
18 A convincing argument has been made that such is the case in the sphere of the wider economy, 
where postwar Fordism and Keynesianism in the Western world has to be regarded as an exception or
aberration to the more long-standing and global condition of precarity (Neilson and Rossiter 2008).
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rightly puts it, “highly competitive and individualistic.” For evidence of this, one only
needs recall legendary instances of intellectual competition, such as the extended debate
between Franciscan and Dominican friar-theologians in the thirteenth and fourteenth
century on the Trinity and other matters (Friedman 2013), or the duel between Newton
and Leibniz on the invention of calculus (Hall 1980), to say nothing of the acrimonious
(if not always significant) feuds between and within the disciplines and academic tribes
that we see today. However, it is also important to note that contemporary academics
work within the confines of, to requote Astin once again, a “reward system” which, in
an arguably much more extreme fashion than previous ages, “encourages individualism
and discourages community in the pursuit of knowledge.”
The radical journalist and Marxist  Bob Fitch was fond of saying that “vulgar
Marxism explains 90% of what goes on in the world”  (Henwood 2011). It is debatable
whether Fitch got the figure correct, but it is certainly the case that the roots of the
present  intensification  of  publish-and-perish  need  not  be  found  in  some  hidden
metaphysical or even ideological register, but merely in the day-to-day management of
universities  and  their  relations  to  our  capitalist-dominant  social  formation.  Modern
universities  thrive  – or,  for  some less  notable  ones,  survive – on grants,  donations,
student fees, returns on investment and what are called “third stream activities,” such as
consultancy work for and projects with private corporations, public sector agencies and
so  on.  All  of  these  funding  streams  are  directly  affected  by  the  reputation  of  the
institution and, as Astin has argued, “the only function in the job description of the
university faculty member that can contribute directly to the resource base and the
prestige of the university is scientific and scholarly achievement” (Astin 1993, 9).
Within  the  British  university,  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  state  funding,  first
through the cuts from the mid-1970s – with the 1981 cuts in particular being severely-
felt – and then with the introduction of fees which replaced government grants via the
relevant  funding bodies,  when twinned with the growth in the number and size  of
universities, has led to more hands tussling for a goodly share of the funding pie. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that the pressure to publish research has increased
exponentially. To begin on the anecdotal front, this  crescendo has even led a notable
academic figure such as the physicist Peter Higgs, of Higgs boson particle fame, to opine
that had he begun his academic life in an environment such as that which holds sway in
the present, he would not have been able to carry out the pioneering work that he did,
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or perhaps even obtain a job, because by today's standards he would not have been
considered “productive” enough (Aitkenhead 2013).
On  a  more  empirical  front,  there  have  been  numerous  studies  on  the
intensification of the demand for academics to focus on research and, most centrally, to
generate measurable output from such research. One of the most interesting is perhaps
Roger  Burrows  work  on  what  he  calls  the  “contemporary  ‘metricization’  of  the
academy” and its “affective consequences”  (Burrows 2012, 356). Taking as his starting
point Nicholas Gane's argument that neoliberalisation in the non-privatised sector often
takes the form of “simulated” markets where “real” markets cannot be enacted, Burrows
posits that we have in the university reached “a point where metric assemblages begin
to emerge that are of such ‘complexity’ that they take us to a point 'beyond the audit
culture';  towards a different hegemonic project where systems of 'quantified control'
begin to possess their own specificity beyond mere auditing procedures; where there
develops  an  ability  not  just  to  mimic,  but  to  enact competitive  market  processes”
(Burrows 2012, 357, italics in original). From an analysis of developments in the genre of
campus fiction, he suggests that there was “a moment of the metrics” sometime between
the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the 2001 RAE,  a “point at  which
academics  could  no  longer  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  developing  systems  of
measure to which they were becoming increasingly subject” (Burrows 2012, 359). After
detailing the various modulations of  the  ongoing metricization – including research
assessments,  measures  of  teaching  quality  and  self-assessment  of  one's  division  of
labour in terms of time spent on various immaterial activities – Burrows ends with an
examination of league tables, and remarks:
In many ways these ‘league tables’ epitomize many of the themes discussed
here:  they  are  the  result  of  a  whole  range  of  other  metrics  generated  at
different levels of individual and organizational life that all  become folded
and nested  into  a  common scale;  they  attempt  to  collapse  heterogeneous
concrete  activities  into  supposedly  commensurable  value  scales,  allowing
comparison and competition; they are, themselves, a source of commercial
value – providing some sort of a shadow metric of the underlying abstract
value of the neoliberal university; and, for the individual academic, they are
also inescapable – to work in the academy today inevitably involves enacting
intellectual life through such metrics with all of the affective consequences
that follow from this. (Burrows 2012, 368)
The “affective consequences” that Burrows refers have been documented in other
recent  publications,  with  the  most  emotive  possibly  being  Rosalind  Gill's  article,
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“Breaking the silence: The hidden injuries of neo-liberal academia” (Gill 2009). Utilising
a  combination  of  material  from  interviews  and  private  conversations  as  well  as
theoretical analysis, Gill maps out the contours of contemporary academic life, peaking
in the middle of  the  article  with a statement  from a younger  academic's  mentor in
response  to  her  complaints  about  an  unbearable  workload:  “[W]elcome  to  modern
academia. We're all working these crazy hours. I'm sorry to be blunt, but you know
what you have to do: if it's too hot, get out the kitchen” (Gill 2009, 235). Gill follows this
up with her own riposte:
The 'kitchen' of academia is, it would seem, too hot for almost everyone, but
this has not resulted in collective action to turn down the heat, but instead to
an overheated competitive atmosphere in which acts of kindness, generosity and
solidarity ofen seem to continue only in spite of, rather than because of, the
governance  of  universities  Increasingly,  requests  to  perform  activities  that
would once have been considered part of the ‘civic’ collegial responsibility of
being a university lecturer (such as examining PhDs, refereeing articles or
reviewing grant proposals) take on a tone of pleading desperation, as journal
editors or course managers find no one prepared to do the necessary work.
(Gill 2009, 235, italics added).
Here we are back to Astin's assertion that a sense of community is lacking in the
contemporary university due to an over-emphasis on tasks and “outputs” which require
and  reinforce  individualism.  It  is  clear  that  what  emerges  from  this  confluence  of
various individualising forces – institutional pressures, affectual difficulties and indeed
the solitary context of significant segments of academic labour – is an environment
which is, at its worst, positively prohibitive of, and, at its best, seriously detrimental to
the formation of substantialist community within a university, or even a sub-unit such
as a university  department.  When the “proper”  thing to do is  work alone,  forgoing
adequate rest and recreation, all for the sake of producing more publications, there can
be very little of the commonality that is proper – that is, common property – which is
required for a real (or even illusory, if we are to follow Nancy et al.) sense of academic
gemeinschaf to  develop.  In  other  words,  academics  in  general  are  being pushed  to
operate in a solitary,  gesellschaf-oriented fashion akin to how Descartes lived in his
later years in exile, regardless of whether they wish to or not.19
19 One notable exception is, of course, certain forms of research – primarily empirical, but existing in 
not just in the sciences, but also the social sciences and humanities – which is highly collaborative in 
practice, but which is still influenced by the individualistic tendencies of contemporary academia. On 
the other hand, Mark Olssen has argued that the present system “[n]ot only. place[s] too much 
emphasis on research productivity and performativity,” but “encourages dubious research tactics and 
strategies for maximising publications, citations and team-based research” (Olssen 2016, 135).
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The (Al)lure of Non-Substantialist Community
The question that then arises is: if substantialist community is, in practice, largely closed
off to us, given the present conditions of British academic labour, is it not a good idea to
abandon the ideal of substantialist community and pursue instead the formation of non-
substantialist communities within and beyond the institutional sphere of the university?
Such a view would align itself with, for example, the para-academic medievalist Eileen
A. Joy, who, quoting Bill Readings, whose work we have referred to in Chapter Two,
writes  in  favour  of  “creat[ing]  a  collective  that  could  cultivate  and  sustain  such
continual unsettlement, ungrounding, and abandonments, and which would be willing
to dwell in a 'university in ruins' as a mode of 'try[ing] to do what we can, while leaving
space for what we cannot envisage to emerge'” (Joy 2015).
Joy's proposal may appear rather appealing, especially to those of us within a
certain academic milieu.  The British Critical  Legal  Conference,  for  example,  is often
considered by its participants to be an example of an inoperative community, being as it
is “a broad church that exists for 3 days once a year and goes into abeyance once it is
over,” with “no officers or posts, chairpersons and secretaries, committees or delegates”
(Douzinas  2014,  189).  Somewhat  more  adventurously,  the  BABEL  Working  Group,
which  Joy  co-founded,  describes  itself  as  “non-hierarchical  scholarly  collective  and
para-institutional desiring-assemblage” which aims to “to develop new co-disciplinary,
nomadic,  and  convivial  confraternities  between  the  humanities,  sciences,  social
sciences, and the fine arts (both within and beyond the academy) in order to formulate
and practice new critical humanisms” (BABEL Working Group 2016). It is important to
note  that  the  activities  of  BABEL  are  far  more  extensive  than  most  self-organised
academic collectives, and include not just the usual journal but also Punctum Books, an
independent  open-access  publishing house,  Punctum Records,  an open access  music
label,  and  Studium,  described  on  its  Facebook  page  as  a  “co-disciplinary  space  for
critical and creative inquiry” in East Austin, Texas.
However wonderful these instantiations of community which aspire toward the
transgressive and horizontally-organised are, there is a sense in which it is not possible
to see them as supplying the whole answer to our present woes. Joy defines the task of
an inoperative community as “thinking community beyond its bad histories and beyond
any futurizing ideologies that seek specific (utopian) ends” (Joy 2015, italics in original).
Such a critique of utopia – embodied only in part due to its focus on “thinking” – is
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always necessary, but it is arguably the case that these communities fail to meet the
challenge raised by Costas Douzinas himself in his 2005 article, “Oubliez Critique.” If
what  he  calls  the  “global  biopolitical  turn”  has  rendered  “(the  dominant  types  of)
critique” in the preceding period, such as deconstruction and the ethical turn, worthy of
being “forgotten”  in  favour  of  “acts  of  resistance”  (Douzinas  2005,  66,  68–69),  then
surely  the  model  of  inoperative  community  which  accompanied  the  rise  of  these
dominant types of critique in Britain is one which has to itself be called into question.
After all, it should be remembered that the British Critical Legal Conference began in
1985; that is, while the non-substantialist critique was emerging and gaining strength.
The most  significant  weakness  of  non-substantialist  community is  that  in  its
principled  opposition  to  substantialist  community,  which  it  rightly  critiques  as
promising more than the latter can ever achieve, it  ends up setting the bar too low.
Nancy himself, in a dialogue with Esposito first published in Italian in 2001, states that
“with the definition of  an 'inoperative community'  I  wanted precisely to speak of  a
community that does not put into effect any community” (Esposito and Nancy 2010, 81).
In order to avoid what he considers “the terrible germs that we know so well and that
today can be used again for the flags of diverse ethnic and ethno-religious identities,”
which he identifies in “[t]he communitarian and/or communal premise,” Nancy and his
co-philosophers of non-substantialist community provide us with a concept which has
great theoretical worth but little practical utility. At the point at which their work leaves
us at an impasse, some renewed creativity is arguably necessary. Two decades down the
road, having passed through a romance with substantialist community and a period of
disillusionment leading to a dalliance with non-substantialist community as its opposite,
could we be arguably in a place and time where a third form of community, that is
neither a synthesis of the earlier two nor a stable third position, may emerge?
4.3 Prolegomena to an Associationist University
To begin our  sketch towards  a  third  form of  community which  may overcome the
limitations  of  substantialist  and  non-substantialist  forms  within  the  sphere  of  the
university, we shall turn to investigating the fate of a concept of Karatani's which held
an important role in his work during his earlier period but which has almost silently
modulated into other forms in his more recent work. This concept is that of the inter-
crossing or communicative space (in Japanese,  kōtsū kūkan). Karatani initially forged
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this idea, which he sometimes refers to as “space of intercourse” by relating it to the
early Marxian idea of Verkehrsraum, in the fires of his own singular context but using
the  theoretical  tools  of  deconstruction.  Given  this  combination  of  his  aversion  to
Japanese interiority and the deconstructive dynamic, it is unsurprising that the concept
shares  with non-substantialist  community a preference towards  gesellschaf over  the
often  insular  and  even  xenophobic  tendencies  of  gemeinschaf.  Nevertheless,  in  the
1990s Karatani's thought underwent an important shift, to the point that he stated in a
2000 paper that books from his earlier period such as Architecture as Metaphor no longer
“reflected [his] thinking” (Karatani 2000, 259).
What did this shift entail? One way of explaining it is that in the wake of the
demise  of  Really  Existing  Communism,  Karatani  realised  that  his  previous strategic
advocacy  of  the  global  market  as  a  deconstructive  force  which  could  erode  “the
autonomy and closure of national communities” such as that of Japan (Cassegard 2007,
11), even if justified under the former state of global affairs, was no longer correct. As a
result,  his  earlier  idea  of  an  inter-crossing  space,  which  had  political  and  practical
elements  to  it,  was  converted  into  the  almost  entirely  methodological  idea  of  the
transcendental topos where transcritique occurs. At the same time that this happened,
Karatani began to articulate a new basis for counteractions within the social formations
we find ourselves in in the twenty-first century. To grasp this shift, we have to turn to
his most central concept since the turn of the millenium, namely the mode of exchange.
Beginning with the essays that formed the basis for Transcritique, and onwards,
Karatani  began to argue that the various social formations and societies throughout
human history  have  been influenced  by  four  modes  of  exchange,  each  of  which  is
“grounded in its own distinct set of principles,” but which combine to constitute the
particular matrix of a particular society, with one dominant mode forming the fulcrum
(Karatani 2014, 3). Mode A is based on reciprocity and originates in tribal communities
based on relations of gift and countergift (Karatani 2014, 5). Mode B is based on plunder
and redistribution, and first comes onto the scene with the emergence of the state and
empires (Karatani 2014, 5–6). Mode C is based on commodity exchange, which although
existing  for  a  long  time  emerges  in  its  strongest  form  with  the  rise  of  capitalism
(Karatani 2014, 8).  Finally, Mode D or “X” is a Freudian “return of the repressed” in
which the archaic communism of the nomadic band – which upon settlement develops
into Mode A – re-emerges as a critique of the other three modes (Karatani 2014, xi–xii).
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Unlike Modes A, B, and C, Mode D has never become a dominant mode, and indeed has
only intermittently stepped onto the stage in the form of universal religions and their
accompanying communistic political theories (Karatani 2014, 8).
It  is  possible  to  correlate  parts  of  Karatani's  four-fold  system  of  modes  of
exchange  with  the  distinction  between  gemeinschaf and  gesellschaf.  To  return   to
Tönnies himself, it has been pointed out that his formulation of the two was in fact
loosely inspired by Marx,  with  gemeinschaf corresponding to primitive communism
and  gesellschaf to modern capitalism (Loomis and McKinney 2003, 3). Hence, we can
see that Mode A is related to the former pair, and Mode C to the latter. What about
Mode B? It  is  historically  linked to neither  the substantive  reciprocity  of  organicist
community commonly  found  in  tribes  or  nations,  nor  the  dynamic  of  procedural
reciprocity present in impersonal commodity exchange, but rather what Karatani calls
the “principle of empire.” This principle allows for ethnic and religious (and sometimes
even economic and political)  heterogeneity beneath an overarching  imperial political
structure  (Karatani  2014,  225),  and  remains  the  (often  repressed)  foundation  of  the
modern state, and indeed state-centric policies such as the welfare state.
To use the language of modes of exchange, Karatani's strong distaste for Mode A
led him in the 1970s and 1980s to a tactical advocacy of certain forms of Mode C. Even
in Architecture as Metaphor, which is an updated version produced in the early 1990s –
that is, after his post-Soviet “turn” – of material he wrote in this earlier period, we find a
characterisation the  marketplace  as  an  example  of  an  inter-crossing  space  between
communities which do not share a single set of rules – such a “social space” or society
being the way to escape insularity (Karatani 1995b, 146). Having said that, even at that
point  he  recognised  that  the  global  economy  constitutes  a  “one  single  gigantic
community” with “a certain regularity (system of rules)”  (Karatani 1995b, 146). By the
time  Transcritique was first published in 2001, he was clearly distancing himself from
any perceived positive appraisal of  gesellschaf,  saying that “[i]t was when the trade
with outside worlds was internalized within Gemeinschaf that Gesellschaf was formed”
(Karatani 2003b, 105). This is simply another way of saying that Mode C is intrinsically
tied up with Mode A in what he calls the “Borromean knot” of Capital-Nation-State, the
social  formation  within  which  we  presently  live.  Karatani  summarises  our  difficult
predicament as follows: “It is impossible to overthrow one of [the three elements] alone.
If we try to overcome capitalism by means of either the state or nation, we will end up
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reinforcing the state or nation; Stalinism is the former case while Nazism is the latter”
(Karatani 2008b, 585). In other words, any attempt to undermine the knot by assaulting
one of the three “rings” only leads to the others taking over and stabilising the system.
When we shift our gaze from our wider social formation to the sphere of the
British  university,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  resonances  between  the  modes  of
exchange and the various “questions” of the university which we are faced with. The
instrumentalist question has much in common with Mode C or commodity exchange.
The idealist  question tends  to  lead  towards  state-centric  or  Mode  B-style  solutions.
Finally,  the various theories of  community which we have examined in this chapter
mirror the dynamics of Mode A or reciprocity. If we transpose Karatani's insight of the
ultimate barrenness of adopting an inward-facing, communal outlook within our wider
historical conjuncture, then a turn toward a simple revival of gemeinschaf as a solution
to the woes we presently face in UK higher education begins to look far less attractive.20
The only way out of this bind, for Karatani, is Mode D, which he has also termed
associationism or  X. It can be argued that it is at the point where Karatani realises his
formulation  of  inter-crossing  spaces  correlates  too  closely  with  the  deconstructive
dynamic of capitalism,21 which he later terms Mode C, that he is forced to develop the
more unique alternative of associationism. What then is it? The associative Mode D is,
to extend what has already been said, “the return of repressed mode of exchange A at
the  stages  where  modes  of  exchange  B  and  C  are  dominant”  (Karatani  2014,  xi).
However, Karatani's antipathy towards inward-facing community has not faded, for he
argues that “[m]ode of exchange D is not simply the restoration of mode A— it is not,
that  is,  the  restoration  of  community,”  because  for  him  to  restore  A  “in  a  higher
20 Equally, any attempt to return to a state of affairs where Mode B-style redistribution was more 
prominent simply reconfigures the parts while maintaining the deeply unjust whole. Here Karatani's 
observation that “[m]ore often than not, social democracy functions as chauvinistic nationalism” 
should be borne in mind (Karatani 2008b, 591). It should not be forgotten that British citizens (and 
subsequently EU citizens) enjoyed highly-subsidised higher education for forty-four years after fees 
were dramatically raised for non-citizens. The generality of this phenomenon can also be seen in a 
central video message for the unsuccessful campaign for Bernie Sanders to be the 2016 presidential 
nominee of the Democratic Party, which has as its background music Simon & Garfunkel's “America.”
Although Sanders' definition of what America stands for was far wider than all of the other 
candidates seeking the nomination of the two major parties, the fact remains that in order to 
campaign for social democratic policies, the most effective tool was to invoke a national 
consciousness, in order to gain the support of the “all [who have] come to look for America” (Simon 
& Garfunkel 1968). Another example is British Prime Minister Theresa May's disavowal of anti-state 
Thatcherism in the wake of the Brexit vote, in which she stated, “It's time to remember the good that 
government can do,” while resurgent nationalism provided the backdrop (BBC News 2016).
21 Indeed, already in Architecture as Metaphor he acknowledges that “capitalism itself is deconstructive” 
(Karatani 1995b, 71).
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dimension, is in fact only possible with the negation of A” (Karatani 2014, xi–xii). What
it really entails is “the restoration of nomadic society” (Karatani 2014, xii).
It is perhaps crucial to note that Karatani's nomadic society is very far from any
form of contemporary ultra-liberalism, captured in images such as that of “the beautiful
nomad” in a recent advertisement for Pullmans hotels, which Giles Fraser describes:
The music pulsates. A young man is going for a run in Shanghai, off to some
high-powered meeting, then returning to his hotel. The narrator sounds sexy
and  enticing.  “No  frontiers,  no  borders,  no  limits.  You  are  the  beautiful
nomads. And our world is your playground.” (Fraser 2016a)
This  advertisement  –  and,  by  extension,  and  the  wider  “global”  or  “digital
nomad” movement surrounding it22 – is in fact an expression of and propaganda piece
for Mode C in the twenty-first century, and is completely antithetical to Mode D. The
latter, however, remains to be fully fleshed out in practical terms, given that it is an
ongoing project for Karatani, the discreet working title of which is “a study of D” (D no
kenkyū) (Richter 2015). However, there are hints and sketches in the work that we have
available to us. Most notably, he has argued that mode of exchange D has generally
emerged in our historical actuality “in the form of universal religions”  (Karatani 2014,
127). It can be found, to take one example from his survey of the many world religions,
“in  its  classic  form  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus”  (Karatani  2014,  145).  Its  recurring
components are, first, criticism of the priestly class and state-colluding hierarchy (Mode
B);  second,  a  critique  of  family  and  community (Mode  A);  and,  finally,  resistance
towards the “inequalities of wealth and class society” as a result of “the money economy
and private property” (Mode C) (Karatani 2014, 145). He goes on to explain:
Jesus’s teachings can be summed up in two points: “Love the Lord your God
with all your heart” and “love your neighbor as yourself” (Mark 12:30, 12:31).
The love that Jesus speaks of is not simply a matter of the heart. It means in
reality a gift without reciprocation. Jesus’s sect was, as Frederick Engels and
Karl Kautsky stressed, communistic. . All universal religions in their early
stages display this tendency, which shows that they are in fact the return of
the repressed, mode of exchange A. In this way, universal religion appears in
the  form  of  something  that  intends  a  reciprocal  mutual  community
(association) that resists merchant capitalism, its  community, and the state.
(Karatani 2014, 145)
However,  the  radical  core  of  these  universal  religions  –  that  is,  their  going
beyond the limitations of the other three modes – is lost when they degenerate into
either,  on  the  one  hand,  state  religions  by  merging  with  the  state-centric  Mode  B
22 For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Kannisto 2014.
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(plunder-redistribution),  or,  on  the  other,  communal  religions  by  merging  with  the
inward-looking Mode A (reciprocity)  (Karatani 2014, 146–147). One could reasonably
extrapolate this analysis to argue that universal religions can also be co-opted by Mode
C (commodity exchange) and turned into trendy consumer “products” which one can
try, buy and even subsequently discard for the next new thing. As Tobias Jones has
argued,  Cardinal  Basil  Hume's  assertion  that  “shopping is  the  new religion”  should
today be  inverted,  given that  in  some spheres  in  our  present,  “religion  is  the  new
shopping” (T. Jones 2008, 5).
In order to illuminate this degeneration of Mode D more clearly, we can turn to
the work of, perhaps surprisingly, Ivan Illich. It has already been mentioned that Illich is
often  seen  as  a  champion  of  the  traditional  or  “vernacular”  ways  of  embodied
gemeinschaf,  inveighing like  a  prophet against  the  forces  of  abstract,  isolating and
impersonal gesellschaf. I submit that this is a reading of him as an apologist for Mode A
is easy to construct from his earlier work and occasional interventions after he receded,
as David Cayley narrates, from the popular limelight after the poor reception of Gender
(1983), his last book for a major trade publisher (Cayley 2005, 24–25). Even in the text
from  which  the  quote  this  chapter  opens  with  was  taken,  Illich  seems  to  rather
unproblematically take the side of rootedness, virtue, local culture and – perhaps most
alarmingly for those of us who continue to be laden down and horrified by the history
of  communal  conflict  –  soil (Groeneveld,  Hoinacki,  and  Illich  1990).  Esposito
passionately expresses this standpoint in his 2001 dialogue with Nancy, where he says,
“We need to be ever on the lookout for  every substantialist lapse of the idea and the
practice of community” (Esposito and Nancy 2010, 82, italics added).
Nevertheless, in parts of his final work, and perhaps most clearly in The Rivers
North of the Future, a posthumous text consisting of conversations with David Cayley
which  were  partially  edited  into  the  first-person  perspective,  a  more  nuanced  view
emerges. The central figures of this book are two characters from a Gospel parable, that
is, the Jew wounded by robbers on a dangerous road and the Good Samaritan who stops
to  care  for  and  remove  him  from  further  harm.  Jews  and  Samaritans  of  that  era
considered  each  other  strangers  –  some  might  even  say  enemies  –  to  whom  no
obligation to love or even assist  existed.  Illich believes that this story illustrates the
incredible potentials and dangers of the primitive Christian message. In his words:
[T]he  Incarnation  [and  Jesus'  teaching]  makes  possible  a  surprising  and
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entirely new flowering of love and knowledge. . A new dimension of love
has  opened,  but  this  opening is  highly  ambiguous  because  of  the  way it
explodes  certain  universal  assumptions  about  the  conditions  under  which
love [is] possible. Before I was limited by the people into which I was born
and the family in which I was raised. Now I can choose whom I will love and
where I will love. And this deeply threatens the traditional basis for ethics,
which was always an ethnos, an historically given “we” which precedes any
pronunciation of the word “I.” (Illich 2005, 47)
If Illich's language of love seems at first glance to be too fluffy, it is worth noting
that Karatani himself states in a 2014 interview that “mode D, which is the mode A’s
restoration on the higher dimension, also has this power of gifting in abundance, but
only in the higher form. You may call it the power of love, if you like. Perpetual peace or
the world republic will be based upon this real power, which is far stronger than other
powers”  (Karatani,  Hioe,  and  Small  2014,  3).  When this  aspect  of  Mode D is  taken
seriously, the gulf between it and the non-substantialist  community advocated by, for
instance, Esposito, becomes clear. Esposito states that the  munus or gift which is the
origin  of  communitas has  an  element  of  duty  or  obligation  (Esposito  2010,  4).  In
response to the potential  objection that there  must be  “something spontaneous and
therefore eminently voluntary in the notion of gift,” he invokes Marcel Mauss' work on
the gift, whereby the latter thinker stresses the aspect of reciprocity of gift and counter-
gift  (Esposito 2010, 4).  Karatani,  on the other hand, places the Maussian gift solidly
within the scope of Mode A, where the form of reciprocity involved takes place within a
framework  of  obligation  (Karatani  2014,  35).  Hence,  despite  the  valiant  attempt  of
Esposito et alia to escape from substantialist community, the very grounding of a non-
substantialist  alternative  in  Maussian  reciprocity  ironically  leads  them  back  to  the
framework which Karatani terms Mode A, and thus a form of substantialism.
The new ethic of virtue flowing from Illich's reading of Jesus' parable is not only
a negation of Mode A reciprocity, based as it is on a shared ethnos and thus a certain set
of social rules upholding traditional-communal virtue, but also the principle of abstract
and  hierarchical  command  upon  which  Mode  B  is  based.  There  is  no  categorical
imperative involved, for the Samaritan's rescue of the injured other is done “in response
to a call and not a category, in this case the call of the beaten-up Jew in the ditch,” and
thus “cannot be reduced to a norm” (Illich 2005, 52). Finally, given that call to which one
responds  has  a  telos  in  a  “some  body” (Illich  2005,  52),  the  instrumentalist  or
consequentialist Mode C relation based on impersonal exchange is denied as well.
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Illich goes on to argue that the hospitality of the Samaritan – which is very close
to what we, inspired by Karatani, are calling Mode D – is something which is presented
to  the  believing  listener  as  a  singular  person,  and  must  thus  be  taken  up  on  that
horizontal  and  decentralised  level.  This  non-obligatory,  gift-giving  form  of  human
intercourse, however, was rapidly institutionalised in the era following the recognition
of the Church under Constantine, leading to the creation of, for example, houses of
hospitality funded by the organised Christian community for the homeless (Illich 2005,
54). This, Illich holds, was a corruption of the original call which Jesus issued, as the
Greek Church Father John Chrysostom recognised when he argued that “[b]y assigning
the duty to behave in this way to an institution. Christians would lose the habit of
reserving a bed and having a piece of bread ready in every home, and their households
would cease to be Christian homes”  (Illich 2005, 54). In Karatani's language, this is a
clear instance of a cooption of Mode D under the structures of Mode B, resulting in
universal religion turning into state religion.
Indeed, it is this susceptibility of Mode D to be co-opted by the other modes
which renders it a “regulative idea” which, first and foremost, “function[s] as an index
for us to gradually approach, despite its not being fully realizable” (Karatani 2008b, 593).
This striving towards the horizon of Mode D is connected with a practical method we
can  adopt.  Within  the  dance  of  Instrumentalism-Idealism-Community,  we  can  but
endeavour  to  create  and/or  liberate  “space[s]  for  transcritique,”  that  is,  to  bring  the
“transcendental topos” into the realm of embodiment (Karatani 2003b, 134).
Such spaces would be nuclei  where expressions of  Mode D could potentially
emerge, forming a new “skein of relations” (Taylor 2007, 793) which we could perhaps
give the name of an “associationist university.” The word “potentially” is crucial here, for
as  Karatani  himself  argues,  Mode  D is  not  something which  can  be  engineered  or
brought about by will, but appears to arise spontaneously when the conditions are right.
Here he contrasts its dynamics, once again with Mode A, stating for example that in the
case of universal religion, it “arose in the form of an unconscious, compulsory 'return of
the repressed,'” as opposed to Mode A, which if invoked in a modern social formation, is
generally  enacted  through “a  conscious,  nostalgic  restoration  of  the  past”  (Karatani
2014, 259). Therefore, it is right for us to keep associationism as a regulative idea or
horizon, but we must be careful not to slip into turning it into a new constitutive idea.
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Conclusion
This chapter began with an exposition of two main directions in which the issue of
otherness has been dealt with at various points in human history, symbolised by the
terms  gemeinschaf and  gesellschaf as developed by Tönnies. We highlighted the fact
that Illich and Karatani may appear at first sight to each be advocates of one of these
two tendencies, then pointed out how this impression is arguably mistaken. We then
looked at how the manifold interactions between gemeinschaf and gesellschaf has led
to the distinction between substantialist and non-substantialist community, with varied
forms of the former being critiqued and the latter championed by French and Italian
continental theorists in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We ended the section by posing
the question which to be looked at next, namely whether either of these two matrices of
community is what is called for in our present situation in the British university.
In the next section, the two approaches were then placed into a dialogue with
the contemporary university in Britain, examining in turn the issue of community as it
has developed in relation to students, non-academic staff and academics. Our central
discovery  was the extent  in which  a  drive  towards individualism has  broken down
whatever common ties which provided a sense of substantialist community in the past,
leading to an enquiry into the possibilities afforded by a turn towards non-substantialist
community. This direction was, however, found lacking, and the possibility of a third
direction of pursuing community in our time was gestured towards.
In the final section, we began our search for an alternative to both substantialist
and non-substantialist community by turning to examine the fate of Karatani's erstwhile
key concept of inter-crossing space, tracing how it shifts to becoming part of and yet
distinct from the direction of intervention which he has been championing since the
early 2000s, which he has termed Mode D or associationism. By expounding briefly his
idea of a quaternity of modes of exchange, we posited that Mode D offers a way out of
the bind between substantialist and non-substantialist community, and examined how
Illich's analysis of primitive Christianity provides an example of the arising of Mode D
in a particular context, which Karatani understands as the return of a repressed nomadic
tendency in the form of universal religion. By linking Mode D to the concept of the
transcendental topos for transcritique, which evolved from his earlier formulation of
inter-crossing spaces, we posited the possibility of spaces for transcritique within the
university, which would be the nucleus of a possible associationst university.
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The notion of  transcritical  spaces may seem attractive yet vague. A question
rings out from the aether, “What must we do for such spaces to be actualised?” For
many it may seem like Karatani's writings on the elusive Mode D posit an end without
any feasible  means to  get  there.  For  instance,  his  concrete  proposals  for  our  wider
political-social-economic spheres  in  The Structure  of  World  History,  such as radically
reforming the United Nations via a “simultaneous world revolution” involving nations
surrendering their sovereignty to engage in war  (Karatani 2014, 306–307), have been
criticised as outlandish and naïve (Lucas 2015, 123–124; Harootunian 2015, 104–105).23 
Thus  we  find  ourselves  in  a  paradoxical  situation.  Having  abandoned  the
constitutive approach to ideas, we are left with a regulative idea as a somewhat distant
horizon, which although providing a general direction for action, does not come with
clear instructions as on a tin on what we should do in the present. Through the vision of
an associationist university, we are, as it were, lifted to a lofty glimpse of what doing
higher  education  differently  may  be  like,  and  yet  when  we return to  our  practical
circumstances, we realise we are still enmeshed in the workings of Instrumentalism-
Community-Idealism. Moreover, we are often not entangled as an insect in a hated web,
but have our own preferences and leanings among the threads that bind us. For some of
us, if pressed to express a preference for one of these imperfect actualities, community
seems more attractive; for others, idealism or instrumentalism may appear better.
Thus, in the following chapter we shall carry out an investigation into how a
singular  person  is  to  navigate  the  choppy seas  in  which  she  generally  feels  drawn
towards one or  more of  the  well-established ports  of  instrumentalism,  idealism and
community, even if she may also concurrently experience a certain pull towards that
elusive radical calling, which is the vision of an associationist university.
23 The first practical attempt to give institutional form to Mode D, the New Associationist Movement 
(NAM) was founded by Karatani and others in Japan in 2000, but came to an end a mere two years 
later. Karatani attributes NAM's demise to the confluence of two developments, both of which called 
into question NAM's primarily economic strategies to counter-act Capital-Nation-State. The first was 
the September 11 attacks, which led to the deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq, and the second was
the realisation that that the alternative economy they were engaged in building up could only be 
successful with “the support and regulation of national and local government” (Karatani 2006). This 
realisation spurred Karatani to dig deeper into understanding the dynamics behind state and nation, 
and his writing from the mid-2000s onwards reflect this research, most notably The Structure of World
History. Having interrogated the histories and workings of Modes A and B more intimately, his 
present research project is, as was mentioned above, focused upon grasping Mode D in greater detail.
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Singularity, Particularity and Structural History:
On Personal and Collective Vocations in a Plural University
“[S]ociality is inseparable from singularity.”
(Karatani 2003b, 106)
“The apple  tree  never  asks  the  beech  how he  shall
grow, nor the lion, the horse, how he shall  take his
prey.”            (Blake 2002, 167)
“Accordingly, I use heart, head and hand 
All day, I build, scheme, study, and make friends.”
(Browning 1994, 439)
In 1926, when he was twenty years old and at “a time where virtually every young
intellectual in Japan was embracing either Marxism or modernism,” the Japanese writer
Sakaguchi Ango1 began a course of studies on Indian philosophy at Toyo University,
with the aim of becoming a Buddhist monk (Karatani 2010, 25). He was later to abandon
this religious vocation, but during this period published a journal with fellow students
of Buddhism. One issue contains a section discussing Japanese temple life and its future,
and in Ango's brief contribution, which is very far from the commonplace pieties one
might expect from a young aspiring monk, he downplays the virtues of asceticism and
states that “a life that, as it were, follows the earthly passions also contains the power of
the moral code and knowledge” (Sakaguchi 1999; quoted in Karatani 2012, 196).
In two related  essays  of  Karatani's  –  one  of  which  has  been translated  into
English  multiple  times  –  he  quotes  the  entire  short  text  by  Ango.  In  all  of  these
translations, one elusive sentence of Ango's has produced highly divergent renditions in
English. For example, in a 2010 translation by James Dorsey of the first essay, titled “The
Irrational Will to Reason,” the line is translated thus: “Life is to be led according to the
individual's convictions and, in short, anything goes so long as we do not give up on love
and the ties that bind us” (Sakaguchi 1999; quoted in Karatani 2010, 25, italics added).
1 Sakaguchi Ango was the writer's pen-name, arranged in the traditional Japanese format whereby 
Sakaguchi is the surname and Ango the first name. Against the usual practice, however, he has come 
to be known by the first name of his pen-name, including in scholarly articles, and hence here we 
observe this irregularity.
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However, Seiji M. Lippit, in a 2012 translation of “Buddhism and Fascism,” the second
essay,  renders  the  sentence  as  follows:  “Life  is  something  that  should  follow  each
person’s principles and can essentially take any form, but I cannot abandon the bonds of
sexual desire” (Sakaguchi 1999; quoted in Karatani 2012, 196, italics added).2
Both translations agree on the first half of sentence, in which Ango makes a
universal statement tending towards pluralism: each person is to lead her life according
to her principles. In the second half of the sentence,  however, we find what for the
English reader must seem to be a peculiar discrepancy. In Dorsey's translation, Ango
makes another universal statement: regardless of our different convictions, we must not
surrender love and close ties. In Lippit's version, however, Ango switches to the first-
person and confesses that despite the diversity of personal beliefs, he cannot surrender
the  bonds  involved  in  love  and  desire.  This  strange  disparity  is  the  result  of  an
interesting  aspect  of  the  Japanese  language,  where  subjects  and  other  words  in  a
sentence can be omitted if the writer or speaker believes they can be inferred from the
context. In the case of Ango's sentence, the latter half of the compound sentence lacks a
subject, and so it is possible for the reader to interpret that he is either continuing his
universal  train  of  thought,  as  Dorsey  does,  or,  conversely,  transitioning  to  a  more
personal note, as Lippit appears to believe was his intention.
This ambiguity as to the subject in Ango's statement about giving up the ties
which are involved in passion and desire, however, captures in a unique form the wider
uncertainty that is involved in any statement of personal conviction. When someone
says,  for  example,  that  “clearly  humans  are  social  beings,”  the  utterance's  outward
appearance as applying to all  cases often obscures the fact  that such clarity is only
present for the speaker and those who agree with her view. On the other hand, when
someone says, “I am a social being,” the apparent humility of this personal declaration
hides that it  often, in fact,  desires to receive the affirmation of those to whom it is
addressed. This, as we shall see below, is characteristic of what Karatani has called the
circuit of singularity-universality, where practically every singular expression which is
made actually contains a tacit universal address within it. Recognising this allows us to
see  that  even  if  we  were  to  opt  for  Lippit's  translation,  Ango  is  hardly  making  a
statement with relevance only to himself. Hence, in this chapter we shall explore the
2 Lippit translates “aiyoku” as “sexual desire,” but the word is in fact made up of the words for love (“ai”
or 愛) and desire (“yoku” or 欲), and so means, literally, “desire of love.” I am indebted to Michiko Oki 
for this explanation, and for the other points about the Japanese language in this section.
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workings of this circuit and the other which Karatani has identified within theory and
philosophy, namely that of individuality-particularity-generality. The aim of our enquiry
will be to tease out what is at stake in the relations between persons and collectives.
Why should we turn to these questions? In Chapter Four it was argued that the
Manichean  view  of  the  British  university  as  being  characterised  by  a  titanic  clash
between instrumentalism and idealism is both misleading and disempowering, in that it
limits our range of vision and action within the state that we find ourselves in. Where
such a dualistic reading fails, could our triadic conception provide an alternative way
forward? In order to answer this question, the chapter then proceeded to examine the
third  term in  our  conceptual  triad,  namely  community.  By  the  end  of  the  chapter,
however, we were able to see how both substantialist and non-substantialist community,
for all their respective virtues, ultimately fall short of what appears to be needed in our
present conjuncture. Moreover, our sketch of a third alternative, that of an associationist
university, displayed some potential, but its status as a regulative idea or horizon means
that it  cannot provide us with a practical agenda. It  is with this apparent failure of
community to rise up to the challenge that we begin the present chapter, for if neither
instrumentalism, nor idealism, nor a vision of community can “save us,” then what can? 
At  this  point it  is  necessary for us to turn to a  speculative mode of  thought
which, as Karatani asserts in a creative reading of Kant's wager in his First Critique that
some of the planets visible to us are inhabited, it is useful to grasp in both the modern
sense of a spec or bet as well as the similar Latin word spes or hope (Karatani 2003b, 51).3
In the section titled “On having opinions, knowing, and believing” in the First Critique's
Doctrine of Method, Kant argues that there are three stages of being persuaded. The
first is having an opinion, which is “taking something to be true with the consciousness
that it is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient;” the second is believing, which is
holding something to be true despite it being only “subjectively” and not “objectively”
sufficient; the third is  knowing,  which is “taking something to be true [that] is both
subjectively and objectively sufficient”  (Kant 1998a, 686). “Subjective sufficiency” may
be termed conviction, while “objective sufficiency” may be referred to as certainty (Kant
1998a, 686).  For Kant,  the test  of someone's  belief  – that is,  being persuaded at the
3 The etymology of specio (“to see”) and spes (“hope”), although distinct in many respects, are both 
united in a concern with sight. This leads to deriatives such as, from the former, conspicere, “to catch 
sight of, discern” as well as, from the latter, sperare, “to hope, look forward to” (Vaan 2008). In other 
words, the modern use of “spec” as “bet” is in harmony with its ancient root, given that any well-
considered bet requires an adequate degree of of discernment and foresight.
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second level – is the extent to which she is willing to place a bet on it. Thus, a strong
belief is one where its possessor “would wager many advantages in life” on it being
correct (Kant 1998a, 687). The hopeful gamble that will be carried out here – that is, on
the level of belief and conviction – is to bet against there being a silver bullet, one-size-
fits-all solution such as “such-and-such  community is always the answer,” and instead
place  “many  advantages  in  life”  on  the  side  of  there  being  singular  and  dynamic
resolutions for singular persons, collectives and situations, which are themselves ever-
shifting.
Such a bet can only be put to the test in the context of singularities, a level of
discussion which this thesis has not so far engaged in great length upon. However, we
should recall that in the Introduction to this thesis, the personal experience which led to
the genesis of this research project was very briefly laid out. It was related how the
author's involvement in the Save Middlesex Philosophy campaign led him to question
how the present situation of British higher education came to be. In the chapters that
followed this singular story faded quickly into the background even as we directed our
attention to the structural history of the postwar British university.
Having moved swiftly from the singular to the structural – which can be also
deemed the social – in this chapter we shall descend from the altitude which afforded us
an overarching view from above, and return instead to the domain and perspective of
the singular actor – whether personal or collective4 – from which we quietly began. This
move should not be misinterpreted as an inward-facing turn, or an abandonment of the
wider  universitas,  for, as we shall see, there is a keen sense in which universality is
tightly bound up with singularity. In order to clarify these dynamics, the first section of
this chapter explores the connections and contradictions between the seemingly similar
but nevertheless distinct concepts of singularity, individuality, particularity, universality
and generality. We then turn in the second and third sections to examining, respectively,
the notions of vocation and gifts, using as a conceptual resource the writings of St Paul
on the related and indeed foundational Greek terms of klesis and charismata, as a way of
grappling with the plurality of singularities and particularities.
4 Just as linguistics recognises singular collective nouns such as “council” and “team,” by treating 
collective actors as singularities and not as mere aggregations of individuals (as in methodological 
individualism) we are affirming the concept of group personality, a key tenet of political pluralism in 
the English tradition as developed by thinkers such as J. N. Figgis, Harold Laski, G. D. H. Cole and F. 
W. Maitland. This theory of group personality holds that “social groups are real entities which have a 
life and being which is something more than the sum of their individual members,” and it is crucial to 
note that its legal consequences are not simply fictive but “rooted in social facts” (Nicholls 1994, 56).
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5.1 On the Singular Person and the Specific Context
Having traversed seventy years of British higher education history at a rapid pace in the
preceding chapters, a journey undertaken at the levels of structure and macro-history, it
can be difficult to ascertain where to begin a discussion on intervening in the university
sphere in order to have an impact upon its present manifestation and future direction.
The task is truly immense, given the size and complexity of the institution as well as its
entanglement  in  a  web  of  other  forces  in  contemporary  society.  In  the  preceding
chapters, we have encountered a university intimately connected to not only the giant
waves of postwar British history, with all the national and transnational factors which
are involved, but also “local” conditions in the sphere of higher education. Faced with
this gargantuan constellation, we can but ask: how could we possibly proceed?
There are a number of potential approaches that we have to eliminate before we
can reach a satisfactory option. Firstly and most straightforwardly, unlike Alexandre
Kojève, we cannot attempt to find a way out of the immensity of what we are concerned
with by addressing ourselves solely to a single “man of action” (or “tyrant”) whom we
recognise, seeking to become his personal “Hegelian” philosopher or consciousness, as
Hager Weslati suggests the French philosopher attempted in his lost “letter” to Stalin.5
Such an appeal to individual power – that is, a specific recommendation to/for a specific
person – is not only illusory and impossible,  but also elitist and anti-democratic.  In
other words,  it  is  objectionable on both practical  and theoretical  grounds,  the latter
being relevant due to the underlying political orientations of this thesis.                          
However, it would be equally misguided for us to venture to formulate a blanket
strategy which could be deployed by all persons in all circumstances, given the plethora
of contexts and situations which exist. Such an endeavour – which would amount to a
general recommendation to/for a general audience – would either descend into banal
slogans (such as “work toward a non-repressive university”), and/or fail to connect with
or even take account of local or personal conditions. In the first instance it would be of
limited practical use, and in the second it might lead to counter-productive attempts to
5 Weslati's daring hypothesis, drawing from the published recollections of various figures who were in 
close contact with Kojève at the time and her interpretation of various comments in his writings 
about the potential tyrant-philosopher relationship between Napoleon and Hegel which did not come
to pass, is that Kojève's recently rediscovered Russian manuscript from 1940-1941, a copy of which 
was deposited in the Russian embassy in Paris at the time in rather shadowy circumstances, was 
intended as nothing less than a “letter” to Stalin which he hoped would inaugurate such a 
relationship between the Soviet dictator and himself (Weslati 2014).
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superimpose a broad-brush sketch upon situations of greater complexity.
Thus, we shall  adopt a third option: namely that of formulating an approach
which  can  be  adopted  by  singular persons,  but  which  nevertheless  contains  an
engagement with both a striving towards universality as well as the very real difficulties
of particular contexts. This requires us to engage with both the circuits of individuality-
particularity-generality and singularity-universality which Karatani has distilled from
the philosophical canon, rather than dismissing one and privileging the other. This latter
move is one which he himself performs in his explicit advocacy for the singularity-
universality circuit (Karatani 2003b, 100–112). However, we shall resist it in the interests
of being resolutely transcritical, a manouevre which Karatani himself appears to have
taken in his more recent work. The practice of transcritique may sometimes appear on
the  surface  as  a  form  of  prevarication,  but  it  is  in  truth  founded  on  a  simple
acknowledgement that the actual conditions of existence rarely allow us to affirm any
one side of  an antinomy in an unproblematic  fashion.  Nevertheless,  we should also
recognise  that  this  transcritical  approach  is  simply  one  of  many  approaches  and
techniques for enquiry.  Indeed, the persistence of certain persons within stubbornly
partisan  and  non-transcritical  modes  yields  insights  and  perspectives  which
practitioners of transcritique are able to draw from. As we shall see further below, this
fecundity of single-mindedness is what William James had in mind when he argued that
“the one thing that has counted so far in philosophy is that a man should see things, see
them straight in his own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite way of
seeing them” (W. James 1955, 20). However, pace James, the ability to see things in more
than one way should not be dismissed as a mere “mixture of opposite ingredients” (W.
James 1955, 20), for it too has a role to play in the whirl of consciousness, a dance we
experience through a historically-shaped prism which refracts  the  mixed content  of
personal and collective existence into categories such as thought, affect and action.
Singularities Seeking Universality in a World of Particularities
To begin with a perhaps seemingly obscure and/or audacious question: what would it
really mean to address the fruits of our ruminations to singularities in a fashion which
can also be termed universal? Is this extended gesture merely a variation of the famous
Lord Kitchener and Uncle Sam recruitment posters which, to briefly adopt Althusser's
formulation, incessantly address the “I” who comes into being upon being interpellated
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by  the  hailing  word  “you”  (Althusser  1998,  173–174)?  The  short  answer  is  no,  for
although the person who answers positively to this interpellation may like to think his6
response is one-of-a-kind, the overall context of war through the ages, which reduces
unique persons to being mere parts of the figures of those raised, trained, dispatched
and killed, creates a situation whereby in the eyes of the powers that be it matters little
whether it is Person A or Person B who responds to the call, for the end-result which is
in fact sought is simply having two additional boots on the ground – the specific person
whose feet are in those boots is secondary at best.
Thus, what we find here is not what Karatani terms the circuit of singularity-
universality but rather than of individuality-particularity-generality. In the example we
are presently concerned with, the person who responds to the poster is entering a space
where  he  is  not  considered  an  irreplaceable  singularity  but  rather  a  substitutable
individual within a scheme of generality. That is to say, individuals are interchangeable
and replaceable like parts of a machine, while singularities are not. To be blunt about it,
if this volunteer soldier dies, his specific task within the larger war plans will have to be
carried out by another, and conversely, if  he survives certain operations, he may be
moved to take on the task of another who has died. However, it should be noted that
one can be both a singularity and an individual at the same time, for the lover of a fallen
serviceman mourns for the one who was to her/him a singularity, even as he is simply
replaced by another individual or removed from the equation in the world of warcraft.
In Transcritique, Karatani traces another important point of contrast between the
two  circuits.  Whereas  generality  “can  be  abstracted  from  experience,”  universality
“cannot be attained if not for a certain leap” (Karatani 2003b, 100, italics in original). The
circuit that leads from the individual to the general is one which is empirical, in that
what  is  generally  held  to  be  true  or  correct  is  an adding up and harmonisation of
discrete  individual  cases,  such  as  in  the  case  of  the  hosts  of  a  party  who conduct
themselves and arrange things in a way which please their guests as a whole, but who
cannot claim universality for their choices  (Kant 1986, 52–53; Karatani 2003b, 38). In
contrast to this, the pathway from singularity to universality involves a presumptuous,
even unreasonable demand that what is quite clearly a subjective judgment is given the
assent of all others  (Karatani 2003b, 38). The sphere of aesthetics provides us with the
most familiar instances of this paradoxical dynamic, for when a person declares that
6 The male pronoun is used throughout to remain consistent with the historical context of the example.
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King Crimson is  the  greatest  band in the history of  progressive  rock,  although she
knows that she is making a subjective judgment of taste,  nevertheless her assertion
implicitly hopes to attain universal agreement from all  who are concerned with the
matter.  Steven  Shaviro  in  his  reading  of  Kant  and  Karatani  points  out  that  what
separates personal preferences such as one's favourite ice-cream flavour from judgments
of taste is that in the case of the latter there is a certain reaching for the universal which
thus goes “beyond the statement that things are this way 'for me'” (Shaviro 2005).
The upshot of this  is that we are not proposing or even seeking to sketch a
master-plan  which  only  requires  individuals  to  occupy  the  roles  which  we  may
designate. Much less are we trying to map out a single path or revolutionary road which
all must traverse. Indeed, the singularity of each person can be said to matter because of
– to introduce here a word which is not always invoked in this context – vocation. We
shall  discuss  this  concept  in  greater  detail  in  the  following section,  but  for  now it
suffices  to  say  that  we  shall  take  as  our  starting  point  the  theological  concept  of
vocation as developed in the Western Judeo-Christian tradition, tracing its evolution in
medieval Catholicism and the Reformation as well as under the pressure of modern and
contemporary critiques, in order to work towards an integration of the singular and the
universal. As shall become clear, the understanding of vocation to be explored is one
that provides us primarily with a procedural rather than a substantive approach to the
difficult questions we face – in other words, a how but not a what.
Returning to our discussion of the two circuits, we may ask, what is the role of
the particular in the circuit individuality-particularity-generality? After all, the term is
used  by  certain  thinkers  as  a  synonym for  –  or  at  least  to  occupy  the  place  of  –
individuality.  However,  according  to  Karatani's  reading  of  Hegel  and  the  German
Romantics, it in fact serves to mediate between individuality and generality, hence the
order in the circuit (Karatani 2003b, 105). In his words:
“[N]ation”  has  always  been  considered  the  middle  term  (particularity)
between individuality and humanity. . For the Romantics, the idea of nation
came  to  be  privileged  because  of  a  grounding  logic  according  to  which
particularity  synthesizes,  even  originates,  individuality  and  universality.
Within this logic, it is only particularity that assumes the concrete. . The
individual becomes an individual person primarily within one’s own national
language (and nation). The universality of the human being — a human in
general — is abstract and empty when the particularity is absent.  (Karatani
2003b, 103–104)
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However,  it  can  be  said  that  Karatani  moves  too  quickly  from  speaking  of
particularity as a middle term in general to criticising the nation-state as the assumed
space and context of mediation. While it is true that many of the thinkers he cites, from
de  Maistre  to  Wilhelm  Humboldt,  considered  the  nation  as  the  pathway  to  their
conception of humanity7 – which, it is important to emphasise, Karatani considers as a
form of generality rather than universality due to its inward-facing orientation – there
are other forms of particularity that exist, as we shall see below, including some which
have an at least pseudo-universal dimension.
Moreover,  Karatani's  sharp  critique  of  particularity  stems  from  his  aversion
towards the nation(-state) as a mediator, but there are in fact at least two main ways in
which  mediation  and  relationality  take  place.  The  philosopher  Peter  Hallward  has
pointed this out in his careful distinction between what he calls the  specified and the
specific. The specified, in Hallward's framework, is very much akin to the individuality-
particularity-generality  circuit  that  Karatani  is  suspicious  of  –  albeit  with  an ambit
somewhat  wider  than simply the nation – for  it  treats  persons “as  individuated by
certain intrinsic, invariant and thus characteristic properties, innate or acquired, racial
or sexual, national or cultural, physical or spiritual” and thus “reduces the universal to
the  status  of  the  general  or  normal”  (Hallward  2000,  8).  Like  Karatani  he  cites  the
German Romantics  and  other  Counter-Enlightenment  figures  such  as  de  Maistre  as
examples  of  this  form  of  thought  (Hallward  2000,  8).  Crucially,  however,  Hallward
underlines the fact that, as the use of the past-participle indicates, the specified is the
result of an application of “recognized classifications,” and it matters little whether what
is specified is construed narrowly, such as with a nativist or culturalist particularity, or
more broadly, as with some forms of seemingly humanist and universalist visions, for in
his biting words, “[m]ere appreciation of the fact that 'everyone is different and special
in  their  own  way'  belongs  to  such  sophisticated  institutions  as  Sesame  Street  and
McDonaldʼs as much as to some recent postcolonial theories” (Hallward 2000, 8–9).
7 The Romantic idea that the nation is the ground and context for all being (not least of all being-with) 
and becoming has, of course, a much older provenance. We can find a prototype of its modern form in
the Greek idea of ethnos, which Agamben translates elegantly as a “national collectivity based upon 
descent and homogeneity” (Agamben 2011, 257). Illich has explored the primitive Christian disruption
of the Platonic conception of friendship. For Plato, the possibility of love or philia is premised upon a 
shared conception of virtue upon which is built an ethics or ethos, which is itself formulated within 
the context of a certain ethnos or people (Illich 2005, 147). This particularistic conception is challenged
in the Gospels, symbolised in the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan, which we discussed 
analogically in our previous chapter, whereby the Palestinian outsider “acts as a friend towards a 
beaten-up Jew” (Illich 2005, 147).
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Against the essentialism – whether monist or pluralist, parochial or globalist –
of the specified, various thinkers have put forward philosophies of the specific, which
must  nevertheless  be  distinguished  from  the  singular.  The  key  difference  can  be
explained as follows. The singular, as we have seen, simply disregards the question of
mediation  in  its  leap  into  the  universal  –  it  is,  in  Hallward's  words,  “beyond
relationality” (Hallward 2000, 8). The specific, in contrast, chooses to persist in the realm
of  mediation  with  its  surroundings  and  others,  but  in  contrast  to  the  fixity  of  the
specified, it “presupposes an empty, transcendental universal as the necessary medium
of its open-ended relational field”  (Hallward 2000, 8). Relationality is not sidestepped,
but  radicalised  by  the  assertion  of  a  dynamic  subjectivism,  such  as  in  Foucault's
statement in a 1982 interview that “[t]he main interest in life and work is to become
someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book
what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write
it? What is true for writing and for a love relationship is true also for life. The game is
worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end” (Foucault 1988, 9).
Furthermore, we should be aware of the limitations and blind-spots of the circuit
of singularity-universality. In his seminal essay, “An Answer to the Question: What is
Enlightenment?”, Kant argued that the public exercise of one's reason required one to
extricate  oneself  from  one's  specific  responsibilities  and  entanglements  within  a
particular  community in  order  to  enter  the  space  of  cosmopolitan  society
(Weltbürgergesellschaf) (Kant 2006, 19). While he certainly did not deny the necessity of
engagement  within one's  more  situated  spheres  of  commitment  – in his  terms,  the
private exercise of one's reason – it is undeniable that he considered it an inferior, less
enlightened form. Such exertions of one's reason were necessary, perhaps, for making a
living and discharging one's civic duties,8 but it was ultimately one's activity within the
cosmopolitan public which was of primary significance.
Of course, Kant could hardly have argued otherwise given his commitment to
the Enlightenment and its conception of reason. We have already mentioned Counter-
Enlightenment thinkers  such as  de  Maistre  who were focused  on the national  polis
rather  than  the  kosmo-polis.  Whereas  many  thinkers  in  Kant's  lineage  (including
Karatani) view particularistic sentiments, culture and ideas as reactionary or at least
8 Among the examples which Kant gives are citizens who are bound to pay their taxes, officers who are
obliged to comply with the orders of their superiors and clergy who are to teach the catechism and 
instruct their congregations according to their respective church traditions (Kant 2006, 19–20).
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damagingly parochial, those who oppose or at least call into question the rationalism of
the Enlightenment often bewail the destruction of  community in the interests of what
Kant calls “the society of the citizens of the world”  (Kant 2006, 19). In the first case,
what appears to be demanded is a form of “reverse-kenosis.” St Paul in his Epistle to the
Philippians says that “Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not
count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself [ekenōsen], taking
the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:5-7, RSV). According to
theorists of kenotic theology, this  kenosis,  or “self-emptying” was necessary in order
that the eternal and creating Word, the Second Person of the Trinity, could “descend”
and take the form of a human being, Jesus of Nazareth (Gore 1891, 157–158). When Kant
and  his  followers  speak  of  becoming  cosmopolitan,  however,  what  appears  to  be
required is also a form of self-emptying, but of one's particular characteristics in order
to “rise” to the level of discourse and societal life in the kosmos.9
Granted, for Karatani being cosmopolitan appears to be an additional rather than
a completely alternative way of living. He writes that Kant “never denied that everyone
always belongs to a certain  community.  He simply urged that individuals behave as
cosmopolitans  in  thinking  and  action”  (Karatani  2003b,  104).  Therefore,  “[i]n  the
concrete,  [being  enlightened]  means  becoming  a  member  not  (only)  of  a  national
community but (also) of a cosmopolitan society” (Karatani 2003b, 100, italics added). The
parentheses which he uses in this last quote, however, indicate a degree of reticence to
concede this point, and it is therefore unsurprising that he writes subsequently in The
Structure of World History: “True fraternity and free association are only possible once
individuals  cut  ties  with  their  communities  (in  Kant’s  language,  cosmopolitans)”
(Karatani  2014,  236).  That is  to say,  for him membership and participation within a
national community is an unavoidable practical necessity, but as far as possible it should
be tempered and trumped by a cosmopolitan orientation.
Nevertheless,  given that we are tracing Karatani's  line of argument,  we have
9 This dynamic can also be linked to what Charles Taylor, in his work on secularity, has called 
“excarnation.” Writing in the context of religion, Taylor points out that the movements of Reform in 
Latin Christendom resulted in “the transfer of our religious life out of bodily forms of ritual, worship, 
practice, so that it comes more and more to reside 'in the head'” (Taylor 2007, 613). As a consequence 
of this, “[e]mbodied feeling is no longer a medium in which we relate to what we recognize as rightly
bearing an aura of the higher; either we do recognize something like this, and we see reason as our 
unique access to it; or we tend to reject this kind of higher altogether, reducing it through naturalistic
explanation” (Taylor 2007, 288). To transpose Taylor's argument into the terms we have been using in 
this thesis, the Reformation marks a turn to thought-centricism and a concomitant denigration of 
feeling-centricism, which also results in a simultaneous transformation of the sphere of acting.
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once again crossed over into speaking as if the nation(-state) is the only, or at least the
most centrally, relevant aspect of our particularities. There are, of course, many other
particular  alliances  and  entanglements  which  are  involved.  In  the  sphere  of  the
university,  these  include  disciplinary  boundaries,  institutional  affiliations,  as  well  as
inter-  and  intra-disciplinary  cliques  (which  often  are  organised  according  to
theoretical/practical interests and/or political tendencies).
However,  even in  the  restricted  space  of  national  and  other  inwardly-facing
communities, it should be noted that Karatani's perspective appears to have broadened
in the decade or so between the writing of  Transcritique and The Structure of World
History.  Whereas  in  Transcritique he  simply  opposes  the  individuality-particularity-
generality circuit to the singularity-universality circuit, considering them to be at odds
with each other even where they co-exist, in the later text he appears to have moved
towards a more transcritical  position.  Speaking in the context  of  universal  religions
such  as  Judaism and  Christianity,  he  states  that  they  “do not  become  universal  by
negating the particular. Rather, they become universal through an incessant awareness
of  the  contradiction between universality  and  particularity”  (Karatani  2014,  143).  In
other words, if we do not wish to collapse in one or the other direction what is in many
respects a productive antinomy, we cannot but endure the somewhat unsettling nature
of dwelling within such contradictions.
Therefore, this discomfort is not to be lamented, for it is within this space of
tension  between  particularity  and  universality  that  responses  to  the  history  of  the
postwar  British  university  which  are  truly  singular  may  be  forged.  Through  the
operation of transcritique – that is, bracketing – these responses will also be able to
access the other circuit and thus engage with their respective particular contexts in a
resolutely specific manner. Kant was able to resolve the Third Antinomy between nature
and  freedom  by  paradoxically  affirming  the  truth  of  both  through  essentially  a
bracketing operation. By bracketing the determining operations of natural causality, it is
possible to establish practical freedom; conversely, by bracketing the assumption of free
will, it is possible to observe the motions of causality (Karatani 2003b, 117). Likewise, so
long as we are prepared to oscillate from one circuit to the other, we do not necessarily
have  to  choose  between  singularity-universality  and  individuality-particularity-
generality, although it should be added that it is best to engage with the latter circuit
under the aegis of the specific and not the specified.
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Having said all this, how do we deal with the obvious fact of the multifarious
and conflicting responses to the set of circumstances we find ourselves in? If we wish to
move away from the easiest “solution” of finding like-minded others to combine one's
efforts or identifying contrary-minded others to oppose, we will have to acknowledge
the necessary plurality in vocations. This is where the aphorism from Blake quoted at the
beginning of this chapter may help us find a way forward. In a famous section in The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell titled, “Proverbs of Hell,” the radical poet and artist wrote,
“The apple tree never asks the beech how he shall grow, nor the lion, the horse, how he
shall  take his prey”  (Blake 2002, 167).  This simple recognition of multiplicity,  which
consists  in  accepting  that  we  are  not  all  identical  beings  and  therefore  cannot  be
expected to adhere to identical forms of life, may seem banal,10 but we shall use it as a
starting point for discussing vocation, the subject of the next section of this chapter.
Nevertheless,  we must meet the challenge, already alluded to in the aforementioned
quote  from Hallward,  that  any  such  talk  not  fall  into  the  truly  banal  mass  media
message that “everyone is different and special in their own way,” but seriously grapple
with the specific and the singular,  for  our  aim is  to formulate  an adequate  way of
dealing with the conflicting demands of the conceptual triad in the university.
5.2 Vocation
The term vocation is one that often elicits rather strong reactions, at least in part due to
its complicated history. In some spheres of academic and political thought, any positive
resort  to  language  or  concepts  which  have  a  religious  –  especially  Christian  –
provenance is still deemed slightly suspect, if not completely anathema. Nevertheless,
the legacies of twentieth-century thinkers such as Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin
who engaged with theological thought, as well as the recent popularity and prominence
of continental thinkers who have followed in their steps, including Alain Badiou, Slavoj
Žižek and – arguably in the most extensive fashion – Giorgio Agamben, have altered
the scene to a significant degree. Hence, it has become possible for declarations such as
10 The Italian feminist Adrian Cavarero has argued against the blanket application of the 
poststructuralist axioms of difference and anti-essentialism to the field of sexual difference, pointing 
out that “feminine sexual difference is a corporeal difference,” and that this “banality” nevertheless 
“asks for a meaning, the returning of a meaning” (Cavarero and Bertolino 2008, 143–144). The Blake 
proverb likewise grounds its meaning upon the banality of differences in the physical world. It is far 
more contentious whether human persons are distinct in such “banal” ways, but the bare fact of 
physical and physiological differences, both external and internal, which lead to differences in basic 
abilities such as dexterity and strength, do indicate that although the human person is arguably more 
adaptable and malleable than the apple tree, there are distinct limits to her degree of self-creation.
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that of legal theorist Anton Schütz (from which an extended quote is necessary):
[T]he line between 'religion' and 'outside religion', between the 'spiritual' and
the 'temporal/secular', has collapsed as such. And it is its disappearance and
the resulting indissociability of the two sides which opens up, for the first
time,  the  possibility  of  viewing  the  Western  experience  in  toto  as  one
immense (although empirically finite)  unitary event, a “singularity.”  Not only
is there a relation linking Lenin and Saint Paul, but without the Pauline “un-
coupling  from  law”  no  Western  Science,  no  Enlightenment  anti-
institutionalism,  no  socialist  revolution,  no  post-modern  human  rights
philosophy,  can  as  much  as  be  conceived,  no  social-peace-pampering
Western-type “civil society” as much as be dreamt of. The task consists in
retracing the history of Christianity-cum-postchristianity as a West-internal
longue  durée,  in  drawing  the  general  map  of  the  Western  adventure,  in
inscribing Humanism, Enlightenment philosophy, socialism, etc., within this
one overarching Western event. (Schütz 2005, 85).
In  other  words,  the  project  of  extracting  from  this  “Western  experience”  a
secularised  essence  which  can  be  synthesised  with  one's  favoured  revolutionary  or
reformist views – that is, the exercise which fuelled experiments such as the French
republican calendar,11 as well as other attempts to clear from the messy slate of Western
history any influences from religion and, to risk some vain repetition, Christianity, in
particular – has to be rejected as an ahistorical and ultimately counter-productive cause.
Even if one is a thorough believer in secularism, a participant in the postcolonial or
decolonial  movements,  or  even  an  anti-Constantinian  Christian,  any  investigation
which is either premised upon or engages seriously with Western thought has to pass
through Christendom and its contested legacy rather than attempt to leap over it.
Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  grapple  with  the  relations  between  universality,
singularity and particularity – that is  to say, the problematic stated in the previous
section – there is much that can be gained from engaging with Judeo-Christian ideas on
vocation,  in  that  this  textual  and  lived  tradition has  for  millenia  wrestled with the
tensions between, in the Christian case, universalist visions and singular lives, as well
as, in the Jewish context, the roles played by particular communal vocations and the
singular person in the fashioning of a world-affirming approach to life. At this point of
setting off, if we wanted to summarise the overarching argument of this section, we
could say that the concept of vocation allows a person to hold on firmly and act boldly
11 In their zeal to abolish as many elements of the ancien regime as possible, the French revolutionaries 
adopted a new decimalised calendar which had twelve months, each divided into three weeks of ten 
days length. The months were renamed with neologisms referring to the season, such as Fructidor (a 
combination of the Latin word for fruit, fructus, and the Greek word for gift, doron) (M. Shaw 2011, 
43).
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according to her views, principles and deepest stirrings, and yet avoid the danger of
considering them to be superior to or more true than all others and in all cases.
The Invention of Vocation
We begin our enquiry into vocation by examining its lexical and conceptual history.
Etymologically-speaking, the Latin word vocatio simply means a calling, and in Ancient
Rome  it  had  been  used  in  various  senses,  including  a  legal  summons  or  even  an
invitation to dinner (Lewis and Short 1879). However, the use of the word by Jerome in
the Vulgate to translate the Greek klesis – which itself had similar meanings as vocatio
in  the  legal  and  non-religious  social  realm  (Liddell  and  Scott  1940) –  in  the  New
Testament  epistles  led  to  its  meaning  acquiring  a  distinctly  Christian  context  and
content, which with the rise of Christendom indelibly marked its history from then on.
Of  course,  the  religious  concept  of  vocation pre-dates  textual  sources  which
utilise  the  respective  Latin  or  Greek  terms  like  the  Vulgate  or  indeed  the  New
Testament, for the idea of calling has a much older provenance. Even within the biblical
canon,12 Walter Brueggemann has  argued that  the creation narrative  in the Hebrew
Book of  Genesis,  wherein God assigns to the human being the task of “tilling” and
“keeping” the Garden of Eden (Gen. 1:15, RSV), implies that “[f]rom the beginning, the
human creature  is  called [and]  given a vocation”  (Brueggemann 1982,  46).  As for  a
vocation which is given to a singular person, the paramount example in the Hebrew
Scriptures  is  arguably  that  of  Abraham,  but  both  the Old and New Testaments  are
replete with stories of those who received special tasks, almost without exception as a
result  of  divine  revelation.  In  fact,  in  the  Septuagint,  the  Greek  translation  of  the
Hebrew  Scriptures,  words  from  the  same  family  as  klesis are  used  in  narratives
involving “Adamic naming,” where a person or place is given a name that corresponds
with a deep truth of its reality, as in the mythical naming of the animals by Adam in the
second chapter of Genesis.13 Therefore, Adamic names are considered “perfect linguistic
12 For reasons of space and argumentative cohesiveness, we shall constrain our textual discussion to the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, given that it is the central source for the Western idea of vocation which 
we are most concerned with here. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate 
concepts within non-Western civilisations and pre-Christian Western Antiquity which are similar to 
the Christian and/or secular notions of vocation which have arisen in the West in the Common Era. 
This is not to downplay the significance of these alternative discourses, but rather simply to recognise
their less prominent role in constructing the sphere of the British university and indeed Anglo-
American discourse more generally. 
13 Of course, the Adamic naming of the animals in the creation narrative pertains to a particular and not
a singular reality, for as Karatani points out, the sphere of the singular is that of the proper name, 
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representations  of  nonlinguistic  realities”  (D.  Dawson 1991,  85).  It  should  be  noted,
however, that these underlying realities are not necessarily eternal or even pre-existing,
for there are numerous instances in the Hebrew Scriptures where a new name is given
to fit a new identity or ontological reality, such as when Abram, the “exalted father”
(Strong 1890), becomes Abraham, the “father of many nations” (Genesis 17:5, KJV). Thus
we see that klesis need not  be understood as a static, essentialist notion, but can in fact
be framed as a dynamic concept with much affinity to philosophies of becoming.
Nevertheless, we have to be careful not to indiscriminately read into the textual
canon  a  modern  conception  of  vocation  which  involves,  to  put  it  simply,  choosing
between multiple options for one's central (pre)occupation. Such a task generally arises
wherever and whenever a significant degree of social mobility exists. In the various
times  and  places  in  history  and  the  present  where  social  stratification  is  rigid,  the
possibility of living a life which veers away from the path that appears to be set out for
one from birth – whether due to class, caste or any other social constraint – is highly
unlikely. In such situations, the question of vocation in terms of “work” appears to have
a rather restricted range of answers, the most common one being to simply follow the
family occupation or trade,  or,  in the case of women in certain strata and societies,
becoming a wife and mother. However, it would be equally mistaken to assume that the
possibility  of  choosing  one's  primary  (pre)occupations  is  an  entirely  modern
phenomenon, for the historical record does provide instances of this even in relatively
socially-immobile settings, most dramatically perhaps in the decision to abandon the life
of “regular” work for that of philosophical contemplation, such as that of Socrates, the
son  of  a  stonemason  (Howatson  2013,  528).  Indeed,  the  primary  barrier  to  social
mobility  in  traditional  societies  such  as  that  of  Ancient  Greece  is  one  less  tied  to
occupation but rather to status or estate, for although a slave, a foreign resident and a
citizen may all  exert  their  strength and skill  in  the same workshop,  a social  chasm
separates the latter from his less privileged workmates  (Austin 1980, 22–23).
Here we have one of those areas of life where the pre-modern situation is closer
to our “post-modern” present than the modern one. It can be argued that the modern
understanding which originated in the Protestant Reformation whereby one's everyday
occupation  or  work  is  the  primary  locus  of  one's  vocation  distracts  us  from  more
such as with a dog named Taro, rather than the generic name, as with the genus Canis to which the 
dog named Taro belongs on a taxinomic level (Karatani 1995b, xxiii).
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infrastructural questions. For if we extrapolate from the image from antiquity of fellow
craftsmen who, although they cooperate in their activities, are nevertheless very distinct
from each other  due to  their  different  legal  statuses,  we may say that  the  issue of
vocation today is less a question of what the primary activities that one engages in are
but  rather  one's  way of  being and becoming.  Such an understanding of  vocation is
indelibly tied to how one lives, of which practical tasks – that is to say, the what – are
but one consideration. Two young academics may share an office, and outwardly appear
to be of one occupation, and yet it is possible that one has a state of being and becoming
which is aligned to what we may call her vocation, while the other does not.
What then is this idea of vocation which concentrates upon the how? Before we
can answer this question adequately, we will first have to conduct a brief genealogy of
the development of the notion of klesis, observing both its use in the early texts as well
as  its  most  important  permutations  in  the  succeeding  centuries.  Through  this
investigation  we  shall  see  that  the  idea  of  vocation  which  focuses  upon  form
superimposed upon a minimalist yet essential content is not only closer to the original
use of  klesis when compared to its subsequent manifestations, but is also much more
radical in its nature and consequences.
A Very Brief History of Vocation in the Christian Context
As we have already seen, the Latin word vocatio first acquired the sense of a religious
calling or vocation when Jerome used it to translate the Greek term klesis as it was used
in  the  New  Testament  letters,  for  instance  in  the  First  Epistle  of  St  Paul  to  the
Corinthians, where the apostle writes, “For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not
many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called” (1 Cor.
1:26, KJV, italics added). Or, again, in his Epistle to the Philippians, “Brethren. this one
thing I  do,  forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those
things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God
in Christ Jesus” (Phil. 3:13-14, KJV, italics added). From these examples we can see that
Paul is not speaking of calling in the modern, workaday sense of an occupation – nor
even an occupation which one feels a special affinity with – but rather “the general
Christian 'calling' to belong to Christ” (Elliott 2005, 33).14
14 In the words of Karl Barth, the Swiss proponent of “dialectical theology,” this calling is “the act of the 
call of God issued in Jesus Christ by which a man is transplanted into his new state as a Christian, is 
made a participant in the promise. bound up with this new state, and assumes the duty. 
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To  some  contemporary  eyes  and  ears,  this  may  seem  a  narrow  or  even
insignificant  matter,  but  it  is  important  that  we  not  forget  the  marginality  of  the
Christian faith when Paul was writing. Far from the conformist default of Christendom
or the personal and/or private choice of the modern and postmodern age, to become a
Christian  in  the first  century C.E.  was to  join a  strange  sect  that  sprang out  from
Judaism in the Eastern backwaters of the Roman Empire. Moreover, the exclusivity of
the  claims of  the  Christian faith  within its  theological  framework,  which  led  to  its
adherents refusing to engage in the official Imperial religious rites, made embracing it a
dangerous choice, for it was not just a matter of refusal or exodus but rather a counter-
narrative that challenged the discourse of the Empire by appropriating its key concepts
and seemingly subverting them.15
This choice to respond to this calling to the Christian faith was not, however, a
wholly individualistic one,  for one's  response made one a member of the church or
Christian community, whose original word in Greek, ekklesia or assembly, itself shares
the  same  etymological  filiation  as  klesis (Agamben  2005,  19). The heroism of  early
Christianity, however, almost came to an end with Constantine's embrace of the faith
and its rise to become the religion of the Empire. With the inversion of Christianity
from structurally-disadvantaged sect into state religion, the radical idea of klesis had to
evolve or risk complete dissipation. Hence, it mutated from being simply the call to be a
Christian to that of an “authentic” Christian life, which in its earliest manifestations
generally took the form of a flight from the city in order to live a life of a solitary or
cenobitic (i.e. communal) ascetic in the desert. Nevertheless, to use the terms that we
discussed in the previous section of this chapter, in both these cases the core of the
vocation was, strictly-speaking, particular and not singular, in that they each involved a
general  exhortation inviting whoever may respond to a general and not a universal
calling. Thus, the demands placed on the respondent were generic and not singular. For
the message was “become a Christian” or “become a consecrated religious,” and for this
task the singular qualities of the hearer were insignificant, or even irrelevant, which
leads us back to the interpellating posters depicting Lord Kitchener and Uncle Sam.
corresponding to this state” (Barth 1961, III.4:600).
15 Indeed, much of the language used by early Christians to refer to Christ and his Kingdom could be 
seen as plagiarised from Imperial terminology. To give just a few examples, the “good news” of 
Emperor Augustus' birthday became the Christian euangélion or gospel, the inscription referring to 
Julius Caesar as “God made manifest” was transposed into the Christian understanding of the 
Incarnation, and the word for the Second Coming of Christ, parousia, was originally used to describe 
the Emperor's visit to a city (Young 2006, 14–15).
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Thus, from the early monastic athletes – who gained the name Desert Mothers
and Fathers – onwards until the Protestant Reformation, the word vocatio came to refer
solely to the special vocation of becoming a priest  or consecrated religious  (Placher
2005, 6–7). It is easy to critique this development as being a hierarchical turn which
created an ecclesiastical elite – and, indeed, in many ways it was – but it is also worth
noting that what it also did was preserve the notion that vocatio was something other
than  simply  the  instrumental  demands  of  whatever  practical  social  and  economic
structure was in place. Granted, the social structures and ideologies of Antiquity and the
medieval era, where productive work was seen as inferior to a life of contemplation,
helped to produce this elitist conception (J. Dawson 2005, 223). However, to return to
the  argument  of  Schütz's  which  highlights  the  continuity  of  secular,  post-Christian
developments with the Christian period which preceded and still conditions it, it can
still be argued that the figure of the ascetic under religious vows is the precursor to
subsequent counter-cultural roles such as that of the rebel, the revolutionary and the
activist.  Indeed,  numerous figures in historical  insurrections,  revolutions and protest
movements have been either clerics and/or monastics or former clerics and/or former
monastics, from the late medieval Lollard priest John Ball and radical reformer Thomas
Müntzer to, more recently, Sr Anne Montgomery RSCJ and Fr Daniel Berrigan SJ of the
anti-war  Plowshares  Movement.16 Of  course,  the  two  exemplary  examples  of  this
phenomenon from the  United  States  in  the  twentieth  century  were  Rev  Dr  Martin
Luther  King Jr  and  Malcolm X.  With  such  persons  we find a  rebellion  against  the
conformist  and  conforming  elements  of  the  consecrated  religious  vocation,  which
converts and subverts the particular-general medieval notion of such a vocation into
singular, and yet not necessarily solitary, expressions. It is as if having responded to the
religious equivalent of a Lord Kitchener poster – and there are many instances of such
literature in churches – such persons then decide that a path which treads precariously
between “loyal” rebellion and heterodox resistance is one they really are to walk upon.
The next  major  modulation  of  vocation  in  Western  Christendom  took  place
during and as part of the Protestant Reformation. In “An Open Letter to The Christian
16 The Plowshares Movement began in 1980 when eight anti-war activists broke into the General 
Electric Nuclear Missile facility in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, damaged nose cones of nuclear 
warheads and poured blood onto various documents. The name of the movement comes from a 
passage in the biblical Book of Isaiah: “[T]hey shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their 
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war 
any more” (Isa. 2:4, KJV). Over seventy-five similar actions have taken place around the world since 
the first action, primarily but not exclusively by religious activists (M. A. Muller and Brown 2010).
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Nobility,”  written in  1520,  the  German reformer  Martin  Luther  attacks  the  Catholic
doctrine  of  the  time which divided the world into  a  “spiritual  estate”  comprised  of
“pope, bishops, priests and monks” and a “temporal estate” made up of “princes, lords,
artisans, and farmers” (Luther 1520). This conception, which elevated clerics to a special
status, Luther rejects in his characteristically truculent manner as “a fine bit of lying and
hypocrisy”  (Luther 1520). It  is important to note that Luther maintains a distinction
between the sphere of secular government, which he terms the worldly kingdom of
“law,” and that of spiritual striving, which he terms the heavenly kingdom of “grace”
(Luther 1989, 429), but he expands the boundaries of the latter to include all Christians,
and not just the “spiritual professionals”  (Luther 1520). The theological path towards
this “democratisation” is mapped through a reading of selected New Testament epistles,
which allows him to challenge the very foundation of the specifically Catholic division
of spiritual and temporal, namely, the distinction between clerical and lay persons.
Traditional Catholic theology held that the priesthood was a special ontological
status which was conferred by the sacrament of priestly ordination by a bishop. Luther,
on the other hand, puts forward a notion that has become known as the “priesthood of
all believers.” He justified this conception by citing both St Peter and St Paul. In the First
Epistle of Peter, the author, addressing his audience of Christians who were “scattered
throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia,” writes: “[Y]e are a chosen
generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation” (1 Peter 1:1-2, 2:9, KJV). If all Christians
are already priests,  then the role of dispensing the sacraments and preaching is not
premised upon a unique ontological status, but is rather an office which is undertaken
by the office-holder within the boundaries of church order  (Luther 1520). Luther cites
Paul's Letter to the Romans, where it is said that “For as we have many members in one
body, and all members have not the same office: So we, being many, are one body in
Christ, and every one members one of another” (Rom. 12:4-5, KJV).
At first glance, this levelling of the priesthood to simply one role in the body of
believers at the same time appears to elevate all forms of human activity – including
non-economic labour, e.g. being a spouse, parent or child –  to the status of vocations, a
position that is taken by various commentators such as William E. Placher  (Placher
2005, 205–206). After all, in a Christmas sermon written around 1521, Luther argues that
“all works are the same to a Christian, no matter what they are”  (Luther 2005, 214).
Nevertheless, it may be more accurate to say that Luther's broadening of the concept of
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vocation, like some instances of democratisation in the political realm, is primarily a
levelling down rather than a levelling up.17 A particularly telling expression of Luther's
theology of vocation can be found in his translation of a key passage in Paul's First
Letter to the Corinthians (7:20) in which the word klesis – or, to be exact, its equivalent
form klesei – is translated as Beruf, that is, “job” or “occupation,” rather than Berufung or
Ruf, that is, “calling” (Elliott 2005, 36). The King James Version maintained the straight-
forward and widely-accepted concept of klesis: “Let every man abide in the same calling
wherein he was called” (1 Cor.  7:20,  KJV).  Luther,  on the other hand, translated the
passage as follows: “Ein jeglicher bleibe in dem Beruf, darin er berufen ist” (L1545). It is
not an exaggeration to say that this choice of word by Luther in this single passage has
had significant consequences for the history of the concept of vocation ever since.
Luther's intention, in translating what had been understood as vocatio into Beruf,
was  “to  demonstrate  and  prove  that  not  only  the  monk  has  a  vocation,  but  every
Christian in the world and in secular employment as well”  (Kittel and Friedrich 1966).
The effect of this daring translation, however, was to subsume the concept of vocation
under a socially conservative rubric, for together with Luther's attempt to horizontalise
the previously hegemonic idea of vocation came his teaching that Christians should not
seek to change their “external position[s],” just as the shepherds who worshipped the
infant Jesus returned to their flocks and did not attempt to retire to a “higher” monastic
life (Luther 2005, 214). Thus, Luther's democratisation of vocation is formal rather than
17 Luther would probably not have accepted this claim, given his interesting thought experiment in the 
sphere of political theory, one which he considers analogical to the priesthood of all believers. He 
sketches a situation where “ten brothers, all king's sons and equal heirs” decide upon “one of 
themselves to rule the inheritance for them all,” and argues that in such a situation “they would all be 
kings and equal in power, though one of them would be charged with the duty of ruling” (Luther 
1520). An enthusiastic democrat may see Luther's image as an apologia for popular sovereignty, and 
even link it to the claims that an “ascending” theory of government – to use Walter Ullmann's term – 
was the practice of medieval Germanic tribes, who elected their rulers (Ullmann 1978, 22). However, 
as even Ullmann recognises, the king could only be elected those from deemed to be of royal blood. 
Frode Horvik has pointed out that this “royal blood-right” was considered to be sacral; thus, the 
plausibility of claiming a strong element of democracy – whether in the classical or modern sense – 
among these tribes is rather low (Hervik 2012, 144). Luther's enthusiastic cooperation with the 
various princes in the Holy Roman Empire, moreover, makes any claim for a pronounced democratic 
impulse in him rather difficult, at least in the secular kingdom of Law. Furthermore, to return to the 
question of levelling up or down in the spiritual kingdom of Grace, if we take priesthood as being 
something that is “added” to “bare humanity” upon one's embrace of the Christian faith, Luther's 
concomitant proviso that practical order requires the office of priest to be exercised by specific people
means that in his attempt to raise all Christians to the status of priesthood, Luther ironically reduces 
all to the position of the laity. This may not be a bad thing for some, particularly anti-institutionalists 
and anti-clericalists whether formally within the sphere of Christianity (such as the Quakers or the 
Japanese Non-Church Movement) or outside it, but ultimately Luther's claim that ten heirs may select
one of their number to rule and yet be all kings equally is nonsensical, for to be a king is to be a 
monarch, and the very meaning of monarchos is “sole ruler.”
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substantive, as the upshot of his treatment of all varieties of Beruf as of equal standing
before God, when twinned with the idea that one's place in the world is no accident but
rather appointed by God, is to legitimise the actual hierarchies that exist. The peasant is
to remain a peasant, the artisan an artisan, and so on. This attitude of indifference and
resignation to what one is “given” is ironically a central part of the internal life of the
religious orders which Luther opposed. As the Principles of the Anglican Society of the
Sacred  Mission  counsels  the  member  potentially  disaffected  by  an  uncongenial
assignment, “If you have given your whole life to God why should you prefer to lose it
in this way rather than it that” (Society of the Sacred Mission 1909, sec. xii)?18
Hence,  New  Testament  scholar  S.  Scott  Bartchy  has  argued  that  Ruf is  the
German word that corresponds best to klesis. Although Berufung, a word that carries the
meaning  of  vocation  or  calling,  is  arguably  slightly  preferable  to  the
technical/vocational term Beruf, and certainly better than alternative terms even more
tied to  social  class  such as  Stand (status)  or  Platz (place)  which have  been used in
translations since the Luther Bible, he nevertheless cites German feminist theologian
Luise  Schottroff's  scepticism that  Berufung is  “a  clear  advance”  over  Beruf  (Bartchy
2009). This is probably so because although the difference between Ruf and Berufung is
subtle, the former's advantage is that it is associated with a call from an external source,
as in the traditional Ruf to take up a professorship in a German university (Phillips 2015,
219).19 In other words,  with  Ruf the (proto-)liberal  element of autonomous choice is
downplayed, as one does not initiate the vocational “move” but rather responds to a call
which comes from outside oneself. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this response is
itself  only  possible  if  it  is  in  accord  with  something  that  is  inside  oneself.  To  use,
analogically, the example of the Ruf to become a professor at a particular university, if
one  has  absolutely  no  inclination  towards  the  position,  then  the  call  will  almost
certainly go unheeded. In other words, a connection must be made between the within
and the beyond for there to be an instance of a fulfilled klesis or vocation.
18 Beyond this occupational indifference, however, Luther's translation of klesis as Beruf has gradually 
led to an even nastier turn in the intepretation of the subsequent verse in the chapter. As S. Scott 
Bartchy has shown, Beruf gradually morphed in some translations into words even further from the 
original meaning of klesis such as Stand or, in English, condition. Hence in the New Revised Standard 
Version, published in 1989, verses 20 and 21 are translated as follows: “Let each of you remain in the 
condition in which you were called. Were you a slave when called? Do not be concerned about it. 
Even if you can gain your freedom, make use of your present condition now more than ever” (1 Cor. 7:20-
21, NRSV, italics added). Thus Paul's ruminations about the calling to embrace the way of Christ have 
evolved monstrously into a justification for slaves to remain in slavery (Bartchy 2008).
19 I am indebted to Félix Krawatzek for this distinction between the two terms.
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As Weber famously pointed out, Luther's radical reworking of the concept of
vocation in his translation of the Bible spilled over into other Protestant societies, with
the clearest example in the English-speaking world being that of the Calvinist Puritans
(Weber  2001,  xiii).  Puritan  divines  such  as  William  Perkins  formulated  a  two-fold
conception of vocation, dividing it into the “general calling” of Christian life, “common
to all  who live in the Church of God,” and “particular” or “personal callings” which
correspond to specific forms of labour or offices (Perkins 1626, 752, 754). The closeness
of  his  terminology to our discussion in the previous section is  significant,  although
there are certain finer distinctions that should be made. First of all, Perkins is generally
considered to be among the Calvinists who hold to an understanding of the Christian
klesis which is, in the terms we have been using, particular rather than general (and
certainly not universal). It is a central doctrine of Calvinism that God has chosen an
“elect” to be saved from eternal damnation, and by extension excluded many others
from salvation.  This  is  what  is  commonly  known as  “predestination.”  However,  the
particularity of this calling is further strengthened by those who hold to what has come
to be known as “limited atonement.” These Calvinists, whose patrimony some trace back
to Theodore Beza, the sixteenth-century French theologian and disciple of Calvin, hold
to the idea that Christ's atonement on the cross was “limited,” and by this it is meant
that Christ  died not  for the sins of  the whole world but rather only for the elect. 20
Perkins,  like other theologians of  his  time, spoke of “redemption” and “satisfaction”
rather than “atonement,” the latter being a term that came into use later (Ballitch 2015,
452), but his denial that Christ died for those outside the elect nevertheless arguably
gives him a place among this group. In his own words, “the price is payd in the counsell
of God, and as touching the event  only for those which are elected and predestinated”
(Perkins 1606, 18, italics added).
Secondly, Perkins' understanding of a “personal calling” is what we would call
20 It is true that the doctrine of limited atonement is a later formulation and does not itself occur in the 
writings of Calvin or other early Calvinists, although some argue that it and the other four of the 
“five points” of Calvinism can be traced back to the Synod of Dort in 1618-1619, which was convened 
in response to the rise of Arminianism, with its belief in what was subsequently termed unlimited 
atonement, namely, the notion that Christ died for all and not just for the elect, although some may 
choose not to believe and thus not be saved (Torrance 1983, 83). The historical theologian Richard A. 
Muller has cast doubt on these claims, noting that not only is atonement an English word which was 
not used by Calvin or any of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Calvinist theologians who wrote 
in Latin, the theological debates of their time were very different from those that erupted in the 
Anglo-American world from the nineteenth century, and the “five points” of Calvinism are a 
distillation of the tradition which occurred in that spatial-temporal context (R. A. Muller 2012, 59–60).
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an individual and not a singular calling. In his view, one is called to fill particular roles
or “offices” in society, and he names and categorises them under two headings. The first
are “of the essence and foundation of any societie,” and include that of a master or a
servant, a husband or a wife, a parent and a child; the second are “only for the good,
happy and quiet  estate  of  a  society,”  such as  that  of  a  merchant,  a  husbandman,  a
physician, a lawyer and so on (Perkins 1626, 758). All of these roles are pre-given, and
require  only  persons  to  be  inserted  into  them,  thus  following  the  pattern  of  the
individual-general relation which we discussed earlier.
The upshot of this is that we can see how the classical Protestant understanding
of vocation, from Luther through the Puritan Calvinists and up until the present day, is
based on the individual-particular-general circuit rather than the singular-universal one.
This being the case, it is perhaps no wonder that such thinking could not resist, and
indeed went hand-in-hand with, the rise of alienated labour under capitalism, as studies
from Weber and R. H. Tawney onwards on the intimate relationship between religion
and the economy in the countries where the capitalist mode of production arose have
shown. For if one's vocation is simply filling in a role that has to be played in a given
socio-historical  situation,  this  role is not only infused with religious significance,  as
Weber pointed out  (Weber 2001, 40), but also eradicates the singularity of the person.
For if the person is not singular but merely individual, even if, as Perkins acknowledged,
“every calling must be fitted to the man” (Perkins 1606, 758), the fit is akin to, it can be
said without excessive exaggeration, a specific nut being sought for a specific bolt, thus
resulting in a rather mechanical view of society with people as interchangeable parts.21
The aforementioned transformation of  labour under capitalism brought about
another gradual shift in the Christian understanding of vocation. To begin, it should be
noted that in the Catholic regions of Europe, the intellectual and spiritual legacy of the
Counter-Reformation  was  such  that  the  medieval  understanding  of  vocation  as
restricted  to  special  religious  callings  was  maintained,  and  would  not  change
significantly until after the church-shaking event of the Second Vatican Council in 1962-
21 It is true that the predominant metaphor used by such Christian writers to describe the Christian 
community – or, in a few cases, society as a whole – is an organic one, i.e. a human body, and in this 
they follow St Paul. However, it has been discerned that the conception or paradigm of a living 
creature which they worked with was influenced by the philosophies of mechanism in thinkers such 
as Descartes and Hobbes who were their contemporaries. The literary theorist George C. Herndl, for 
instance, detects mechanistic strands in Perkins' sermons and tracts (Herndl 1970, 154).
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1965.22 It was this divergence that Weber pointed towards in The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism when he noted that the conception of vocation as Beruf or practical
sphere of work was in fact absent in the languages of the Catholic peoples of Europe
(Weber 2001, 39). This can be attributed to the rejection of the Lutheran innovation in
understanding vocation which we discussed earlier. Hence, we find that in Pope Leo
XIII's famous 1891 encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which inaugurated the body of theology
known as Catholic Social Teaching, he deals with the question of work not in terms of
vocation but rather primarily as a means of earning a living, supporting a family and
bettering one's condition by acquiring private property (Leo XIII 2002, sec. 5).
However, with the advent and intensification of capitalist hegemony across the
Western world, voices began to be heard from even Protestant quarters which called
into  question  the  equivalence  of  vocation  and  work  brought  about  by  Luther,  the
Puritans and other Reformers. Often this took the form of a critique of capitalism or, at
least, the principle of competition which it is generally founded upon, as in the work of
Baptist  minister  and  social  gospel  pioneer  Walter  Rauschenbusch,  most  notably  in
Christianity and the Social  Crisis (1907),  his powerful broadside against not only the
inequality and injustices of the time but also the apolitical and asocial forms of piety
which explicitly or tacitly legitimised them. He pointed out that the “right to work” had
become a slogan deployed  by  employers  to  hire  strike-breakers  (W.  Rauschenbusch
2007, 263), and that the principle of cooperation based on the Christian idea of human
relations of love was increasingly difficult to practise in a capitalist culture, with the
“higher principle” of service to others greatly obscured unless one was in a line of work
such  as  medicine,  teaching  or  art  (W.  Rauschenbusch  2007,  253).  Nevertheless,
Rauschenbusch  still  believed  that  a  person's  daily  work  could  be  filled  with  divine
purpose if society could be reconstructed on the basis of service to humanity, which he
linked to the Gospel idea of the Kingdom of God (W. Rauschenbusch 2007, 290).
Subsequently,  however,  the  entire  project  to  sanctify  everyday  labour  came
under  attack  from dissident  voices  such  as  the  French  Protestant  theologian,  social
theorist  and  Christian  anarchist  Jacques  Ellul.  Ellul  writes  in  a  1980  essay  (which
appeared in English in 1985): “I scarcely know a biblical text which presents work as
22 Hence, one finds in Evelyn Waugh's 1945 novel Brideshead Revisited the fifteen-year old Cordelia 
Flyte, a devout Roman Catholic, explaining to the Anglican-raised protagonist, Charles Ryder, what it 
would mean for her to have a vocation: “[A vocation] means you can be a nun. lf you haven’t a 
vocation, it’s no good however much you want to be; and if you have a vocation, you can’t get away 
from it, however much you hate it” (Waugh 2000, 213).
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valuable,  good,  or  virtuous.  .  In  the  Bible  work  is  a  necessity,  a  constraint,  a
punishment, except in a few, unusual texts” (Ellul 1985, 43). In another piece published
in English in 1972, he insists that “[n]othing in the Bible allows us to identify work with
calling. . [Work] is an imperative of survival, and the Bible remains realistic enough
not to superimpose upon this necessity a superfluous spiritual decoration” (Ellul 1972,
8). Here we find that Ellul rejects the Protestant Beruf, but also refuses to return to the
traditionalist Catholic vocatio, thus opening a way for him and others to reach back to
the primitive understanding of klesis as the “mere” calling to follow Christ.
Versions of Academic Klesis
Having examined the invention and development of the concept of  klesis  within the
Christian context in the preceding section, the question which arises naturally is simply
this: if the klesis of the New Testament, understood in its primitive and most meaningful
sense, is to belong to and follow after Christ, what is the klesis of the university? What
are we who dwell within it called to do? In order to answer this seemingly simple and
yet rather controversial question, we shall consider the rather interesting taxonomy of
academics formulated by Stanley Fish in a 2012 series of lectures, published as Versions
of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution  (Fish 2014).  Fish categorises
academics  according to  their  various  views  on  the  contentious  subject  of  academic
freedom, but it  can be argued that his analysis is relevant to not just this particular
aspect  of  higher  education,  but  in  fact  the  university's  calling  as  a  whole.  An
examination and extension of Fish's arguments will  reveal  that the broad periods in
which the conception of vocation developed within the Christian West, as discussed
above,  have  in  fact  more  specific  analogues  within  the  sphere  of  higher  education.
However, we will see that we cannot easily leap into an understanding of a primitive
klesis for  the  university  as  is  possible  in  the  Christian  context,  given the canonical
textual resources available to the latter which we unfortunately do not have in the same
manner. It is also important to note that, in employing Fish's taxonomy, we must avoid
the trap of reducing the entirety of higher education to simply the work of academics,
who form but one of its parts. Hence, with each of Fish's classifications, we have to be
careful  to  not  forget  the  perspectives  of  the  other  major  human  segments  of  the
university community, namely non-academic staff and students.
Fish identifies five “schools” which differ in their assessment of the boundaries
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and responsibilities of academic freedom, which he organises in an ascending fashion
from the most inward-facing and conservative to the most outward-facing and radical –
or, in his own words, “plotted on a continuum that goes from right to left” (Fish 2014, 7).
For  the  purposes  of  our  argument,  however,  we can divide  the  five  into  two main
categories, for at the core of Fish's classifications is one simple question: does academia
exist for a good or an end that lies outside its practical activities – whether in part or in
toto – or is its  raison d'être  contained simply in its primary internal activities, that is,
those directly involving or indirectly linked to learning, teaching and research?
For four of Fish's five schools, the answer to this question is that there is indeed
a telos or at least a justification that is added on to the “bare” work of the university. The
differences between them arise from varying opinions as to what exactly this additional
justification is, and how it transforms how one understands the basic activities carried
out  in  the  higher  education  sphere.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  Fish  sees  in  them  a
trajectory  of  increasing  radicalism  in  the  expansion  –  which  in  some  cases  is
paradoxically accompanied by a certain narrowing – of the purposes of the academic
institution, a radicalism that he disapproves of.
Let us begin, however, with the first school, in which Fish places himself – and
half-jokingly but rather unpersuasively suggests that he may be the only member of.23
He calls it the “It's just a job” school, and its perspective on higher education, which he
describes as “deflationary,” considers academia to be “a service that offers knowledge
and skills to students who wish to receive them” and not “a vocation or holy calling”
(Fish 2014, 10). It is important to note that Fish's antipathy to the word vocation arises
from his disagreement with the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom
and  Academic  Tenure  promulgated  by   the  American  Association  of  University
Professors  (AAUP),  which he claims is  founded upon a distinction between what is
considered a “job” and what is considered a “vocation.” In his words:
A job is defined by an agreement (often contractual) between a worker and a
boss:  you will  do X  and I  will  pay  you Y;  and  if  you fail  to  perform as
stipulated, I will discipline or even dismiss you. Those called to a vocation are
not merely workers; they are professionals; that is, they profess something
larger than the task immediately at hand – a religious faith, a commitment to
the rule of law, a dedication to healing, a zeal for truth – and in order to
23 Literary critic Evan Kindley, in a review of Fish's book, points out that Fish is “being disingenuous: 
there is in fact a large class of professionals within the university who tend to hold just such a view —
the view that professors are, at the end of the day, just employees, with no special rights or privileges 
that don’t attach to other kinds of employees. They’re called administrators” (Kindley 2016).
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become credentialed  professors,  as  opposed  to  being amateurs,  they  must
undergo a rigorous and lengthy period of training. Being a professional is less
a  matter  of  specific  performances.  than  of  a  continual,  indeed,  lifelong
responsiveness to an ideal or a spirit. (Fish 2014, 3)
Rejecting  the  concept  of  “vocation”  which  the  AAUP  Declaration  and  its
intellectual successors are founded upon,24 Fish and other adherents to the “It's just a
job”  school  believe  that  they  are  not  in  their  academic  labours  “exercising  First
Amendment rights or forming citizens or inculcating moral values or training soldiers
to fight for social justice;” instead, “[t]heir obligations and aspirations are defined by the
distinctive task – the advancement of knowledge – they are trained and paid to perform,
defined,  that  is,  by  contract  and  by  the  course  catalog  rather  than  by  a  vision  of
democracy or world peace”  (Fish 2014, 10). Given that the AAUP's invocation of the
concept of vocation or calling is clearly rooted in the Protestant innovation in the idea
of  klesis,  the  desacralisation  of  the  work  of  the  academic  that  Fish's  first  school
advocates can be seen as a break with the sanctification of everyday labour embodied in
the Lutheran notion of vocation as Beruf. However, this school goes beyond the critique
of Luther's Beruf which we examined earlier, namely, the one made by Christians critics
such as Ellul, because in this case there is not even a baseline klesis, such as the calling
to a Christian life, that can be returned to. The gesture here is towards disenchantment
and secularity pure and simple: there is no such thing as an academic klesis; there is not
even Luther's  Beruf, but only the pre-Reformation understanding of the German word
and  its  corresponding  analogues  in  other  languages.  Therefore  for  Fish,  academic
teaching,  research  and  other  related  labours  are  all  merely  instances  of  work,  and
nothing grander. This is not to say that he thinks academic work is of not great value,
but  rather  that  its  value  lies  solely  in itself.  We might  call  this  autotelic  approach,
borrowing from the famous aesthetic slogan which first  came to prominence in the
nineteenth century, “academia for academia's sake.”
The second  school  arises  directly  out  of  the  1915  AAUP  declaration  quoted
above, and Fish terms it the “For the common good” school. Here we find a conception
of vocation similar to Luther's Beruf, although the sacred dimension of calling has here
been largely secularised. Rather than performing one's work for the glory of God, it is
24 The 1915 Declaration certainly describes the task of the academic in lofty terms, including as a “high 
calling” which “our profession may prove unworthy of” (American Association of University 
Professors 2006, 300).
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rather to democracy and the community that one renders one's service.25 Alongside the
extension of human knowledge and the education of students, the university's task is to
provide expert advice “for various branches of  public service” which will  contribute
“toward the right solution of. social problems”  (American Association of University
Professors 2006). The university in a democratic society bears the responsibility “to help
make public opinion more self-critical and more circumspect, to check the more hasty
and unconsidered impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to the habit of
looking before and after” (American Association of University Professors 2006).
A third school, Fish says, comes into being as “a logical extension” of the second.
This is the “Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings” school  (Fish 2014, 11). If
academics are meant to be “a counterweight to the force of common popular opinion,
they must themselves be uncommon, not only intellectually but morally; they must be
in the words of the 1915 Declaration, 'men of high gift and character'” (Fish 2014, 11–12,
italics in original). The underlying principle of this school is eerily reminiscent of the
elitist  idea  of  vocation  which  was  hegemonic  in  pre-Reformation  Christendom and
which continued in the Catholic world from the Counter-Reformation until the Second
Vatican Council. Here we find that academics are the equivalent of nuns, monks, priests
and apostolic religious in the realm of higher education; that is, they are the spiritual
athletes of the university,  bearers of a unique calling, which carries not just  special
responsibilities  but  also  special  rights,  for  in  their  role  of  correcting “the  errors  of
popular opinion, they escape popular judgment and are not to be held accountable to
the same laws and restrictions that constrain ordinary citizens” (Fish 2014, 12).
For Fish, the next step away from seeing academic labours as simply a job whose
value lies  wholly  in itself  is  taken by the fourth school,  the  “Academic freedom as
critique” school. He cites Judith Butler's work on the concept and practice of critique as
being exemplary of this approach, whereby “[a]cademic freedom is understood. as a
protection for  dissent;”  furthermore,  “the  scope  of  dissent  must  extend to  the  very
distinction  and  boundaries  the  academy presently  enforces”  (Fish  2014,  13).  In  this
vision,  the  boundaries  between  academic  labours  and  political  imperatives  become
blurred, for the drawing of definite lines “has the effect of freezing the status quo and of
allowing distinctions originally rooted in politics to present themselves as apolitical and
25 Nonetheless, there is arguably a residue of religiosity here, for it was St Paul who summarised the 
entirety of the law in one single duty, namely to love one's neighbour (Gal. 5:14).
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natural”  (Fish 2014, 13). The critical legal tradition that we will  examine in the final
section of this chapter is,  of course, the central expression of this school within the
realm of legal studies, and embodies all the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.
Finally,  we  have  the  most  daring  school,  namely  the  “Academic  freedom as
revolution” school (Fish 2014, 13). Its academic members equate the duties of teaching to
that of a citizen, with the latter generally construed in a leftist political fashion, leading
to radical pedagogist Henry A. Giroux's pronouncement that university teachers have a
responsibility  to  “fight  for  an  inclusive  and  radical  democracy  by  recognizing  that
education in the broadest sense is not just about understanding, however critical, but
also about providing the conditions for assuming the responsibilities we have as citizens
to expose human misery and to eliminate the conditions that produce it” (Giroux 2008,
128). Interestingly, this approach erases, in a sense, the uniqueness of the academic: she
is  merely  carrying  out  the  general  tasks  of  preparing  the  way  for  and  fomenting
revolution  in  the  specific  realm  of  her  daily  work.  Here  we  find  a  conception  of
vocation, then, which at first glance seems, in terms of structure, remarkably close to
the primitive Christian understanding of klesis, for the calling to work for social justice
and  to  challenge  an  unjust  world  is  common  to  all  who choose  to  embrace  it,  in
response to it reaching their ears. However, this is not a klesis specific to the university,
but rather one which leads to a  doxa and praxis of activists, revolutionaries, and their
fellow travellers. In this sense, it lies halfway between Luther's Beruf and traditionalist
Catholic  vocatio, as it paradoxically involves both the baptism of worldly activities in
the light of higher aims, as well as the sense that one is carrying out a special task.26
In  light  of  the  discussion  above,  it  can  be  argued  that  Fish  sees  the  fairly
moderate  perspective  of  the  “For  the  common good”  school  as  the  beginning  of  a
slippery slope. By admitting that there are “higher values” or aims which transcend the
“severe professionalism of the 'It's just a job' school” (Fish 2014, 11), one takes the first
tentative step onto the top of the slope, and, from where Fish stands, it becomes difficult
either to avoid sliding all the way to asserting that the value of academia lies in its
service to the revolution, or to validly criticise those who happily do so, even if one has
latched on to an intermediate point down the hill.
26 An analogue from the history of Christianity is the devotio moderna movement which flowered in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Germany and the Low Countries. The central idea behind this 
movement was that it was possible to live a rigorous and devoted Christian life in the world without 
formally embracing the institutional framework of the religious orders (McGinn 2012, 97).
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However, Fish's one-dimensional continuum, in which the latter four of his five
schools represent incremental shifts away from the simple and pure “It's just  a job”
perspective,  is  far  too  simplistic.  It  is  possible  to  map  out  Fish's  framework  more
accurately as well  as bring it  into a conversation with the various other theoretical
threads we have explored so far in this thesis, an encounter which we have already
began  in  the  last  few  pages.  The  diagram  on  the  following  page27 represents  the
discussion so far and what is to come.
The diagram allows us  to  see  convergences  and divergences  which may not
always  be  as  visible  while  engaging  purely  in  the  linguistic  mode.  For  example,  it
becomes easier to see that Fish's desire to resist external validation or vindication for
the activities of the university can be turned against right-wing tendencies as well as
the left-wing ones which he trains his fire upon.28 Hence, his framing of his five schools
as being “plotted on a continuum that goes from right to left” is misleading (Fish 2014,
7). To begin with, his denigration of the “Academic freedom as revolution” school as
subsuming academic activities completely under a foreign rubric applies as well to the
economistic instrumentalism we analysed in Chapter Two, because in both cases the
university  does  not  have its  own justifying content  – that  is,  it  does  not  exist  and
operate for itself – but is judged according to its furtherance of extrinsic goals. The key
difference, however, is that whereas academic radicals of the revolutionary sort hold in a
febrile tension their idealistic commitments and their instrumentalist aims, economistic
instrumentalism  formally  ignores  the  matter  of  principles,  and  so  even  though  its
practitioners are often not themselves devoid of abstract ideas, the primary source of
justification(s) for their decisions and policies lies squarely at the top of the triangle.
We can also enquire into certain curious affinities in the diagram. For a start,
how can it be that economistic instrumentalism, which is the hegemonic manifestation
of  the “university without its  own content” which we discussed in Chapter Two, is
located in the same corner of the triangle as Fish's “It's just a job” school, given that Fish
is against justifying academic labour through any telos apart from the work itself? What
in fact unites them is their commitment to what we may call a “pure” – that is, pre-
27 The basic structure of this triangular diagram is adapted from one in Donald F. Durbaugh's study, The 
Believers' Church: The History and Character of Radical Protestantism, in which he maps out the 
various Christian churches and sects according to the Trinitarian poles of Word, Spirit and Tradition 
(Durnbaugh 1985, 31).
28 In his aforementioned review of the book, Kindley asserts that “there are left[-wing] and right[-wing] 
versions of all of the positions [Fish] describes” (Kindley 2016).
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Lutheran and post-Lutheran – conception of Beruf, in which academic labour is neither
special nor sacred. Ironically, Fish's disavowal of any external validation of academic
work does not lead to a telos-free zone, for his minimalist withdrawal from the sphere of
wider  aims naturally leads  to the colonisation of  that  very sphere by the dominant
framework of contemporary life in the university and beyond – namely, economistic
calculation.  After  all,  academic  activities  conducted  according  to  the  principle  of
“academia for academia's sake” do not, even in the tallest ivory tower and under the
most rarefied of conditions, operate in a vacuum. Thus, as David Harvey observes in the
analogous case of “art for art's sake,” it is often swallowed up by the very dynamics of
commodification which it may be opposed to in theory (Harvey 1990, 22).
The respective locations of the four non-autotelic schools in our diagram is also
instructive, as it complicates Fish's conception of the five schools as a sequence which
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can be depicted on a single line that runs from right to left. The “For the common good”
school is indeed often the first move away from the “It's just a job” mentality, but once
one reaches the centre of the triangle, to shift one's perspective towards any of the final
three schools takes one in different directions.
Academic exceptionalism, with its assertion that the task of the university is a
unique one with its own distinct premises and perhaps even deserving of  sui generis
privileges within wider society, takes one down-and-leftwards in the direction of the
university-in-itself  and  its  emphasis  on  community,  and  also,  as  we  have  already
observed,  very  close  to  medieval  vocatio.  It  is  particularly  concerned  with  its  own
internal consistency and counter-hegemonic position, which entails a more “separatist”
approach, which is expressed most closely by the image of the dissident cell.
The revolutionary school, on the other hand, is premised more upon abstract
ideals and principles such as social justice and emancipation than  community per se.
Nevertheless, there is a strong instrumentalist streak in its operations as well, and so it
involves a movement primarily to the right side of the triangle. On the vertical axis it
lies in between Luther's Beruf and medieval vocatio, as we discussed earlier, and it sees
its  operations  as  being  that  of  a  “vanguard”  within  the  university  and  society.  Its
purpose is to exert power over and harness existing institutions towards wider societal
transformation, rather than to create spaces of exception via a strategy of exodus, and
therefore can be represented by the image of the radical institution.
Finally, adherents to the school of critique are the most critical of any form of
instrumentalism, and thus joining this party entails a move downwards and far away
from the top-end of the triangle. Its idea of calling involves some elements of medieval
vocatio, but is also perhaps the closest among the five schools to the New Testament
conception  of  klesis,  with  its  critique  of  narrow  professionalism  and  a  general
orientation towards an entire way or form of life. On the horizontal axis, it straddles
somewhat precariously the middle point between  community and abstract principles,
separatism  and  vanguardism.  The  counter-cultural  aspects  of  critique  lead  to  and
presuppose a strong sense of community, but it is also a school which involves strongly-
held ideals. Thus, the image which symbolises it best, perhaps, is the student occupation.
Having  synthesised  Fish's  useful  taxonomy  with  the  theoretical  framework
which we have constructed over the course of this thesis, we are now in position where
we may may return to the question with which we began this sub-section, namely: what
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is the klesis of the university? There is sadly no single answer, for one's response to this
question depends on what one's conception of calling is, which is in turn linked to one's
relation to each of the three poles of the conceptual triad of the university. All these
complicated dynamics can be represented by where one is located on the triangular
diagram above. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that the mapping of the ideal
types in Fish's taxonomy onto the diagram are not meant to be static, unshifting points,
but rather something closer to a “home base” from which singular and collective actors
begin their work and return to. For instance, there will be those aligned to the school of
critique who choose at certain times to engage in more instrumentalist struggles.29 This
does not either invalidate the heuristic value of the diagram nor does it  necessarily
indicate a rupture in the dominant position of such actors, but in many cases simply
signals a tactical and often temporary shift.
This situation of stark plurality both in understanding the idea of klesis or calling
within the university as well as how such an idea is expressed in thought, affect and
practice may seem rather overwhelming in its unruliness. How then are we to deal with
these conflicting forces? One way of doing so is  to dip once again into the Pauline
toolbox and bring into the discussion the concept which is the necessary partner of
klesis,  namely,  charismata,  that is,  the various  charisma or  gifts  that accompany the
calling. For it is through delving into the dynamics of convergent, divergent and even
patently irreconciliable expressions of and attempts to live out the academic klesis that
we may interrogate what at first sight appears to be the meta-antinomy which runs
across and divides the pluralistic university, namely that of partiality and integration.
5.3 Partiality and Integration in a Web of Pluralism and Exclusivism
There are two opposing yet complementary ways in which denizens of the university
may manifest their respective callings. The first is the path of partiality, which involves
holding firmly to the specific perspective and approach which one feels most passionate
about,  and not allowing oneself  to be distracted or swayed by opposing viewpoints.
Despite  a  few  decades  of  postmodern  and  post-structuralist  currents  in  academic
discourse, it can be said that this is still the default mode in which most within the
university  operate.  The  second  path  is  that  of  integration,  which  involves  careful
29 An example of this would be a critical scholar who decides to enter the world of representative 
politics. Instances of this in the critical legal world include Roberto M. Unger in Brazil and, more 
recently, Costas Douzinas in Greece.
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listening and observation of the various strands of doxa and praxis in the university, and
then developing a synthesis of sorts which allows one to create a hopefully valuable if
seemingly motley blend of these elements.30 In terms of the diagram above,  we can
understand the partial approach as finding one's spot in the triangle and rooting oneself
there,  while the integrative approach involves hovering within a particular area and
staking out what is often a new point between existing positions. Hovering over these
two approaches is the possibility of a pluralist attitude, in which one may adopt either a
partial or integrative strategy, yet acknowledge that one's viewpoint does not explain
the whole of the field, and indeed value the multiplicity of expressions. The opposite of
this is, of course, an exclusivist attitude, which considers one's specific position to be the
complete  truth  or,  at  the  very  least,  very  close  to  it.  It  can  be  said  that  pluralists
recognise  that  their  personal  and  collective  stances  are  located  somewhere  on  the
triangle – or to use a common phrase,  are but part of a bigger picture.  Conversely,
exclusivists generally refuse to acknowledge that anything like the diagram exists, for it
does not fit with their vision, which sees things in one-dimensional terms of black and
white. Even they do accept that they can be placed on a particular taxonomic diagram,
they hold to the view there is in fact a correct spot on it where one should be.
Exclusivism is fairly straight-forward to practise and to preach. By contrast, a
large part of the challenge of adopting and maintaining a pluralist attitude is the fact
that the format of academic discourse favours its exclusivist “rival.” It is true that Julia
Kristeva  argues,  building  upon  the  work  of  Mikhail  Bakhtin,  that  a  text  contains
underlying capacities for “intertextuality” due to its relationship with prior, synchronic
and future texts. In her own words, a text “relat[es] communicative speech, which aims
to inform directly,  to  different  kinds of  anterior  or  synchronic utterances”  (Kristeva
1980, 36). However, the conventional academic text, considered on its own, is at the
same time a monologic, centripetal medium due to the requirement that it put forward a
unified,  non-contradictory  main  argument.  This  aspect  of  academic  texts  is  clearest
when  we  compare  them  with  the  explicitly  dialogical,  centrifugal  approach  which
Bakhtin identifies in the novel (Bakhtin 1981, 272–273), although these elements are also
present in other genres, such as the Platonic dialogue.
The fact that no piece of writing is in truth formed outside of exchanges with
30 It is important to note that this new synthesis is itself often an instance of creativity and novelty, 
rather than simply a piecing together of elements previously considered to be contradictory. The fruit 
of integration is a new thing, akin to a chemically-bonded compound rather than just a mixture.
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others living, deceased and to come nonetheless does not puncture one of the official
pretensions of academic writing, in which the formal acknowledgements offered still
stand apart from the author. And yet Bakhtin's argument that “the culture of essential
and inescapable solitude” conceals that “[t]he very being of man (both external  and
internal) is the deepest communion” (Bakhtin 1984, 287) is only one surface of a multi-
sided phenomenon. To move momentarily from Bakhtin to some of those who can be
said to extend his work, it is accurate to say that reports of the death of the author have
been greatly exaggerated, for an exaggeration necessarily presupposes an actual truth
that has been blown out of proportion. The received wisdom of post-structuralist textual
indeterminacy has not put to an end the attribution of thoughts expressed in words to
those from whom those words have come. Even if the writer is a shell filled entirely
with elements from outside, the existence of the shell cannot be done away with. Hence
Bakhtin's assertion that “[a] person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and
always on the boundary” (Bakhtin 1984, 287) misses the fact that this boundary, if semi-
porous for the most part, not infrequently closes upon itself, if only to open up again.
Hence,  there is  what appears  at  first  glance to be a meta-antinomy between
partiality and integration, which is connected to but far from identical with the leaning
towards  either  exclusivism  and  pluralism  which  lies  in  the  background.  A  closer
consideration of this dynamic, however, reveals that partiality and integration are not
diametrically opposed but are rather the two extremes of a continuum, for it is perfectly
possible to strongly favour a particular approach while accepting approaches which are
more integrative as equally valid alternatives, and vice versa. The real antinomy is, in
fact,  the  opposition  between  the  exclusivist  attitude  and  the  pluralist  attitude,  for
adherents  to  one  almost  always  consider  those  on  the  other  side  to  be  completely
mistaken.  However,  what  if  it  were  possible  to  understand  both  these  positions  as
mutually supportive when viewed from a second-order perspective?
Adopting a frame of reference that is both wider and deeper, it can be argued
that both exclusivists and pluralists have something to contribute to the university as a
totality. The passion of the former for their specific particularity or synthesis allows
them to act and speak with great decisiveness and conviction. This ties in with William
James' characterisation of a great philosopher, already quoted above, as she who sees
things “straight in [her] own peculiar way, and [is] dissatisfied with any opposite way
of  seeing  them”  (W.  James  1955,  20).  To  demand  that  such  persons  give  up  their
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singleness  of  mind,  heart  and  hand  would  be  to  deprive  us  of  their  valuable
contributions,  attained  through  the  deployment  of  –  and  even  surrender  to  –  the
powerful internal forces which drive them.
However, unflinching conviction is not the only virtue that is needed in a sphere
such the university.  The pluralist view may be caricatured by its detractors as over-
cautious, indecisive or wishy-washy, but it too has an important part to play. Especially
in situations which have become extremely polarised, the impulse which impels some to
recognise the partial truths among the various actors locked into agonistic stand-offs
can  be  remarkably  helpful.  To  use  an  everyday metaphor,  in  a  highly  oppositional
situation in which one perspective is emerging as hegemonic, the exclusivist attitude is
like  the  pedal  in  a  motorised  vehicle  which  allows  it  to  accelerate  in  a  particular
direction, while the pluralist attitude often acts as the brake pedal, which allows for a
more considered survey of one's surroundings and turning, if required, to the left, to the
right, or even around. In fact, in certain circumstances such braking is necessary to
prevent a horrendous accident. In a different situation – for instance, one which is less
polarised and more conciliatory – these roles may be reversed, and pluralism may be
the throttle while exclusivism may act as the brake pedal. Regardless of which roles are
taken up by the two attitudes in the situation concerned, it is clear that the university,
to link it by analogy to an automobile, needs both pedals in order to be driven well.
If both exclusivist and pluralist attitudes have valuable contributions to make to
the university's overall vocation, then the question on the level of a singular person or
group of persons is this: how does one choose between them? Indeed, is choice even the
right concept to deploy, given that, strictly-speaking, one does not generally decide upon
a vocation but is rather, quite often, seized by it? Following on from this, if taking an
exclusivist  or  pluralist  stance  is  a  “decision”  or  acquiescence  that  only  forms  the
backdrop to one's  expression of  the academic vocation,  how does one reconcile  the
manifold  partial  or  integrative  expressions  of  these  two  stances,  of  which  the  five
schools Fish identified are but a few ideal types? The answer to these two questions lies
in the concept which we will now delve into, namely that of charismata or gifts.
Charismata: The Counterpart which Provides Form to Klesis
When it comes to debates about the purpose and essence of the university and those
who labour within it, the temptation is to attempt to convince every other actor that
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one's specific notion and expression of the academic  klesis is the right one. However,
given that we have explored the various conflicting understandings of what having a
vocation within the university even means – from “pure” or secular Beruf, on the one
end, to New Testament klesis, on the other – such an endeavour is quite certainly futile,
for it is nearly impossible to agree upon a certain substantive content when one does
not even agree upon the form in which that content is to be contained within.
It must be emphasised that what is being advocated here is not a weakening of
one's particular positions, beliefs or practices in favour of a bland middle-of-the-road
liberalism which only admits into the terrain of dispute and decision a constricted band
of theory-affect-practice which is considered “reasonable.” Neither is it necessary for all
of us to abandon our objections to particular ideas, affects and practices of those on the
other sides of the divide. Indeed, as already stated above, it is important for there to be
some of us who resolutely refuse to entertain the possibility that conflicting perspectives
have  significant  (or  even  any)  validity.  Such  absolute  convictions  often  assist  the
rigorous development of those positions. However, it is equally important that there are
others who are willing to stand in the unstable middle ground and, when faced with
matters of great contestation, attempt to broker workable compromises between rival
groups, or at least carry the pluralist flag. For it is also crucial to note that compromise
is simply one of the many possible resolutions to a certain conflict. But perhaps one way
of summing up the heart of the matter is this: it is essential for at least certain persons
in the university to recognise the distinctive charisms of its various actors.
The term “charism” is a religious one, and comes from the Greek word charisma,
which means a “gift of grace” (Kittel and Friedrich 1985). In the Pauline tradition, this
concept is tied to that of klesis, for while the latter is universal, the former – in its plural
form,  that  is,  charismata –  provides  both singular  and particular  renderings of  that
universal  vocation  among  the  various  persons  who embrace  it.  It  can  be  said  that
charismata have both singular and particular aspects, for often life in human society
requires that persons combine their efforts and energies in collective endeavours, which
then results in the creation or affirmation of a particular charism which structures the
common life of an organisation or even a group of friends such as the Bloomsbury
Group or the Clapham Sect. Such particular charisms are rarely identical to the singular
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charism which a person experiences as developing during the course of her life, but one
clear exception can be seen in the case of a notable figure who founds an organisation
according to a particular vision which overlaps significantly with her singular one.31
Paul addresses the relation between klesis and charismata most significantly in a
text we have already referenced above, namely his First Letter to the Corinthians. To
begin with,  he recognises that he himself  has a specific constellation of  gifts  which
make up his singular charisma, and his passion for this charism can easily lead to him
wishing that all possessed it. Nonetheless, he is aware that his singular charism is not
that of everyone else. Thus he states in a passage discussing celibacy and marriage, “For
I  would  that  all  men  were  even  as  I  myself.  But  every  man  hath  his  proper  gift
[charisma] of God, one after this manner, and another after that” (1 Cor. 7:7, KJV). Paul
tempers his obvious enthusiasm for celibacy, which came from his personal experience
of  the  freedom  which  it  gave  him  to  carry  out  his  missionary  endeavours,  by
acknowledging that the merits of such a way of life do not negate those of other ways,
such as marriage. This move of Paul's is a remarkable gesture towards a pluralist stance,
even if within a rather particular frame, namely that of the Christian faith.
Thus he goes on to write that “as God hath distributed [emerisen] to every man,
as the Lord hath called [keklēken] every one, so let him walk” (1 Cor. 7:17, KJV). Bartchy
argues in an unpublished note received by the author of this thesis on 7 th July 2016 that
we should understand emerisen and keklēken not as as synonyms used by Paul to merely
underscore  a  point,  but  rather  as  two distinct  terms corresponding to,  respectively,
charismata and klesis. Citing Wolfgang Schrage's German commentary on the letter, he
also asserts  that  charismata is  bound up with one's  external  situation – that  is,  the
distinct  location and set  of  circumstances  which one finds oneself  in  – while  klesis
pertains to the essential call. It is important for us to stress that one's distinct location in
the world, whether understood as being purely contingent or imbued with some greater
sense of meaning or purpose, is always the practical starting point for any form of life.
Even in an age which elevates personal choice as one of the highest ideals, any person
who has lived for a certain number of years will recognise that there are many things in
life  which  are  beyond  the  autonomous  determination  of  a  single  person.  It  is  by
recognising this fact of overarching heteronomy that we may be able to accept that our
31 A fairly recent example of this exceptional confluence of singularity and particularity in the religious 
sphere is that of Mother Teresa and her Missionaries of Charity.
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talents and defects, our capacities and limitations, our resources and poverty, and so on,
are all in some way charismata or gifts. Given the choice, we may have not chosen some
of  these  things  for  ourselves,  yet,  whether  we  like  them or  not,  they  are  the  raw
materials with which our lives must be fashioned.
If it can be said that charismata provides forms for the living out of klesis, it is
equally  the  case  that  klesis provides  an  underlying  structure  for  the  exercise  of
charismata.  It  is,  of  course,  a  truism that  a  gift  can always  be  misused,  because  if
something is truly handed over to the use of a person, that person has the power to
utilise it for whatever she decides upon. Here is where the concept of klesis returns to
perform its role, for the actions of a person who takes on a certain calling – that is, the
exercise  of  her gifts  – can always be  measured by their  congruence with the basic
content of the essential vocation in question. Thus  charismata, far from displacing or
superseding klesis, in fact enters into a mutually-supportive relationship with it.
“That's all very well and good,” one might say, “but what does all this hullaballoo
about  klesis and  charismata  have to do beyond the sphere of Christianity,  especially
since  we  have  deconstructed  the  secular  conception  of  vocation?”  What  the  word
charismata signifies outside  its  ecclesiastical  setting and the framework of  Christian
theology is, like the existence of multiplicity we discussed above, a banality. It is widely
recognised  that  some of  us  are  or  have become better  at  certain  things than other
things, although it is also recognised that there is generally ample room for persons to
venture into activities which they do not – on the surface and according to the usual
criteria – seem to be “fitted” to. We may call the first instance “ability” and the second
“potential,” and they connect with Manuel Delanda's idea that it is not simply presently-
manifested  properties that are real,  but also latent  tendencies and  capacities (DeLanda
2013, 71). The strength of the concept of  charismata, however, lies in the fact that it,
when  paired  with  klesis,  it  holds  together  the  antinomical  poles  of  pluralism  and
exclusivism, as alternatives to mere fragmentation and/or totalitarianism.32
32 An additional objection to the deployment of the concept of charismata, from a secular perspective, is
that speaking of gifts presupposes a giver, which in the Christian references here is assumed to be 
God. Indeed, as Angus McDonald has pointed out in an exploration of “Critique as Avocation,” the 
same can be said about the idea of vocation as a calling, for historically-speaking the one who calls 
the human being to a certain thing was also a divine being (McDonald 2012). Nevertheless, this 
protest does not in any significant way challenge the use to which we have put Pauline concepts such
as klesis and charismata, for although they may have a religious origin, the empirical matters which 
they deal with – namely, stirrings towards particular and singular tasks and the certain capacities 
which tend to accompany them – are indisputable, even if they often resist easy explanation.
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Indeed, the best way of valuing the various interpretations and expressions of
the academic vocation, represented by the triangular diagram above, is to (re)conceive
them  not as  conflicting  versions  of  klesis but  rather  as  strangely  complementary
versions  of  charismata.  To  each  of  us  has  been  distributed  [emerisen]  a  singular
charisma,  which  is  far  from static  but  constantly  evolving and  developing.  It  is  by
embodying this  charisma that a person or group is able to engage in the overarching
and underlying  klesis of the university. Faced with a divisive ecclesial  community in
Corinth, Paul chose the metaphor of a body to illustrate the value of plurality:
For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am
not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the
ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore
not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If
the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? . And the eye cannot say
unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have
no need of you. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to
be more feeble, are necessary. (1 Cor. 12:14-17, 21-22, KJV)
Perhaps  the  greatest  barrier  towards  such  an  understanding  of  the  varied
expressions of vocation in the university is the fact that many of us, if scratched hard
enough, reveal (semi-)exclusivist tendencies below any surface pluralism. The metaphor
of the body simply does not work if one considers another actor to be part of  not the
wider body one is a member of but rather another body. Here the spatial aspects of the
triangle diagram are instructive,  as often one may not be entirely sectarian in one's
conceptualisation of  who is  part  of  the  same body as  oneself,  but  will  nevertheless
delimit  this  body to  a  certain  section  of  the  triangle  instead  of  embracing it  in  its
entirety.  This  is  a  less  dogmatic  and more  strategic  form of  exclusivism,  because  it
believes that collaboration with those outside one's specific area can take place on the
basis of certain congruent aims, but it remains exclusivist because clear boundaries are
maintained. Thus it is conceivable that the proponents of the school of “critique” may
make  common  cause  with  those  in  the  school  of  “revolution,”  the  “academic
exceptionalism” school or even those in the “for the common good” school, but refuse to
have anything to do with the “it's just a job” school.
We  must,  however,  return  to  the  difficult  question  which  we  have  thus  far
skirted around: can we formulate a “baseline klesis” for the university, in the manner of
the simple Christian pledge to follow Christ discussed in the preceding section? Even
despite the manifest disagreements between the various ideal types of the university
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vocation, as well as the structural contingency of the alliances and divergences between
these types which we have just discussed, it is possible to say that if we retrace the
variegated academic vocations to “ground zero,” we will find an agreement upon Fish's
description of the most basic mission of the university, namely to educate and advance
knowledge. From this starting point, many denizens of higher education have set off in
contrasting directions, which has led to inevitable differences on what educating and
advancing knowledge means and involves, and what should be added unto these basic
activities, yet at the level of bare academic praxis, there still exists this common ground.
At the day's end, this is not something to be scoffed at, but rather valued as a possible
basis for mutual recognition, if not appreciation between the various contesting sides.
At this point it is necessary for the writer to pause for a moment the impersonal
form of argumentation being pursued and make a personal declaration and admission.
In the previous chapters, we have followed a trajectory that can be said to be ultimately
partial rather than disinterested. The critique of instrumentalism and idealism in the
postwar  university  in  Chapters  Two  and  Three,  as  well  as  the  elucidation  of  the
university-in-itself  in  Chapter  Four,  are  latently  grounded  on  the  methodological
presupposition that although bracketing all  other viewpoints in order to focus one's
attention on one particular perspective is possible in part, and indeed necessary, it is
impossible to completely escape one's subjective position in the world and thus engage
in absolutely “objective” reflection. With the partial exception of this chapter, largely
hidden in the backstage of this thesis is an overarching view which is coloured by the
writer's  own  inclinations  toward  a  “feeling-centred”  approach,  that  is,  towards  the
bottom-left corner of the triangle, with the closest of the five schools being, perhaps
unsurprisingly,  that of “critique.”  Therefore,  transposing the alleged words of Martin
Luther at the Diet of Worms into what we are here considering, I am left with no choice
but to admit, “Here I stand; I can do no other.”33 For I am of course not completely
exempt from the statement in Chapter Four that “convinced proponents of one of the
three perspectives. carry their home terrain within them wherever they go and thus
instinctively reframe everything they encounter in its terms.”
Nevertheless, on the issue of exclusivism versus pluralism, my tendencies lean
33 Some more recent translations have interpreted Luther's famous statement in a manner which stress 
its propositional element. For instance, in the collection edited by Henry Scowcroft Bettenson, we 
find the first phrase translated as “On this I stand” (Bettenson 1967, 201). The traditional, and more 
literal, translation from the German “Hie stehe ich” is here preferred for its spatial connotations.
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towards the latter, and thus I am less of a “convinced proponent of one of the three
perspectives” than someone who recognises his instinctive leanings and who wishes to
moderate  them through  productive  oscillation.  However,  although  I  can  attempt  to
minimise  the  influence  of  my  partiality  in  the  last  instance,  and  briefly  enter,  for
instance,  the  world  at  the  top  of  the  triangle  where  –  at  its  most  extreme  –
instrumentalism reigns and everything is just a job, in order to grasp its underlying
logic,  it  is nonetheless for me a very difficult  operation which I  cannot  presume to
execute with complete precision or  success.  Having already critiqued the aspects of
instrumentalism which I find to be damaging, the follow-up question of whether there
is anything to be redeemed from the wider sphere in which it arose, namely, action-
centricism, needs to be addressed. However, given my residual partiality, the best that I
can do is to firstly assume, as a matter of methodology, that there is a contribution to be
made from that section of the diagram, and then do all I can to discern what it may be.
For what I am unable to fully present (much less represent), I can nevertheless posit in
principle.  That  is  to  say,  even  though  I  may  personally  be  very  much  disinclined
towards a strongly instrumentalist perspective, and may struggle to articulate its merits,
I am still convinced that the broader action-centric perspective which has brought about
this instrumentalist approach has its place within the larger whole.
It is at this point, however, that the dangers of an unreflective form of pluralism
become  apparent.  It  is  all  well  and  good  to  wish  to  include  the  action-centric
perspective  from which the rapacious instrumentalism documented  in Chapter  Two
arose, but if this is done at the expense of critically assessing the impact of such an
approach, then what we end up with is a form of insipid relativism, that is, the sort of
“equivocating” which, as we have seen, Karatani rightly excoriates (Karatani 2003b, 23).
The  underlying  search  for  truth  which  drives  exclusivism  will  be  completely
surrendered to an inclusivity-obsessed approach which masquerades behind a mask of
pluralism. Thus we would be unable to identify the misuses of  charismata which we
have already gestured toward above, because in the name of transcritical oscillation we
will have suspended the equally pertinent task of measuring a particular expression of
any of the three overarching perspectives according to the klesis of the university. True
pluralism – that is, a careful grappling with plurality – does not say, “anything goes,”
but rather, “despite our differences, let's work together for a common good.”
This leads us to a difficult question: how are we to identify when a particular
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charisma is being abused or expressed in a negative form? One way has already been
mentioned, namely to examine whether the expression is in line with the core klesis of
the university, which we have defined as to educate and advance knowledge. This is a
substantive method of  assessment.  There is  another,  more  procedural method,  which
takes as its focus the manner in which the charisma is being manifested. Although we
have said that it is sometimes acceptable and even helpful for an exclusivist approach to
be taken, when this is done in a way which not only denigrates all other perspectives
but also seeks to marginalise or even destroy them, we have a strong indication that the
klesis of the university is being lost to an out-of-control abuse of charismata. Indeed, the
hegemonic instrumentalism presently regnant in much of the university qualifies as an
instance of abuse from both substantive and procedural standpoints, for not only does it
subordinate  the  baseline  klesis of  the  university  to  non-educational  externalist  aims
grounded on  narrow economism,  it  also  fails  to  recognise  whatsoever  the  value  of
thought-centric and feeling-centric views and practices. Hence, it is not only a dominant
framework, but can also be considered as an at least incipiently totalitarian one. 
Furthermore,  the  incapacity  of  any of  us  to  encompass  the  totality  within  a
single frame of vision is simply a symptom of subjectivity and finitude. For to return
once again to a previous argument, this time from Chapter Two, we cannot but accept
Žižek's assertion that “[t]he trap to be avoided here, of course, is the naïve idea that one
should keep in view the social totality”  (Žižek 2004, 129). Adorno's captures this most
succinctly when he writes that “the whole is the false” (Adorno 2005, 50). This insight
has also been expressed in terms more down-to-earth, and indeed more applied, by G. K.
Chesterton, who in a piece entitled “History Versus the Historians” argued as follows:
No good modern historians are impartial. All modern historians are divided
into two classes – those who tell half the truth, like Macaulay and Froude,
and those who tell  none of the truth, like Hallam and the Impartials.  The
angry historians see one side of the question. The calm historians see nothing
at all, not even the question itself. (Chesterton 1958, 129)
Having said all this, in the remainder of this thesis I will attempt to explore the
practical contours of what it means to take a side and to “tell half the truth,” or perhaps
even  less  than  half.  On  the  level  of  analysis  I  am bounded  by  my own subjective
limitations – here I take humble leave of the project of Kantian objectivity – yet on the
level of meta-analysis, it is, I submit, possible to enquire into how analysis is by-and-
large done. In other words, what is to be carried out is an investigation into  process
186
Chapter 5
rather than  substance.  The central argument that I have been putting forward is that
vocational expression is a form of truth-telling, and thus a singular and existential affair,
but which, on the intermediate level of particularity, nevertheless intersects with certain
categories  which  were  explored  in  the  preceding  chapters  and  represented  in  the
triangular diagram, which we might call, somewhat inelegantly, the University Triangle.
For from this confluence we have been able to sketch what is close to a taxonomy of life
within the university, linked to the concept of vocation as conditioned by both  klesis
and charismata. In the final chapter of this thesis, in order to put some flesh on these
skeletal frameworks, we shall turn to examining how this has played out within a very
specific sphere, namely that of the British tradition of critical legal thought.
What we shall see through this “case study,” as it were, is that the concept of
charismata helps us to explore the varied responses to the question of “how is it to be
done?” where the divergent extrapolations of  klesis  beyond the baseline of education
and research mean that the old Leninist question “what is to be done?” is unable to be
answered in a straight-forward manner.34
Conclusion
We began this chapter with the question of how the various conflicting perspectives
within the space of the university may be understood in relation to each other. The
speculative gamble that was taken was to begin our enquiry at the level of singular
persons,  which required us to examine the relationship between the two circuits  of
individuality-particularity-generality  and  singularity-universality  which  Karatani  has
identified within the tradition of modern European philosophy, construed broadly. The
end-result of this examination was a hypothesis that both the realms of the particular
(or specific) and the singular should be engaged with, for where utter singularity fails to
provide any clear markers, the patterns of particularity provide possible ways forward.
Having laid out the abstract foundations of our engagement, we then moved on
to  a  consideration  of  the  concept  of  vocation  as  a  means  of  understanding  how a
singular  person or  group may arbitrate  between the subterranean tensions between
universalist  visions,  singular  lives  and  particular  categories.  An  etymological  and
historical survey of the concept in the Christian (and therefore post-Antiquity Western)
34 One source of inspiration for this formulation is a text by the Tiqqun collective, first published in 
2001 and titled “How is it to be done?” (Tiqqun 2008).
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tradition allowed us to understand the varieties of the idea from its most primitive form
of  a  baseline  klesis to  a  purely  secular  understanding  of  work,  with  the  Catholic
exaltation of the monastic path as the true fulfilment of the Christian calling as well as
the  Protestant  sacralisation  of  everyday  undertakings  lying  somewhere  in  between.
These concepts were then brought into a conversation with Stanley Fish's typology of
interpretations of the academic vocation, finally resulting in our development of the
University Triangle as a diagram which places the various conceptual threads of this
and the preceding chapters into a cohesive relational structure.
Nevertheless, our examination of Christian and academic vocation revealed more
divergences than congruences, and thus the Pauline concept of charismata or gifts was
explored as a companion to  klesis which allows for the valuing of distinct and even
seemingly conflicting understandings of the academic vocation (and, indeed, vocation in
general).  By  putting  in  place  a  methodological  axiom  that  the  various  particular
vocations explored in the preceding section are brought into complex and potentially
enriching  configurations  via  the  operations  of  partiality  and  integration  as  well  as
exclusivism and pluralism, we were able to assert that these organising categories of the
singular gifts which are the possession of the various actors in the university should not
be  summarily  dismissed  as  inferior  or  misguided.  Nevertheless,  we  ended  with  an
acknowledgement that a comprehensive view of the totality is unavailable to any of us
as a singular being, and thus the best that can be done is to engage with the facts of
plurality and otherness while steadfastly telling the truth of one's singular vocation.
Having explored these issues on a theoretical level, it now behoves us to ground
the predominantly abstract analysis of this chapter within a specific context within the
university. Thus, in the next and final chapter we shall take as a particular case study
the  tale  of  European critical  legal  thought,  mapping the  various  sub-cultures  of  its
expressions of critique with the assistance of the University Triangle via a consideration
of  certain  texts  and  thinkers.  This  exercise  will  allow  us  to  see  how  the  neat
formulations we have been dealing with have to be qualified and contextualised when
dealing with such specificities, in a test of the interpretive validity and utility of the
framework which we have constructed. However, our entry into the case study will be
preceded by a preparation of the ground via an examination of the partiality of any
triadic understanding within a particular thinker or body of work.
188
Chapter 6
Test-driving the Vocational Hypothesis:
The Conceptual Triad in British Critical Legal Thought
“There is something in critique which is akin
to virtue.”
(Foucault 1997, 25)
In a September 2012 post on the  Critical Legal Thinking blog, one of the few Web 2.0
outlets dedicated specifically to the tradition of European critical legal thought, Gilbert
Leung reflects on the 30th Critical Legal Conference (CLC) which had taken place earlier
that month. Hosted by the KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Leung
quotes the organiser as saying that the institute has no law department, nor does it
confer law degrees, but this “in a way makes it the ideal place to hold a legal conference
whose very identity, to put it euphemistically, seems forever in question” (Leung 2012).
He  then  makes  reference  to  a  debate  which  erupted  on  the  website  prior  to  the
conference  about  the  CLC's  purpose,  its  relevance  or  irrelevance,  and  indeed  what
critique really means, before relating an anecdote from the final plenary session. Angus
McDonald, a stalwart of the CLC since the late 1980s, delivered a paper on “Critique as
Avocation,” and during the question time which followed, was asked by a newcomer if
he “could help her out of the general 'confusion' in which the conference had left her”
(Leung 2012). McDonald's muted response was simply: “I can't help you” (Leung 2012).
I begin this final chapter with these allusions to confusion, identity crises and
restless searching for purpose because it is part of the everyday experience of many in
the contemporary university, and is thus foundational for this very thesis. In the last
chapter I have endeavoured to provide, through the discussion of the various forms of
klesis and charismata that presently exist in the sphere of British higher education, an
organisational  key to make some sense of the generally decentred, even tumultuous
state  of  things.  In this  chapter,  we shall  examine how the triadic conception of  the
university can be utilised as a practical tool of analysis in two rather different settings.
In  the  first  section,  we  examine  how the  triad  in  its  most  general  form –  namely
thought-centricism, action-centricism and feeling-centricism – allows us to understand
the ultimately partial triadic conceptions such as that of Kant himself.  In the second
section,  we  will  take  the  specific  case  of  British/European  critical  legal  theory  to
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demonstrate how the general form of the triad interacts with the University Triad of
instrumentalism,  idealism  and  community.  The  particular  sphere  of  the
British/European  Critical  Legal  Conference  will  thus  act  as  an  intermediate  space
between these two triadic conceptualisations,  revealing the dynamics between them.
6.1     The Partiality of Triads
In the last section of Chapter One, we explored the triadic discursive-practical structure
of the university in terms of both the constitution of each element of the triad as well
as,  in  outline,  the  relations  between  them.  It  was  argued  that  each  question  arises
through  the  bracketing  or  temporary  suspension  of  the  other  two  questions.  This
operation can be said to be the underlying cause of the inability of those who primarily
employ one  of  the  three  perspectives  to comprehend the standpoints  of  those  who
generally opt for either of the other two. Indeed, for some, the perspective they favour
contracts their field of vision so acutely that they cannot conceive of any other valid
view.  This  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  they  simply  deny the  existence  of  other
perspectives, nor that they never oscillate into viewing the university from them, but
rather  that  these  other  perspectives  are  seen as  deficient  in  “value”  or  “truth.”  The
terrain that they choose to fight from – instrumentalism, idealism or community – very
easily becomes the only terrain that they admit as permissible for engagement.
This territorial  analogy is,  however,  imperfect in that it  may mislead us into
thinking that convinced proponents of one of the three perspectives refuse to venture
from their home terrain. It is rather the case that they carry their home terrain within
them wherever they go and thus automatically reframe everything they encounter in its
terms. Hence, the idealist does not deny the need for practical decisions, but approaches
them  in  a  resolutely  idealist  fashion,  such  as  with  Kant's  categorical  imperative;
likewise, the instrumentalist is able to converse about principles, but derives them from
utilitarian  calculations  and  empirical  observations.  Nevertheless,  such  one-sided
manoeuvres are never without contradictions and incongruences, because as Karatani
points  out,  “[w]hen  one  seeks  to  explain  everything  from  one  and  the  same
positionality, one is inexorably confronted by antinomy” (Karatani 2003b, 41).
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis to enquire deeply into how or why
any person or group comes to prefer – or, indeed, have an orientation towards – one (or,
at most, two) of the three perspectives in the triad. To carry out such an investigation
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adequately would require us to delve into spheres such as psychology and sociology
which, while not unrelated to this present study, are nonetheless sufficiently distinct
from it that any treatment of these issues would distract more than it would enlighten.
After  all,  it  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  establish  a  link  between a  person's  individual
propensities towards specific modes of thought, feeling and action and the substantive
views which she puts forward. It is sufficient for our purposes to identify the wider
pattern of her engagement through an examination of the arguments made. Hence, with
one key exception, the questions of how and why will be bracketed even as we focus on
what exactly this dynamic entails and what could we do in light of such understanding.1
The Ultimate Partiality of Kant's Architectonic
Although the initial  analogous triad upon which the conceptual  triad of  the  British
university has been elaborated so far in this thesis has been drawn from the philosophy
of Kant, it is important to emphasise that Karatani himself identifies its recurrence in
various  theoretical  triads  since  Kant,  most  prominently  in  Lacan's  triptych  of  the
Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, but also – albeit with less elaboration – in Marx
and Nietzsche (Karatani 1995b, xlii).2 In his words: “The fact that Kant's triadic concept
is replaceable with different triads indicates that it forms a kind of structure that can be
grasped transcendentally” (Karatani 1995b, xliii).
In the section titled “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” in his First  Critique,
Kant argues that it is necessary to practise architectonics, or “the art of constructing a
system,” because “[w]ithout systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it
will be an aggregate, and not a system”  (Kant 1990, 466). Although in the preceding
chapters  our  discussion  of  this  triad  has  been  grounded  primarily  upon  Karatani's
reading of Kant's architectonic, it should be recognised that Kant himself was not free
from  his  own  individual  perspective,  which  can  be  categorised  as  an  instance  of
thought-centric thought, as distinct from  action-centric or  feeling-centric thought. This
1 It should be noted, however, that these questions of how and why are most worthy of closer 
examination by those who wish to take them up. Even those who are the most disdainful of 
psychologisms or sociologisms in such an area cannot deny the everyday experience, whether banal 
or profound, of being more attracted to particular directions in thought, feeling and action.
2 In an interview with Joel Wainwright, published in 2012, Karatani responds to a question on whether 
“Marx’s value form theory” can be regarded “as an explicit reiteration of Kant’s triadic structure” by 
first gesturing toward his bringing together of the Kantian and Lacanian triads, before stating that 
commodities can be considered as akin to the real, value-form to the symbolic and money to the 
imaginary (Karatani and Wainwright 2012, 33).
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partiality makes his conceptual triad or architectonic less “universal,” scientific or pure
than he and his followers, past and present, might have believed.
In prosaic,  everyday terms, each element in the conceptual triad is necessary
because all of us have an approach to the three dimensions of life which it describes:
firstly, how we interact with the outer world, that is, our day-to-day  doing; secondly,
how we engage with ideas as well as employ them to understand the world, that is, our
mechanisms of  thinking; and thirdly, how we deal with the unruly dimensions of life
which  escape  both  practical  action  and  conceptual  cognition,  which  is  captured  by
terms such as affect, emotion, prehension or simply feeling.
Here we may find a link, albeit not an entirely straight-forward one, to the three
Neoplatonic “transcendentals” deriving from Antiquity but formally established during
the Renaissance, namely, goodness, truth and beauty.3 These three transcendentals, of
course,  connect  directly  to  Kant's  three  Critiques,  which  examined  each  in  turn,
beginning with truth, then goodness and finally beauty. In an exchange in 2013 with
Korean literary critic, Kim Uchang, Karatani carries out a very concise genealogy of the
three transcendentals as they have developed in competition with each other through
the centuries, forming what he termed “intellectual, ethical and sensible approaches”
(Kim and Karatani 2014, 182). He points out that at different points in time and space,
one (or  sometimes two)  of  these  three approaches have been regarded with greater
favour.  The  sensible  approach  which  approaches  the  world  through  beauty  has
generally been considered “inferior,” but there have been times and places where it has
become ascendent, such as Japan in the Heian period and with the Romanticism that
emerged in the West in the wake of Kant (Kim and Karatani 2014, 182). In the Occident,
Romanticism was followed by realism in literature, marking the return of truth and the
intellectual approach to a central position, before Socialism, which was a secular form
of morality, came onto the scene to indicate a new rise of the ethical approach (Kim and
Karatani 2014, 182). The dynamics of these complex shifts between intellectual, ethical
3 The Italian Neoplatonic philosopher Marsilio Ficino is regarded as the first to distill this tripartite 
formulation of the transcendentals from the discord of debates through the centuries. In The Philebus 
Commentary, published in 1496, he writes, “So the action of the intelligence is directed to some end. 
For in so far as it understands, its end is the truth; in so far as it wills, its end is the good; in so far as 
it acts, its end is the beautiful” (Ficino 1975, 78). Although Ficino uses the word “acts” to describe the 
activity of the intelligence with regards to the beautiful, we should understand this less as an instance
of physical activity in the world, and more in the generic sense in which aesthetics is concerned with 
judging impressions which have a sensuous dimension. Kant himself, in a 1772 letter to his student, 
Marcus Herz, spoke of “the universal principles of feeling, taste, and sensuous desire” (Kant 1998a, 
47).
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and sensible stances constitute, in effect, the history of relations between humans and
other beings and objects in the world, as well as within human societies.
At  this  point  it  is  important  to  note  the  fuzziness  of  divisions  between the
approaches,  particularly  the  intellectual  and the ethical,  especially  when connecting
them with the categories of thinking and acting. In Kant's system, for example, practical
action is governed by the faculty of reason, and thus one's acting has to proceed through
rational principles. On the other hand, the search for truth takes place for Kant within
the domain of phenomena or sensible nature, and so one's thinking is far from divorced
from the world. In other words, each approach pre-supposes and is sustained by the
other. Just as a point of contrast, in a different system that privileges direct experience,
the guiding thread of acting would not be reason but perhaps a embodied life-force, and
thus under such a paradigm ethics would be linked to something akin to libido.
 Likewise, if we consider the sphere of the postwar British university we can see
that the patent antagonism between instrumentalism and idealism masks their mutual
contamination. For there is a sense in which a hidden residue of instrumentalism lies at
the heart of the most vigorous forms of idealism, and vice versa. What this means is that
there is, strictly-speaking, no such thing as a “pure” form of either perspective, but that
each  is  penetrated  by  the  other,  resulting  in  the  silent  subsistence  of  undercover
elements at the core of that which may appear at first glance to be unadulterated. That
is to say, bracketing is an artificial operation involving ordering, rather than a simple
“accessing” of cleanly-delineated spheres which are, as it were, already “there.”
Nevertheless, the semi-porousness of the borders between the domains does not
override the fact that particular philosophies tend to privilege one of them. For instance,
a thought-centric system of thought such as Kant's subsumes the other two domains of
action and feeling under the rubric of thinking. Although Karatani does not himself
make  this  point  –  and  it  is  uncertain  that  he  would  agree  with  it,  given  his  own
secondary  thinking-centred  sympathies  which  aligns  partially  with  Kant's4 –  he
nonetheless  recognises  that  Kant's  critique  reshaped  what  was  meant  by  scientific
thought, morality and the arts. In his words, “before and after Kant the categorisation of
4 Karatani's thinking-centred leanings are evident in his consistent advocacy of universality and 
singularity over communal (i.e. subjectivist and particular) perspectives. However, it can be argued 
that his primary approach is an action-centric one, which can be discerned from his recurring 
emphasis on the ethical as well as politics. In his dialogue with Kim Uchang, for instance, he laments 
the historical bias towards aesthetics (i.e. feeling-centricism) in Japan and appears to admire the 
political stance of contemporary Koreans, opining: “[W]e need to become more political in Japan” 
(Kim and Karatani 2014, 187).
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scientific thoughts, moralities and the arts was totally altered” (Karatani 2003b, 35).
Hence, for instance, we find that Kant's ethical prescriptions for acting in the
world – in his own words, his practical  reason – is based not upon a consideration of
concrete reality, which for Kant is only accessible to humans in the mediated form of
phenomena, given that things-in-themselves are obscured from us, but rather upon the
pure principles derived through the faculty of reason, which deals not with the sensible
or nature but rather the suprasensible (or supersensible) (Kant 1996, 178). The question,
“How are we to act?” receives the response, “In accordance to the maxims which your
exercise of reason has led you to legislate for yourself, and if you wish to be moral –
that is, truly free from your tempestuous desires – according to only the maxims which
you are able to will to be universal laws.”
Here  it  should  also  be  noted  that  Kant's  thought-centric  architectonic  has  a
strongly pseudo-juridical  flavour,  as is  obvious from the distinctly legal  terminology
which he constantly  employs.5 The cognitive  faculties  of  reason,  understanding and
judgment are  law-givers for  the  faculties  of  the  soul,  namely desire,  knowledge and
feeling (Kant  1986,  16–17).  Each  faculty  in  the  first  triad  has  its  corresponding
jurisdiction in  the  second  triad  (Nuzzo  2005,  127).  Kant's  injunction  to  follow  the
exercise of reason in one's moral conduct extends also to his political theory. In the
words of the post-colonial theorist and anthropologist Talal Asad: “It was Kant who
replaced the model of the 'republic of letters' with another model: the 'court of reason'”
(Asad 2009, 50). Against the focus of the republic of letters upon the egalitarian mental
jousting  between  ideas  and  their  progenitors,  Kant's  court  of  reason  posited  the
possibility and indeed superiority of rational critique – that is to say, the elevation of a
philosophical  science  over  literary  rhetoric  (Asad  2009,  49–50).  We might  even say,
borrowing a distinction which Cornel West invokes in contrasting Plato and American
pragmatism,  that  this  results  in  the  return  of  “objective”  epistēmē to  triumph  over
“subjective” doxa (West and Brown 1993, S163).
Indeed, the rational law-giver is the centre of Kantian political life. As Asad puts
it,  “In  Kant’s  political  philosophy  it  is  law,  not  critique,  that  ends  the  chaos  of
5 It is important to note, however, that in The Metaphysic of Morals, Kant distinguishes between what 
he calls the juridical and the ethical aspects of morality. The former is “directed merely to external 
actions and their conformity to law” whereas the latter “also require[s] that they (the laws) 
themselves be the determining grounds of actions” (Kant 1991, 42). In this manner Kant reserves the 
term juridical for the sphere of external laws. Bearing this distinction of his in mind, as we shall see, 
his repeated invocation of legal words and phrases can nevertheless be said to provide what we term 
here a “pseudo-juridical flavour” to his philosophical system.
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metaphysics and holds the corrosive effects of skepticism in check. And its concern is
no longer with mundane life but with epistemology” – that is, political action is not
grounded upon immediate experience but rather with the true (Asad 2009, 50, italics in
original).  Ironically-enough, what we may term the “will to law” is at work even in
many critical legal theorists who would disclaim any lineage to the Kantian project, but
who in their focus on legality ultimately elevate law and its underlying rationalism –
even if deconstructed and/or de-centred to almost a-rational forms – over ethics, politics
or art. This can be contrasted, for instance, to critical legal theorists who elevate ethics
and politics over law, creating an action-centric rather than a thought-centric account of
the relationship between the juridical and other spheres of life. Finally, there are critical
legal theorists who adopt an aesthetic stance, taking as their primary source aspects of
the world which stimulate feeling, such as literature and visual art. These divisions will
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
Having just  mentioned  the  aesthetic  stance,  it  is  important  for  us  to  briefly
examine Kant's thought-centric approach to this very question of aesthetics, in order
that we might see the effects of his particular perspective in this sphere.6 We have seen
how Kant's architectonic necessitates a turn away in the sphere of practical action from
empirical experience to the categorical imperative – the maxim which can be willed as a
universal law –  as the bearer of objective morality. In the aesthetic component of his
triadic system we find a similar concern for the universal as the guarantor of an exercise
of human rationality, in order that aesthetic judgment may be designated as a higher
human  faculty,  that  is,  together  with  understanding  and  reason  and  above  that  of
sensibility. In his Analytic of the Beautiful, it is clear Kant appreciates that empirical
agreement  by  everyone  upon  matters  of  taste  –  that  is,  general  agreement  –  is
impossible.  Nevertheless,  he  posits  that  an  instance  of  proper  exercise  of  taste  is
universal, in that it demands the assent of all to its judgment. In his own words:
The judgement of taste itself does not  postulate the agreement of everyone
(for it is only competent for a logically universal judgement to do this, in that
it  is  able  to  bring  forward  reasons);  it  only  imputes this  agreement  to
everyone,  as  an  instance  of  the  rule  in  respect  of  which  it  looks  for
confirmation,  not  from concepts,  but from the concurrence of  others.  The
6 It is crucial to note, however, that Kant does not use the word “aesthetics” for the domain of sensuous
beauty which we are discussing here, preferring the term “taste.” In a footnote in the First Critique he 
states that “[t]he Germans are the only ones who now employ the word 'aesthetics' to designate that 
which others call the critique of taste” (Kant 1998a, 156). Instead, he reserves the word “aesthetics” for
its etymological and classical sense, that is, for sensuous perception.
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universal  voice  is,  therefore,  only  an  idea  —  resting  upon  grounds  the
investigation of which is here postponed. (Kant 1986, 56, italics in original)
As Karatani points out with regards to the original German, “postulieren [i.e. to
postulate] means to assume as self-evident, while  ansinnen [i.e. to impute] means to
make an (unreasonable) request or demand” (Karatani 2003b, 38). Or as Michael Wayne
puts it, “We accord the aesthetic judgment a certain universal validity  as if it were a
logical objective judgment, when in fact it is merely a subjective one, but one which
[nonetheless] escapes private and individualistic subjectivity” (M. Wayne 2014, 96). This
elegant (if somewhat questionable) operation ensures that within the Kantian system,
judgments of taste are lifted to an idealistic, “rational” and universal plane, despite their
manifest difference from what other theoretical systems may consider as rationality.
In summary, it can be said that in order to fully benefit from Kant's architectonic,
we have to recognise its limits and limitations, particularly its bias towards reason or
thinking, which leads to the recasting of both the spheres of acting and feeling within a
rational mould. Nevertheless, the great strength of Kant's system is its underlying drive
towards  comprehensiveness  and  internal  coherence.  Although  it  is  ultimately  (and
indeed inevitably) unable to cut itself  off completely from its  thought-centricism, its
valiant persistence according to the “will to architecture” – a term used by Karatani to
denote “the will to construct an edifice of knowledge on a solid foundation” that he
considers the “foundation of Western thought” (Karatani 1995b, xxxii, xxxv) – makes it
one of the deepest explorations of the conceptual triad within the Occidental canon.
Finally,  however,  it  must be noted that to point out Kant's  over-emphasis on
reason is not to abandon reason itself in toto. Karatani is right to argue that “[a]s Kant
has shown, the critique of reason, or the critique of its grounding that is caused by the
constitutive use of reason, cannot be made but by reason”  (Karatani 2008b, 593). Here
we may gain some insight  from the work of  the  cultural  historian Morris  Berman,
whose book  Wandering God criticises  what  he calls  the  “dominant  tradition” in the
West,  a  tradition which privileges logic  and form over process,  matter and paradox
(Berman  2000,  208–209).  However,  discussing  the  evolution  of  Wittgenstein's
philosophy, which Berman perceives as moving from a logic-centred system with some
concessions to process in the early years to one embracing paradox, he argues that, even
in  Wittgenstein's  later  work,  the  philosopher  “never  completely  left  the  [dominant
tradition] because it is this form of intellectual transcendence that makes any rational
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discourse and analysis. possible,” including Berman's own book  (Berman 2000, 211–
212). Hence, what we began in Chapter Five and continue here can be regarded as a
contribution to the Kantian exploration of “the boundaries or limits of human subjective
faculties”  (Karatani 2003b, 34),  not ignoring the more severe critiques of rationalism
arising from traditions such as  Romanticism,  postmodernism and post-structuralism,
but weighing them up in light of the present moment and specific context.
6.2 The Triadic University Meets British/European Critical Legal Theory
In the previous chapter, we explored the question of identifying singular expressions of
academic  vocation,  which  even  so  contain  strivings  towards  universality,  within  a
general context of a plurality in which particular patterns can be identified. Much of this
was at a relatively high level of abstraction, and thus in this section our attention will
shift to articulating how these singular vocations play out within a more circumscribed
context. The “case study” that has been chosen is that of critical legal studies in the
European tradition, as it will allow us to see, at a level closer to the ground, how a
particular ideal type of academic klesis – in this case, the school of “critique” – interacts
with its surroundings, as depicted in the University Triangle.
Nevertheless, it would be far too ambitious to attempt a comprehensive survey
of  the entire “BritCrit”  tradition within the constrained space of  this  portion of  the
chapter, and so what has become necessary is to delimit the territory being covered.
Accordingly, although the discussion to come involves narrative elements, we will in
general  focus  our  attention  on  selected  texts  which  put  forward  arguments  which
display strong tendencies towards one of the three corners of the triangle, while not
losing sight  of  the  fact  that  the  location of  the  “home base”  of  critique  within the
diagram, that is, towards its bottom, restricts the range of movement those who begin
there. For example, even the most action-centric of such writings will not soar to the
diagrammatic heights which may be achieved with a resolutely instrumentalist starting
point, or even one which commences at the central point of “the common good.” It is
also  worth  noting,  however,  that  in  this  exercise  the  centripetal  and  monologic
tendencies of academic writing which we have discussed are an advantage, as where
even a focus on specific authors would be difficult due to the evolutionary character of
the thought of most thinkers, the medium of a text written at a certain time and place
and to a certain audience is able to display its leanings toward one (or two) of the poles.
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In addition, at this point it is essential for us to note, as was argued above with
reference to Morris  Berman, that it  is  impossible to engage in rational  discourse or
analysis without at least partially embedding oneself in what he calls the “dominant
tradition” which privileges logic and reason. Thus, any attempt to examine the impact of
our conceptual triad in critical legal writing will have to engage with texts which are far
from the best exemplars of action-centrism or feeling-centrism, for the most developed
and refined cases of these viewpoints are not found in academic discourse, but rather in
more embodied spheres such as activism and artistic production.
Finally,  the  terms  British and  European critical  legal  theory  are  used  here
interchangeably,  for  lack  of  better  adjectives,  because  even  though  the  tradition  of
critical legal thought which is being addressed is in fact not limited to the British isles
but  rather  has  involved  comrades  in  Europe  and  even  beyond,  it  is  nevertheless  a
phenomenon which revolves around an academic conference that began in and still
finds its (non-institutional) centre in the United Kingdom.7 This is the British Critical
Legal Conference, better known to its regular participants as simply “the CLC,” the first
of which was held in 1985 at the University of Kent. Since then it has made occasional
travels to places as far-flung as India and South Africa, but has generally taken place in
the United Kingdom or, regularly yet less frequently, in different parts of continental
Europe.  Of course,  there  are undoubtedly those who are  influenced by and,  indeed,
practitioners of this tradition of critical  legal  thinking without being regulars at  the
yearly  conferences,  yet  the  CLC  still  acts  as  a  key  physical  manifestation  of  the
movement which, in a brief history of the conference written by Costas Douzinas, one
of its stalwarts from the earliest days, is described as “a school of thought committed to
a plurality of theoretical approaches to law and radical politics” (Douzinas 2014, 189).8
Douzinas' use of the word “plurality” in the description just cited is instructive
as it is true that unlike the American equivalent of the CLC, the Conference for Critical
7 In 1987 it was still possible for Peter Fitzpatrick and Alan Hunt to remark that although “[t]here are 
considerable variations in the style, focus and method of work produced under the label of 'critical 
legal studies' . [c]ritical legal scholarship has not formed clearly delineated 'national' varieties” 
(Fitzpatrick and Hunt 1987, 1). Within less than a decade this statement was no longer an easy one to 
make, with the increasing distance between the approaches taken on different sides of the Atlantic, 
even though these divergences were more along regional rather than strictly national lines.
8 We have made reference in Chapter Four to the minimalist institutionalism of the CLC as described 
by Douzinas. Aside from the absence of any functionaries or committees, we flagged its nature as 
“just a conference, an ‘inoperative community’, a broad church that exists for 3 days once a year and 
goes into abeyance once it is over.” Thus, “each year the conference decides the place and organisers 
for the next meeting, leaving it to its organisers to put together the programme” (Douzinas 2014, 189).
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Legal Studies, which effectively disbanded itself after a rancourous meeting in 1994 at
Georgetown University in which the “old Marxists guard” left in protest at the emerging
dominance of those engaged in the “critique of difference”  (Douzinas 2014, 193), the
British manifestation of the movement has managed to largely hold together despite not
insignificant  divergences  in  theoretical-practical  concerns  amongst  its  participants.
Nevertheless, this “broad church,” to use a term from Douzinas' article, is quite similar
to the institution from which the very term originates, namely the Church of England.
As with “the C of E,” polite, formal unity conceals a multitude of divisions from the
usual personal rivalries to full-scale accusations of betraying the cause, that is to say,
“heresy” (often intoned  sotto voce in casual conversation but also not infrequently in
more  strident  writing  and  speech),  which  occasionally  result  in  the  breaking  of
fellowship, although in less formal terms than the organisational concept of “schism.” It
is these divisions which we are concerned to outline, in order to see whether it is indeed
possible to value the contributions of the various parties rather than simply to tolerate
them as misguided (if sincere) views, or whether nothing short of a Puritan attitude is
ultimately the lot of many of the BritCrits.
The three main directions which the vocation of critique has been taken within
the British critical legal tradition can be named as follows: firstly, action-centric politics;
secondly,  thought-centric  law  and  ethics;  and  thirdly,  feeling-centric  aesthetics.
Throughout  the  movement's  history  each  of  these  sub-cultures  have  been  present,
although at different points one or more of them have come to the fore. Here it is worth
noting that these divisions echo in part Perry Anderson's argument in Considerations on
Western Marxism that leftist movements in Europe have generally moved in a trajectory
which  goes  from  traditional  proletarian  political  struggles,  to  a  retreat  into  the
theoretical seclusion of universities (the style of which begins with the work of Gramsci
and  Benjamin),  and  finally  to  a  concern  with  aesthetics  and  the  study  of  culture
(Anderson 1979, 89, 92–93). Peter Goodrich has applied this analysis to the development
of critical legal studies, referring to it as the movement “from practice to melancholia to
aesthetics” (Katyal, Goodrich, and Tushnet 2013, 604). Goodrich's historical argument is
broadly true of critical legal thinking if treated as a global phenomenon. However, from
a more parochial perspective, it can be asserted that the full emergence of the BritCrit
tradition in the form of the CLC during the mid-1980s took place at the stage where the
more overtly political focus on practice was in decline, institutionalist melancholia had
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settled  in,  and  a  certain  form  of  aesthetics  was  on  the  rise.  Since  then,  there  has
arguably been a movement in the opposite direction where, despite all three strands
remaining active,  the  focus  has  shifted  back to  politics  after  a  sojourn through the
terrain  of  more  idealist  conceptions  of  law  which  are  often  fairly  well  attuned  to
institutionalised existence. We shall examine the three sub-cultures according to this
broad chronology of the European tradition, that is, from aesthetics to politics via law.
However, before we depart on our very swift aerial journey, it is necessary to
make a brief note of the broader history of critical legal studies (CLS), already alluded to
above,  before  its  British  arm took  off  in  a  real  way.  In  an  article  written  in  1991,
American CLS scholar Mark Tushnet gives the following account of its beginnings:
The origins of critical legal studies as a political location are relatively easy to
identify. In early 1976 David Trubek returned from a trip to Cambridge [in
Massachusetts] and told me that he had spoken with Duncan Kennedy.9 They
had agreed that there were a number of people doing academic studies of law
that seemed to have certain common themes, and that it might be useful to
gather these people, and a few others, to see whether that perception was
accurate. The themes dealt with questions of ideology in ways that seemed
compatible with the traditional focus on “law and society” at the University
of Wisconsin Law School, yet concentrated on legal doctrine in ways that
seemed compatible with more mainstream approaches to legal scholarship. If
that perception were correct, the thought was, some sort of organizational
locus for that intellectual work would be useful.10 (Tushnet 1991, 1523)
There were from the start  numerous expressions of  this  common intellectual
work, but “[t]hese themes converged in the programmatic statement that law is politics,
all the way down” (Tushnet 1991, 1526). This assertion was not the more quotidian one
whereby “we can talk about identifiably liberal and conservative positions on various
issues in the law, ranging from affirmative action to strict liability versus negligence,”
but rather one which “saw law as a form of human activity in which political conflicts
were  worked  out  in  ways  that  contributed  to  the  stability  of  the  social  order
('legitimation') in part by constituting personality and social institutions in ways that
came to seem natural” (Tushnet 1991, 1526). These statements sum up the first stage of
CLS, which intersected with the slightly older tradition of law and society “where the
9 Details of the relationship between Trubek and Kennedy as well as other early events can be found in
Schlegel 1984, which is a much less clinical treatment of the early history of the CLS movement.
10 Tushnet goes on to remark that “[e]ven at the start there was some sense that a relatively formal 
structure was needed to provide the location for the academic activities that Trubek had referred to, 
and we developed a list of 'steering committee' members to put on the letterhead” (Tushnet 1991, 
1523). This characteristic of the American CLS movement stands in stark contrast to the British one, 
which, as already noted in a footnote above, prides itself in having no such formal structure, but 
rather manifesting as an “inoperative community” that simply convenes for three days every year.
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legal Marxists were originally located,” before moving “from practice, from radical and
rebellious  lawyering,  from  confronting  authority,  to  institutionalization”  (Katyal,
Goodrich, and Tushnet 2013, 604). Goodrich recounts the phase of institutionalisation,
where CLS scholars rose in the academy, as one where “they taught, they published,
[and] forged links with the outside of the law school and with its temporal other, the
next generation of scholars and students” (Katyal, Goodrich, and Tushnet 2013, 604).
Although  the  temporalities  of  the  American  and  European  critical  legal
traditions are, strictly-speaking, parallel and therefore subject to distinct, uneven and
discontinuous  developments,  there  have  nonetheless  been  certain  combined  and
resonant effects over the years. Hence, the developments in the 1980s and 1990s within
the European scene can be seen as both an extension of and a response to earlier as well
as concurrent developments within its American counterpart. With all this in mind, we
may now proceed  to  discuss  the first  phase  of  the  European critical  legal  tradition
according to Douzinas, that is, the one which was dominated by “aesthetics.”
Aesthetics
In his article on the history of the CLC, Douzinas describes the fifth conference which
was held in 1989 at the University of Newcastle:
It was something of a watershed. Peter Rush gave a performance: without
speaking he walked around and danced to a pre-recorded set of comments
and music. Ronnie Warrington, Shaun McVeigh, Peter Goodrich and myself
performed a play entitled “Suspended Sentences” . Kate Green and Hilary
Lim organised  an open  debate  with  the  audience  about  women and law,
someone played the bagpipes. It was the high point of what can be called the
“aesthetic turn” in critical legal theory. (Douzinas 2014, 190)
Douzinas attributes this turning point in European critical legal theory to the
wider political conjuncture, with the collapse of the Berlin wall and, with it, much of the
“[o]ld  radical  certainties,  Marxist  dogmas  [and]  aspirations  of  radical  sociology and
criminology”  (Douzinas  2014,  190).  Many  of  the  early  BritCrits,  in  contrast  to  the
aforementioned old Marxist guard of American CLS and their European counterparts,
schooled  themselves  in  different  intellectual  lineages,  particularly  post-Marxism and
poststructuralism, and were thus more conversant in philosophy, psychoanalysis and
aesthetics than sociology, criminology and economics (Douzinas 2014, 191). As a result,
in the aftermath of a political defeat for the left similar in scale to that which was faced
by Benjamin and Gramsci with the rise of fascism, and which had brought about the
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first wave of left-wing melancholy in the twentieth century (Anderson 1979, 89–90), the
gaze of these British critics was turned upon issues relevant to and deploying the tools
of deconstruction and hermeneutics, psychoanalysis and semiotics. The textual methods
of European continental  philosophers were used to trace the “omissions,  repressions
and distortions, signs of the oppressive power and symptoms of the traumas created by
the institution” of law and legality, among them “racism, patriarchy [and] economic
exploitation” (Douzinas 2014, 190).
Such was the historical constellation which drove British critical legal thinking
at the time, but underlying this phase was what we may understand as a feeling-centric
turn towards community. The very fact that deep bonds of comradeship and solidarity
were forged among relatively isolated and even institutionally-ostracised critical legal
thinkers, through the deepening of the foundations of a non-substantialist  community
such as the Critical Legal Conference, was a display of longing for a communal spirit in
the  wake  of  disillusionment  with  its  twentieth-century  substantialist  expressions.
Returning  to  the  University  Triangle,  the  CLC  can  also  be  understood  as  a  key
manifestation of a certain separatist  mentality,  for if the pre-existing legal academic
associations could not  assimilate  the “Crits,”  it  was only natural  that  an alternative
forum be found(ed) for these (semi-)outcasts.11
Once a particular academic wave or trend subsides,  it  is often only the most
dedicated who steadfastly remain with what was for many a non-permanent obsession.
In  the  case  of  the  aesthetic  turn  in  British  critical  legal  thought,  the  turn  of  the
millenium saw a steady decline in the use of deconstructive parentheses and puns, but
the  province  of  feeling-centric  concerns  such  as  community,  beauty,  art,  virtue,
materiality  and  creation  continues  to  be  the  primary  abode  for  certain  scholars.
Moreover, there are always new ones who arrive within its boundaries to set up camp,
and who might settle down if the territory proves to be a congenial place for them.
How are we to recognise such legal aesthetes? Perhaps one place to start is to
examine one of the central preoccupations of feeling-centred thought which we have
just mentioned, and indeed have explored at some length in Chapter Four, namely the
question of community. Here the work of Adam Gearey, who has drawn widely from
aesthetic philosophy and literary sources to interrogate various issues of law and the
11 The same can be argued for other BritCrit institutions which came into being around this time, 
including the Law and Critique journal, established in 1990, and Birkbeck Law School, the first 
academic outfit to be founded explicitly upon critical legal values, in 1992.
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political from his early monograph Law and Aesthetics (Gearey 2001) onwards, is quite
instructive. For example, in his recent work on welfare, he argues for a realignment of
thinking  on  welfare  rights  which,  while  tactically  adapting  themes  from  Rawslian
liberalism and communitarianism which “are useful to our project”  (Gearey 2015, 4),
takes as an alternative starting point the concept of solidarity (Gearey 2015, 2).
Gearey admits that solidarity has become a tricky term to deploy, not least of all
because  of  the  presently  regnant  discourse  in  the  area  which  considers  those  “on
welfare” – or, in British terminology, “benefits” – as “scroungers or 'chavs',” that is, “an
underclass who must be disciplined and put back to work”  (Gearey 2015, 2). He then
raises, however, a counter-tradition of thought that “sees welfare as rooted in mutual
aid,” and which connects with “a great deal of contemporary anthropological evidence
that describes the centrality of reciprocity and cooperation to human social behaviour”
(Gearey 2015, 2–3). With the appearance of the word reciprocity, we know that we have
reached a sphere homologous to Karatani's Mode of Exchange A.12 Gearey's multiple
recourses to Mauss in the legal thinker's monograph Justice as Welfare provide further
evidence of this orientation, such as when he cites passages from Mauss' The Gif which
relate to social insurance (Gearey 2012, 64).
However, it should be noted that Gearey is not, in any way, a beater of narrow
communal drums, for he emphasises that “[s]olidarity does not suggest some inclusion
into an essential community that erases the very real differences that constitute social
being” (Gearey 2015, 7). Instead, he grounds his understanding of solidarity on “only an
understanding  of  social  existence  as  characterized  by  a  life  cycle  that  moves  from
childhood, to adulthood and old age” (Gearey 2015, 7). Nevertheless, his confidence in
the continued relevance of the language of reciprocity, as well as terms favoured by R.
H. Tawney such as “common institutions,” “common needs,” “common enjoyment” and
indeed “common culture” suggest an expansive understanding of – to use Esposito's
terms – the substantialist proper which is held in common, rather than a rejection of it
for purely non-substantialist community. Hence, Gearey writes that “[s]olidarity defines
the 'in common'13 of the welfare state: that set of mutual rights and obligations that we
12 Gearey goes on to state that what he terms the “welfare community” involves “a form of solidarity or 
mutual concern. that is an expression of political agency rather than dependency on the state or the 
privatized atomism of the market” (Gearey 2012, 3, italics added). This is, of course, a classic case of 
pitting of Mode A against Modes B and C, which as Karatani has pointed out, often endeavours to 
perform “a conscious, nostalgic restoration of the past” (Karatani 2014, 259).
13 Another clear sign of Gearey's feeling-centric alignment can be found in a recent journal article 
where he reads F. W. Maitland's jurisprudential understanding of the trust in English common law 
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have described as the welfare community” (Gearey 2012, 26).
Thus, here we find an instance of a feeling-centric turn within a field which has
been  dominated  by  action-centricism  and  thought-centricism  –  that  is,  by  policy
“wonkery”  and  the  construction  of  abstract  formulations.  Nevertheless,  Gearey's
aestheticism is not restricted to invocations of communal spirit and “being-with,” but
are also evinced in his methodological orientations, in which he deploys art in general
and poetry in particular in often surprising ways. To give just one example, in an article
in an edited collection published in 2011, he attempts to delve into “the meaning of
welfare” through an engagement with Walt Whitman's poems, “So Long” and “Song of
Myself”  (Gearey 2011, 149). However, it  is crucial to note that for Gearey, here “the
aesthetic is not to be understood as a theory of the beautiful,” but, following the lead of
Terry Eagleton, is rather linked to the meaning of  aesthesis,  its  root word, which is
situated in “the realm of the human perception, of sensation in the material world”
(Gearey  2011,  150,  italics  added).  Nevertheless,  it  would  be  mistaken  for  us  to
understand from this assertion that the beautiful itself is banished, for in the very appeal
to the insights of poetry we find an engagement with art, and therefore beauty. Perhaps
contrary  to  first  impressions,  the  sphere  of  the  aesthetic  is  simply  broadened  to
encompass spheres which are normally seen as the territory of other approaches.
While the writings of Gearey which we have briefly examined here displays a
steadfast walking upon the path of aesthetics, on a wider level this route – for a time a
central  highway  –  has  become  a  much-less-treaded  road,  and  its  centrality  in  the
chronos of European CLS in the late 1980s and early 1990s was supplanted by the route
of ethics as law and justice, which we will now consider.
Ethics and Law
The mid-1990s saw the rise of another paradigm for critical legal theory in Europe, as a
slightly belated response to the ascendency of Western neoliberal capitalism – that is,
the putative “end of history” which Francis Fukuyama proclaimed (Fukuyama 1992) – in
alongside Hegel's concept of sittlichkeit (Gearey 2016, 106), which the Hegelian scholar Charles Taylor
has defined as “refer[ring] to the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am 
part” (Taylor 2015, 81). Willliam E. Conklin points out that the fairly common contemporary 
translation of this Hegelian idea into English as “ethical life” risks “the imputation by the Anglo-
American legal scholar that Sittlichkeit concerns individual moral action. rather than the manner in 
which a community shares values and assumptions that concern how strangers recognize each other”
(Conklin 2008, 162). By expounding on this concept using the language of ethos (Gearey 2016, 106–
107), Gearey avoids this individualistic confusion, but has to struggle against its associations with 
ethnos and the inward-facing community, which we have explored in Chapter Four.
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the aftermath of the demise of “Really Existing Socialism” in 1989-1992. This triumph of
the  dominant  ideology  of  the  Western  world  heralded  the  creation  of  “a  common
symbolic, ideological and institutional framework” grounded upon an ethical humanism
of sorts, leading to “humanitarian” military action, a focus upon human rights, and so
on (Douzinas 2014, 192). Critical jurisprudence replied to this appeal to “[i]nternational
law and universal morality” which endeavoured to “humanise capitalism [and] soften its
side-effects” by developing conceptions of morality and justice which were not built
upon Kantian foundations, but which maintained “a utopian moment” in order to escape
the generally subtle tyranny of the ideas then hegemonic (Douzinas 2014, 192).
Douzinas points out that this “emerging strong ethical position mobilised the
quasi-transcendental or transcendent concept of the Other and the associated gambits of
incalculable  justice,  messianism  without  a  messiah  or  the  democracy  to  come”
(Douzinas  2014,  192,  italics  added).  To give  a  prominent  example,  Peter  Fitzpatrick,
whose  work  in  the  1980s  and  early  1990s  was,  in  the  main,  informed  by  Western
Marxism,  Foucault,  anthropology and a  certain  variety of  legal  pluralism,14 came to
embrace the late Derridianism which was a central element of this ethical turn.
In  Douzinas'  narrative,  the  central  dichotomy which  the  critical  legal  ethics
posed – drawing from Derrida, Levinas, Benjamin and Bloch – was that between an
immanent conception of law, which sought to “redress, redirect the law when it forgets
its own promises,” and a transcendent “justice proper” which “judges the whole of the
law in the name of a transcendent other-based principle” (Douzinas 2014, 192–193). In
the work of Fitzpatrick from the later 1990s onwards we find elements of this dualism,
albeit in a characteristically unique form. His most notable insight was to identify two
aspects in the workings of the law, a determinate one which allows us to say at a given
point what the law is in a definitive manner – an essential criterion for its operations –
as well as a responsive one which allows the law to adapt to an “ever-changing relation”
which is the “generative terms of [our] being together” (Fitzpatrick 2007, 181–182).15 In
his  words,  “[o]ne quality. cannot  be  affirmed without  the pertinence of  the  other”
(Fitzpatrick  2016,  259).  The  inspiration  for  this  aporetic  conception  is  Derrida's
14 A paradigmatic instance of this period of his work is Fitzpatrick 1983.
15 It is important to recognise that Fitzpatrick's interest in the question of the law's capacity to respond 
to an ever-changing enviroinment can be found in as early an article as “Law and Societies” in 1984, 
where he states: “The gap between law and social reality is sometimes seen as the law's lack of 
responsiveness to society and sometimes in terms of its efforts to bring society into line with it” 
(Fitzpatrick 1984, 127). However, at this point the (late) Derridian toolbox was not available to him to 
formulate the determinate/responsive distinction which became his signature concept.
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distinction  between  the  conditioned  and  the  unconditional,  which  he  explored  in
various fields, including law and hospitality (Derrida 1987; Derrida 2000).
If we were to analyse these twinned concepts within the University Triangle, we
can see that it is a shift towards the idealism and thought-centricism at its bottom-right
corner, given its formulation and application in fairly abstract terms.16 The messy and
unruly aspects involved in action-centricism, which often trouble elegant theoretical
devices, are not its foremost domain, and it does not glorify the (self-)creative impulse in
the manner which we have seen in feeling-centric legal critique. It is, indeed, a sober
and measured analysis of the operations of law at a highly conceptual level. Although
the responsive is linked to the horizontal and particular, as compared to the vertical and
universal tendencies of the determined (Fitzpatrick 2016, 258–259), these connections to
“the ground” are made primarily as a matter of deduction rather than induction.17
Douzinas' assessment of the critique of this ethical period, of which Fitzpatrick's
work stands as one exemplary instance, runs as follows:
The welcoming of the other, the emergence of justice, the coming of the event
appeared on the theoretical horizon at the point when the conditions for their
realisation were retreating. The emergence of the “Other” as a key critical
position was an admission of defeat however. The hope for a just law and
society was transferred into some unpredictable future. With hindsight this
explicit and extravagant turn to morality was perhaps too big a concession to
the dominant ideology of the time. (Douzinas 2014, 193)
This somewhat measured post-hoc appraisal seems fair, although its necessarily
broad-brush strokes do not adequately capture the nuances of the wider spectrum of
thought-centric critique. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the practical import of
the  reorientation  of  thinkers  like  Fitzpatrick  away  from  Marxism  and  Foucauldian
thought and towards deconstruction18 marked a move away from a more overtly activist
mentality to one involving greater critical distance and abstraction, leading ultimately
to  a  certain  reticence  in  the  sphere  of  practical  political  engagement.  Hence,  it  is
unsurprising that as the world changed and the tide of critique turned in response, it
16 For example, in Modernism and the Grounds of Law, a key monograph of this phase of Fitzpatrick's 
work, the practical “instantiations” of the central principle of determinedness and responsiveness 
which are explored are nationalism, imperialism and globalism – hardly micro-issues, to say the least 
(Fitzpatrick 2001, chap. 4–6).
17 This observation is not meant to be a criticism of any sort. Indeed, many of the argumentative paths 
taken in this thesis itself are, in the main, deductive rather than inductive. In the terms set out in the 
first chapter, this is the effect of transcendental retrospection, which supplements empirical genealogy.
18 Taking into account the singular temporalities of academics, it is unsurprising that some did not 
heartily embrace the aesthetic phase of the early CLC, and instead transitioned from the slightly 
“older” Marxist and the “law and society” traditions to deconstructive ethics.
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was upon the shores of politics that the BritCrit waves began to wash upon once more.
Politics
It was argued earlier, drawing from Douzinas, that both the aesthetic and ethical phases
of the European critical legal tradition arose as a result of the decisive events of 1989-
1992 and the ushering in of a “new world order” marked by a seemingly victorious
globalised  capitalism and its  ideological  and  institutional  counterparts.  However,  as
Douzinas also points out, the political settlement came under decisive assault with the
September 11, 2001 attacks, while the economic settlement started to unravel with the
global economic turmoil beginning in 2008. This, he asserts, “led to a distinct turn to a
politics  of  resistance”  (Douzinas  2014,  194).  In  the  terms  of  this  thesis'  conceptual
framework, we can say that what resulted was a rise in action-centric theoria as well as
praxis within the British critical legal community.
One of the hallmarks of an action-centric political approach is its attention to
concrete factors, which always trouble any polished, abstract theory. Abstraction cannot
be avoided, particularly in an academic environment, but here it is brought into contact
with the messier elements of reality as an inevitable necessity. This characteristic of
critical  legal  thinking  which  focuses  on  action  can  be  seen  in  the  recent  political
writings  of  Douzinas.  A piece  of  commentary on the Syriza  government in Greece,
published in April 2016 and part of a forthcoming book, provides a classic instance of
his approach in miniature. In it he argues that “[l]eft governmentality involves planning
carefully and preparing state reforms, but also improvising and adjusting, becoming at
once brutally pragmatic and uncompromisingly principled” (Douzinas 2016). Although
at first glance pragmatism and principles appear to be placed in an equal relationship,
Douzinas'  conception  of  multiple  temporalities  allows  us  to  see  that  the  former
predominates on the shorter term, while the latter comes to a fuller expression only on
the long term. In a nod towards both Derrida's à venir (“to come”) and Bloch's “Not Yet”
– thus displaying a measure of continuity with the ethical period which we have just
examined19 – as well as employing concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis, he writes:
The memorandum is the symbolic order of Syriza. It distributes government,
MPs and party into their current positions of unwilling small-scale agents of
European capital. The social transformation programme, on the other hand, is
19 Indeed, Douzinas argues that in the present phase of critical legal thinking in Europe, “aesthetic and 
ethical concerns [have] remained methodologically strong. But the collapse of the new world order 
[has] led to a distinct turn to a politics of resistance” (Douzinas 2014, 193–194).
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the imaginary order. It allows us to keep going by believing and acting now
in the  name of  a  “not  yet”  or  a  “to  come,”  which  re-defines  our  current
predicament as the necessary precursor of a socialist future. . Syriza will
reach the second temporality of left governance and the third of left vision
only by continuously and simultaneously implementing and undermining the
agreement policies. Only when this third temporality starts unfolding, freed
from the neoliberal lambast, will the full programme of the left of the 21st
century emerge. It is a case of escaping into the future, acting now from the
perspective of  a future perfect,  of  what will  have been. In this  sense,  the
future becomes an active factor of our present. (Douzinas 2016)
Here  it  is  worth  recalling  that  Karatani  links  Lacan's  symbolic  order  to  the
phenomenon in Kant, and the imaginary order to the Kantian idea. Mapping these links
onto our own conceptual triad, we see that for Douzinas, although the sphere of action
is in this case dominated by the despised memorandum with the European Union, the
European  Central  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  which  the  Syriza
government  was  arm-twisted  into  accepting  and  implementing,  it  is  necessary  to
remain in this  situation of  imperfection yet  working with an orientation towards a
Blochian-Derridian Novum that is to come. The alternative of escaping into a pure realm
of complete rupture with the aforementioned institutions – which in different forms is
the choice of the Communist KKE, the splinter group Popular Unity and various other
far-left groups – is to begin with an ideal rather than with the present balance of forces.
Although on at least a formal level these alternative groupings on the Left share with
Syriza the left-wing commitment towards “a concrete analysis of the concrete situation,
taking full notice of the balance of forces” (Douzinas 2016), their underlying aversion to
any form of pragmatism is what distinguishes them from Douzinas and others on his
side in the Greek left who are evidently less thought-centric and wedded to purity than
these critics of Syriza.
Indeed, those for whom action is essential tend to engage with the problematic
of idealism by adopting the regulative idea rather than the constitutive idea. As we have
noted in the preliminary note on Karatani, this is indeed the case in his recent work,
and he names this regulative idea “X” or “association” (Karatani 2008b, 576). Douzinas
enacts a similar move when he argues for “isodemocracy,” which he terms, adopting a
phrase  used  much  by  Jodi  Dean,  a  “communist  horizon”20 (Douzinas  2016).  It  is
particularly important to note that such a regulative horizon is not “a future utopia, a
non-realizable ideal,” but neither is it “a telos, a terminal station, or the purpose and end
20 See, for instance Dean 2012.
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of historical teleology or entelechy;” rather, it “remains open and unreachable but is
integrated as a guiding lighthouse beam into our everyday practice” (Douzinas 2016).
Whereas thought-centricism since Plato involves an assumption that the idea is
pristine  and its  actualisation necessarily involves a contamination of  its  immaculate
essence,  action-centricism celebrates  the  transition from abstract  to  concrete.  When
Douzinas turns to the democratic aspect of isodemocracy, for example, he states that it
“too, is a horizon that keeps changing as we approach it. The general principle becomes
concretized and transformed, the horizon takes on the colors and tints of the rainbow, a
deeper hue and a wider spectrum. We move from strengthening a principle that has
been hollowed out to the recognition that the principle itself has limited reach. It needs to
be universalized and deepened in order to succeed” (Douzinas 2016, italics added).
This argument about the limited reach of the principle itself and the necessity of
concretising it is a crucial shift upwards in the University Triangle from the generally
low-lying position of the school of critique. While it is true that those of this school
have rarely been isolated from the sphere of praxis, their forays into the political realm
have generally been at the level of micropolitics and protest rather than macropolitics
and governmentality. Hence, although it would be inaccurate to say that the BritCrits
have  remained  cooped  up in  their  ivory  towers,  they  have  for  the  most  part  been
content to limit their on-the-ground engagement to spaces such as the street, the picket
line, the refugee camp and the occupation of square, park or building. In such contexts,
the necessity of not just practical compromise but ideological contamination is kept at a
manageable level, and thus the disconcerting yet easily-slung left-wing epithets such as
“hierarchical,” “patriarchal,” “anti-democratic” or simply “problematic” are hard to avoid.
We can also observe Douzinas' action-centric leanings in his formulation of a
“universal moral command” in his 2013 book  Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis:
Greece and the Future of Europe, a theoretical move that he makes as a response to the
crippling “erosion of social ethos” experienced in Greece as a result of the economic
crisis. A comparison with the Kantian categorical imperative which is its tacit prototype
brings out their manifest differences. In his  Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,
Kant writes: “There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act
only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal  law”  (Kant  1998b,  31).  This primary formulation by Kant  of  the
imperative is procedural  rather than substantive,  in that he provides an overarching
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structure to guide ethical action but leaves the autonomous subject in his system to fill
out the empty space. Douzinas, by contrast, phrases his universal moral command in the
following  categorical  form:  “Always  act  according  to  a  maxim  which,  universally
applied,  attacks  and  cancels  the  causes  that  exclude  and  condemn to  symbolic  and
physical death large numbers of people” (Douzinas 2013, 63). The activist – and indeed,
progressive or left-wing political – implications of this imperative are clear. An evil is
named, namely the exclusions and condemnations to “symbolic and physical death” of
“large numbers of people,”  and Douzinas enjoins the reader to evaluate her possible
actions according to whether they will contribute to eradicating the causes of this evil.
Moreover,  lest  we  assume  that  action-centricism  is  focused  upon  politics  or
political  philosophy pure  and  simple,  it  is  worth  noting Douzinas  has  pursued  this
approach in more explicitly legal settings as well. In Chapter Four we made reference to
his 2005 article,  “Oubliez Critique.”  In this  piece,  which is  an exploration of what it
means to engage in critique in our political present, which he terms the “New Times,” he
argues that the “global biopolitical turn” means that “(the dominant types of) critique”
practised  by  critical  legal  scholars  in  the  preceding  period,  which  include
deconstruction  and  the  ethical  turn,  should  be  “forgotten”  in  favour  of  “acts  of
resistance” (Douzinas 2005, 66, 68–69). Even before the financial crisis beginning in 2008
caused the hidden cracks in the make-up of our society to be made undeniably visible,
Douzinas was already calling for  “counter action” rather than a “counter principle” to
resist sovereignty in these “New Times” (Douzinas 2005, 68). It is crucial, he insists, for
critical legal theory to “be re-linked with emancipatory and radical politics” (Douzinas
2005, 58), and it is only by “forgetting (the dominant types of) critique that we might be
able to defy” what is symbolised and actualised in “the law” (Douzinas 2005, 69).
The Wider Canvas
Now that we've gone on a whistlestop tour through the territory of European critical
legal thinking with the University Triangle as our conceptual map, it is possible to make
a few comments about how the concepts developed earlier in this and the previous
chapter intersect with this particular segment of university reality. First of all, we can
see that complete partiality is a rarity on the ground, for although Gearey's primary
position is solidly on the feeling-centric side of things, in his concern for the wider
sphere  of  materiality,  as  well  as  his  engagement with social-political  issues  such as
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welfare,  we  find  a  certain  integrative  aspect  in  his  work.  Likewise,  Douzinas'
engagement with practical politics in Greece does not undo his solid commitment to
principled thought-centricism, as evinced in his residual appeals to the ethical critique
of politics and the political, and his ultimate subordination of pragmatism to a vision of
“a socialist future,” which can be understood as a regulative idea (Douzinas 2016).
Nevertheless, there is little sign of a pluralist attitude in the writings which we
have examined, with the exclusivist attitude being almost an unspoken  sine qua non.
This is not surprising, given what we have already said about the nature of academic
praxis and  its  strong  predilection  towards  exclusivism.  However,  where  explicit
recognition of the value of competing analyses and ideas is absent, perhaps the practical
expression of a certain pluralism can be found in the continued existence of the CLC,
which continues to be a space where critically-inclined legal thinkers can convene for a
long weekend each year for both deep discussion and casual camaraderie. While any
previous and present participant of this inoperative  community can testify as to the
fierceness – to a point approaching rancour – of not a few of these intellectual and
socio-political  exchanges,  the  very  fact  that  the  CLC  is  thirty-two  years  old  and
counting21 is testament to the fact that a certain implicit pluralism can co-exist with a
more dominant exclusivist framework.
Given the generally exclusivist framework in which critical legal thinking has by
and large taken place, perhaps one challenge which participants in the European critical
legal tradition may wish to take up is the articulation of a coherent pluralist perspective
which may inform the workings of this more-or-less non-substantialist  community. If
this were ever to be taken up seriously, it is hoped that this thesis may contribute to the
conversation. Nevertheless, it may be that such an endeavour is unnecessary given the
underlying (if conditional) pluralist attitudes of the liberal political tradition, conceived
broadly, from its early figures to Rawls and Habermas in the last half-century, which
already  form  part  of  the  environment  in  which  critique  takes  place.  In  this  sense,
perhaps the combative agonism which is experienced at the CLC and its wider republic
of articles and monographs is itself a key contribution to the space of academic klesis.
Here,  once again,  we find the concomitance of  two antinomical  elements  – that  is,
pluralism and exclusivism – and thus it is crucial to maintain a transcritical approach.
21 This figure becomes all the more significant when we place it beside the fact that the American 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies only lasted for seventeen years, i.e. from 1977-1994.
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For  given  that  the  distribution  of  these  elements  are  unequal  depending  on  one's
location within the wider matrix, it is often a difficult process to determine which is to
be affirmed, and which is to be acted against. Hence, to keep both in play is necessary,
even as this task often has to be distributed among different actors in the wider frame,
given that none of us are able to take on the task of being all things for all situations.
Conclusion
We began this chapter with an intention to interrogate in more specific ways the triadic
conceptualisation of the university which was developed in the preceding chapters. In
the first section, we considered the matter of the ultimate partiality of any formulation
of  the  conceptual  triad,  including  that  of  Kant's  architectonic  which  we,  following
Karatani,  took as  our  starting point.  By placing this  architectonic in the context  of
Kant's  thought-centricism,  we were able to appreciate how his own subjective slant
colours any triad we may extract from his work in a rationalistic hue, focused as it is on
universal principles and imbued with juridical metaphors. Nevertheless, we ended by
acknowledging  that  this  imbalance  in  Kant's  own work  should  not  induce  in  us  a
reaction to swing away from reason completely, especially due to its essential role in
any form of reasoned discourse,  but merely allow us to see the inevitability of any
vision to be influenced by its subject-position, which is both singular and particular.
We then moved on in the second section to examine the case of British/European
critical legal thought, as an intermediate sphere between the more generic forms of the
triad formulated through our reading of Karatani, and the far more specific form of the
triad in the sphere of the university. We took as our starting point Douzinas' narrative
of the development of the Critical Legal Conference as a guiding thread for our enquiry
into the three perspectives of aesthetics, ethics and law, and politics. Specific writings
from critical legal thinkers were then analysed to extract their essential contents which
manifest leanings toward feeling-centricism, thought-centricism and action-centricism,
respectively. From here we saw that although all the thinkers cited were themselves not
“pure” examples of any of the three perspectives, it is nevertheless possible to trace the
tendencies of each. Finally, we reflected upon the contradiction between exclusivism
and pluralism in these writings and more generally, before concluding that what must
be maintained is a transcritical approach which is able to hold the two poles of this and
other antinomies of the university in a productive, if often uncomfortable tension.
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It is customary for all theses to end with a conclusion. The etymology of the English
word “conclude” comes from the Latin con and claudo. Claudo means “to shut something
that is open”  (Lewis and Short 1879), but the prefix  con bears two possible meanings.
One is to designate “the completeness, perfecting of any act”  (Lewis and Short 1879),
and on this reading to conclude would be to shut something completely, one might even
say for good. This is the most natural understanding of a conclusion in an academic
work, in that it is meant to bring the text to a definite close – to declare, as in the words
of Pontius Pilate: “What I have written, I have written” (John 19:22, DV).
However, the other possible meaning of con is related to its primitive form cum,
a word meaning a “bringing together of several objects” (Lewis and Short 1879), which
can also be translated simply as “with.”22 Hence, could we not say that to conclude this
thesis would be to shut a number of disparate things together, to impel these rather
unruly objects to be with each other, but without  final closure? For to insist on such
finality would not do justice to the indelibly anarchic elements which will continue to
writhe about even if we were to bury them six feet under the ground in a shared grave –
it would, in effect, be an attempt to freeze what is an unceasingly dynamic process.
Indeed, it is a central two-sided theme of this thesis that, on the one hand, the
elements of the postwar British university which seem to be combined in an indistinct
mixture can be separated out and grasped as specific ingredients, but, on the other hand,
these  distinct  elements  are  always  intimately  related.  Hence,  using  a  form  of  the
bracketing procedure developed by Karatani and other allied thinkers, we have been
able to explore in turn the perspectives of instrumentalism, idealism and community, i.e.
the University Triangle, as they have developed in British higher education over the last
seventy years. Yet we have not remained content with such procedural separation, but
have also explored the interpenetration of each of these perspectives with the others.
Indeed,  this  thesis  began  proper  by  developing  in  the  first  chapter  a
methodology  which  involves  the  bringing  together  of  two  historical-philosophical
traditions, namely the genealogy of Foucault  cum the transcendental retrospection of
Karatani. By combining the empirical punch of the former with the transcendental
22 This is, of course, the very same cum which plays a central role in Nancy's meditations on community
(Nancy 1991) as well as the various related concepts he formulates from “being-in-common” and 
“being-together,” to “being-with” and the extremely minimalist “with” (Esposito and Nancy 2010, 81).
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finesse of the latter into a method we termed trans-genealogy, we were able to set the
tone for an investigation which endeavours to not privilege either narrowly empirical or
over-abstractly structural factors. We ended the chapter by laying out the scaffolding for
the chapters that were to follow. Taking Karatani's reading of Kant according to a triadic
lens as our starting point, we outlined the three questions or perspectives in the British
university to be expanded upon and linked them to Kant's phenomenon, idea and thing-
in-itself.  We then brought  the chapter  to  a  close  by underlining that  the  nature  of
bracketing means that it is impossible to perceive and intervene in the university from
more than one viewpoint at a given time, and thus the only way to avoid the illusions
created by the pronounced parallax and attain a wider grasp of the picture is to oscillate
between various viewpoints in a transcritical manner.
In the subsequent three chapters, which can be considered the second part of the
thesis, we utilised the bracketing operation in order to examine the points of invention
for each of the three perspectives in the University Triangle. We began in Chapter Two
with the instrumentalist mentality, which we defined as a viewpoint which assumes
that  the  primary  measure  of  any  policy  or  practice  within  higher  education  is  its
consequences  for  whatever  goals  have  been  pre-determined.  This  approach,  which
results  in  a  university  without  its  own  telos or  content,  is  one  which  is  generally
associated with Thatcherite neoliberalism. However,  contrary to this assumption, we
traced the history of higher education instrumentalism to a significantly earlier point,
that  is,  the postwar Labour government under  Clement Attlee,  via a reading of  the
Barlow  Report  which  provided  an  ideological  basis  for  the  expansion  of  public
university funding in the idea of producing “scientific man-power.”
In  Chapter  Three,  we  turned  our  attention  to  what  we  termed  the  idealist
conception of higher education, generally grounded as it is on a flawed reading of the
1963 Robbins Report on Higher Education. The idealist approach is one which posits a
single,  unifying  ideal  to  be  the  backbone  of  a  system of  university  education,  and
measures policies according to their furtherance of this ideal. However, far from the
received interpretation of the Robbins Report which continues to be trumpeted by those
who argue for the renewal of the idea of a “public university” built upon the Report's
foundations,  we saw how Lionel  Robbins'  neoliberal  economic ideas  were peppered
throughout  the  model  of  and  justification  for  higher  education  which  he  develops.
Moreover, Karatani's exegesis of Kant's distinction between constitutive and regulative
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ideas was deployed to grasp the impossibility of pure idealism, and hence the regulative
idea that provides an index for action but not a blueprint for rolling out was advocated.
Both Chapters Two and Three, dealing as they were with bygone periods of the
university's  history,  were  tacitly  founded  upon  the  thought-centric  enquiry  which
intends to ascertain the truth or accuracy of the pictures of the past which have come
down to us. In Chapter Four, we turned to consider the third perspective of community,
but  considering  as  we  were  this  question  within  the  frame  of  our  situation  in  the
present, we reorientated ourselves epistemically to the action-centric question of what
is timely or appropriate given the state of the British university today. In order to make
sense of the various contemporary forces tussling on the subject  of community,  we
made use of Tönnies' conceptual distinction between  gemeinschaf and  gesellschaf in
order to formulate two ideal types of substantialist and non-substantialist community
which we find in both the spheres of theory and practice. We then surveyed the playing
out of these dynamics in the distinct yet overlapping circles of students, non-academic
staff and academic  staff,  and  concluded that  the  drive  towards individualism in the
postwar  period  has  resulted  in  the  deterioration  of  the  sense  of  substantialist
community which was more tangible in the early decades after the Second World War.
Finally, having found both substantialist and non-substantialist community lacking in
various ways, we took Karatani's fourfold conceptualisation of the modes of exchange
in society as a launching point for an alternative conception of community in higher
education inspired by his fourth, “Mode D,” and named it the associationist university.
This notion, however, is a regulative idea rather than a detailed, practical agenda.
Having came to the end of the second part of the thesis, we found that we had
an interpretive  key for  organising the disparate  elements  in the postwar university,
namely the University Triangle, and a narrative of how each element in the triad has
come to be. However, we still lacked a sense of what can be done beyond setting the
associationist university as a horizon for general orientation. In the final section of the
thesis, we turned to exploring a means of arbitrating between and dwelling with the
manifold expressions of the University Triangle that presently exist, not only outside of
us but indeed within each actor in the British university. In doing this we calibrated
ourselves  to  the  final  element  of  the  Epistemic  Triangle,  namely  the feeling-centric
enquiry  into  authenticity.  Having  examined  the  objective  questions  of  truth  and
timeliness/appropriateness, in these final two chapters we adopted a more subjective
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strategy, approaching the question of what we can do through the concept of vocation.
Given that the question of vocation is essentially a way of grappling with the
problematic  of  singularity,  Chapter  Five  thus  began  with  an  exploration  of  what
Karatani  has  called  the  two  circuits  of  individuality-particularity-generality  and
singularity-universality,  in  order to lay the theoretical  groundwork for what was to
come. It was argued that transcritical engagement with both these circuits is necessary
in order to get beyond the dichotomy which pits them against each other, for vocation
involves universalist visions, singular lives and particular categories. Having laid these
foundations, we then launched into an examination of the concept of vocation as it has
developed in the post-Antiquity Western – that is,  Christian –  tradition, for in this
history we were able to find various connected but competing interpretations of the
Pauline concept of klesis or calling, ranging from the primitive baseline klesis of being a
Christ-follower  and  the  Catholic  elevation  of  monasticism as  the  true  fulfilment  of
Christian life, to the Lutheran concept of  Beruf which sacralises everyday work and a
purely  secular  idea  of  labour.  We  then  connected  these  concepts  to  Stanley  Fish's
typology of versions of the academic vocation, resulting in a more detailed mapping of
various elements  we have discussed of  the  University  Triangle  in a  single  diagram.
However, this placement of the elements in a diagrammatic format did not resolve the
persistent question of how the diverging elements are to understood: are they locked in
an unending battle for the soul of the university, with no common ground to be found
between them? Or is some sort of mutual understanding or at least tolerance possible?
To attempt to answer this  question,  we brought in another concept  for  the Pauline
toolbox which is a counterpart to klesis, namely charismata or gifts. It was argued that
the tension between partiality towards one or more vocational directions and a strategy
of  integration  is,  in  fact,  not  as  tricky  to  resolve  as  that  between  an  attitude  of
exclusivism and one of pluralism. However, if we assume, on principle if not in total
subjective conviction, that no single person can grasp the totality, following the lead of
Žižek and Adorno, then we are able to accept the task of telling the truth of our singular
vocations while attempting to engage with the seemingly strange approaches to higher
education which are manifested by others.
In the sixth and final chapter, we set out to place the theoretical elaboration in
the previous chapter on a more grounded footing. By examining the partiality in the last
instance which is found in every formulation of the conceptual triad – with the possible
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exception  of  its  more  general  form,  i.e.  thought-centricism,  action-centricism  and
feeling-centricism –  through a consideration of Kant's architectonic, we were able to
see how every triadic conceptualisation is coloured by the tint of its author's glasses.
Lastly, we explored the sphere of British/European critical legal theory as a case study
of sorts, in order to see how the conceptual triad plays out in a particular context within
the university. By examining specific writings by specific thinkers, we were able to see
how leanings toward the different poles of the triangle find expression. Faced with these
irreducible distinctions, we ended by returning to the practice of transcritical oscillation
as the only way of keeping all these elements in play in the wider sphere, even if none
of us is able to embody them all at once.
We began this  thesis  with a  methodological  exploration which led us  to the
transcendental topos for transcritique, and it is with this topos that we draw things to a
close. For it is in this transversal, transpositional space that we are able to shut disparate
elements together, to place them in an uneasy state of being alongside or cum, without
mandating that  they  stay  frozen for  eternity.  However,  it  must  be  emphasised  that
transcritical  oscillation  is  not  only  necessary  at  the  superstructural  level  of  the
University Triangle, but also at the infrastructural level of the Epistemic Triangle. For
example,  if  one enters into the subjectivist perspective of authenticity by bracketing
truth and contextual timeliness, it becomes impossible to dispute with those who insist
that what one considers wrong-headed or damaging policies, actions and arguments are
honest expressions of their deeply held convictions and patterns of life – that is to say,
their charismata. Even appeals to a baseline klesis as a means of dialogue or arbitration
may not  be  sufficient,  for  there  is  often  contestation  about  the  very  content  of  an
essential vocation of the university, even if an “ecumenical” approach allows us to posit
the basic vocation of conveying and furthering knowledge as a common thread which
can bring a sense of unity, however tenuous. Therefore, in such a situation, it may be
necessary  to  switch  epistemic  perspectives  and  approach  the  problem  from  the
standpoint of truth or timeliness, where the deficiencies of such “adversaries” can be
attacked on the grounds of falsity and/or a poor interpretation of the situation. The
drawback of this, of course, is that it may lead to the opposed sides talking past each
other, especially if the underlying rules of engagement are not mutually recognised – in
other words, if what is being bracketed and unbracketed is different for each side.
How do we know what is most appropriate to be bracketed or unbracketed?
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Given the complexities of the social totality, is it not the case that coherent cases can be
made for favouring each of the various stances over the others in a given situation?
Here we return to the gamble we made at the beginning of Chapter Five, namely “to bet
against there  being  a  silver  bullet,  one-size-fits-all  solution  such  as  “such-and-such
community is always the answer,” and instead place “many advantages in life” on the
side of there being singular and dynamic resolutions for singular persons, collectives
and situations, which are themselves ever-shifting.” If, as has been argued, one of the
constitutional limitations of the academic argument is that of requiring a monologic
argument, another related problem is that it tends to lead to the advocacy of a single
exclusivist solution to a problem. This, of course, includes the single solution of “pure”
pluralism, itself a exclusivist claim on a different level of abstraction.
Moreover, although this thesis has taken the path of attempting to analyse the
heterogeneity and complexity of the university, it is far from the case that a complex,
nuanced understanding is always the best. It is at this point that we should return to a
concept we explored in Chapter One, namely Foucault's notion of the intolerable. The
immediacy  of  an  intolerable  aspect  or  situation  can  cut  through  the  vacillating  of
seemingly  pluralist  or  “postmodern”  indeterminacy  which  any  complex  formulation
tends toward. To return to an earlier theme, it is possible, in the abstract, to see the
value of an instrumentalist approach to university policy based on a particular reading
of the present juncture – that is,  a doubly action-centric stance.  However, when we
consider  the fact  that  such an approach,  clearly  manifested  in  recent  governmental
documents  such  as  the  Browne  Report  and  the  last  two  White  Papers  on  higher
education,  is  presently  running roughshod  over  and  effectively  silencing alternative
viewpoints, the response of some actors within the university of unflinching, prophetic
denunciation is to be greatly appreciated. We in the university have a need for some
prophets in both the vein of the Hebrew Scriptures and modern revolutionaries, and
indeed  probably  more  regularly  than  “sometimes.”  For  after  all,  in  a  realm  where
questions and debates seem to be never-ending, there is a vocation for those who are
able to conclude in the sense of providing a con of completeness, however momentary.
And thus, even though I must admit that I doubt such an unbending, nail-in-the-
coffin conviction is entirely my lot in this thesis, the impossibility to continue to write
until the end of time forces me to inscribe here: “Quod scripsi, scripsi.”23
23 The Latin version of Pilate's aforementioned statement.
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